From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de, dionnaglaze@google.com, pgonda@google.com,
seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 11:30:07 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1a4e6652-2e24-955c-5332-da84cced68e4@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230722111909.15166-6-nikunj@amd.com>
On 7/22/23 06:19, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> Drop vmpck and os_area_msg_seqno pointers so that secret page layout
> does not need to be exposed to the sev-guest driver after the rework.
> Instead, add helper APIs to access vmpck and os_area_msg_seqno when
> needed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
> ---
> drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 84 +++++++++++++------------
> 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> index d4241048b397..8ad43e007d3b 100644
> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> @@ -50,8 +50,7 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {
>
> struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
> struct snp_req_data input;
> - u32 *os_area_msg_seqno;
> - u8 *vmpck;
> + unsigned int vmpck_id;
> };
>
> static u32 vmpck_id;
> @@ -67,12 +66,23 @@ static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
> +static inline u8 *snp_get_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
> +{
> + return snp_dev->layout->vmpck0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id * VMPCK_KEY_LEN;
> +}
> +
> +static inline u32 *snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
> +{
> + return &snp_dev->layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id;
> +}
> +
> +static bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
I noticed this name change from is_vmpck_empty() to snp_is_vmpck_empty().
Is that in prep for moving, too? Is so, maybe call that out in the commit
message.
> {
> char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0};
> + u8 *key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev);
>
> - if (snp_dev->vmpck)
> - return !memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
> + if (key)
> + return !memcmp(key, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
I believe key can't be NULL, so this check isn't required.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> return true;
> }
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-01 16:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-22 11:18 [PATCH v3 00/14] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:18 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-01 15:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-07-22 11:18 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] virt: sev-guest: Move mutex to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:18 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] virt: sev-guest: Replace pr_debug with dev_dbg Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-01 15:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-08-02 4:08 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:18 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-01 15:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-08-02 4:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-01 16:30 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2023-08-02 4:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-08-02 16:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-08-03 5:02 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-01 16:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] x86/tsc: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-07-22 11:19 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-01 4:47 ` [PATCH v3 00/14] Add Secure TSC support " Nikunj A. Dadhania
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