From: "tip-bot2 for David Kaplan" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SSB
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 13:39:29 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <175638836960.1920.12208793699420420560.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250819192200.2003074-5-david.kaplan@amd.com>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 8b3641dfb6f902407495c63b9b64482b32319b66
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/8b3641dfb6f902407495c63b9b64482b32319b66
Author: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
AuthorDate: Tue, 19 Aug 2025 14:21:59 -05:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Wed, 27 Aug 2025 18:17:12 +02:00
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SSB
Attack vector controls for SSB were missed in the initial attack vector series.
The default mitigation for SSB requires user-space opt-in so it is only
relevant for user->user attacks. Check with attack vector controls when
the command is auto - i.e., no explicit user selection has been done.
Fixes: 2d31d2874663 ("x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug")
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250819192200.2003074-5-david.kaplan@amd.com
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst | 5 +----
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 9 +++++++-
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
index 6dd0800..5964901 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Spectre_v2 X X
Spectre_v2_user X X * (Note 1)
SRBDS X X X X
SRSO X X X X
-SSB (Note 4)
+SSB X
TAA X X X X * (Note 2)
TSA X X X X
=============== ============== ============ ============= ============== ============ ========
@@ -229,9 +229,6 @@ Notes:
3 -- Disables SMT if cross-thread mitigations are fully enabled, the CPU is
vulnerable, and STIBP is not supported
- 4 -- Speculative store bypass is always enabled by default (no kernel
- mitigation applied) unless overridden with spec_store_bypass_disable option
-
When an attack-vector is disabled, all mitigations for the vulnerabilities
listed in the above table are disabled, unless mitigation is required for a
different enabled attack-vector or a mitigation is explicitly selected via a
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 49ef1b8..af838b8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -416,6 +416,10 @@ static bool __init should_mitigate_vuln(unsigned int bug)
cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER) ||
cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST) ||
(smt_mitigations != SMT_MITIGATIONS_OFF);
+
+ case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER);
+
default:
WARN(1, "Unknown bug %x\n", bug);
return false;
@@ -2710,6 +2714,11 @@ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void)
ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
break;
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
+ if (should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+ ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+ else
+ ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+ break;
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
break;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-28 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-19 19:21 [PATCH v2 0/5] Bugs clean-up David Kaplan
2025-08-19 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/bugs: Use early_param for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-08-20 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 21:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-08-27 21:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-19 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/bugs: Use early_param for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-08-22 11:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-22 14:12 ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-22 14:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-22 14:37 ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-19 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/bugs: Simplify SSB cmdline parsing David Kaplan
2025-08-27 22:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-08-19 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SSB David Kaplan
2025-08-21 6:17 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-08-27 10:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 11:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 14:05 ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-27 14:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 14:25 ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-27 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 15:47 ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-27 16:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 16:15 ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-27 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-28 13:39 ` tip-bot2 for David Kaplan [this message]
2025-08-19 19:22 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/bugs: Remove uses of cpu_mitigations_off() David Kaplan
2025-08-21 6:18 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] Bugs clean-up Pawan Gupta
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