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From: serue@us.ibm.com
To: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>,
	David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
	Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>,
	Gerrit Huizenga <gerrit@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [patch 3/12] lsm stacking v0.2: introduce security_*_value API
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2005 14:49:27 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050630194927.GC23538@serge.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050630194458.GA23439@serge.austin.ibm.com>

Define the functions to be used by LSMs to add, retrieve, and remove
elements to the kernel object ->security hlists.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/security-stack.h |   51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/security.h       |   29 +++++++++++++++
 security/security.c            |   75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 155 insertions(+)

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/security-stack.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/security-stack.h	2005-06-30 14:11:36.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * security-stack.h
+ *
+ * Contains function prototypes or inline definitions for the
+ * function which manipulate kernel object security annotations.
+ *
+ * If stacker is compiled in, then we use the full functions as
+ * defined in security/security.c.  Otherwise we use the #defines
+ * here.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKER
+extern struct security_list *security_get_value(struct hlist_head *head,
+			int security_id);
+
+extern struct security_list *security_set_value(struct hlist_head *head,
+			int security_id, struct security_list *obj_node);
+extern struct security_list *security_add_value(struct hlist_head *head,
+			int security_id, struct security_list *obj_node);
+extern struct security_list *security_del_value(struct hlist_head *head,
+			int security_id);
+#else
+static inline struct security_list *
+security_get_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id)
+{
+	struct hlist_node *tmp = head->first;
+	return tmp ? hlist_entry(tmp, struct security_list, list) : NULL;
+}
+
+static inline struct security_list *
+security_set_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id,
+	struct security_list *obj_node)
+{
+	head->first = &obj_node->list;
+}
+
+static inline struct security_list *
+security_add_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id,
+	struct security_list *obj_node)
+{
+	head->first = &obj_node->list;
+}
+
+static inline struct security_list *
+security_del_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id)
+{
+	struct hlist_node *tmp = head->first;
+	head->first = NULL;
+	return tmp ? hlist_entry(tmp, struct security_list, list) : NULL;
+}
+#endif
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/security.h
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc1.orig/include/linux/security.h	2005-06-30 14:03:13.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/security.h	2005-06-30 14:11:36.000000000 -0500
@@ -34,6 +34,35 @@
 struct ctl_table;
 
 /*
+ * structure to be embedded at top of each LSM's security
+ * objects.
+ */
+struct security_list {
+	struct hlist_node list;
+	int security_id;
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * These #defines present more convenient interfaces to
+ * LSMs for using the security{g,d,s}et_value functions.
+ */
+#define security_get_value_type(head, id, type) ( { \
+	struct security_list *v = security_get_value(head, id); \
+	v ? hlist_entry(v, type, lsm_list) : NULL; } )
+
+#define security_set_value_type(head, id, value) \
+	security_set_value(head, id, &value->lsm_list);
+
+#define security_add_value_type(head, id, value) \
+	security_add_value(head, id, &value->lsm_list);
+
+#define security_del_value_type(head, id, type) ( { \
+	struct security_list *v; \
+	v = security_del_value(head, id); \
+	v ? hlist_entry(v, type, lsm_list) : NULL; } )
+
+/*
  * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
  * as the default capabilities functions
  */
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/security.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc1.orig/security/security.c	2005-06-30 14:03:54.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/security.c	2005-06-30 14:11:36.000000000 -0500
@@ -20,6 +20,81 @@
 
