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* [PATCH v7 0/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
@ 2023-01-16 23:01 Kim Phillips
  2023-01-16 23:01 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for cpuid leaf 80000021/EAX (FeatureExt2Eax) Kim Phillips
                   ` (7 more replies)
  0 siblings, 8 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Kim Phillips @ 2023-01-16 23:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86
  Cc: Kim Phillips, Borislav Petkov, Boris Ostrovsky, Dave Hansen,
	H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar, Joao Martins, Jonathan Corbet,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Paolo Bonzini, Sean Christopherson,
	Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
	Juergen Gross, Peter Zijlstra, Tony Luck, Tom Lendacky,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy, kvm, linux-doc, linux-kernel

The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS
(Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation).

Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present.
It typically provides greater performance over the incumbent
generic retpolines mitigation.

Patch 1 adds support for the whole leaf that contains the
AutoIBRS feature bit.

Patches 2-5 mainly move the existing features over from
scattered / open-coded in KVM into the new shared leaf,
where they match hardware.

Patch 6 Adds support for AutoIBRS by turning its EFER
enablement bit on at startup if the feature is available.

Patch 7 Adds support for propagating AutoIBRS to the guest.

v7: - Add Dave Hansen's Acked-by to unchanged patch 6/7
    - Change patch 3/7 to not bother to set MSR DE_CFG[1]
      if X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC is already set [Boris]
    - v6 went out with two 1/1's, try to not do that again

v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230110224643.452273-1-kim.phillips@amd.com/
    Address v5 comment from Boris:
    - Move CPUID leaf 0x8000021 EAX feature bits from scattered
      to the new whole leaf since the majority of the features
      will be used in the kernel and thus a separate leaf is
       appropriate.

v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221205233235.622491-1-kim.phillips@amd.com/
    Address v4 comments from Dave Hansen, Pawan Gupta, and Boris:
    - Don't add new user-visible 'autoibrs' command line
      options that we have to document: reuse 'eibrs'
    - Update Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
    - Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to Hygon as well
    - Re-word commit texts to not use words like 'us'

v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221201015003.295769-8-kim.phillips@amd.com/
    Moved some kvm bits that had crept into patch 6/7 back into 7/7,
    and addressed v3 comments:
    - Don't put ", kvm" in titles of patches that don't touch kvm.  [SeanC]
    - () after function names, i.e. kvm_set_cpu_caps().  [SeanC]
    - follow the established kvm_cpu_cap_init_scattered() style [SeanC]
    - Add using cpu_feature_enabled() instead of static_cpu_has() to
      commit text [SeanC]
    - Pawan Gupta mentioned that the ordering of enabling the Intel
      feature bit past Intel EIBRS bug detection could be avoided
      by setting NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to cpu_vuln_whitelist, so did that
      which allowed regrouping all EIBRS related code to one place
      in cpu_set_bug_bits().

v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221129235816.188737-1-kim.phillips@amd.com/
    - Remove Co-developed-bys.  They require signed-off-bys,
      so co-developers need to add them themselves.
    - update check_null_seg_clears_base() [Boris]
    - Made the feature bit additions separate patches
      because v2 patch was clearly doing too many things at once.

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221124000449.79014-1-kim.phillips@amd.com/
    https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/11/23/1690
    - Use synthetic/scattered bits instead of introducing new leaf [Boris]
    - Combine the rest of the leaf's bits being used [Paolo]
      Note: Bits not used by the host can be moved to kvm/cpuid.c if
      maintainers do not want them in cpufeatures.h.
    - Hoist bitsetting code to kvm_set_cpu_caps(), and use
      cpuid_entry_override() in __do_cpuid_func() [Paolo]
    - Reuse SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum [Boris, PeterZ, D.Hansen]
      - Change from Boris' diff:
        Moved setting X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED to after BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB
        so PBRSB mitigations wouldn't be enabled.
    - Allow for users to specify "autoibrs,lfence/retpoline" instead
      of actively preventing the extra protections.  AutoIBRS doesn't
      require the extra protection, but we allow it anyway.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221104213651.141057-1-kim.phillips@amd.com/

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

Kim Phillips (7):
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for cpuid leaf 80000021/EAX (FeatureExt2Eax)
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Move the LFENCE_RDTSC / LFENCE always serializing
    feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature
  x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
  x86/cpu, kvm: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest

 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |  6 ++--
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  6 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h             |  7 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            | 11 +++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h      |  3 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h      |  3 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 20 ++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  | 22 +++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                          | 30 +++++++------------
 arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h                  |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                        |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            |  3 ++
 14 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

-- 
2.34.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
@ 2023-01-24 16:33 Kim Phillips
  2023-01-26 10:12 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Kim Phillips
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Kim Phillips @ 2023-01-24 16:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86
  Cc: Kim Phillips, Borislav Petkov, Boris Ostrovsky, Dave Hansen,
	H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar, Joao Martins, Jonathan Corbet,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Paolo Bonzini, Sean Christopherson,
	Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
	Juergen Gross, Peter Zijlstra, Tony Luck, Tom Lendacky,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy, kvm, linux-doc, linux-kernel

The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.

