From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: viro@ftp.linux.org.uk, hch@infradead.org,
Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]
Date: Wed, 05 Dec 2007 19:38:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20071205193859.24617.36392.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20071205193818.24617.79771.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
performed by a task by duplicating a security record, modifying it and then
using task_struct::act_as to point to it when performing operations on behalf
of a task.
This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the
cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a
potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
security data.
This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:
(*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).
(*) security_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security
datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task
creates.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 22 ++++++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
kernel/cred.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/dummy.c | 15 ++++++++
security/security.c | 13 +++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9f8906
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* Credential management
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_CRED_H
+#define _LINUX_CRED_H
+
+struct task_security;
+struct inode;
+
+extern struct task_security *get_kernel_security(const char *,
+ struct task_struct *);
+extern int change_create_files_as(struct task_security *, struct inode *);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_CRED_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b7ba073..f0dce11 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -557,6 +557,18 @@ struct request_sock;
* Duplicate and attach the security structure currently attached to the
* p->security field.
* Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ * @task_kernel_act_as:
+ * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
+ * @sec points to the task security record to be modified.
+ * @service names the service making the request.
+ * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference.
+ * Return 0 if successful.
+ * @task_create_files_as:
+ * Set the file creation context in a task security record to be the same
+ * as the objective context of the specified inode.
+ * @sec points to the task security record to be modified.
+ * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
+ * Return 0 if successful.
* @task_setuid:
* Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity
* attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates
@@ -1321,6 +1333,11 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*task_alloc_security) (struct task_struct *p);
void (*task_free_security) (struct task_security *p);
int (*task_dup_security) (struct task_security *p);
+ int (*task_kernel_act_as)(struct task_security *sec,
+ const char *service,
+ struct task_struct *daemon);
+ int (*task_create_files_as)(struct task_security *sec,
+ struct inode *inode);
int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
int (*task_post_setuid) (uid_t old_ruid /* or fsuid */ ,
uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
@@ -1571,6 +1588,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *p);
void security_task_free(struct task_security *p);
int security_task_dup(struct task_security *p);
+int security_task_kernel_act_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ const char *service,
+ struct task_struct *daemon);
+int security_task_create_files_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ struct inode *inode);
int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
int security_task_post_setuid(uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
uid_t old_suid, int flags);
@@ -2054,6 +2076,19 @@ static inline int security_task_dup(struct task_security *p)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_task_kernel_act_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ const char *service,
+ struct task_struct *daemon)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_create_files_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_task_setuid (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
int flags)
{
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index ddf98c6..eac1d0c 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
@@ -137,3 +138,88 @@ void put_task_security(struct task_security *sec)
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_task_security);
+
+/**
+ * get_kernel_security - Get a task security record for a named kernel service
+ * @service: The name of the service
+ * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
+ *
+ * Get a task security record for a specific kernel service. This can then be
+ * used to override a task's own security so that work can be done on behalf of
+ * that task that requires a different security context.
+ *
+ * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL.
+ * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that;
+ * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys.
+ *
+ * @daemon is also passd to the LSM module as a base from which to initialise
+ * any MAC controls.
+ *
+ * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
+ */
+struct task_security *get_kernel_security(const char *service,
+ struct task_struct *daemon)
+{
+ const struct task_security *dsec;
+ struct task_security *sec;
+ int ret;
+
+ sec = kzalloc(sizeof *sec, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sec)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (daemon) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ dsec = rcu_dereference(daemon->sec);
+ *sec = *dsec;
+ get_group_info(sec->group_info);
+ get_uid(sec->user);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ sec->request_key_auth = NULL;
+ sec->thread_keyring = NULL;
+ sec->tgsec = NULL;
+#endif
+ } else {
+ sec->keep_capabilities = 0;
+ sec->cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET;
+ sec->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET;
+ sec->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
+ sec->user = &root_user;
+ get_uid(sec->user);
+ sec->group_info = &init_groups;
+ get_group_info(sec->group_info);
+ }
+
+ atomic_set(&sec->usage, 1);
+ spin_lock_init(&sec->lock);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ sec->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
+#endif
+
+ ret = security_task_kernel_act_as(sec, service, daemon);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ put_task_security(sec);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ return sec;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_kernel_security);
+
+/**
+ * change_create_files_as - Change the file create context in a security record
+ * @sec: The security record to alter
+ * @inode: The inode to take the context from
+ *
+ * Change the file creation context in a security record to be the same as the
+ * object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have the same
+ * MAC context as that inode.
