From: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
To: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>,
Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-49995: tipc: guard against string buffer overrun
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 11:41:01 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1eb55d16-071a-4e86-9038-31c9bb3f23ed@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2024102138-CVE-2024-49995-ec59@gregkh>
Hi,
On 21/10/24 23:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> Description
> ===========
>
> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
>
> tipc: guard against string buffer overrun
>
> Smatch reports that copying media_name and if_name to name_parts may
> overwrite the destination.
>
> .../bearer.c:166 bearer_name_validate() error: strcpy() 'media_name' too large for 'name_parts->media_name' (32 vs 16)
> .../bearer.c:167 bearer_name_validate() error: strcpy() 'if_name' too large for 'name_parts->if_name' (1010102 vs 16)
>
> This does seem to be the case so guard against this possibility by using
> strscpy() and failing if truncation occurs.
>
> Introduced by commit b97bf3fd8f6a ("[TIPC] Initial merge")
>
> Compile tested only.
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-49995 to this issue.
>
>
Looking at the fix commit with more lines around the fix:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6555a2a9212be6983d2319d65276484f7c5f431a&context=30
/* validate component parts of bearer name */
if ((media_len <= 1) || (media_len > TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME) ||
(if_len <= 1) || (if_len > TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME))
return 0;
/* return bearer name components, if necessary */
if (name_parts) {
- strcpy(name_parts->media_name, media_name);
- strcpy(name_parts->if_name, if_name);
+ if (strscpy(name_parts->media_name, media_name,
+ TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (strscpy(name_parts->if_name, if_name,
+ TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME) < 0)
+ return 0;
}
return 1;
both media_len and if_len have validation checks above the
if(name_parts) check. So I think this patch just silences the static
checker warnings.
Simon/Dan , could you please help confirming that ?
Thanks,
Harshit
> Affected and fixed versions
> ===========================
>
> Fixed in 5.10.227 with commit e2b2558971e0
> Fixed in 5.15.168 with commit 54dae0e9063e
> Fixed in 6.1.113 with commit 80c0be7bcf94
> Fixed in 6.6.55 with commit 12d26aa7fd3c
> Fixed in 6.10.14 with commit 2ed7f42dfd3e
> Fixed in 6.11.3 with commit a18c7b239d02
> Fixed in 6.12-rc1 with commit 6555a2a9212b
>
> Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
> kernel versions by the kernel community.
>
> Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
> older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
> https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2024-49995
> will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
> up to date information about this issue.
>
>
> Affected files
> ==============
>
> The file(s) affected by this issue are:
> net/tipc/bearer.c
>
>
> Mitigation
> ==========
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
> stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
> changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
> release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
> supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
> the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
> issue can be found at these commits:
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2b2558971e02ca33eb637a8350d68a48b3e8e46
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54dae0e9063ed23c9acf8d5ab9b18d3426a8ac18
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80c0be7bcf940ce9308311575c3aff8983c9b97a
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12d26aa7fd3cbdbc5149b6e516563478d575026e
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ed7f42dfd3edb387034128ca5b0f639836d4ddd
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a18c7b239d02aafb791ae2c45226f6bb40641792
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6555a2a9212be6983d2319d65276484f7c5f431a
next parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-24 6:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2024102138-CVE-2024-49995-ec59@gregkh>
2025-04-24 6:11 ` Harshit Mogalapalli [this message]
2025-04-24 7:30 ` Simon Horman
2025-04-24 8:17 ` Dan Carpenter
2025-04-24 8:45 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2025-04-24 13:44 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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