It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS,
h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions.

The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by
setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.

Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present.  It typically
provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.

Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum.  AMD Automatic IBRS and
Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement.  Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to
cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.

The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic
IBRS, if available.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |  6 +++---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 20 +++++++++++--------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  | 19 ++++++++++--------
 6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index c4dcdb3d0d45..3fe6511c5405 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -610,9 +610,9 @@ kernel command line.
                 retpoline,generic       Retpolines
                 retpoline,lfence        LFENCE; indirect branch
                 retpoline,amd           alias for retpoline,lfence
-                eibrs                   enhanced IBRS
-                eibrs,retpoline         enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
-                eibrs,lfence            enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+                eibrs                   Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+                eibrs,retpoline         Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+                eibrs,lfence            Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
                 ibrs                    use IBRS to protect kernel
 
 		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 0ee891133d76..1d2f92edb5a1 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5729,9 +5729,9 @@
 			retpoline,generic - Retpolines
 			retpoline,lfence  - LFENCE; indirect branch
 			retpoline,amd     - alias for retpoline,lfence
-			eibrs		  - enhanced IBRS
-			eibrs,retpoline   - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
-			eibrs,lfence      - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+			eibrs		  - Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+			eibrs,retpoline   - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+			eibrs,lfence      - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
 			ibrs		  - use IBRS to protect kernel
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 8ef89d595771..fdb8e09234ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP	(20*32+ 0) /* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */
 #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC	(20*32+ 2) /* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE	(20*32+ 6) /* "" Null Selector Clears Base */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS		(20*32+ 8) /* "" Automatic IBRS */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR	(20*32+ 9) /* "" SMM_CTL MSR is not present */
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 4e0a7ad17083..ad35355ee43e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #define _EFER_SVME		12 /* Enable virtualization */
 #define _EFER_LMSLE		13 /* Long Mode Segment Limit Enable */
 #define _EFER_FFXSR		14 /* Enable Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR */
+#define _EFER_AUTOIBRS		21 /* Enable Automatic IBRS */
 
 #define EFER_SCE		(1<<_EFER_SCE)
 #define EFER_LME		(1<<_EFER_LME)
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
 #define EFER_SVME		(1<<_EFER_SVME)
 #define EFER_LMSLE		(1<<_EFER_LMSLE)
 #define EFER_FFXSR		(1<<_EFER_FFXSR)
+#define EFER_AUTOIBRS		(1<<_EFER_AUTOIBRS)
 
 /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 4a0add86c182..cf81848b72f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1238,9 +1238,9 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
 	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE]			= "Mitigation: Retpolines",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE]			= "Mitigation: LFENCE",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + LFENCE",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + Retpolines",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS]			= "Mitigation: IBRS",
 };
 
@@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
 	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
-		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have Enhanced or Automatic IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
 		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
@@ -1495,8 +1495,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
 
 	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
-		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-		update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
+			msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
+		} else {
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+			update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		}
 	}
 
 	switch (mode) {
@@ -1580,8 +1584,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	/*
 	 * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware.  IBRS
 	 * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
-	 * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
-	 * enabled.
+	 * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced / Automatic IBRS aren't
+	 * otherwise enabled.
 	 *
 	 * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
 	 * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 162352d42ce0..8ce67a8a61a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1229,8 +1229,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
 
 	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
-	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
-	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
 
 	/* Zhaoxin Family 7 */
 	VULNWL(CENTAUR,	7, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO),
@@ -1341,8 +1341,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
-	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
+	/*
+	 * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature
+	 * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist.
+	 */
+	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+		if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
+		    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
+	}
 
 	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
 	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
@@ -1404,11 +1412,6 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
 	}
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
-	    !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
-	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
-		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
-
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
-- 
2.34.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2023-01-26 10:12 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2023-01-16 23:01 [PATCH v7 0/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Support AMD Automatic IBRS Kim Phillips
2023-01-16 23:01 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for cpuid leaf 80000021/EAX (FeatureExt2Eax) Kim Phillips
2023-01-16 23:01 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature Kim Phillips
2023-01-16 23:01 ` [PATCH v7 3/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Move the LFENCE_RDTSC / LFENCE always serializing feature Kim Phillips
2023-01-17 11:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-17 21:25   ` [tip: x86/cpu] x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC tip-bot2 for Kim Phillips
2023-01-16 23:01 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature Kim Phillips
2023-01-17 21:25   ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Kim Phillips
2023-01-16 23:01 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature Kim Phillips
2023-01-17 21:25   ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Kim Phillips
2023-01-16 23:01 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS Kim Phillips
2023-01-17 21:25   ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Kim Phillips
2023-01-16 23:01 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest Kim Phillips
2023-01-17 21:25   ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Kim Phillips
2023-01-17 11:54 ` [PATCH v7 0/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Support AMD Automatic IBRS Borislav Petkov
2023-01-20  1:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-20 11:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-24 16:33 [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: " Kim Phillips
2023-01-26 10:12 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Kim Phillips

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