From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: torvalds@osdl.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no, chuck.lever@oracle.com
Cc: nfsv4@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 08/45] KEYS: Add keyctl function to get a security label [ver #35]
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2008 14:30:51 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080328143051.3483.99108.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080328143010.3483.99079.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.
The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:
(*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
size_t buflen)
This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
attached to a key in the buffer provided.
Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
will take place.
A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is
in force then an empty string will be returned.
A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
successful.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
Documentation/keys.txt | 21 +++++++++++++++
include/linux/keyctl.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 20 +++++++++++++-
security/dummy.c | 8 ++++++
security/keys/compat.c | 3 ++
security/keys/internal.h | 2 +
security/keys/keyctl.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/security.c | 5 +++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 +++++++++++++--
9 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/keys.txt b/Documentation/keys.txt
index 38a90d9..d5c7a57 100644
--- a/Documentation/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/keys.txt
@@ -733,6 +733,27 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
The assumed authoritative key is inherited across fork and exec.
+ (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
+ size_t buflen)
+
+ This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
+ attached to a key in the buffer provided.
+
+ Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
+ produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
+ than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
+ will take place.
+
+ A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
+ sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is
+ in force then an empty string will be returned.
+
+ A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
+ successful.
+
+
===============
KERNEL SERVICES
===============
diff --git a/include/linux/keyctl.h b/include/linux/keyctl.h
index 3365945..656ee6b 100644
--- a/include/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@
#define KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING 14 /* set default request-key keyring */
#define KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT 15 /* set key timeout */
#define KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY 16 /* assume request_key() authorisation */
+#define KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY 17 /* get key security label */
#endif /* _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c673dfd..491c195 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -989,6 +989,17 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
* Return 1 if permission granted, 0 if permission denied and -ve it the
* normal permissions model should be effected.
+ * @key_getsecurity:
+ * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key
+ * for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function
+ * allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller
+ * should free it.
+ * @key points to the key to be queried.
+ * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ * an error.
+ * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
*
* Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
*
@@ -1477,7 +1488,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*key_permission)(key_ref_t key_ref,
struct task_struct *context,
key_perm_t perm);
-
+ int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
};
@@ -2648,6 +2659,7 @@ int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long f
void security_key_free(struct key *key);
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm);
+int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
#else
@@ -2669,6 +2681,12 @@ static inline int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+ *_buffer = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 78d8f92..f26da49 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -979,6 +979,13 @@ static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
{
return 0;
}
+
+static int dummy_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+ *_buffer = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
@@ -1167,6 +1174,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_alloc);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_free);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
}
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index e10ec99..c766c68 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
return keyctl_assume_authority(arg2);
+ case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
+ return keyctl_get_security(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index e385066..72e3576 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ extern long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int);
extern long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t, unsigned);
extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
-
+extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t, char __user *, size_t);
/*
* debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index c32f5c6..acc9c89 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -1087,6 +1088,66 @@ error:
} /* end keyctl_assume_authority() */
+/*
+ * get the security label of a key
+ * - the key must grant us view permission
+ * - if there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it
+ * - unless there's an error, we return the amount of information available,
+ * irrespective of how much we may have copied (including the terminal NUL)
+ * - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY)
+ */
+long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
+ char __user *buffer,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct key *key, *instkey;
+ key_ref_t key_ref;
+ char *context;
+ long ret;
+
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+ if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
+ return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+ /* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we
+ * have the authorisation token handy */
+ instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
+ if (IS_ERR(instkey))
+ return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+ key_put(instkey);
+
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, keyid, 0, 1, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+ return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+ }
+
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+ ret = security_key_getsecurity(key, &context);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty
+ * string */
+ ret = 1;
+ if (buffer && buflen > 0 &&
