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From: "tip-bot2 for David Kaplan" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SSB
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 13:39:29 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <175638836960.1920.12208793699420420560.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250819192200.2003074-5-david.kaplan@amd.com>

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     8b3641dfb6f902407495c63b9b64482b32319b66
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/8b3641dfb6f902407495c63b9b64482b32319b66
Author:        David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 19 Aug 2025 14:21:59 -05:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Wed, 27 Aug 2025 18:17:12 +02:00

x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SSB

Attack vector controls for SSB were missed in the initial attack vector series.
The default mitigation for SSB requires user-space opt-in so it is only
relevant for user->user attacks.  Check with attack vector controls when
the command is auto - i.e., no explicit user selection has been done.

Fixes: 2d31d2874663 ("x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug")
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250819192200.2003074-5-david.kaplan@amd.com
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst |  5 +----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                                   |  9 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
index 6dd0800..5964901 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Spectre_v2            X                           X
 Spectre_v2_user                      X                           X            *       (Note 1)
 SRBDS                 X              X            X              X
 SRSO                  X              X            X              X
-SSB                                                                                   (Note 4)
+SSB                                  X
 TAA                   X              X            X              X            *       (Note 2)
 TSA                   X              X            X              X
 =============== ============== ============ ============= ============== ============ ========
@@ -229,9 +229,6 @@ Notes:
    3 --  Disables SMT if cross-thread mitigations are fully enabled, the CPU is
    vulnerable, and STIBP is not supported
 
-   4 --  Speculative store bypass is always enabled by default (no kernel
-   mitigation applied) unless overridden with spec_store_bypass_disable option
-
 When an attack-vector is disabled, all mitigations for the vulnerabilities
 listed in the above table are disabled, unless mitigation is required for a
 different enabled attack-vector or a mitigation is explicitly selected via a
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 49ef1b8..af838b8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -416,6 +416,10 @@ static bool __init should_mitigate_vuln(unsigned int bug)
 		       cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER) ||
 		       cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST) ||
 		       (smt_mitigations != SMT_MITIGATIONS_OFF);
+
+	case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+		return cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER);
+
 	default:
 		WARN(1, "Unknown bug %x\n", bug);
 		return false;
@@ -2710,6 +2714,11 @@ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 		ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
 		break;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
+		if (should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+			ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+		else
+			ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+		break;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
 		ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
 		break;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-28 13:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-19 19:21 [PATCH v2 0/5] Bugs clean-up David Kaplan
2025-08-19 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/bugs: Use early_param for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-08-20 18:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 21:51   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-08-27 21:59     ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-19 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/bugs: Use early_param for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-08-22 11:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-22 14:12     ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-22 14:30       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-22 14:37         ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-19 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/bugs: Simplify SSB cmdline parsing David Kaplan
2025-08-27 22:02   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-08-19 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SSB David Kaplan
2025-08-21  6:17   ` Pawan Gupta
2025-08-27 10:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 11:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 14:05         ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-27 14:22           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 14:25             ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-27 15:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 15:47                 ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-27 16:11                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-27 16:15                     ` Kaplan, David
2025-08-27 16:19                       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-08-28 13:39   ` tip-bot2 for David Kaplan [this message]
2025-08-19 19:22 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/bugs: Remove uses of cpu_mitigations_off() David Kaplan
2025-08-21  6:18 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] Bugs clean-up Pawan Gupta

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