+ */
+int change_create_files_as(struct task_security *sec, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ sec->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
+ sec->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
+ return security_task_create_files_as(sec, inode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(change_create_files_as);
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 526549d..1c8bad6 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -495,6 +495,19 @@ static int dummy_task_dup_security(struct task_security *p)
return 0;
}
+static int dummy_task_kernel_act_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ const char *service,
+ struct task_struct *daemon)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int dummy_task_create_files_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_task_setuid (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
{
return 0;
@@ -1063,6 +1076,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_dup_security);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_kernel_act_as);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_create_files_as);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_post_setuid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 92d66d6..86d94e5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -583,6 +583,19 @@ int security_task_dup(struct task_security *sec)
return security_ops->task_dup_security(sec);
}
+int security_task_kernel_act_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ const char *service,
+ struct task_struct *daemon)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_kernel_act_as(sec, service, daemon);
+}
+
+int security_task_create_files_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_create_files_as(sec, inode);
+}
+
int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
{
return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 20a6b55..2416f54 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2846,6 +2846,49 @@ static int selinux_task_dup_security(struct task_security *sec)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * get the security data for a kernel service, deriving the subjective context
+ * from the security data of a userspace daemon if one supplied
+ * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
+ */
+static int selinux_task_kernel_act_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ const char *service,
+ struct task_struct *daemon)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec, *dtsec;
+ u32 ksid;
+ int ret;
+
+ tsec = sec->security;
+ dtsec = daemon ? daemon->sec->security : init_task.sec->security;
+
+ ret = security_transition_sid(dtsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, &ksid);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ tsec->sid = ksid;
+ tsec->create_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ tsec->keycreate_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ tsec->sockcreate_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sec->security = tsec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
+ * objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int selinux_task_create_files_as(struct task_security *sec,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = sec->security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
{
/* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
@@ -4884,6 +4927,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
.task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
.task_dup_security = selinux_task_dup_security,
+ .task_kernel_act_as = selinux_task_kernel_act_as,
+ .task_create_files_as = selinux_task_create_files_as,
.task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
.task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
.task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-12-05 19:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-12-05 19:38 [PATCH 00/28] Permit filesystem local caching " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:38 ` [PATCH 01/28] KEYS: Increase the payload size when instantiating a key " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:38 ` [PATCH 02/28] KEYS: Check starting keyring as part of search " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:38 ` [PATCH 03/28] KEYS: Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:38 ` [PATCH 04/28] KEYS: Add keyctl function to get a security label " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:38 ` [PATCH 05/28] Security: Change current->fs[ug]id to current_fs[ug]id() " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:38 ` [PATCH 06/28] SECURITY: Separate task security context from task_struct " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:38 ` [PATCH 07/28] SECURITY: De-embed task security record from task and use refcounting " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:38 ` David Howells [this message]
2007-12-10 16:46 ` [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions " Stephen Smalley
2007-12-10 17:07 ` David Howells
2007-12-10 17:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-10 21:08 ` David Howells
2007-12-10 21:27 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-10 22:26 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-10 23:44 ` David Howells
2007-12-10 23:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-11 18:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-11 19:26 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-11 19:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-11 20:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-10 23:36 ` David Howells
2007-12-10 23:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-11 19:52 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-11 19:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-12 14:41 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-12-12 14:53 ` David Howells
