From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, x86@kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/5] x86/head/64: Check SEV encryption before switching to kernel page-table
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 12:29:36 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <19b93a95-eed2-c8f9-6f7f-f79fe7146c0c@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201028164659.27002-5-joro@8bytes.org>
On 10/28/20 11:46 AM, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> When SEV is enabled the kernel requests the C-Bit position again from
> the hypervisor to built its own page-table. Since the hypervisor is an
s/built/build/
> untrusted source the C-bit position needs to be verified before the
> kernel page-table is used.
>
> Call the sev_verify_cbit() function before writing the CR3.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
> index 7eb2a1c87969..3c417734790f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
> @@ -161,6 +161,21 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
>
> /* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */
> addq phys_base(%rip), %rax
> +
> + /*
> + * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
> + * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
> + * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
> + * the next RET instruction.
> + * %rsi carries pointer to realmode data and is callee-clobbered. Save
> + * and restore it.
> + */
> + pushq %rsi
> + movq %rax, %rdi
> + call sev_verify_cbit
> + popq %rsi
> +
> + /* Switch to new page-table */
> movq %rax, %cr3
>
> /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */
> @@ -279,6 +294,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
> SYM_CODE_END(secondary_startup_64)
>
> #include "verify_cpu.S"
> +#include "sev_verify_cbit.S"
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index efbb3de472df..bc0833713be9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
> */
> u64 sme_me_mask __section(".data") = 0;
> u64 sev_status __section(".data") = 0;
> +u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
> DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-29 1:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-28 16:46 [PATCH v4 0/5] x86/sev-es: Mitigate some HV attack vectors Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Introduce sev_status Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 17:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add CPUID sanity check to early #VC handler Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 17:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] x86/boot/compressed/64: Sanity-check CPUID results in the " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 17:25 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] x86/head/64: Check SEV encryption before switching to kernel page-table Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 17:29 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/sev-es: Do not support MMIO to/from encrypted memory Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 17:31 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
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