From: bert hubert <ahu@ds9a.nl>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@osdl.org
Cc: devik@cdi.cz
Subject: [PATCH] Allow /dev/{,k}mem to be disabled to prevent kernel from being modified easily
Date: Sun, 3 Aug 2003 20:09:50 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20030803180950.GA11575@outpost.ds9a.nl> (raw)
Greetings,
After being gloriously rootkitted with a program coded by HTB author Martin
Devera (lots of thanks, devik, your work is appreciated, I suggest you read
up about Oppenheimer when disclaiming that you are 'just a coder'. The item
to google on is: "ethics sweetness hydrogen bomb Oppenheimer"), I wrote
a patch to disable /dev/kmem and /dev/mem, which is harmless on servers
without X.
It blocks attempts by rootkits, such as devik's SucKIT, to hide themselves.
It is not a final solution but it raises the bar a lot. Please apply.
By default, nothing is changed, but I'd turn this feature on on servers
without X. Patch:
--- linux-2.6.0-test1/drivers/char/Kconfig.orig Mon Jul 14 05:29:27 2003
+++ linux-2.6.0-test1/drivers/char/Kconfig Sun Aug 3 19:55:37 2003
@@ -1003,5 +1003,20 @@
out to lunch past a certain margin. It can reboot the system
or merely print a warning.
+config MEMORY_ACCESS
+ bool "Allow userspace access to memory"
+ default y
+ help
+ Security paranoid operators may want to disable userspace
+ from accessing raw memory or kernel memory via /dev/mem and
+ /dev/kmem. Some malware hides itself from sight by manipulating
+ the kernel directly via raw memory, disabling this feature
+ gives some protection against rootkits.
+
+ Answering 'N' generally breaks the X Window System.
+
+ Answer 'Y' unless you are paranoid about security or don't
+ care about X.
+
endmenu
--- linux-2.6.0-test1/drivers/char/mem.c.orig Sun Aug 3 19:22:29 2003
+++ linux-2.6.0-test1/drivers/char/mem.c Sun Aug 3 19:34:04 2003
@@ -608,12 +608,14 @@
static int memory_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
{
switch (minor(inode->i_rdev)) {
+#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_ACCESS)
case 1:
filp->f_op = &mem_fops;
break;
case 2:
filp->f_op = &kmem_fops;
break;
+#endif
case 3:
filp->f_op = &null_fops;
break;
@@ -655,8 +657,10 @@
umode_t mode;
struct file_operations *fops;
} devlist[] = { /* list of minor devices */
+#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_ACCESS)
{1, "mem", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP, &mem_fops},
{2, "kmem", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP, &kmem_fops},
+#endif
{3, "null", S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, &null_fops},
#if defined(CONFIG_ISA) || !defined(__mc68000__)
{4, "port", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP, &port_fops},
--
http://www.PowerDNS.com Open source, database driven DNS Software
http://lartc.org Linux Advanced Routing & Traffic Control HOWTO
next reply other threads:[~2003-08-03 18:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2003-08-03 18:09 bert hubert [this message]
2003-08-03 19:11 ` Willy Tarreau
2003-08-03 19:18 ` bert hubert
2003-08-03 20:26 ` Willy Tarreau
2003-08-03 21:37 ` Andries Brouwer
2003-08-03 19:32 ` Andrew Morton
2003-08-03 20:45 ` bert hubert
2003-08-03 20:52 ` Wichert Akkerman
2003-08-03 21:00 ` Andrew Morton
2003-08-03 21:33 ` David Lang
2003-08-03 21:47 ` bert hubert
2003-08-04 13:10 ` Alan Cox
2003-08-03 20:14 ` Matan Ziv-Av
2003-08-03 21:02 ` Alan Cox
2003-08-03 21:08 ` Erik Andersen
2003-08-04 12:30 ` eliezer
2003-08-04 9:37 ` devik
2003-08-04 13:46 ` bert hubert
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