* [BUG] sctp: auth: NULL asoc->shkey after a failed SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY makes close() oops
@ 2026-11-19 3:04 Kyuwon Cho
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Kyuwon Cho @ 2026-11-19 3:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner, Xin Long
Cc: David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Simon Horman, Jun Yang, linux-sctp, netdev, linux-kernel
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3714 bytes --]
Hi Marcelo, Xin,
While testing v7.4-rc3 with an LLM-guided test generator that we are
developing as a research prototype, we found that an SCTP association
whose shared key could not be set up still builds authenticated chunks,
with a NULL key. Closing such a socket with SO_LINGER {1, 0} then
oopses in sctp_auth_shkey_hold(); here as an unprivileged user:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sctp_auth_shkey_hold (include/linux/refcount.h:366 net/sctp/auth.c:113)
Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000018 by task test/115
CPU: 1 UID: 65534 PID: 115 Comm: test Not tainted 7.4.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
sctp_auth_shkey_hold (include/linux/refcount.h:366 net/sctp/auth.c:113)
sctp_control_set_owner_w (net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:112)
sctp_make_abort_user (net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1492 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:953 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1016)
sctp_close (net/sctp/socket.c:1564)
inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:443)
__sock_release (net/socket.c:735)
sock_close (net/socket.c:1529)
__fput (fs/file_table.c:512)
fput_close_sync (fs/file_table.c:618)
__x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1574 fs/open.c:1597 fs/open.c:1584)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
</TASK>
When the INIT-ACK arrives, sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack() queues
SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT, which records that the peer supports AUTH and which
chunks it wants authenticated, and then SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY:
case SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY:
error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc,
GFP_ATOMIC);
break;
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() returns -ENOMEM before it sets
asoc->shkey when the secret cannot be allocated:
secret = sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret(asoc, ep_key, gfp);
if (!secret)
return -ENOMEM;
...
asoc->shkey = ep_key;
sctp_cmd_interpreter() then drops the remaining commands, but the
association stays, with peer.auth_capable set and asoc->shkey NULL. If
the peer listed ABORT among the chunks to authenticate, the ABORT that
close() builds has chunk->auth set, and sctp_control_set_owner_w()
takes a reference on the NULL key:
if (chunk->auth) {
if (!chunk->shkey)
chunk->shkey = asoc->shkey;
sctp_auth_shkey_hold(chunk->shkey);
}
The peer can be remote; the local side needs one GFP_ATOMIC allocation
to fail while it processes the INIT-ACK. The reproducer makes it fail
with fail-nth (CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION) and runs as an unprivileged user
(uid 65534) in its own user and network namespace: a listener on
127.0.0.1 with AUTH enabled and ABORT in its SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK list, and
a client that connects with fail-nth set to 1..60 and closes each
socket with SO_LINGER {1, 0}. On an x86_64 QEMU guest with 2 vCPUs and
KASAN (gcc 13.3), it oopses every time.
The reference on the shared key comes from 1b1e0bc99474 ("sctp: add
refcnt support for sh_key"). ad1320865b18 ("sctp: hold shkey across
socket migration") and 52ffeaa358d1 ("sctp: re-point retained control
chunks on association migration"), both in v7.4-rc3, handle the
migration paths and not this one.
Checked against v7.4-rc3 (aebb72744764); this code is the same in net
(2a324a58a084).
A patch is attached (git format-patch against v7.4-rc3; it applies to
net (2a324a58a084)):
0001-sctp-auth-don-t-authenticate-chunks-without-an-assoc.patch
It makes sctp_auth_send_cid() return false while asoc->shkey is NULL, so
chunks are not marked for authentication until the association has a
key. It was written with LLM assistance; we reviewed and tested it. With
it, the reproducer no longer triggers the report.
The reproducer (repro.c), the kernel config and the patch are attached.
Thanks,
Kyuwon Cho
[-- Attachment #2: repro.c --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2911 bytes --]
// KASAN: null-ptr-deref Write in sctp_auth_shkey_hold, from close() on an SCTP socket whose association
// shared key could not be set up.