 #define SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION	"1.0.0"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKER
+fastcall struct security_list *
+security_get_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id)
+{
+	struct security_list *e, *ret = NULL;
+	struct hlist_node *tmp;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	for (tmp = head->first; tmp;
+			 tmp = rcu_dereference(tmp->next)) {
+		e = hlist_entry(tmp, struct security_list, list);
+		if (e->security_id == security_id) {
+			ret = e;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+fastcall void
+security_set_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id,
+	struct security_list *obj_node)
+{
+
+	obj_node->security_id = security_id;
+	hlist_add_head(&obj_node->list, head);
+}
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(stacker_value_spinlock);
+
+fastcall void
+security_add_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id,
+	struct security_list *obj_node)
+{
+
+	spin_lock(&stacker_value_spinlock);
+	obj_node->security_id = security_id;
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&obj_node->list, head);
+	spin_unlock(&stacker_value_spinlock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX Serge: is it possible to add a security_del_value_locked(),
+ * which waits for a full rcu read cycle before returning an object
+ * to be deleted, so that it would be safe to use along with racing
+ * security_get_value()?
+ */
+
+/* No locking needed: only called during object_destroy */
+fastcall struct security_list *
+security_del_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id)
+{
+	struct security_list *e;
+	struct hlist_node *tmp;
+
+	for (tmp = head->first; tmp; tmp = tmp->next) {
+		e = hlist_entry(tmp, struct security_list, list);
+		if (e->security_id == security_id) {
+			hlist_del(&e->list);
+			return e;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_get_value);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_set_value);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_add_value);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_del_value);
+#endif
+
 /* things that live in dummy.c */
 extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
 extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-06-30 19:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-06-30 19:44 [patch 0/12] lsm stacking v0.2: intro serue
2005-06-30 19:48 ` [patch 1/12] lsm stacking v0.2: don't default to dummy_##hook serue
2005-06-30 19:48 ` [patch 2/12] lsm stacking v0.2: replace void* security with hlist serue
2005-06-30 19:49 ` serue [this message]
2005-06-30 19:49 ` [patch 4/12] lsm stacking v0.2: stacker documentation serue
2005-06-30 19:50 ` [patch 5/12] lsm stacking v0.2: actual stacker module serue
2005-07-01  2:32   ` James Morris
2005-07-01 19:24     ` serge
2005-07-01 20:35   ` Greg KH
2005-07-03  0:24     ` serge
2005-07-03 18:25       ` Tony Jones
2005-07-03 18:53         ` James Morris
2005-07-03 19:09           ` Tony Jones
2005-07-03 20:44           ` [PATCH] securityfs Greg KH
2005-07-04 12:39             ` serge
2005-07-04 15:53             ` serge
2005-07-05  6:07               ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 12:25                 ` serge
2005-07-06  6:52             ` James Morris
2005-07-06  7:04               ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 12:29               ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-06 15:35                 ` James Morris
2005-07-06 16:06                   ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-06 16:16                     ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 18:01                     ` Chris Wright
2005-07-06 22:08             ` serue
2005-07-06 22:22               ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 23:32                 ` serge
2005-07-07 17:30                 ` serge
2005-07-07 17:48                   ` Greg KH
2005-07-07 18:27                     ` serue
2005-07-07 22:46                       ` serge
2005-07-07 23:06                         ` Greg KH
2005-07-07 23:12                           ` serue
2005-07-08 20:44                           ` serue
2005-07-08 20:49                             ` Greg KH
2005-07-08 21:03                               ` Chris Wright
2005-07-04  3:18   ` [patch 5/12] lsm stacking v0.2: actual stacker module Tony Jones
2005-07-04 11:51     ` serge
2005-07-04 19:37       ` Tony Jones
2005-07-04 20:06         ` serge
2005-07-04 20:41           ` Tony Jones
2005-07-05 18:17             ` serge
2005-07-08 21:43     ` serue
2005-07-08 22:12       ` serue
2005-07-11 14:40   ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-11 17:51     ` serue
2005-07-11 19:03       ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-13 16:39     ` serue
2005-07-13 18:27       ` serue
2005-06-30 19:51 ` [patch 6/12] lsm stacking v0.2: stackable capability lsm serue
2005-06-30 19:52 ` [patch 7/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: update security structs serue
2005-06-30 19:53 ` [patch 8/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: use security_*_value API serue
2005-06-30 19:53 ` [patch 9/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: remove secondary support serue
2005-06-30 19:54 ` [patch 10/12] lsm stacking v0.2: hook completeness verification serue
2005-06-30 19:55 ` [patch 11/12] lsm stacking v0.2: /proc/$$/attr/ sharing serue
2005-06-30 19:55 ` [patch 12/12] lsm stacking v0.2: update seclvl for stacking serue

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