* [PATCH net 1/2] net: mptcp: take token lookup references with acquire ordering [not found] <20261112124547.193812-1-2122295973@qq.com> @ 2026-11-12 12:45 ` Hang Nan 2026-11-12 12:50 ` netdev-bot+sinfo 2026-11-13 13:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko 2026-11-12 12:45 ` [PATCH net 2/2] net: core: take the reuseport migration reference " Hang Nan [not found] ` <20261112124547.193812-2-2122295973@qq.com> 2 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Hang Nan @ 2026-11-12 12:45 UTC (permalink / raw) To: netdev Cc: mptcp, matttbe, martineau, geliang, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, kuniyu, willemb, linux-kernel, Hang Nan, stable mptcp_token_get_sock() validates the token and the network namespace, takes a reference on the socket and then validates them again. The second validation only rejects a socket that is being torn down if it is ordered after the reference acquisition: mptcp_token_destroy() unlinks the socket and does WRITE_ONCE(msk->token, 0), so a reader that observes the token before the acquisition can return a socket whose token has already been cleared. refcount_inc_not_zero() does not provide acquire ordering since the refcount_t consolidation in fb041bb7c0a9, which removed the ordering that the previous atomic_add_unless() based implementation gave. On weakly ordered CPUs the loads of msk->token and sock_net(sk) can therefore be reordered before the refcount increment, defeating the re-validation. The same pattern was fixed for the IPv4 and IPv6 established lookups, inet_twsk_purge() and bpf_sk_assign() in 5b5d8f351dd9. The iterator below has the same shape and is converted as well. No behaviour change on strongly ordered architectures; this only restores the ordering the second validation relies on. Fixes: fb041bb7c0a9 ("locking/refcount: Consolidate implementations of refcount_t") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hang Nan <2122295973@qq.com> --- net/mptcp/token.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mptcp/token.c b/net/mptcp/token.c index e0f2823f92ef..3429b43a9f7c 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/token.c +++ b/net/mptcp/token.c @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_get_sock(struct net *net, u32 token) !net_eq(sock_net(sk), net)) continue; - if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt)) + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire(&sk->sk_refcnt)) goto not_found; if (READ_ONCE(msk->token) != token || @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_iter_next(const struct net *net, long *s_slot, if (num <= *s_num) continue; - if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt)) + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire(&sk->sk_refcnt)) continue; if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net)) { -- 2.53.0 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net 1/2] net: mptcp: take token lookup references with acquire ordering 2026-11-12 12:45 ` [PATCH net 1/2] net: mptcp: take token lookup references with acquire ordering Hang Nan @ 2026-11-12 12:50 ` netdev-bot+sinfo 2026-11-13 13:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko 1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: netdev-bot+sinfo @ 2026-11-12 12:50 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Hang Nan Cc: netdev, mptcp, matttbe, martineau, geliang, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, kuniyu, willemb, linux-kernel, stable Hi! This is an automated message. This series looks like a fix, but its commit messages seem to be missing some information: - How the issue was discovered, e.g. hit in production, hit during development, syzbot report, manual code inspection, LLM or static analysis tool scan. - Whether the issue was actually triggered, or is only theoretical (e.g. found by LLM and not proven at runtime). If it was triggered please include the symptoms, like the stack trace or kernel messages. Please do not repost the series just to address the above. Instead, reply to this email with the missing information, so that reviewers can take it into account. If the series needs another revision for other reasons, please include the information in the commit messages then. The evaluation is done by an LLM so it may be wrong, if you think that is the case please reply and explain. