* [tip: x86/shstk] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
@ 2023-07-19 22:47 tip-bot2 for Rick Edgecombe
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot2 for Rick Edgecombe @ 2023-07-19 22:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Rick Edgecombe, Dave Hansen, Borislav Petkov (AMD),
Kees Cook, Mike Rapoport (IBM),
Pengfei Xu, John Allen, x86, linux-kernel
The following commit has been merged into the x86/shstk branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 18e66b695e787374ca762ecdeaa1ab5e3772af94
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/18e66b695e787374ca762ecdeaa1ab5e3772af94
Author: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:10:32 -07:00
Committer: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
CommitterDate: Tue, 11 Jul 2023 14:12:18 -07:00
x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return
address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the
kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built
for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it
is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but
without protection.
Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will
share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify
that at least one CET feature is configured.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-7-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7422db4..e860f80 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1849,6 +1849,11 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT
(CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 140000)) && \
$(as-instr,endbr64)
+config X86_CET
+ def_bool n
+ help
+ CET features configured (Shadow stack or IBT)
+
config X86_KERNEL_IBT
prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
def_bool y
@@ -1856,6 +1861,7 @@ config X86_KERNEL_IBT
# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f
depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000
select OBJTOOL
+ select X86_CET
help
Build the kernel with support for Indirect Branch Tracking, a
hardware support course-grain forward-edge Control Flow Integrity
@@ -1949,6 +1955,24 @@ config X86_SGX
If unsure, say N.
+config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+ bool "X86 userspace shadow stack"
+ depends on AS_WRUSS
+ depends on X86_64
+ select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ select X86_CET
+ help
+ Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+ return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+ Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+ get protection "for free".
+
+ CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020.
+
+ See Documentation/x86/shstk.rst for more information.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index b88f784..8ad41da 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -24,3 +24,8 @@ config AS_GFNI
def_bool $(as-instr,vgf2p8mulb %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1$(comma)%xmm2)
help
Supported by binutils >= 2.30 and LLVM integrated assembler
+
+config AS_WRUSS
+ def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
+ help
+ Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [tip: x86/shstk] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
@ 2023-06-16 19:17 tip-bot2 for Rick Edgecombe
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot2 for Rick Edgecombe @ 2023-06-16 19:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Rick Edgecombe, Dave Hansen, Borislav Petkov (AMD),
Kees Cook, Mike Rapoport (IBM),
Pengfei Xu, John Allen, x86, linux-kernel
The following commit has been merged into the x86/shstk branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 76aced427011fe790520b191186b0fc9b47c841b
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/76aced427011fe790520b191186b0fc9b47c841b
Author: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:10:32 -07:00
Committer: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
CommitterDate: Thu, 15 Jun 2023 16:31:00 -07:00
x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return
address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the
kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built
for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it
is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but
without protection.
Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will
share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify
that at least one CET feature is configured.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-7-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 53bab12..ce460d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1852,6 +1852,11 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT
(CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 140000)) && \
$(as-instr,endbr64)
+config X86_CET
+ def_bool n
+ help
+ CET features configured (Shadow stack or IBT)
+
config X86_KERNEL_IBT
prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
def_bool y
@@ -1859,6 +1864,7 @@ config X86_KERNEL_IBT
# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f
depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000
select OBJTOOL
+ select X86_CET
help
Build the kernel with support for Indirect Branch Tracking, a
hardware support course-grain forward-edge Control Flow Integrity
@@ -1952,6 +1958,24 @@ config X86_SGX
If unsure, say N.
+config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+ bool "X86 userspace shadow stack"
+ depends on AS_WRUSS
+ depends on X86_64
+ select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ select X86_CET
+ help
+ Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+ return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+ Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+ get protection "for free".
+
+ CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020.
+
+ See Documentation/x86/shstk.rst for more information.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index b88f784..8ad41da 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -24,3 +24,8 @@ config AS_GFNI
def_bool $(as-instr,vgf2p8mulb %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1$(comma)%xmm2)
help
Supported by binutils >= 2.30 and LLVM integrated assembler
+
+config AS_WRUSS
+ def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
+ help
+ Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [tip: x86/shstk] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
@ 2023-03-20 16:39 tip-bot2 for Rick Edgecombe
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot2 for Rick Edgecombe @ 2023-03-20 16:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Rick Edgecombe, Dave Hansen, Borislav Petkov (AMD),
Kees Cook, Mike Rapoport (IBM),
Pengfei Xu, John Allen, x86, linux-kernel
The following commit has been merged into the x86/shstk branch of tip:
Commit-ID: f7dabb27de62e121afc32c44748328841249e68f
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/f7dabb27de62e121afc32c44748328841249e68f
Author: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Sat, 18 Mar 2023 17:14:57 -07:00
Committer: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
CommitterDate: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 09:01:07 -07:00
x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return
address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the
kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built
for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it
is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but
without protection.
Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will
share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify
that at least one CET feature is configured.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230319001535.23210-3-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index a825bf0..f03791b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1851,6 +1851,11 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT
(CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 140000)) && \
$(as-instr,endbr64)
+config X86_CET
+ def_bool n
+ help
+ CET features configured (Shadow stack or IBT)
+
config X86_KERNEL_IBT
prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
def_bool y
@@ -1858,6 +1863,7 @@ config X86_KERNEL_IBT
# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f
depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000
select OBJTOOL
+ select X86_CET
help
Build the kernel with support for Indirect Branch Tracking, a
hardware support course-grain forward-edge Control Flow Integrity
@@ -1952,6 +1958,24 @@ config X86_SGX
If unsure, say N.
+config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+ bool "X86 userspace shadow stack"
+ depends on AS_WRUSS
+ depends on X86_64
+ select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ select X86_CET
+ help
+ Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+ return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+ Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+ get protection "for free".
+
+ CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020.
+
+ See Documentation/x86/shstk.rst for more information.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index b88f784..8ad41da 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -24,3 +24,8 @@ config AS_GFNI
def_bool $(as-instr,vgf2p8mulb %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1$(comma)%xmm2)
help
Supported by binutils >= 2.30 and LLVM integrated assembler
+
+config AS_WRUSS
+ def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
+ help
+ Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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