From: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<dave.hansen@intel.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<chao.gao@intel.com>, <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
<mlevitsk@redhat.com>, <john.allen@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 09:43:18 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <18f3d0e9-316a-49ec-87fd-3fd16828c7f8@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240116072555.jnj74yairx7add6i@yy-desk-7060>
On 1/16/2024 3:25 PM, Yuan Yao wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 21, 2023 at 09:02:37AM -0500, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>> Expose CET features to guest if KVM/host can support them, clear CPUID
>> feature bits if KVM/host cannot support.
>>
>> Set CPUID feature bits so that CET features are available in guest CPUID.
>> Add CR4.CET bit support in order to allow guest set CET master control
>> bit.
>>
>> Disable KVM CET feature if unrestricted_guest is unsupported/disabled as
>> KVM does not support emulating CET.
>>
>> The CET load-bits in VM_ENTRY/VM_EXIT control fields should be set to make
>> guest CET xstates isolated from host's.
>>
>> On platforms with VMX_BASIC[bit56] == 0, inject #CP at VMX entry with error
>> code will fail, and if VMX_BASIC[bit56] == 1, #CP injection with or without
>> error code is allowed. Disable CET feature bits if the MSR bit is cleared
>> so that nested VMM can inject #CP if and only if VMX_BASIC[bit56] == 1.
>>
>> Don't expose CET feature if either of {U,S}_CET xstate bits is cleared
>> in host XSS or if XSAVES isn't supported.
>>
>> CET MSR contents after reset, power-up and INIT are set to 0s, clears the
>> guest fpstate fields so that the guest MSRs are reset to 0s after the events.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
>> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
>> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 6 ++++++
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 6 ++++--
>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 3 +++
>> 8 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> ...
>> -#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS 0
>> +#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | \
>> + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
>>
>> u64 __read_mostly host_efer;
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_efer);
>> @@ -9921,6 +9922,20 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
>> if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
>> kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
>>
>> + if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
>> + !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
>> + kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~(XFEATURE_CET_USER |
>> + XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL);
> Looks should be XFEATURE_MASK_xxx.
Good catch! Thanks!
>
>> +
>> + if ((kvm_caps.supported_xss & (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER |
>> + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) !=
>> + (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) {
>> + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
>> + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
>> + kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~(XFEATURE_CET_USER |
>> + XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL);
> Ditto.
Yes.
>
>> + }
>> +
>> #define __kvm_cpu_cap_has(UNUSED_, f) kvm_cpu_cap_has(f)
>> cr4_reserved_bits = __cr4_reserved_bits(__kvm_cpu_cap_has, UNUSED_);
>> #undef __kvm_cpu_cap_has
>> @@ -12392,7 +12407,9 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>
>> static inline bool is_xstate_reset_needed(void)
>> {
>> - return kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX);
>> + return kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX) ||
>> + kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
>> + kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
>> }
>>
>> void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
>> @@ -12469,6 +12486,16 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
>> XFEATURE_BNDCSR);
>> }
>>
>> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
>> + fpstate_clear_xstate_component(fpstate,
>> + XFEATURE_CET_USER);
>> + fpstate_clear_xstate_component(fpstate,
>> + XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL);
>> + } else if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
>> + fpstate_clear_xstate_component(fpstate,
>> + XFEATURE_CET_USER);
>> + }
>> +
>> if (init_event)
>> kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
>> }
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>> index 656107e64c93..cc585051d24b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>> @@ -533,6 +533,9 @@ bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type);
>> __reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_PCIDE; \
>> if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_LAM)) \
>> __reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_LAM_SUP; \
>> + if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && \
>> + !__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_IBT)) \
>> + __reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_CET; \
>> __reserved_bits; \
>> })
>>
>> --
>> 2.39.3
>>
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-17 1:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-21 14:02 [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:25 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03 9:10 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:26 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04 22:26 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:32 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03 9:17 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:32 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03 18:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04 2:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 8:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:33 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:33 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-15 9:58 ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17 1:41 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-17 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-17 5:31 ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17 6:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-16 7:25 ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17 1:43 ` Yang, Weijiang [this message]
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:35 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-16 7:22 ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17 1:53 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-03 18:50 ` [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04 7:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 21:10 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 0:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05 0:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 0:44 ` Jim Mattson
2024-01-05 0:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05 9:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-05 16:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05 17:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 18:09 ` Jim Mattson
2024-01-05 18:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 19:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-08 14:17 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-09 15:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-11 14:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-15 1:55 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-17 0:53 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-05 9:04 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
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