From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Maxime Bélair" <maxime.belair@canonical.com>,
"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, kees@kernel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_manage_policy hook
Date: Sun, 11 May 2025 04:20:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1b01ccd0-5a1b-4b34-bbe4-13ee3b73292d@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250509.Chuecae0phoo@digikod.net>
On 5/9/25 03:26, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On Thu, May 08, 2025 at 09:54:19AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 5/8/2025 1:29 AM, John Johansen wrote:
>>> On 5/7/25 13:25, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>> On Wed, May 7, 2025 at 6:41 AM Tetsuo Handa
>>>> <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
>>>>> On 2025/05/06 23:32, Maxime Bélair wrote:
>>>>>> diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
>>>>>> index dcaad8818679..b39e6635a7d5 100644
>>>>>> --- a/security/lsm_syscalls.c
>>>>>> +++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
>>>>>> @@ -122,5 +122,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lsm_list_modules, u64 __user
>>>>>> *, ids, u32 __user *, size,
>>>>>> SYSCALL_DEFINE5(lsm_manage_policy, u32, lsm_id, u32, op, void
>>>>>> __user *, buf, u32
>>>>>> __user *, size, u32, flags)
>>>>>> {
>>>>>> - return 0;
>>>>>> + size_t usize;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (get_user(usize, size))
>>>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + return security_lsm_manage_policy(lsm_id, op, buf, usize,
>>>>>> flags);
>>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> syzbot will report user-controlled unbounded huge size memory
>>>>> allocation attempt. ;-)
>>>>>
>>>>> This interface might be fine for AppArmor, but TOMOYO won't use this
>>>>> interface because
>>>>> TOMOYO's policy is line-oriented ASCII text data where the
>>>>> destination is switched via
>>>>> pseudo‑filesystem's filename ...
>>>>
>>>> While Tetsuo's comment is limited to TOMOYO, I believe the argument
>>>> applies to a number of other LSMs as well. The reality is that there
>>>> is no one policy ideal shared across LSMs and that complicates things
>>>> like the lsm_manage_policy() proposal. I'm intentionally saying
>>>> "complicates" and not "prevents" because I don't want to flat out
>>>> reject something like this, but I think there needs to be a larger
>>>> discussion among the different LSM groups about what such an API
>>>> should look like. We may not need to get every LSM to support this
>>>> new API, but we need to get something that would work for a
>>>> significant majority and would be general/extensible enough that we
>>>> would expect it to work with the majority of future LSMs (as much as
>>>> we can predict the future anyway).
>>>>
>>>
>>> yep, I look at this is just a starting point for discussion. There
>>> isn't going to be any discussion without some code, so here is a v1
>>> that supports a single LSM let the bike shedding begin.
>>
>> Aside from the issues with allocating a buffer for a big policy
>> I don't see a problem with this proposal. The system call looks
>> a lot like the other LSM interfaces, so any developer who likes
>> those ought to like this one. The infrastructure can easily check
>> the lsm_id and only call the appropriate LSM hook, so no one
>> is going to be interfering with other modules.
>
> We may not want to only be able to load buffers containing policies, but
> also to leverage file descriptors like Landlock does. Getting a
I am not opposed to a syscall that leverages file desriptors like landlock
but that would be a different syscall with different semantics, and
something for an lsm that wants that semantic to introduce.
> property from a kernel object or updating it is mainly about dealing
> with a buffer. And the current LSM syscalls do just that. Other kind
> of operations may require more than that though.
>
sure but they don't do it for the semantic of loading/managing policy.
> I don't like multiplexer syscalls because they don't expose a clear
> semantic and can be complex to manage and filter. This new syscall is
> kind of a multiplexer that redirect commands to an arbitrary set of
> kernel parts, which can then define their own semantic. I'd like to see
> a clear set of well-defined operations and their required permission.
> Even better, one syscall per operation should simplify their interface.
I am not opposed to that approach. This can be multiple syscalls. Its
a v1 to try and see if we can come to any agreement on a set of semantics
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-11 11:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-06 14:32 [PATCH 0/3] lsm: introduce lsm_manage_policy() syscall Maxime Bélair
2025-05-06 14:32 ` [PATCH 1/3] Wire up the lsm_manage_policy syscall Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07 6:26 ` Song Liu
2025-05-07 15:37 ` Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07 22:04 ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-08 7:52 ` John Johansen
2025-05-09 10:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-11 11:09 ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 6:06 ` Song Liu
2025-05-08 8:18 ` John Johansen
2025-05-09 10:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-11 10:47 ` John Johansen
2025-05-12 10:20 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-17 7:59 ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 7:12 ` John Johansen
2025-05-07 13:58 ` kernel test robot
2025-05-06 14:32 ` [PATCH 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_manage_policy hook Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07 6:19 ` Song Liu
2025-05-07 15:37 ` Maxime Bélair
2025-05-08 8:20 ` John Johansen
2025-05-07 10:40 ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-07 15:37 ` Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07 20:25 ` Paul Moore
2025-05-08 8:29 ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 16:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-09 10:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-09 14:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-11 11:26 ` John Johansen
2025-05-11 11:20 ` John Johansen [this message]
2025-05-08 8:25 ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 12:55 ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-08 14:44 ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 15:07 ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-09 3:25 ` John Johansen
2025-05-07 12:04 ` kernel test robot
2025-05-06 14:32 ` [PATCH 3/3] AppArmor: add support for lsm_manage_policy Maxime Bélair
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