From: "tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/core] x86/bugs: Fix SRSO reporting on Zen1/2 with SMT disabled
Date: Tue, 13 May 2025 21:05:57 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <174717035700.406.11853328229238715261.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250513110405.15872-1-bp@kernel.org>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/core branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 891d3b8be32a69ae94d32e3f1e1ee01359020d49
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/891d3b8be32a69ae94d32e3f1e1ee01359020d49
Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
AuthorDate: Tue, 13 May 2025 13:04:05 +02:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Tue, 13 May 2025 22:31:08 +02:00
x86/bugs: Fix SRSO reporting on Zen1/2 with SMT disabled
1f4bb068b498 ("x86/bugs: Restructure SRSO mitigation") does this:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
return;
}
and, in particular, sets srso_mitigation to NONE. This leads to
reporting
Speculative Return Stack Overflow: Vulnerable
on Zen2 machines.
There's a far bigger confusion with what SRSO_NO means and how it is
used in the code but this will be a matter of future fixes and
restructuring to how the SRSO mitigation gets determined.
Fix the reporting issue for now.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250513110405.15872-1-bp@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 47c74c4..dd8b50b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2942,7 +2942,9 @@ static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void)
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE))
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) && !cpu_mitigations_off())
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) &&
+ !cpu_mitigations_off() &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
}
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-13 21:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-13 11:04 [PATCH] " Borislav Petkov
2025-05-13 19:40 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-13 21:05 ` tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD) [this message]
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