From: "tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 09:48:10 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <178281289064.3843924.16801965129525302354.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260616044654.3468742-9-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip:
Commit-ID: a4573a3838ae4fc73b70019cfa1dac9aaea7cc2f
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/a4573a3838ae4fc73b70019cfa1dac9aaea7cc2f
Author: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
AuthorDate: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:46:54 +08:00
Committer: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CommitterDate: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 11:46:08 +02:00
perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested
perf_event_open() currently gates perf_allow_kernel() only on
!attr.exclude_kernel.
However, users can still request kernel callchain collection with
attr.exclude_callchain_kernel == 0 even when attr.exclude_kernel == 1.
That still requires kernel profiling privilege, but the existing check
does not enforce it.
Update the permission check to call perf_allow_kernel() when either
kernel sampling is requested or kernel callchains are requested.
This keeps permission checks aligned with requested data and prevents
unprivileged use of kernel callchain capture.
Signed-off-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616044654.3468742-9-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com
---
kernel/events/core.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index dd3bd9c..0f29d17 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -13932,7 +13932,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
if (err)
return err;
- if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
+ if (!attr.exclude_kernel ||
+ ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) &&
+ !attr.exclude_callchain_kernel)) {
err = perf_allow_kernel();
if (err)
return err;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-30 9:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-16 4:46 [Patch v4 0/8] perf/x86: Miscellaneous PMU bug fixes Dapeng Mi
2026-06-16 4:46 ` [Patch v4 1/8] perf/x86/intel: Remove anythread_deprecated bit from perf_capabilities Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30 9:48 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-16 4:46 ` [Patch v4 2/8] perf/x86/intel: Keep cap_user_rdpmc in sync with RDPMC user-disable state Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30 9:48 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-16 4:46 ` [Patch v4 3/8] perf/x86/intel: Fallback to sw branch type decoding if no hw decoding Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30 9:48 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-16 4:46 ` [Patch v4 4/8] perf/x86/intel: Fix kernel address leakages in LBR stack Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30 9:48 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-16 4:46 ` [Patch v4 5/8] perf/x86/intel: Validate the return value of intel_pmu_init_hybrid() Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30 9:48 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-16 4:46 ` [Patch v4 6/8] perf/x86/intel: Drop fixed-counter PEBS constraints for baseline PEBS Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30 9:48 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-16 4:46 ` [Patch v4 7/8] perf/core: Fix kernel register info leak via hardware skid Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30 9:48 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
2026-06-16 4:46 ` [Patch v4 8/8] perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30 9:48 ` tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-06-12 9:01 [Patch v3 " Dapeng Mi
2026-06-30 9:09 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Dapeng Mi
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