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From: Thomas Bleher <bleher@informatik.uni-muenchen.de>
To: Dave Neuer <mr.fred.smoothie@pobox.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview
Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2006 12:01:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060422100108.GA7292@thorium.jmh.mhn.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <161717d50604211438h2f6f768fgf1e8466065802b5e@mail.gmail.com>

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* Dave Neuer <mr.fred.smoothie@pobox.com> [2006-04-21 23:41]:
> On 4/21/06, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> >
> > IIUC, AppArmor does impose such constraints, but only from the
> > perspective of an individual program's profile.  Upon link(2), they
> > check that the program had link permission to the old link name and that
> > both the old link name and new link name have consistent permissions in
> > the profile, and they prohibit or limit by capability the ability to
> > manipulate the namespace by confined programs.  But this doesn't mean
> > that another program running under a different profile can't create such
> > a link (if allowed to do so by its profile, of course), or that an
> > unconfined process cannot do so.  There is no real "system policy" or
> > system-wide security properties with AppArmor; you can only look at it
> > in terms of individual programs (which themselves are identified by path
> > too).
> >
> > > However, I'll say up front that such an argument would only suffice to
> > > move it from "broken" to "very brittle in face of changes" (for instance,
> > > would such a hardlink restriction cause collateral damage that an attacker
> > > could exploit?  How badly does it fail in the face of a misdesigned policy?)
> >
> > Indeed.  I think Thomas Bleher made a good assessment of it in:
> > https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-hardened/2006-March/000143.html
> 
> But what about Dr. Cowan's response at:
> https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-hardened/2006-March/000144.html

I didn't have time to answer his mail then, but I will try to do so now.

Mr. Cowan asserts that today Linux is used mainly as a single-user
machine or a dedicated network servers and that AppArmor is designed to
secure these.
For me, this is not enough, because I also need to secure multi-user
computers and I don't want to learn a new security mechanism for these
machines. (I worked several years as a system administrator for a
university where this was my main job).

But the more important point is that, IMO, AppArmor also fails to secure
e.g. dedicated network servers. Consider for example an Apache server
where users are allowed to install CGIs. How do you prevent an attacker
from subverting a buggy CGI and using the host to send spam? 
(Hint: It's really easy using standard SELinux policy).

> In particular, if you don't trust your users, why do you give them the
> ability to create links?

Well, let's have a look at how Linux is used at e.g. university (that's
where I have the most experience). Lot's of untrusted students, doing
lots of weird things. They need to be allowed to run all sorts of
software, experiment with Linux, share files locally and so on. It's not
easy to confine such users.

On those machines, you don't care very much about individual users (if a
user is stupid enough to get his account hacked you just wipe his
homedir and restore from backup), but you do care about system integrity
and secrecy of things like /etc/shadow.
It is possible to confine such a system using SELinux (I've done it). Is
it possible using AppArmor? As far as I understood it is not. For me,
that's a severe limit in functionality.

