From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
To: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>,
Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-49995: tipc: guard against string buffer overrun
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 11:17:01 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1cc70ad0-4fa7-422f-ade4-b19a19ce3b61@stanley.mountain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1eb55d16-071a-4e86-9038-31c9bb3f23ed@oracle.com>
On Thu, Apr 24, 2025 at 11:41:01AM +0530, Harshit Mogalapalli wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 21/10/24 23:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > Description
> > ===========
> >
> > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> >
> > tipc: guard against string buffer overrun
> >
> > Smatch reports that copying media_name and if_name to name_parts may
> > overwrite the destination.
> >
> > .../bearer.c:166 bearer_name_validate() error: strcpy() 'media_name' too large for 'name_parts->media_name' (32 vs 16)
> > .../bearer.c:167 bearer_name_validate() error: strcpy() 'if_name' too large for 'name_parts->if_name' (1010102 vs 16)
> >
> > This does seem to be the case so guard against this possibility by using
> > strscpy() and failing if truncation occurs.
> >
> > Introduced by commit b97bf3fd8f6a ("[TIPC] Initial merge")
> >
> > Compile tested only.
> >
> > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-49995 to this issue.
> >
> >
>
> Looking at the fix commit with more lines around the fix:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6555a2a9212be6983d2319d65276484f7c5f431a&context=30
>
>
> /* validate component parts of bearer name */
> if ((media_len <= 1) || (media_len > TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME) ||
> (if_len <= 1) || (if_len > TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME))
> return 0;
>
> /* return bearer name components, if necessary */
> if (name_parts) {
> - strcpy(name_parts->media_name, media_name);
> - strcpy(name_parts->if_name, if_name);
> + if (strscpy(name_parts->media_name, media_name,
> + TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME) < 0)
> + return 0;
> + if (strscpy(name_parts->if_name, if_name,
> + TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME) < 0)
> + return 0;
> }
> return 1;
>
>
>
> both media_len and if_len have validation checks above the if(name_parts)
> check. So I think this patch just silences the static checker warnings.
>
> Simon/Dan , could you please help confirming that ?
Correct. The "validate component parts of bearer name" checks are
sufficient. This will not affect runtime.
regards,
dan carpenter
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-24 8:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2024102138-CVE-2024-49995-ec59@gregkh>
2025-04-24 6:11 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2025-04-24 7:30 ` Simon Horman
2025-04-24 8:17 ` Dan Carpenter [this message]
2025-04-24 8:45 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2025-04-24 13:44 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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