* [tip: x86/cache] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock on errors during mount
@ 2026-07-13 21:24 tip-bot2 for Reinette Chatre
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: tip-bot2 for Reinette Chatre @ 2026-07-13 21:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: Sashiko, Tony Luck, Reinette Chatre, Borislav Petkov (AMD),
Ben Horgan, Chen Yu, x86, linux-kernel
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cache branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 4f6db8caa19d77252bad5a9784bc5c1057ef673f
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/4f6db8caa19d77252bad5a9784bc5c1057ef673f
Author: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 10:39:39 -07:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 12:39:20 -07:00
fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock on errors during mount
rdt_get_tree() acquires rdtgroup_mutex before calling kernfs_get_tree(). If
superblock setup fails inside kernfs_get_tree(), the VFS calls .kill_sb()
(rdt_kill_sb()) on the same thread before kernfs_get_tree() returns.
rdt_kill_sb() unconditionally attempts to acquire rdtgroup_mutex and
deadlock occurs.
Since mount failure resulting from kernfs_get_tree() already calls the
resctrl fs unmount handler (rdt_kill_sb()) let both call the same helper
to make it clear both paths perform the same cleanup.
Call kernfs_get_tree() outside of locks. If kernfs_get_tree() fails and
ctx->kfc.new_sb_created is set, then rdt_kill_sb() has already been called
and no further cleanup is needed.
kernfs_get_tree() may set ctx->kfc.new_sb_created and then fail to obtain
an inode for the new kn, causing the rdt_kill_sb() path to run with one fewer
reference than required for the root to remain accessible in kernfs_kill_sb().
Add an extra hold on rdtgroup_default.kn to defend against this scenario
and ensure the root can be dereferenced safely from kernfs_kill_sb().
Dropping locks before kernfs_get_tree() creates a window where CPU hotplug
callbacks can race with the mount operation. Specifically, an online event
observing resctrl_mounted == true could concurrently append directories to
the unactivated kernfs tree, allocate mon_data structures, and arm background
workers.
This concurrency is safe because the mount has not yet returned to the VFS,
meaning userspace cannot interact with these transient files. If
kernfs_get_tree() subsequently fails, the standard resctrl_unmount() teardown
safely manages the concurrent modifications: any dynamically generated kernfs
nodes are removed, and the associated memory is freed. Any background
workers spawned by the hotplug event will naturally exit without re-arming
when they acquire rdtgroup_mutex and observe resctrl_mounted == false.
Fixes: 5ff193fbde20 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add basic resctrl filesystem support")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260429184858.36423-1-tony.luck%40intel.com [1]
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Ben Horgan <ben.horgan@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/fe701825d7f538a6bbac6732230004050300c93e.1783963505.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
---
fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 9804e40..ce96472 100644
--- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -2989,10 +2989,34 @@ static void resctrl_fs_teardown(void)
rdtgroup_destroy_root();
}
+static void resctrl_unmount(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ rdt_disable_ctx();
+
+ /* Put everything back to default values. */
+ for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource(r)
+ resctrl_arch_reset_all_ctrls(r);
+
+ resctrl_fs_teardown();
+ if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable())
+ resctrl_arch_disable_alloc();
+ if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
+ resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
+ resctrl_mounted = false;
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+}
+
static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
unsigned long flags = RFTYPE_CTRL_BASE;
+ struct kernfs_node *rdt_root_kn;
struct rdt_l3_mon_domain *dom;
struct rdt_resource *r;
int ret;
@@ -3068,10 +3092,6 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
if (ret)
goto out_mondata;
- ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out_psl;
-
if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable())
resctrl_arch_enable_alloc();
if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
@@ -3087,10 +3107,38 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
RESCTRL_PICK_ANY_CPU);
}
- goto out;
+ /*
+ * Ensure root remains accessible after mutex is unlocked so that
+ * kernfs_kill_sb() can run safely if called by kernfs_get_tree()'s
+ * failure path after creating a superblock but before taking reference
+ * on root kn (for example, if unable to get inode for root kn).
+ */
+ kernfs_get(rdtgroup_default.kn);
+
+ /*
+ * Make backup of the current root kn being created to be used in
+ * kernfs_put(). The additional reference taken above will prevent the
+ * kn from being freed before kernfs_kill_sb() can run but
+ * rdtgroup_default.kn may be set to NULL via rdtgroup_destroy_root()
+ * and its backing root (rdt_root) could be overwritten before
+ * kernfs_put() can run.
+ */
+ rdt_root_kn = rdtgroup_default.kn;
+
+ rdt_last_cmd_clear();
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+
+ ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
+ /*
+ * resctrl can only be mounted once, new superblock only expected
+ * to be created once.
+ */
+ if (!ctx->kfc.new_sb_created)
+ resctrl_unmount();
+ kernfs_put(rdt_root_kn);
+ return ret;
-out_psl:
- rdt_pseudo_lock_release();
out_mondata:
if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
kernfs_remove(kn_mondata);
@@ -3110,7 +3158,6 @@ out_schemata_free:
out_root:
rdtgroup_destroy_root();
out:
- rdt_last_cmd_clear();
mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
cpus_read_unlock();
return ret;
@@ -3197,26 +3244,8 @@ static int rdt_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct rdt_resource *r;
-
- cpus_read_lock();
- mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
-
- rdt_disable_ctx();
-
- /* Put everything back to default values. */
- for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource(r)
- resctrl_arch_reset_all_ctrls(r);
-
- resctrl_fs_teardown();
- if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable())
- resctrl_arch_disable_alloc();
- if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
- resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
- resctrl_mounted = false;
+ resctrl_unmount();
kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
- mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
- cpus_read_unlock();
}
static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
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