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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@kernel.org>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Fix SRSO reporting on Zen1/2 with SMT disabled
Date: Tue, 13 May 2025 13:04:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250513110405.15872-1-bp@kernel.org> (raw)

From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>

1f4bb068b498 ("x86/bugs: Restructure SRSO mitigation") does this:

  if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
          setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
          srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
          return;
  }

and, in particular, sets srso_mitigation to NONE. This leads to
reporting

  Speculative Return Stack Overflow: Vulnerable

on Zen2 machines.

There's a far bigger confusion with what SRSO_NO means and how it is
used in the code but this will be a matter of future fixes and
restructuring to how the SRSO mitigation gets determined.

Fix the reporting issue for now.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 47c74c4ae206..dd8b50b4ceaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2942,7 +2942,9 @@ static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void)
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE))
 		srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) && !cpu_mitigations_off())
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) &&
+	    !cpu_mitigations_off() &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
 		pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
 }
 
-- 
2.43.0


             reply	other threads:[~2025-05-13 11:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-13 11:04 Borislav Petkov [this message]
2025-05-13 19:40 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-13 21:05 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)

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