// A listener on 127.0.0.1:9999 enables AUTH and lists ABORT among the chunks that must be authenticated, so its
// INIT-ACK asks the client to authenticate ABORT. Each client connect() fails its Nth allocation (fail-nth,
// CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION); when the failed one is the association key secret of SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY, the
// association keeps peer.auth_capable with asoc->shkey == NULL, and close() with SO_LINGER {1, 0} builds an
// authenticated ABORT that takes a reference on the NULL key.
// It runs in a new user and network namespace, so it works as an unprivileged user too.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define SOL_SCTP 132
#define SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK 21
#define SCTP_AUTH_SUPPORTED 129
static void write_file(const char *path, const char *s)
{
int f = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (f >= 0 && write(f, s, strlen(s)) < 0)
perror(path);
close(f);
}
static void enter_netns_with_lo(void)
{
struct ifreq ifr = { .ifr_name = "lo", .ifr_flags = IFF_UP };
char map[32];
int s;
snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %d 1", getuid());
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET))
perror("unshare");
write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny");
write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", map);
snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %d 1", getgid());
write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", map);
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
ioctl(s, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr);
close(s);
}
static int sctp_auth_socket(void)
{
struct { int32_t assoc_id; uint32_t value; } on = { 0, 1 };
int s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SCTP);
setsockopt(s, SOL_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_SUPPORTED, &on, sizeof(on));
return s;
}
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in sa = { .sin_family = AF_INET, .sin_port = htons(9999) };
struct linger abort_on_close = { 1, 0 };
uint8_t abort_chunk = 6; /* SCTP_CID_ABORT */
int lst, fail;
enter_netns_with_lo();
lst = sctp_auth_socket();
fail = open("/proc/self/fail-nth", O_WRONLY);
inet_pton(AF_INET, "127.0.0.1", &sa.sin_addr);
setsockopt(lst, SOL_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK, &abort_chunk, sizeof(abort_chunk));
if (bind(lst, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) || listen(lst, 128) || fail < 0) {
perror("setup");
return 1;
}
for (int n = 1; n <= 60; n++) {
int c = sctp_auth_socket();
char nth[16];
fcntl(c, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
pwrite(fail, nth, snprintf(nth, sizeof(nth), "%d", n), 0);
connect(c, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));
usleep(20000);
pwrite(fail, "0", 1, 0);
setsockopt(c, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &abort_on_close, sizeof(abort_on_close));
close(c);
usleep(5000);
}
printf("done\n");
return 0;
}
[-- Attachment #3: config.gz --]
[-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 38966 bytes --]
[-- Attachment #4: 0001-sctp-auth-don-t-authenticate-chunks-without-an-assoc.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1705 bytes --]
>From 2e554096914c2c0823d4f2e396cdf9fcece2663e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kyuwon Cho <kyuwoncho18@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 11:36:52 +0900
Subject: [PATCH net] sctp: auth: don't authenticate chunks without an
association key
When the INIT-ACK is processed, SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT marks the peer as
AUTH capable and SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY then sets up the association key.
If sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() fails to allocate the secret, it
returns -ENOMEM before setting asoc->shkey, but the association stays,
with peer.auth_capable set. A chunk that the peer wants authenticated,
such as the ABORT built by close() with SO_LINGER {1, 0}, then takes a
reference on the NULL key:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sctp_auth_shkey_hold (net/sctp/auth.c:113)
Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000018
Call Trace:
sctp_auth_shkey_hold (net/sctp/auth.c:113)
sctp_control_set_owner_w (net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:112)
sctp_make_abort_user (net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1016)
sctp_close (net/sctp/socket.c:1564)
Don't mark chunks for authentication while the association has no key.
Fixes: 1b1e0bc99474 ("sctp: add refcnt support for sh_key")
Signed-off-by: Kyuwon Cho <kyuwoncho18@gmail.com>
---
net/sctp/auth.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index cbeb8a87a17a..5f8e110929d4 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ int sctp_auth_send_cid(enum sctp_cid chunk, const struct sctp_association *asoc)
if (!asoc)
return 0;
- if (!asoc->peer.auth_capable)
+ if (!asoc->peer.auth_capable || !asoc->shkey)
return 0;
return __sctp_auth_cid(chunk, asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
--
2.43.0
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