From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, morgan@kernel.org
Cc: sfr@canb.auug.org.au, dhowells@redhat.com, viro@ftp.linux.org.uk,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/24] CRED: Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks [ver #7]
Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2008 16:37:39 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080806153739.14351.13364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080806153713.14351.91448.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
include/linux/security.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
security/commoncap.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 12 ++++++------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++++++----
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dc23a3d..c3eed5a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -49,8 +49,12 @@ extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-extern int cap_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-extern void cap_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+extern int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+extern void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern int cap_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -1289,12 +1293,12 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- int (*capset_check) (kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- void (*capset_set) (kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+ int (*capset_check) (const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+ void (*capset_set) (const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int (*acct) (struct file *file);
int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
@@ -1561,12 +1565,12 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_acct(struct file *file);
int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
@@ -1754,16 +1758,16 @@ static inline int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static inline int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static inline int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
return cap_capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static inline void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static inline void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
cap_capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 059a131..40e8b83 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -117,8 +117,9 @@ static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-int cap_capset_check (kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
if (cap_inh_is_capped()
&& !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
@@ -149,8 +150,9 @@ int cap_capset_check (kernel_cap_t *effective,
return 0;
}
-void cap_capset_set (kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
current->cap_effective = *effective;
current->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 78502ac..c2203f5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -145,16 +145,16 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
return security_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
security_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b040887..9cc59f6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1781,8 +1781,9 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static int selinux_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static int selinux_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
int error;
@@ -1793,8 +1794,9 @@ static int selinux_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
-static void selinux_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static void selinux_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
secondary_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-08-06 15:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-08-06 15:37 [PATCH 00/24] Introduce credentials " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 01/24] Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 02/24] KEYS: Disperse linux/key_ui.h " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 03/24] KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 04/24] CRED: Neuter sys_capset() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` David Howells [this message]
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 06/24] CRED: Change current->fs[ug]id to current_fs[ug]id() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 07/24] CRED: Wrap most current->e?[ug]id and some task->e?[ug]id " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 08/24] CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 09/24] CRED: Detach the credentials " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 10/24] CRED: Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 11/24] CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 12/24] CRED: Wrap access to SELinux's task SID " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 13/24] CRED: Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 14/24] CRED: Rename is_single_threaded() to is_wq_single_threaded() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 15/24] CRED: Make inode_has_perm() and file_has_perm() take a cred pointer " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 16/24] CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 17/24] CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 18/24] CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 19/24] CRED: Prettify commoncap.c " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 20/24] CRED: Use creds in file structs " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:39 ` [PATCH 21/24] CRED: Documentation " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:39 ` [PATCH 22/24] CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:39 ` [PATCH 23/24] CRED: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:39 ` [PATCH 24/24] CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions " David Howells
2008-08-07 8:50 ` [PATCH 00/24] Introduce credentials " James Morris
2008-08-07 9:32 ` David Howells
2008-08-07 9:56 ` James Morris
2008-08-07 12:03 ` James Morris
2008-08-08 0:23 ` Stephen Rothwell
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