mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: serue@us.ibm.com
To: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>,
	David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
	Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>,
	Gerrit Huizenga <gerrit@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [patch 6/12] lsm stacking v0.2: stackable capability lsm
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2005 14:51:50 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050630195150.GF23538@serge.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050630194458.GA23439@serge.austin.ibm.com>

This patch adds a version of the capability module which is safe to
stack with SELinux.  It notably does not define the inode_setxattr
and inode_removexattr hooks, as these otherwise prevent selinux from
saving file types to disk.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 Kconfig         |   21 +++++++++++
 Makefile        |    1 
 cap_stack.c     |  101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 selinux/Kconfig |    2 +
 4 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/Kconfig
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc1.orig/security/Kconfig	2005-06-30 15:32:43.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/Kconfig	2005-06-30 15:33:43.000000000 -0500
@@ -56,10 +56,29 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK
 config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
 	tristate "Default Linux Capabilities"
 	depends on SECURITY
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX=n && SECURITY_CAP_STACK=n
 	help
-	  This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality.
+	  This enables the default Linux capabilities functionality.
+	  This module may not be used in conjunction with the stackable
+	  capabilities or SELinux modules.
+
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
 
+	  If you are using SELinux, answer N here and look at the
+	  Stackable Linux Capabilities instead.
+
+config SECURITY_CAP_STACK
+	tristate "Stackable Linux Capabilities"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	help
+	  This enables the "stackable" Linux capabilities functionality.
+
+	  If you are using SELinux, this option will be automatically
+	  enabled.
+
+	  If you are not using any other LSMs, answer N here and see above
+	  for the Default Linux Capabilities.
+
 config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 	tristate "Root Plug Support"
 	depends on USB && SECURITY
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/Makefile
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc1.orig/security/Makefile	2005-06-30 15:32:43.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/Makefile	2005-06-30 15:32:47.000000000 -0500
@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o d
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= commoncap.o capability.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAP_STACK)	+= commoncap.o cap_stack.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= commoncap.o root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SECLVL)		+= seclvl.o
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/cap_stack.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/cap_stack.c	2005-06-30 15:32:47.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/*
+ *  Capabilities Linux Security Module
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ *	(at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+
+static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
+	.ptrace =			cap_ptrace,
+	.capget =			cap_capget,
+	.capset_check =			cap_capset_check,
+	.capset_set =			cap_capset_set,
+	.capable =			cap_capable,
+	.settime =			cap_settime,
+	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
+	.netlink_recv =			cap_netlink_recv,
+
+	.bprm_apply_creds =		cap_bprm_apply_creds,
+	.bprm_set_security =		cap_bprm_set_security,
+	.bprm_secureexec =		cap_bprm_secureexec,
+
+	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
+	.task_reparent_to_init =	cap_task_reparent_to_init,
+
+	.syslog =                       cap_syslog,
+
+	.vm_enough_memory =             cap_vm_enough_memory,
+};
+
+#define MY_NAME __stringify(KBUILD_MODNAME)
+
+/* flag to keep track of how we were registered */
+static int secondary;
+
+static int capability_disable;
+module_param_named(disable, capability_disable, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable, "To disable capabilities module set disable = 1");
+
+static int __init capability_init (void)
+{
+	if (capability_disable) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "Capabilities disabled at initialization\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
+	if (register_security (&capability_ops)) {
+		/* try registering with primary module */
+		if (mod_reg_security (MY_NAME, &capability_ops)) {
+			printk (KERN_INFO "Failure registering capabilities "
+				"with primary security module.\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		secondary = 1;
+	}
