[PATCH 1/2] usbip: clear actual_length after a failed receive

[PATCH 1/2] usbip: clear actual_length after a failed receive

[Cheng Yongkang]

vhci_recv_ret_submit() receives the transfer buffer for an IN URB.  When
usbip_recv_xbuff() fails, it sets urb->status to -EPROTO and gives the URB
back, but leaves urb->actual_length at the value supplied by the usbip
peer.  A malicious peer can set actual_length larger than
transfer_buffer_length; usbfs then copies that many bytes from the
kmalloc(transfer_buffer_length) buffer to userspace:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x79/0xb0
  Read of size 88 at addr ...
  copy_urb_data_to_user+0x36f/0x480

Clear actual_length on the failure path so the failed URB never carries a
peer-controlled length.  The URB is completed with -EPROTO and userspace
observes a zero-length, failed transfer.

Fixes: aabb5b833872 ("usbip: Fix error path of vhci_recv_ret_submit()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Cheng Yongkang <teel4res@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c
index a678e7c..741107a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void vhci_recv_ret_submit(struct vhci_device *vdev,
 	/* recv transfer buffer */
 	if (usbip_recv_xbuff(ud, urb) < 0) {
 		urb->status = -EPROTO;
+		urb->actual_length = 0;
 		goto error;
 	}
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 0/2] usb: fix over-reported actual_length in usbip/usbfs

[Cheng Yongkang]

The usbip vhci receive error path gives a failed URB back with the
peer-supplied actual_length, and usbfs copy_urb_data_to_user() trusts
that length for non-isochronous URBs.  A malicious usbip peer can make
usbfs read past the transfer buffer.

Patch 1 clears actual_length on the vhci receive failure path.  Patch 2
clamps the copied length to transfer_buffer_length in usbfs as a
defense-in-depth measure for any HCD that violates the actual_length
contract.

Cheng Yongkang (2):
  usbip: clear actual_length after a failed receive
  usb: usbfs: clamp the copied length to transfer_buffer_length

 drivers/usb/core/devio.c    | 7 +++++--
 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 2/2] usb: usbfs: clamp the copied length to transfer_buffer_length

[Cheng Yongkang]

copy_urb_data_to_user() uses urb->actual_length as the number of bytes to
copy to userspace for non-isochronous URBs.  The usbfs contract is that a
driver must not report more data than the transfer buffer holds, but
usbfs cannot rely on every HCD or device implementation to honor it; a
malicious usbip peer can already set actual_length beyond
transfer_buffer_length and trigger an out-of-bounds read:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x79/0xb0
  Read of size 88 at addr ...
  copy_urb_data_to_user+0x36f/0x480

Clamp the non-isochronous length to transfer_buffer_length before the
copy.  Normal URBs are unaffected; the isochronous path already uses
transfer_buffer_length.

Fixes: 3d97ff63f899 ("usbdevfs: Use scatter-gather lists for large bulk transfers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Cheng Yongkang <teel4res@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/usb/core/devio.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
index 101cb94..9554b6a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
@@ -557,10 +557,13 @@ static int copy_urb_data_to_user(u8 __user *userbuffer, struct urb *urb)
 {
 	unsigned i, len, size;
 
-	if (urb->number_of_packets > 0)		/* Isochronous */
+	if (urb->number_of_packets > 0) {	/* Isochronous */
 		len = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
-	else					/* Non-Isoc */
+	} else {				/* Non-Isoc */
 		len = urb->actual_length;
+		if (len > urb->transfer_buffer_length)
+			len = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
+	}
 
 	if (urb->num_sgs == 0) {
 		if (copy_to_user(userbuffer, urb->transfer_buffer, len))
-- 
2.34.1