+ copy_to_user(buffer, "", 1) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ } else if (ret > 0) {
+ /* return as much data as there's room for */
+ if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
+ if (buflen > ret)
+ buflen = ret;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, context, buflen) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ kfree(context);
+ }
+
+ key_ref_put(key_ref);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* the key control system call
@@ -1167,6 +1228,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_keyctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t) arg2);
+ case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
+ return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
+ (char *) arg3,
+ (size_t) arg4);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b1387a6..b1f4568 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1109,4 +1109,9 @@ int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, context, perm);
}
+int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+ return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e3dabb1..bfb8b27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5228,6 +5228,20 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
}
+static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+ char *context = NULL;
+ unsigned len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = len;
+ *_buffer = context;
+ return rc;
+}
+
#endif
static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
@@ -5409,9 +5423,10 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
- .key_free = selinux_key_free,
- .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
+ .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
+ .key_free = selinux_key_free,
+ .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
+ .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
#endif
};
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-03-28 14:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-03-28 14:30 [PATCH 00/45] Permit filesystem local caching " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:30 ` [PATCH 01/45] KEYS: Increase the payload size when instantiating a key " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:30 ` [PATCH 02/45] KEYS: Check starting keyring as part of search " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:30 ` [PATCH 03/45] KEYS: Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:30 ` [PATCH 04/45] KEYS: Allow clients to set key perms in key_create_or_update() " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:30 ` [PATCH 05/45] KEYS: Don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:30 ` [PATCH 06/45] KEYS: Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys " David Howells
2008-04-01 15:29 ` Berthold Cogel
2008-03-28 14:30 ` [PATCH 07/45] KEYS: Make key_serial() a function if CONFIG_KEYS=y " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:30 ` David Howells [this message]
2008-03-28 14:30 ` [PATCH 09/45] Security: Change current->fs[ug]id to current_fs[ug]id() " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 10/45] Security: Separate task security context from task_struct " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 11/45] Security: De-embed task security record from task and use refcounting " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 12/45] Security: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 13/45] Security: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 14/45] Security: Make NFSD work with detached security " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 15/45] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 16/45] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 17/45] FS-Cache: Provide an add_wait_queue_tail() function " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 18/45] FS-Cache: Generic filesystem caching facility " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 19/45] Add missing consts to xattr function arguments " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 20/45] CacheFiles: Add missing copy_page export for ia64 " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:31 ` [PATCH 21/45] CacheFiles: Be consistent about the use of mapping vs file->f_mapping in Ext3 " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 22/45] CacheFiles: Add a hook to write a single page of data to an inode " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 23/45] CacheFiles: Permit the page lock state to be monitored " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 24/45] CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 25/45] CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 26/45] AFS: Add a MAINTAINERS record for AFS " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 27/45] AFS: prevent double cell registration " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 28/45] FS-Cache: Make kAFS use FS-Cache " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 29/45] NFS: Add comment banners to some NFS functions " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 30/45] NFS: Add FS-Cache option bit and debug bit " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 31/45] NFS: Permit local filesystem caching to be enabled for NFS " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:32 ` [PATCH 32/45] NFS: Register NFS for caching and retrieve the top-level index " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 33/45] NFS: Define and create server-level objects " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 34/45] NFS: Define and create superblock-level " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 35/45] NFS: Define and create inode-level cache " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 36/45] NFS: Use local disk inode cache " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 37/45] NFS: Invalidate FsCache page flags when cache removed " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 38/45] NFS: Add some new I/O counters for FS-Cache doing things for NFS " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 39/45] NFS: FS-Cache page management " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 40/45] NFS: Add read context retention for FS-Cache to call back with " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 41/45] NFS: nfs_readpage_async() needs to be accessible as a fallback for local caching " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 42/45] NFS: Read pages from FS-Cache into an NFS inode " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 43/45] NFS: Store pages from an NFS inode into a local cache " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:33 ` [PATCH 44/45] NFS: Display local caching state " David Howells
2008-03-28 14:34 ` [PATCH 45/45] NFS: Add mount options to enable local caching on NFS " David Howells
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20080328143051.3483.99108.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk \
--to=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=chuck.lever@oracle.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=nfsv4@linux-nfs.org \
--cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=torvalds@osdl.org \
--cc=trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®