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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	crispin@crispincowan.com, serue@us.ibm.com, matthew@wil.cx,
	paul.moore@hp.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [TOMOYO #7 30/30] Hooks for SAKURA and TOMOYO.
Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2008 08:21:00 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080418132059.GA9011@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080417174656.GA5880@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>

Quoting Pavel Machek (pavel@ucw.cz):
> > 
> > Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > > It is true that namespace may differ between processes,
> > > > but I think that that is the matter of how to restrict namespace manipulation operations.
> > > > As I said, a system can't survive if namespace is madly manipulated.
> > > > To keep the system workable, /bin/ must be the directory for binary programs,
> > > > /etc/ must be the directory for configuration files, and so on in all namespaces.
> > > 
> > > Ehm? Where did you get those ideas?
> > > 
> > > I'm free to name my directories any way I want, and keep config files
> > > in /pavlix_config, thank you... There is even distro that does
> > > something like that, IIRC...
> > > 
> > We can make processes have different namespace by using clone() with CLONE_NEWNS.
> > But even if some process got a different namespace, it need to follow conventional rules.
> > Optional files (e.g. /pavlix_config) need not to follow conventional rules.
> > What I'm talking about is essetial files (e.g. /bin/sh and
> > /etc/passwd).
> 
> Why would I need to follow rules?
> 
> > Can your system continue running even if essetial files are not in place
> > (like /bin/sh moved to /etc/sh and /etc/passwd moved to /bin/passwd) ?
> 
> Why not? They are just a names, they can be changed as log as you
> change them everywhere. Which is rather easy for small
> systems... think openembedded.
> 									Pavel

This is getting silly - if you change them "everywhere" then you can
change them in your security profiles too :)

Anyway this thread has degenerated again.

Crispin, thanks for posting those use cases.

Now the next step IMO is for someone (Tetsuo?) to take one of those use
cases and run through each of the four (was it 4?) proposed methods for
handling the pathnames.  One paragraph describing how the use case in
general would be handled, then a list of shortcomings for the solution.

-serge

  reply	other threads:[~2008-04-18 13:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-04-04 12:22 [TOMOYO #7 00/30] TOMOYO Linux 1.6.0 released Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 01/30] TOMOYO Linux documentation Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 02/30] Internal functions prototypes for SAKURA and TOMOYO Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 15:29   ` Daniel Walker
2008-04-07 13:56     ` [TOMOYO #7 02/30] Internal functions prototypes for SAKURA andTOMOYO Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-07 15:24       ` Daniel Walker
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 03/30] Constants for /proc/ccs/ interface Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 04/30] Prototypes of realpath Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 05/30] External functions prototypes for SAKURA Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 06/30] External functions prototypes for TOMOYO Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 07/30] Some wrapper functions for socket operation Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 08/30] Some of permission checks from VFS helper functions Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 09/30] Access control part of tamper-proof device filesystem Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 10/30] Common functions for SAKURA and TOMOYO Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 11/30] /proc/ccs/ interface for policy management Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 12/30] Memory and pathname management functions Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 13/30] mount restriction part Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 14/30] Shadow mount prevention part Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 15/30] Automatic bind port selection control part Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 16/30] Unmount restriction part Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:22 ` [TOMOYO #7 17/30] chroot " Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 18/30] pivot_root " Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 19/30] Auditing functions for TOMOYO Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 20/30] Socket operation restriction part Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 21/30] Capability " Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 22/30] Conditional ACL support functions Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 23/30] argvrestriction part Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 24/30] File operation restriction part Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 25/30] Signal " Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 26/30] Domain transition handler Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 27/30] Environment variable restriction part Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 28/30] Filesystem part of tamper-proof device filesystem Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 29/30] Kconfig and Makefile Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 12:23 ` [TOMOYO #7 30/30] Hooks for SAKURA and TOMOYO Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-04 16:29   ` Daniel Walker
2008-04-07 13:56     ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-07 15:39       ` Daniel Walker
2008-04-07 15:40   ` Paul Moore
2008-04-07 22:57     ` Casey Schaufler
2008-04-09  8:37     ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-04-09 12:49       ` Stephen Smalley
2008-04-10  5:57         ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-04-10 12:51           ` Stephen Smalley
2008-04-11 11:48             ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-04-09 13:11       ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-04-09 13:26         ` Stephen Smalley
2008-04-11 14:12         ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-11 14:30           ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-04-12 11:33             ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-13 16:36             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-04-14  2:05               ` Crispin Cowan
2008-04-14 14:17                 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-04-14 17:05                   ` Casey Schaufler
2008-04-15 11:14                     ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-15 16:32                       ` Casey Schaufler
2008-04-17  7:24                         ` Crispin Cowan
2008-04-16 19:13                       ` Pavel Machek
2008-04-17 11:58                         ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-04-17 17:46                           ` Pavel Machek
2008-04-18 13:21                             ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2008-04-15  4:59                   ` Crispin Cowan
2008-04-16 16:31                     ` Stephen Smalley
2008-04-17  7:49                       ` Crispin Cowan
2008-04-17  8:45                         ` Jamie Lokier
2008-04-17 12:42                         ` Stephen Smalley
2008-04-15 13:00                 ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-04-14  1:41             ` Crispin Cowan
2008-04-14 13:48               ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-04-15  3:21                 ` Crispin Cowan
2008-04-15  4:57                   ` Al Viro
2008-04-09 13:22       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-04-11  3:57         ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-04-24  5:28 ` [TOMOYO #7 00/30] TOMOYO Linux 1.6.0 released Toshiharu Harada
2008-04-24 14:48   ` Serge E. Hallyn

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