From: "tip-bot2 for David Kaplan" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 11:53:42 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <174074362237.10177.13779022409559637481.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250108202515.385902-4-david.kaplan@amd.com>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: b8ce25df2999ac6a135ce1bd14b7243030a1338a
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/b8ce25df2999ac6a135ce1bd14b7243030a1338a
Author: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 08 Jan 2025 14:24:43 -06:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 12:40:21 +01:00
x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds
Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds to create consistent vulnerability
handling. These AUTO mitigations will be turned into the appropriate default
mitigations in the <vuln>_select_mitigation() functions. Later, these will be
used with the new attack vector controls to help select appropriate
mitigations.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108202515.385902-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index c0cd101..90278d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -757,6 +757,7 @@ extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
enum mds_mitigations {
MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 4269ed1..93c437f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_FULL : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
enum taa_mitigations {
TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO,
TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
@@ -256,27 +257,29 @@ enum taa_mitigations {
/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
enum mmio_mitigations {
MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO,
MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
};
/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
enum rfds_mitigations {
RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
};
/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
{
@@ -285,6 +288,9 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
return;
}
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
@@ -514,6 +520,9 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void)
if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
return;
+ if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+ rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW;
+
if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
else
@@ -1979,6 +1988,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
switch (mds_mitigation) {
case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO:
case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
@@ -1990,6 +2000,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
switch (taa_mitigation) {
case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO:
case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
if (sched_smt_active())
pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
@@ -2001,6 +2012,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
switch (mmio_mitigation) {
case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO:
case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
if (sched_smt_active())
pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-28 11:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 138+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-08 20:24 [PATCH v3 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 01/35] x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 02/35] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 03/35] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53 ` tip-bot2 for David Kaplan [this message]
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:13 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:17 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:28 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 22:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-10 22:33 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 05/35] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:24 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:19 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 22:50 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 17:17 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 19:17 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 06/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:42 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:22 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:35 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 23:29 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 20:35 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 23:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:28 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-12 23:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-19 18:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-21 21:48 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 07/35] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 23:36 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 22:49 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 08/35] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 09/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 23:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 22:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 10/35] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 17:06 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:27 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:40 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 23:52 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 15:36 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-09 5:22 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 15:26 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-09 16:40 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 16:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-10 18:45 ` David Laight
2025-01-10 20:30 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-10 20:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-10 18:35 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 20:50 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 0:10 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-24 15:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-24 15:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 0:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 15:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-12 21:35 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 14/35] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 15/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 1:07 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:40 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 16/35] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 1:10 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:45 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 17/35] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 1:21 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:47 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 18/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 16:39 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:01 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 19/35] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-02-11 16:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 16:57 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 20/35] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-02-11 18:07 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 17:33 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 20:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-17 20:38 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 23:39 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-18 2:24 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-18 7:05 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-18 8:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-20 22:04 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-26 18:57 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 20:14 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 21:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-26 21:51 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-26 21:03 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 22:13 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 22:18 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 22:34 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 23:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-27 0:35 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 1:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-27 3:50 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 14:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 14:36 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 15:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 15:22 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 16:05 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 21/35] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-01-09 3:43 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 15:08 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 18:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 18:54 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 19:04 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 20:34 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 20:53 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 22:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 18:55 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 22/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 23/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2025-02-11 19:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 24/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 25/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 26/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 27/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 28/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 29/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 30/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-02-11 19:03 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:22 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 31/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 32/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 33/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 34/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 35/35] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
[not found] ` <20250110083627.xankiqhczr7ksldv@desk>
2025-01-10 15:39 ` [PATCH v3 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20250110171410.ttbt7cohzdjwi4hk@desk>
2025-01-12 11:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-13 17:41 ` Pawan Gupta
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=174074362237.10177.13779022409559637481.tip-bot2@tip-bot2 \
--to=tip-bot2@linutronix.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=david.kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®