2007-12-12 14:59 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-12-11 20:42 ` David Howells
2007-12-11 21:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-11 21:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-19 3:28 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-12-19 5:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-19 14:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-11 22:43 ` David Howells
2007-12-11 23:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-12 15:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-12 16:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-12 18:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-12 18:34 ` David Howells
2007-12-12 19:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-12 19:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-12 20:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-12 22:29 ` David Howells
2007-12-12 22:32 ` David Howells
2007-12-12 18:25 ` David Howells
2007-12-12 19:20 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-12 19:29 ` David Howells
2007-12-12 19:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-12 22:55 ` David Howells
2007-12-13 14:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-13 16:03 ` David Howells
2007-12-12 18:29 ` David Howells
2007-12-12 19:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-12 19:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-12 22:52 ` David Howells
2007-12-12 22:49 ` David Howells
2007-12-13 14:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-13 15:36 ` David Howells
2007-12-13 16:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-13 17:01 ` David Howells
2007-12-13 17:27 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-12-13 18:04 ` David Howells
2007-12-19 3:28 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-12-19 23:38 ` David Howells
2008-01-09 16:51 ` David Howells
2008-01-09 18:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-01-09 18:56 ` David Howells
2008-01-09 19:19 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-01-10 11:09 ` David Howells
2008-01-14 14:01 ` David Howells
2008-01-14 14:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-01-14 15:19 ` David Howells
2008-01-15 14:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-01-15 16:03 ` David Howells
2008-01-15 16:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-01-15 18:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-01-15 19:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-01-15 21:55 ` David Howells
2008-01-15 22:23 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-01-14 14:06 ` David Howells
2008-01-15 14:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-01-23 20:52 ` David Howells
2008-01-23 22:03 ` James Morris
2008-01-09 17:27 ` David Howells
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 09/28] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead " David Howells
2007-12-14 3:51 ` Nick Piggin
2007-12-17 22:42 ` David Howells
2007-12-18 7:03 ` Nick Piggin
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management " David Howells
2007-12-14 4:08 ` Nick Piggin
2007-12-17 22:36 ` David Howells
2007-12-18 7:00 ` Nick Piggin
2007-12-20 18:33 ` David Howells
2007-12-21 1:08 ` Nick Piggin
2008-01-02 16:27 ` David Howells
2008-01-07 11:33 ` Nick Piggin
2008-01-07 13:09 ` David Howells
2008-01-08 3:01 ` Nick Piggin
2008-01-08 23:51 ` David Howells
2008-01-09 1:52 ` Nick Piggin
2008-01-09 15:45 ` David Howells
2008-01-09 23:52 ` Nick Piggin
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 11/28] FS-Cache: Provide an add_wait_queue_tail() function " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 12/28] FS-Cache: Generic filesystem caching facility " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 13/28] CacheFiles: Add missing copy_page export for ia64 " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 14/28] CacheFiles: Be consistent about the use of mapping vs file->f_mapping in Ext3 " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 15/28] CacheFiles: Add a hook to write a single page of data to an inode " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 16/28] CacheFiles: Permit the page lock state to be monitored " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 17/28] CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 18/28] CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 19/28] NFS: Use local caching " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:40 ` [PATCH 20/28] NFS: Configuration and mount option changes to enable local caching on NFS " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:40 ` [PATCH 21/28] NFS: Display local caching state " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:40 ` [PATCH 22/28] fcrypt endianness misannotations " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:40 ` [PATCH 23/28] AFS: Add TestSetPageError() " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:40 ` [PATCH 24/28] AFS: Add a function to excise a rejected write from the pagecache " David Howells
2007-12-14 4:21 ` Nick Piggin
2007-12-17 22:54 ` David Howells
2007-12-18 7:07 ` Nick Piggin
2007-12-20 18:49 ` David Howells
2007-12-21 1:11 ` Nick Piggin
2007-12-05 19:40 ` [PATCH 25/28] AFS: Improve handling of a rejected writeback " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:40 ` [PATCH 26/28] AF_RXRPC: Save the operation ID for debugging " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:40 ` [PATCH 27/28] AFS: Implement shared-writable mmap " David Howells
2007-12-05 19:40 ` [PATCH 28/28] FS-Cache: Make kAFS use FS-Cache " David Howells
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20071205193859.24617.36392.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk \
--to=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=hch@infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=viro@ftp.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®