+	printk (KERN_INFO "Capability LSM initialized%s\n",
+		secondary ? " as secondary" : "");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit capability_exit (void)
+{
+	if (capability_disable)
+		return;
+	/* remove ourselves from the security framework */
+	if (secondary) {
+		if (mod_unreg_security (MY_NAME, &capability_ops))
+			printk (KERN_INFO "Failure unregistering capabilities "
+				"with primary module.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (unregister_security (&capability_ops)) {
+		printk (KERN_INFO
+			"Failure unregistering capabilities with the kernel\n");
+	}
+}
+
+security_initcall (capability_init);
+module_exit (capability_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Standard Linux Capabilities Security Module");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/selinux/Kconfig
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc1.orig/security/selinux/Kconfig	2005-06-30 14:15:01.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/selinux/Kconfig	2005-06-30 15:32:47.000000000 -0500
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX
 	bool "NSA SELinux Support"
 	depends on SECURITY && NET && INET
 	default n
+	select SECURITY_CAP_STACK
+	select SECURITY_STACKER
 	help
 	  This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
 	  You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-06-30 20:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-06-30 19:44 [patch 0/12] lsm stacking v0.2: intro serue
2005-06-30 19:48 ` [patch 1/12] lsm stacking v0.2: don't default to dummy_##hook serue
2005-06-30 19:48 ` [patch 2/12] lsm stacking v0.2: replace void* security with hlist serue
2005-06-30 19:49 ` [patch 3/12] lsm stacking v0.2: introduce security_*_value API serue
2005-06-30 19:49 ` [patch 4/12] lsm stacking v0.2: stacker documentation serue
2005-06-30 19:50 ` [patch 5/12] lsm stacking v0.2: actual stacker module serue
2005-07-01  2:32   ` James Morris
2005-07-01 19:24     ` serge
2005-07-01 20:35   ` Greg KH
2005-07-03  0:24     ` serge
2005-07-03 18:25       ` Tony Jones
2005-07-03 18:53         ` James Morris
2005-07-03 19:09           ` Tony Jones
2005-07-03 20:44           ` [PATCH] securityfs Greg KH
2005-07-04 12:39             ` serge
2005-07-04 15:53             ` serge
2005-07-05  6:07               ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 12:25                 ` serge
2005-07-06  6:52             ` James Morris
2005-07-06  7:04               ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 12:29               ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-06 15:35                 ` James Morris
2005-07-06 16:06                   ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-06 16:16                     ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 18:01                     ` Chris Wright
2005-07-06 22:08             ` serue
2005-07-06 22:22               ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 23:32                 ` serge
2005-07-07 17:30                 ` serge
2005-07-07 17:48                   ` Greg KH
2005-07-07 18:27                     ` serue
2005-07-07 22:46                       ` serge
2005-07-07 23:06                         ` Greg KH
2005-07-07 23:12                           ` serue
2005-07-08 20:44                           ` serue
2005-07-08 20:49                             ` Greg KH
2005-07-08 21:03                               ` Chris Wright
2005-07-04  3:18   ` [patch 5/12] lsm stacking v0.2: actual stacker module Tony Jones
2005-07-04 11:51     ` serge
2005-07-04 19:37       ` Tony Jones
2005-07-04 20:06         ` serge
2005-07-04 20:41           ` Tony Jones
2005-07-05 18:17             ` serge
2005-07-08 21:43     ` serue
2005-07-08 22:12       ` serue
2005-07-11 14:40   ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-11 17:51     ` serue
2005-07-11 19:03       ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-13 16:39     ` serue
2005-07-13 18:27       ` serue
2005-06-30 19:51 ` serue [this message]
2005-06-30 19:52 ` [patch 7/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: update security structs serue
2005-06-30 19:53 ` [patch 8/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: use security_*_value API serue
2005-06-30 19:53 ` [patch 9/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: remove secondary support serue
2005-06-30 19:54 ` [patch 10/12] lsm stacking v0.2: hook completeness verification serue
2005-06-30 19:55 ` [patch 11/12] lsm stacking v0.2: /proc/$$/attr/ sharing serue
2005-06-30 19:55 ` [patch 12/12] lsm stacking v0.2: update seclvl for stacking serue

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20050630195150.GF23538@serge.austin.ibm.com \
    --to=serue@us.ibm.com \
    --cc=akpm@osdl.org \
    --cc=chrisw@osdl.org \
    --cc=gerrit@us.ibm.com \
    --cc=jmorris@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mhalcrow@us.ibm.com \
    --cc=safford@watson.ibm.com \
    --cc=sailer@us.ibm.com \
    --cc=sds@epoch.ncsc.mil \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome