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From: "Maxime Bélair" <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, mic@digikod.net,
	kees@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_manage_policy hook
Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 17:37:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <705fa834-b680-4a0e-9996-cca0565b0987@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9c68743f-5efa-4a77-a29b-d3e8f2b2a462@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>



On 5/7/25 12:40, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2025/05/06 23:32, Maxime Bélair wrote:
>> diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
>> index dcaad8818679..b39e6635a7d5 100644
>> --- a/security/lsm_syscalls.c
>> +++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
>> @@ -122,5 +122,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lsm_list_modules, u64 __user *, ids, u32 __user *, size,
>>  SYSCALL_DEFINE5(lsm_manage_policy, u32, lsm_id, u32, op, void __user *, buf, u32
>>  		__user *, size, u32, flags)
>>  {
>> -	return 0;
>> +	size_t usize;
>> +
>> +	if (get_user(usize, size))
>> +		return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +	return security_lsm_manage_policy(lsm_id, op, buf, usize, flags);
>>  }
> 
> syzbot will report user-controlled unbounded huge size memory allocation attempt. ;-)
> 
> This interface might be fine for AppArmor, but TOMOYO won't use this interface because
> TOMOYO's policy is line-oriented ASCII text data where the destination is switched via
> pseudo‑filesystem's filename; use of filename helps restricting which type of policy
> can be manipulated by which process. 

First, like any LSM, TOMOYO is not obliged to implement every operation. It can simply
expose the one that makes sense for its use case. For instance, I don't think it needs an
equivalent of the manager interface.

If TOMOYO wants to support several sub‑operations, it can distinguish them with the
syscall’s flags parameter instead of filenames (as securityfs_if.c does today) and reuse
the code already employed by its pseudo‑fs, as in the AppArmor patch. Supporting this
syscall would therefore require only minimal changes.

Line‑oriented ASCII text is not a barrier, either. The syscall can pass that format just
fine. Because a typical TOMOYO line is very small, the performance gains from using the
syscall are actually greater. A brief benchmark is available in [1].

Thanks,

Maxime

[1] https://gitlab.com/-/snippets/4840792

  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-07 15:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-06 14:32 [PATCH 0/3] lsm: introduce lsm_manage_policy() syscall Maxime Bélair
2025-05-06 14:32 ` [PATCH 1/3] Wire up the lsm_manage_policy syscall Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07  6:26   ` Song Liu
2025-05-07 15:37     ` Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07 22:04       ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-08  7:52         ` John Johansen
2025-05-09 10:25           ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-11 11:09             ` John Johansen
2025-05-08  6:06       ` Song Liu
2025-05-08  8:18         ` John Johansen
2025-05-09 10:26           ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-11 10:47             ` John Johansen
2025-05-12 10:20               ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-17  7:59                 ` John Johansen
2025-05-08  7:12     ` John Johansen
2025-05-07 13:58   ` kernel test robot
2025-05-06 14:32 ` [PATCH 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_manage_policy hook Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07  6:19   ` Song Liu
2025-05-07 15:37     ` Maxime Bélair
2025-05-08  8:20       ` John Johansen
2025-05-07 10:40   ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-07 15:37     ` Maxime Bélair [this message]
2025-05-07 20:25     ` Paul Moore
2025-05-08  8:29       ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 16:54         ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-09 10:26           ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-09 14:21             ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-11 11:26               ` John Johansen
2025-05-11 11:20             ` John Johansen
2025-05-08  8:25     ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 12:55       ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-08 14:44         ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 15:07           ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-09  3:25             ` John Johansen
2025-05-07 12:04   ` kernel test robot
2025-05-06 14:32 ` [PATCH 3/3] AppArmor: add support for lsm_manage_policy Maxime Bélair

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