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From: "tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 09:09:29 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <178281056948.3843924.6148225556829232072.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260612090114.3188886-9-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>

The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     a4b016d0a29038a5b7c96bf62c054bf7832451d9
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/a4b016d0a29038a5b7c96bf62c054bf7832451d9
Author:        Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
AuthorDate:    Fri, 12 Jun 2026 17:01:14 +08:00
Committer:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CommitterDate: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 10:57:07 +02:00

perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested

perf_event_open() currently gates perf_allow_kernel() only on
!attr.exclude_kernel.

However, users can still request kernel callchain collection with
attr.exclude_callchain_kernel == 0 even when attr.exclude_kernel == 1.
That still requires kernel profiling privilege, but the existing check
does not enforce it.

Update the permission check to call perf_allow_kernel() when either
kernel sampling is requested or kernel callchains are requested.

This keeps permission checks aligned with requested data and prevents
unprivileged use of kernel callchain capture.

Signed-off-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612090114.3188886-9-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index dd3bd9c..0f29d17 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -13932,7 +13932,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
+	if (!attr.exclude_kernel ||
+	    ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) &&
+	     !attr.exclude_callchain_kernel)) {
 		err = perf_allow_kernel();
 		if (err)
 			return err;

  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-30  9:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-12  9:01 [Patch v3 0/8] perf/x86: Miscellaneous PMU bug fixes Dapeng Mi
2026-06-12  9:01 ` [Patch v3 1/8] perf/x86/intel: Remove anythread_deprecated bit from perf_capabilities Dapeng Mi
2026-06-12  9:46   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-15  0:59     ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-06-15  3:28       ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-06-16 10:02       ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-17  0:14         ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-06-30  9:14           ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-06-30  9:43             ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-30  9:44               ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-06-30  9:09   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-12  9:01 ` [Patch v3 2/8] perf/x86/intel: Keep cap_user_rdpmc in sync with RDPMC user-disable state Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30  9:09   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-12  9:01 ` [Patch v3 3/8] perf/x86/intel: Fallback to sw branch type decoding if no hw decoding Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30  9:09   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-12  9:01 ` [Patch v3 4/8] perf/x86/intel: Fix kernel address leakages in LBR stack Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30  9:09   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-12  9:01 ` [Patch v3 5/8] perf/x86/intel: Validate the return value of intel_pmu_init_hybrid() Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30  9:09   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-12  9:01 ` [Patch v3 6/8] perf/x86/intel: Drop fixed-counter PEBS constraints for baseline PEBS Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30  9:09   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-12  9:01 ` [Patch v3 7/8] perf/core: Fix kernel register info leak via hardware skid Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30  9:09   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-12  9:01 ` [Patch v3 8/8] perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30  9:09   ` tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi [this message]
2026-06-16  4:46 [Patch v4 " Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30  9:48 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi

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