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net 1/2] net: mptcp: take token lookup references with acquire ordering 2026-11-12 12:45 ` [PATCH net 1/2] net: mptcp: take token lookup references with acquire ordering Hang Nan 2026-11-12 12:50 ` netdev-bot+sinfo @ 2026-11-13 13:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko 1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: netdev-bot+sashiko @ 2026-11-13 13:05 UTC (permalink / raw) To: 2122295973 Cc: netdev, mptcp, matttbe, martineau, geliang, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, kuniyu, willemb, linux-kernel, stable Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider. Critical: 0 · High: 2 · Medium: 1 · Low: 1 If you believe none of the issues are legitimate, please reply to each issue of Medium severity or higher and explain why the AI is wrong. If any of them are legitimate and you plan to respin, please let patchwork know by including "pw-bot: cr" as a separate line at the end of your reply (one such reply per series is enough). - [High] mptcp_token_get_sock() uses the token value as its only liveness check, but it accepts a requested token of 0. - [High] mptcp_token_iter_next() re-checks only net_eq() after taking the reference (token.c:376). - [Medium] The commit message gives the wrong reason for the change, and it never mentions the race the change actually closes. - [Low] net: mptcp: Fixes trailer cites commit predating token.c lockless lookups -- net: mptcp: take token lookup references with acquire ordering This patch changes mptcp_token_get_sock() and mptcp_token_iter_next() to use refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire() instead of refcount_inc_not_zero(). The aim is to order the re-validation of msk->token and sock_net() after the reference is taken, as 5b5d8f351dd9 did for the inet lookups. > mptcp_token_get_sock() validates the token and the network namespace, > takes a reference on the socket and then validates them again. The > second validation only rejects a socket that is being torn down if it is > ordered after the reference acquisition: mptcp_token_destroy() unlinks > the socket and does WRITE_ONCE(msk->token, 0), so a reader that observes > the token before the acquisition can return a socket whose token has > already been cleared. [Severity: Medium] Is this the race that the acquire ordering actually closes? mptcp_token_destroy() clears the token without touching sk_refcnt: net/mptcp/token.c:mptcp_token_destroy() { ... spin_unlock_bh(&bucket->lock); WRITE_ONCE(msk->token, 0); } That leaves no release on the refcount for refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire() to pair with. With or without acquire, the re-check can still read the old token. mptcp_token_destroy() can also run right after the re-check succeeds. The case the acquire does fix looks like object reuse. mptcp_prot uses SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU and only listeners set SOCK_RCU_FREE. So an established msk can be freed and reallocated while an RCU reader still holds a pointer to it. The new owner publishes the refcount in sock_init_data_uid(): smp_wmb(); refcount_set(&sk->sk_refcnt, 1); Without acquire, the re-check loads of msk->token and sock_net() can be satisfied before the increment. They would return the old object's values while the increment succeeds on the new object. The lookup could then return an msk from a different connection, possibly in a different netns. include/linux/refcount.h documents this case as the reason for the acquire variants. Since this is tagged for stable, could the commit message describe the SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU reuse case instead of the teardown race? > diff --git a/net/mptcp/token.c b/net/mptcp/token.c > index e0f2823f92efb..3429b43a9f7c3 100644 > --- a/net/mptcp/token.c > +++ b/net/mptcp/token.c > @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_get_sock(struct net *net, u32 token) > !net_eq(sock_net(sk), net)) > continue; > > - if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt)) > + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire(&sk->sk_refcnt)) > goto not_found; > > if (READ_ONCE(msk->token) != token || [Severity: Low] The Fixes tag points at fb041bb7c0a9 ("locking/refcount: Consolidate implementations of refcount_t"), which landed in v5.5-rc1. At that point net/mptcp/token.c did not exist yet, so there was no MPTCP code for that commit to break. The lockless lookup in mptcp_token_get_sock() came in with 2c5ebd001d4f ("mptcp: refactor token container"). That is the refcount_inc_not_zero() on sk->sk_refcnt followed by the token and netns re-check. mptcp_token_iter_next() came in with 96d890daad05 ("mptcp: add msk interations helper"). That added its refcount_inc_not_zero() and the net_eq() re-check. Both of those are in v5.9-rc1. Stable tooling uses the Fixes tag to decide which trees get the backport. Pointing at a v5.5 locking commit would have it try v5.5 through v5.8. In those trees this file is either missing or has no lockless lookup at all. Could the tags be changed to: Fixes: 2c5ebd001d4f ("mptcp: refactor token container") Fixes: 96d890daad05 ("mptcp: add msk interations helper") [Severity: High] What happens in mptcp_token_get_sock() when the requested token is 0? Token 0 is never assigned, because __token_bucket_busy() treats it as busy: return !token || t->chain_len >= TOKEN_MAX_CHAIN_LEN || However, 0 is exactly what mptcp_token_destroy() writes into a dying msk. It is also what a newly reallocated msk holds, since sk_alloc() zeroes the object. For token == 0, both the first check and this re-check pass on a cleared or recycled msk. So the "socket whose token has already been cleared" case from the commit message can still happen with this patch. The token comes from the wire. mptcp_parse_option() copies the MP_JOIN SYN token without checking it, and then: subflow_check_req() subflow_token_join_request() mptcp_token_get_sock(net, 0) Suppose an RCU reader holds a pointer to an msk on bucket 0's chain while that msk is unhashed, freed and reallocated by inet_create() in the same netns. Between sock_init_data() and sk_prot->init(), the new msk has refcount 1, token 0 and the matching netns. It would pass both checks and be returned. subflow_check_req() then calls subflow_use_different_sport(). That sees an inet_sport of 0 and calls mptcp_pm_announced_has_ssk(): list_for_each_entry(entry, &msk->pm.anno_list, list) { pm.anno_list is not initialised until mptcp_pm_data_init() runs from __mptcp_init_sock(), so head->next is still NULL. Can this oops in softirq? Even without reuse, a torn-down msk whose token was just cleared would be returned to the join path and pinned by the request socket. mptcp_diag_dump_one() with idiag_cookie[0] == 0 and the userspace PM token lookup seem to have the same problem. Should mptcp_token_get_sock() return early for token 0, for example: if (!token) return NULL; or should the re-check also confirm the msk is still hashed? > @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_iter_next(const struct net *net, long *s_slot, > if (num <= *s_num) > continue; > > - if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt)) > + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire(&sk->sk_refcnt)) > continue; > > if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net)) { [Severity: High] The commit message says the iterator "has the same shape and is converted as well". The re-check in mptcp_token_iter_next() only looks at net_eq(), though. Can it reject an msk that was torn down or recycled in the same netns? With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, a preempted RCU reader in mptcp_token_iter_next() can hold a pointer to an msk while it is unhashed, freed and reallocated by inet_create() in the same netns. There is a window between sock_init_data_uid() publishing the refcount: smp_wmb(); refcount_set(&sk->sk_refcnt, 1); and __mptcp_init_sock() running: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&msk->conn_list); In that window the msk has refcount 1, the same netns, and zeroed conn_list and pm state. A zeroed pm.pm_type looks like MPTCP_PM_TYPE_KERNEL. The iterator would take the reference, pass the net_eq() check and return this msk. An endpoint delete then does: mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_signal_addr() lock_sock(sk) mptcp_pm_has_subflow_saddr() mptcp_for_each_subflow(msk, subflow) Would this walk the zeroed conn_list and dereference a near-NULL entry? The other iterator users, mptcp_nl_flush_addrs_list(), mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags_all() and mptcp_nl_remove_id_zero_address(), would also act on a half-built or unrelated msk. Should the re-check after the acquire also confirm the msk is still hashed in this slot, for example: !sk_unhashed(sk) && (READ_ONCE(msk->token) & token_mask) == slot -- Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/tencent_28A2BD1631FE531992E91753BA6419FFC506%40qq.com ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net 2/2] net: core: take the reuseport migration reference with acquire ordering [not found] <20261112124547.193812-1-2122295973@qq.com> 2026-11-12 12:45 ` [PATCH net 1/2] net: mptcp: take token lookup references with acquire ordering Hang Nan @ 2026-11-12 12:45 ` Hang Nan 2026-11-13 13:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko [not found] ` <20261112124547.193812-2-2122295973@qq.com> 2 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Hang Nan @ 2026-11-12 12:45 UTC (permalink / raw) To: netdev Cc: mptcp, matttbe, martineau, geliang, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, kuniyu, willemb, linux-kernel, Hang Nan, stable reuseport_migrate_sock() returns a listener with a reference held, and every caller immediately reads that listener: tcp_v4_rcv() and tcp_v6_rcv() pass it to tcp_filter() and tcp_check_req(), and the request-socket paths clone its state. A listener removed from the reuseport group concurrently with that lookup must not be observed in a half-torn-down state after the reference was successfully taken. refcount_inc_not_zero() lost its acquire ordering in the refcount_t consolidation (fb041bb7c0a9), so these subsequent reads are not ordered against the reference acquisition. Use refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire(), as was done for the established-socket lookups, inet_twsk_purge() and bpf_sk_assign() in 5b5d8f351dd9. No behaviour change on strongly ordered architectures. Fixes: fb041bb7c0a9 ("locking/refcount: Consolidate implementations of refcount_t") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hang Nan <2122295973@qq.com> --- net/core/sock_reuseport.