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From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	seanjc@google.com,  pbonzini@redhat.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,  john.allen@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling
Date: Wed, 03 Jan 2024 00:24:44 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5c71c27f0730fc6edcf7d19036d1226786c30364.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231221140239.4349-3-weijiang.yang@intel.com>

On Thu, 2023-12-21 at 09:02 -0500, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> Remove XFEATURE_CET_USER entry from dependency array as the entry doesn't
> reflect true dependency between CET features and the user xstate bit.
> Enable the bit in fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features when either SHSTK or IBT is
> available.
> 
> Both user mode shadow stack and indirect branch tracking features depend
> on XFEATURE_CET_USER bit in XSS to automatically save/restore user mode
> xstate registers, i.e., IA32_U_CET and IA32_PL3_SSP whenever necessary.
> 
> Note, the issue, i.e., CPUID only enumerates IBT but no SHSTK is resulted
> from CET KVM series which synthesizes guest CPUIDs based on userspace
> settings,in real world the case is rare. In other words, the existing
> dependency check is correct when only user mode SHSTK is available.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 9 ++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> index 07911532b108..f6b98693da59 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> @@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ static unsigned short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
>  	[XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR]	= X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
>  	[XFEATURE_PKRU]				= X86_FEATURE_OSPKE,
>  	[XFEATURE_PASID]			= X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
> -	[XFEATURE_CET_USER]			= X86_FEATURE_SHSTK,
>  	[XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG]			= X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,
>  	[XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA]			= X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,
>  };
> @@ -798,6 +797,14 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(unsigned int legacy_size)
>  			fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &= ~BIT_ULL(i);
>  	}
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * CET user mode xstate bit has been cleared by above sanity check.
> +	 * Now pick it up if either SHSTK or IBT is available. Either feature
> +	 * depends on the xstate bit to save/restore user mode states.
> +	 */
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> +		fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features |= BIT_ULL(XFEATURE_CET_USER);
> +

I am still not convinced that this is not a workaround for a bug in the sanity check code,
and I don't really like this, but whatever, as long as the code works, 
I don't intend to fight over this. Let it be.

Best regards,
	Maxim Levitsky


>  	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
>  		fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC;
>  





  reply	other threads:[~2024-01-02 22:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-21 14:02 [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:24   ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:25   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03  9:10     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:26     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04 22:26   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:32   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03  9:17     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:42     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:32   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03 18:16   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04  2:16     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:47   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05  8:16     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:33   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:33   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-15  9:58   ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17  1:41     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-17  1:58       ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-17  5:31         ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17  6:16           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-16  7:25   ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17  1:43     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:35   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-16  7:22   ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17  1:53     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-03 18:50 ` [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04  7:11   ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 21:10     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05  0:22       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05  0:34         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05  0:44           ` Jim Mattson
2024-01-05  0:54           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05  9:28             ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-05 16:21               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05 17:52                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 18:09                   ` Jim Mattson
2024-01-05 18:51                     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 19:34                       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-08 14:17                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-09 15:10                   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-11 14:56                     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-15  1:55                       ` Chao Gao
2024-01-17  0:53                         ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-05  9:04       ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P

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