Thomas


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  reply	other threads:[~2006-04-22 16:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 173+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-04-19 17:49 Tony Jones
2006-04-19 17:49 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/11] security: AppArmor - Integrate into kbuild Tony Jones
2006-04-19 17:57   ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-19 18:10     ` Tony Jones
2006-04-19 18:35   ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-04-19 19:55   ` Adrian Bunk
2006-04-19 20:52     ` Tony Jones
2006-04-19 17:49 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/11] security: AppArmor - Core headers Tony Jones
2006-04-19 18:01   ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-20 17:43     ` Tony Jones
2006-04-19 17:49 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/11] security: AppArmor - LSM interface Tony Jones
2006-04-19 18:05   ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-19 17:49 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/11] security: AppArmor - Core access controls Tony Jones
2006-04-19 18:10   ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-19 18:57     ` Crispin Cowan
2006-04-19 23:05       ` Rik van Riel
2006-04-19 23:18         ` Seth Arnold
2006-04-19 23:21           ` Rik van Riel
2006-04-19 23:50             ` Crispin Cowan
2006-04-20 12:33       ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-20 16:27         ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2006-04-20 17:39     ` Tony Jones
2006-04-19 19:32   ` Jan Engelhardt
2006-04-19 19:50   ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-20  9:40   ` Al Viro
2006-04-20 11:40     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-04-20 21:39       ` Tony Jones
2006-04-19 17:49 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/11] security: AppArmor - Filesystem Tony Jones
2006-04-21 21:13   ` Amy Griffis
2006-04-19 17:49 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/11] security: AppArmor - Userspace interface Tony Jones
2006-04-20 21:39   ` Pavel Machek
2006-04-21 18:01     ` Tony Jones
2006-04-21 18:41       ` Pavel Machek
2006-04-19 17:50 ` [RFC][PATCH 7/11] security: AppArmor - Misc (capabilities, data structures) Tony Jones
2006-04-19 18:16   ` Stephen Hemminger
2006-04-19 17:50 ` [RFC][PATCH 8/11] security: AppArmor - Pathname matching submodule Tony Jones
2006-04-19 17:50 ` [RFC][PATCH 9/11] security: AppArmor - Audit changes Tony Jones
2006-04-21 21:21   ` Amy Griffis
2006-04-22  0:13     ` Steve Grubb
2006-04-22  0:19       ` Tony Jones
2006-04-19 17:50 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/11] security: AppArmor - Add flags to d_path Tony Jones
2006-04-19 22:12   ` Christoph Hellwig
2006-04-20  5:36     ` Tony Jones
2006-04-20  8:26       ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-20 16:43         ` Tony Jones
2006-04-20 17:04           ` Christoph Hellwig
2006-04-20 17:50             ` Tony Jones
2006-04-21 12:16               ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-24 13:05       ` Alan Cox
2006-04-19 17:50 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/11] security: AppArmor - Export namespace semaphore Tony Jones
2006-04-19 22:10   ` Christoph Hellwig
2006-04-20 12:39   ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-20 12:46     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-04-20 12:05       ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-20 13:21         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-04-20 12:48           ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-20 12:58             ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-20 22:11             ` Linda A. Walsh
2006-04-20 23:05               ` Christoph Hellwig
2006-04-21  1:29                 ` Linda A. Walsh
2006-04-21  2:09                   ` Chris Wright
2006-04-21  5:10                     ` Linda Walsh
2006-04-23 12:11                       ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-21 14:02               ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-20 19:45           ` Tony Jones
2006-04-20 20:16             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-04-20 20:22             ` James Morris
2006-04-20 21:50     ` Linda Walsh
2006-04-20 21:56       ` Al Viro
2006-04-20 23:54         ` James Morris
2006-04-21 13:59       ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-19 18:14 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-19 22:32   ` Andi Kleen
2006-04-19 23:00     ` grundig
2006-04-19 23:38       ` Andi Kleen
2006-04-20  1:32         ` Crispin Cowan
2006-04-20 13:00           ` grundig
2006-04-20 13:09             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-04-20 13:15               ` Al Viro
2006-04-21  0:11               ` Tony Jones
2006-04-24 13:01             ` Alan Cox
2006-04-20  8:42     ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-20 19:26       ` Crispin Cowan
2006-04-20 19:27       ` Chris Wright
2006-04-21 12:18         ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-21 17:30           ` Chris Wright
2006-04-21 18:07             ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-21 20:06               ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-04-21 20:35                 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-21 20:44                   ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-21 21:38                   ` Dave Neuer
2006-04-22 10:01                     ` Thomas Bleher [this message]
2006-04-24  4:18               ` Neil Brown
2006-04-24  7:03                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2006-04-24 13:04                   ` Pavel Machek
2006-04-24 13:43                     ` Joshua Brindle
2006-04-24 21:07                   ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-24 23:52                     ` Theodore Ts'o
2006-04-25  6:22                       ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-25 16:45                       ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-25 16:52                         ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-25 17:43                           ` Seth Arnold
2006-04-25 18:34                         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-04-25 18:48                           ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-25 18:56                             ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-04-25  4:25                     ` Casey Schaufler
2006-04-25  7:50                       ` James Morris
2006-04-25 12:46                         ` Theodore Ts'o
2006-04-25 15:06                           ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-25 16:00                         ` Casey Schaufler
2006-04-25 16:21                           ` Randy.Dunlap
2006-04-26  3:42                             ` Casey Schaufler
2006-04-26 12:15                               ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-27  0:21                                 ` Casey Schaufler
2006-04-27 14:47                                   ` Karl MacMillan
2006-04-25 17:29                           ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-26  3:56                             ` Casey Schaufler
2006-04-26 11:32                               ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-25 16:47                       ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-24  7:14                 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-24  8:11                   ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2006-04-25 19:27                   ` Seth Arnold
2006-04-24 13:11                 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-04-24 13:26                   ` Andi Kleen
2006-04-24 13:39                     ` Joshua Brindle
2006-04-24 15:16                       ` Joshua Brindle
2006-04-24 15:50                         ` Tony Jones
2006-04-24 17:03                           ` Joshua Brindle
2006-04-25 17:12                         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-04-25 17:34                           ` Tony Jones
2006-04-24 13:52                     ` Alan Cox
2006-04-24 14:09                       ` Andi Kleen
2006-04-24 20:45                 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-25  8:10                   ` Neil Brown
2006-04-25  8:28                     ` Al Viro
2006-04-25 12:42                     ` James Carter
2006-04-25 12:43                       ` Andi Kleen
2006-04-25 14:50                         ` James Carter
2006-04-25 15:01                         ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-25 18:11                           ` Tony Jones
2006-04-25 21:25                             ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-25 17:07                     ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-26 22:15                       ` Some Concrete AppArmor Questions - was " Neil Brown
2006-04-26 23:06                         ` Ken Brush
2006-04-27  4:15                           ` Andi Kleen
2006-04-27  6:52                             ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-04-27  7:40                               ` Chris Wright
2006-04-27 10:17                             ` Chris Wright
2006-04-27 14:42                               ` Karl MacMillan
2006-04-27 23:44                                 ` Chris Wright
2006-04-28 13:02                                   ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-28 15:49                                     ` Casey Schaufler
2006-04-28 16:04                                       ` Stephen Hemminger
2006-04-28 21:49                                         ` James Morris
2006-04-28 16:56                                       ` Karl MacMillan
2006-04-27 16:03                               ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-27 22:38                                 ` Chris Wright
2006-04-28 13:00                                   ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-27 17:43                           ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-27 17:58                             ` Ken Brush
2006-04-28 11:28                               ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-28 11:47                                 ` Andi Kleen
2006-04-28 12:28                                   ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-27 11:02                         ` Christoph Hellwig
2006-04-27 11:05                           ` Andi Kleen
2006-04-20 11:29     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-04-20 13:24     ` Christoph Hellwig
2006-04-20 22:32     ` Linda A. Walsh
2006-04-20 12:17 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-20 15:38   ` Joshua Brindle
2006-04-20 19:57   ` Crispin Cowan
2006-04-21 13:34     ` Stephen Smalley
2006-04-22 12:27 ` Pavel Machek

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