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c index fccbdd0430b0..78d1d7103122 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c +++ b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c @@ -666,7 +666,8 @@ struct sock *reuseport_migrate_sock(struct sock *sk, if (!nsk) nsk = reuseport_select_sock_by_hash(reuse, hash, socks); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(nsk) || unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&nsk->sk_refcnt))) { + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(nsk) || + unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire(&nsk->sk_refcnt))) { nsk = NULL; goto failure; } -- 2.53.0 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net: core: take the reuseport migration reference with acquire ordering 2026-11-12 12:45 ` [PATCH net 2/2] net: core: take the reuseport migration reference " Hang Nan @ 2026-11-13 13:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: netdev-bot+sashiko @ 2026-11-13 13:05 UTC (permalink / raw) To: 2122295973 Cc: netdev, mptcp, matttbe, martineau, geliang, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, kuniyu, willemb, linux-kernel, stable Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider. Critical: 0 · High: 0 · Medium: 1 · Low: 1 If you believe none of the issues are legitimate, please reply to each issue of Medium severity or higher and explain why the AI is wrong. If any of them are legitimate and you plan to respin, please let patchwork know by including "pw-bot: cr" as a separate line at the end of your reply (one such reply per series is enough). - [Medium] The commit message says the reuseport_migrate_sock() refcount change prevents a listener that is concurrently removed from the… - [Low] The comment in inet_reqsk_clone() (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:925) says its sock_put(sk) on the… -- net: core: take the reuseport migration reference with acquire ordering This commit changes reuseport_migrate_sock() to take the reference on the selected listener with refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire() instead of refcount_inc_not_zero(). The stated goal is to stop callers from observing a listener in a half-torn-down state when it is removed from the reuseport group at the same time. The patch carries Fixes: and Cc: stable tags. > diff --git a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c > index b9e5648fa4c51..56230aa55a3e2 100644 > --- a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c > +++ b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c > @@ -667,7 +667,8 @@ struct sock *reuseport_migrate_sock(struct sock *sk, > if (!nsk) > nsk = reuseport_select_sock_by_hash(reuse, hash, socks); > > - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(nsk) || unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&nsk->sk_refcnt))) { > + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(nsk) || > + unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire(&nsk->sk_refcnt))) { [Severity: Medium] What does the acquire ordering on this increment order against? The commit message says: A listener removed from the reuseport group concurrently with that lookup must not be observed in a half-torn-down state after the reference was successfully taken. reuseport_migrate_sock() picks nsk from reuse->socks[] while holding rcu_read_lock(). Every hashed listener gets SOCK_RCU_FREE in __inet_hash(): net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:__inet_hash() { ... sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE); ... } So the listener's memory cannot be freed or reused for another socket inside this RCU section. Also, nothing after the increment re-validates nsk. There is no sk_state or sk_reuseport_cb re-check before nsk is returned. The contract for the helper in include/linux/refcount.h limits it to that reuse case: refcount_{add|inc}_not_zero_acquire() and refcount_set_release() provide acquire and release ordering for cases when the memory occupied by the object might be reused to store another object. This is important for the cases where secondary validation is required to detect such reuse, e.g. SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU. The secondary validation checks have to happen after the refcount is taken, hence acquire order is necessary. Neither condition holds here. Commit 5b5d8f351dd9, cited as precedent, only changed sites where the socket is validated again after the reference is taken. __inet_lookup_established() re-runs inet_match() and checks the unhashed state, and inet_twsk_purge() re-checks check_net(). Its bpf_sk_assign() change had a separate justification: a BTF socket pointer obtained without a reference. A listener that is being closed is torn down while the closer still holds its own reference. That teardown is not published through a release on sk_refcnt. So even with the acquire, can't a caller still see the closing listener? Callers already handle that state with an explicit check, for example in inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(): spin_lock(&queue->rskq_lock); if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)) { inet_child_forget(sk, req, child); The same pattern also exists elsewhere and is left alone. inet_lookup(), inet6_lookup(), and nf_tproxy_get_sock_v4()/nf_tproxy_get_sock_v6() all take a reference on an unreferenced listener with plain refcount_inc_not_zero() and then use it. Those sites look correct for the same RCU-stable reason, which suggests this one is correct as well without the change. Given that, are the Fixes: fb041bb7c0a9 and Cc: stable tags justified? Could the commit message name a concrete load that can see stale data here, or include a reproducer? As written, the patch adds a barrier on weakly ordered architectures but does not change what callers can observe. > nsk = NULL; > goto failure; > } [Severity: Low] This isn't a bug, but the comment on the matching release in inet_reqsk_clone() still names the old primitive: net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:inet_reqsk_clone() { ... if (!nreq) { __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQFAILURE); /* paired with refcount_inc_not_zero() in reuseport_migrate_sock() */ sock_put(sk); return NULL; } ... } Should this comment be updated if the switch to refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire() is kept? -- Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/tencent_28A2BD1631FE531992E91753BA6419FFC506%40qq.com ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <20261112124547.193812-2-2122295973@qq.com>]
* Re: [PATCH net 1/2] net: mptcp: take token lookup references with acquire ordering [not found] ` <20261112124547.193812-2-2122295973@qq.com> @ 2026-11-12 12:52 ` Hang Nan 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Hang Nan @ 2026-11-12 12:52 UTC (permalink / raw) To: netdev Cc: mptcp, matttbe, martineau, geliang, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, kuniyu, willemb, linux-kernel, stable Hi, Thanks for the automated review. Here is the missing information for the series. How it was found: manual code inspection, not a runtime report. While looking at net/ lockless lookups right after 5b5d8f351dd9 landed, I enumerated every refcount_inc_not_zero() call site in net/ (101 of them) and classified each one by whether the reference is taken only to keep the object alive, or whether object state is re-validated after the acquisition. mptcp_token_get_sock() and mptcp_token_iter_next() are in the second group: they re-read msk->token and sock_net(sk) after the increment, and mptcp_token_destroy() unlinks the socket and then does WRITE_ONCE(msk->token, 0), so the re-validation is the only thing that rejects a socket whose token has already been cleared. reuseport_migrate_sock() in 2/2 is the only other site with that shape in net/. The enumeration of the call sites was tool-assisted; the classification and both changes were checked by hand against the callers and against the teardown paths. Whether it was triggered: no. This is a theoretical ordering gap, not an observed crash. I have no syzbot report, no KCSAN splat, and no runtime reproducer. The reordering is not observable on x86-64 (TSO does not allow it), and demonstrating it would need a weakly ordered CPU (arm64) or KCSAN, neither of which I have access to. So the series does not claim to fix an observed bug. What was verified: the re-validation exists and is the guard described above; the teardown order is __sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu() followed by WRITE_ONCE(msk->token, 0) in mptcp_token_destroy(); both touched objects compile cleanly (net/mptcp/token.o, net/core/sock_reuseport.o) and the change is a no-op on strongly ordered CPUs. The argument is the same one used in 5b5d8f351dd9 for the inet lookups: a successful reference acquisition has to order the validation that follows it. Happy to drop the series or fold it into a larger ordering series if reviewers would rather wait for a KCSAN/arm64 demonstration. Hang Nan ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
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