From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] security/selinux: decrement sizeof size in strncmp
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2009 16:23:16 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <19857.1258147396@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 12 Nov 2009 18:11:55 PST." <4AFCC06B.1030302@schaufler-ca.com>
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On Thu, 12 Nov 2009 18:11:55 PST, Casey Schaufler said:
> James Morris wrote:
> > Do you see potential for a buffer overrun in this case?
> No, but I hate arguing with people who think that every time
> they see strcmp that they have found a security flaw.
How do you feel about people who think every time they see strcmp()
"Oh crap, something that needs auditing"? ;)
The biggest problem with strcmp() is that even if it got audited when that code
went in, it's prone to unaudited breakage when somebody changes something in
some other piece of code, quite often in some other .c file in some other
directory.
Julia, is there a way to use coccinelle to detect unsafe changes like that? Or
is expressing those semantics too difficult?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-11-13 21:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-11-12 7:49 Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 8:16 ` James Morris
2009-11-12 14:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-11-12 14:57 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 16:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-12 18:28 ` David Wagner
2009-11-12 21:41 ` James Morris
2009-11-12 21:59 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 23:56 ` David Wagner
2009-11-13 2:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-13 20:32 ` David Wagner
2009-11-13 21:23 ` Valdis.Kletnieks [this message]
2009-11-13 21:26 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-13 23:08 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-14 0:41 ` David Wagner
2009-11-14 5:08 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-14 15:22 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-13 23:06 ` David Wagner
2009-11-14 3:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-14 3:44 ` David Wagner
2009-11-14 3:48 ` Joe Perches
2009-11-14 5:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-14 5:26 ` Joe Perches
2009-11-14 7:20 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-15 7:45 ` Raja R Harinath
2009-11-15 18:44 ` Casey Schaufler
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