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From: "tip-bot2 for Ravi Bangoria" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sadasivan Shaiju <sadasivan.shaiju2@amd.com>,
	Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: perf/core] perf/amd/ibs: Avoid calling perf_allow_kernel() from the IBS NMI handler
Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2026 10:56:42 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <177227620247.1647592.14977762441472774078.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260216042216.1440-5-ravi.bangoria@amd.com>

The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     b0a09142622a994c4f4088c3f61db5da87cfc711
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/b0a09142622a994c4f4088c3f61db5da87cfc711
Author:        Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 16 Feb 2026 04:22:15 
Committer:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CommitterDate: Fri, 27 Feb 2026 16:40:23 +01:00

perf/amd/ibs: Avoid calling perf_allow_kernel() from the IBS NMI handler

Calling perf_allow_kernel() from the NMI context is unsafe and could be
fatal. Capture the permission at event-initialization time by storing it
in event->hw.flags, and have the NMI handler rely on that cached flag
instead of making the call directly.

Fixes: 50a53b60e141d ("perf/amd/ibs: Prevent leaking sensitive data to userspace")
Reported-by: Sadasivan Shaiju <sadasivan.shaiju2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260216042216.1440-5-ravi.bangoria@amd.com
---
 arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c          | 5 ++++-
 arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
index 05b7c9f..004226b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
@@ -313,6 +313,9 @@ static int perf_ibs_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	if (perf_allow_kernel())
+		hwc->flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_UNPRIVILEGED;
+
 	if (hwc->sample_period) {
 		if (config & perf_ibs->cnt_mask)
 			/* raw max_cnt may not be set */
@@ -1349,7 +1352,7 @@ fail:
 	 * unprivileged users.
 	 */
 	if ((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) &&
-	    perf_allow_kernel()) {
+	    (hwc->flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_UNPRIVILEGED)) {
 		perf_ibs_phyaddr_clear(perf_ibs, &ibs_data);
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h
index 7007833..47f84ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h
@@ -23,3 +23,4 @@ PERF_ARCH(PEBS_LAT_HYBRID,	0x0020000) /* ld and st lat for hybrid */
 PERF_ARCH(NEEDS_BRANCH_STACK,	0x0040000) /* require branch stack setup */
 PERF_ARCH(BRANCH_COUNTERS,	0x0080000) /* logs the counters in the extra space of each branch */
 PERF_ARCH(ACR,			0x0100000) /* Auto counter reload */
+PERF_ARCH(UNPRIVILEGED,		0x0200000) /* Unprivileged event (wrt perf_allow_kernel()) */

  reply	other threads:[~2026-02-28 10:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-16  4:22 [PATCH v2 0/5] perf/amd/ibs: Assorted fixes Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-16  4:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] perf/amd/ibs: Account interrupt for discarded samples Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-23 12:25   ` Michael Petlan
2026-02-24  8:11     ` Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-26 13:06       ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-02-28 10:56   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-16  4:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] perf/amd/ibs: Limit ldlat->l3missonly dependency to Zen5 Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-28 10:56   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-16  4:22 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] perf/amd/ibs: Preserve PhyAddrVal bit when clearing PhyAddr MSR Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-28 10:56   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-16  4:22 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] perf/amd/ibs: Avoid calling perf_allow_kernel() from the IBS NMI handler Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-28 10:56   ` tip-bot2 for Ravi Bangoria [this message]
2026-03-06 21:13   ` Michael Petlan
2026-03-09  9:07   ` Michael Petlan
2026-03-09 11:40     ` Ravi Bangoria
2026-03-09 19:06       ` Michael Petlan
2026-03-10 16:46         ` Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-16  4:22 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] perf/amd/ibs: Avoid race between event add and NMI Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-28 10:56   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Ravi Bangoria
2026-02-18  5:51 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] perf/amd/ibs: Assorted fixes Namhyung Kim

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