mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
To: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
	Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>,
	Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-49995: tipc: guard against string buffer overrun
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 11:17:01 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1cc70ad0-4fa7-422f-ade4-b19a19ce3b61@stanley.mountain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1eb55d16-071a-4e86-9038-31c9bb3f23ed@oracle.com>

On Thu, Apr 24, 2025 at 11:41:01AM +0530, Harshit Mogalapalli wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On 21/10/24 23:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > Description
> > ===========
> > 
> > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> > 
> > tipc: guard against string buffer overrun
> > 
> > Smatch reports that copying media_name and if_name to name_parts may
> > overwrite the destination.
> > 
> >   .../bearer.c:166 bearer_name_validate() error: strcpy() 'media_name' too large for 'name_parts->media_name' (32 vs 16)
> >   .../bearer.c:167 bearer_name_validate() error: strcpy() 'if_name' too large for 'name_parts->if_name' (1010102 vs 16)
> > 
> > This does seem to be the case so guard against this possibility by using
> > strscpy() and failing if truncation occurs.
> > 
> > Introduced by commit b97bf3fd8f6a ("[TIPC] Initial merge")
> > 
> > Compile tested only.
> > 
> > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-49995 to this issue.
> > 
> > 
> 
> Looking at the fix commit with more lines around the fix:
> 
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6555a2a9212be6983d2319d65276484f7c5f431a&context=30
> 
> 
>  	/* validate component parts of bearer name */
>  	if ((media_len <= 1) || (media_len > TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME) ||
>  	    (if_len <= 1) || (if_len > TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME))
>  		return 0;
> 
>  	/* return bearer name components, if necessary */
>  	if (name_parts) {
> -		strcpy(name_parts->media_name, media_name);
> -		strcpy(name_parts->if_name, if_name);
> +		if (strscpy(name_parts->media_name, media_name,
> +			    TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME) < 0)
> +			return 0;
> +		if (strscpy(name_parts->if_name, if_name,
> +			    TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME) < 0)
> +			return 0;
>  	}
>  	return 1;
> 
> 
> 
> both media_len and if_len have validation checks above the if(name_parts)
> check. So I think this patch just silences the static checker warnings.
> 
> Simon/Dan , could you please help confirming that ?

Correct.  The "validate component parts of bearer name" checks are
sufficient.  This will not affect runtime.

regards,
dan carpenter


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-04-24  8:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <2024102138-CVE-2024-49995-ec59@gregkh>
2025-04-24  6:11 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2025-04-24  7:30   ` Simon Horman
2025-04-24  8:17   ` Dan Carpenter [this message]
2025-04-24  8:45     ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2025-04-24 13:44       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1cc70ad0-4fa7-422f-ade4-b19a19ce3b61@stanley.mountain \
    --to=dan.carpenter@linaro.org \
    --cc=cve@kernel.org \
    --cc=error27@gmail.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com \
    --cc=linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=simon.horman@corigine.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®