From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, morgan@kernel.org
Cc: sfr@canb.auug.org.au, dhowells@redhat.com, viro@ftp.linux.org.uk,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 20/24] CRED: Use creds in file structs [ver #7]
Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2008 16:38:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080806153857.14351.95784.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080806153713.14351.91448.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Attach creds to file structs and discard f_uid/f_gid.
file_operations::open() methods (such as hppfs_open()) should use file->f_cred
rather than current_cred(). At the moment file->f_cred will be current_cred()
at this point.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/vpe.c | 4 ++--
drivers/isdn/hysdn/hysdn_procconf.c | 6 ++++--
fs/coda/file.c | 2 +-
fs/file_table.c | 7 ++++---
fs/hppfs/hppfs.c | 4 ++--
include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_LOG.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_LOG.c | 4 ++--
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c | 5 +++--
net/netfilter/xt_owner.c | 16 ++++++++--------
net/sched/cls_flow.c | 4 ++--
11 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/vpe.c b/arch/mips/kernel/vpe.c
index 972b2d2..09786e4 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/vpe.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/vpe.c
@@ -1085,8 +1085,8 @@ static int vpe_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
v->load_addr = NULL;
v->len = 0;
- v->uid = filp->f_uid;
- v->gid = filp->f_gid;
+ v->uid = filp->f_cred->fsuid;
+ v->gid = filp->f_cred->fsgid;
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_APSP_KSPD
/* get kspd to tell us when a syscall_exit happens */
diff --git a/drivers/isdn/hysdn/hysdn_procconf.c b/drivers/isdn/hysdn/hysdn_procconf.c
index 484299b..8f9f491 100644
--- a/drivers/isdn/hysdn/hysdn_procconf.c
+++ b/drivers/isdn/hysdn/hysdn_procconf.c
@@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ hysdn_conf_open(struct inode *ino, struct file *filep)
}
if (card->debug_flags & (LOG_PROC_OPEN | LOG_PROC_ALL))
hysdn_addlog(card, "config open for uid=%d gid=%d mode=0x%x",
- filep->f_uid, filep->f_gid, filep->f_mode);
+ filep->f_cred->fsuid, filep->f_cred->fsgid,
+ filep->f_mode);
if ((filep->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_WRITE) {
/* write only access -> write boot file or conf line */
@@ -331,7 +332,8 @@ hysdn_conf_close(struct inode *ino, struct file *filep)
}
if (card->debug_flags & (LOG_PROC_OPEN | LOG_PROC_ALL))
hysdn_addlog(card, "config close for uid=%d gid=%d mode=0x%x",
- filep->f_uid, filep->f_gid, filep->f_mode);
+ filep->f_cred->fsuid, filep->f_cred->fsgid,
+ filep->f_mode);
if ((filep->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_WRITE) {
/* write only access -> write boot file or conf line */
diff --git a/fs/coda/file.c b/fs/coda/file.c
index 29137ff..5a87699 100644
--- a/fs/coda/file.c
+++ b/fs/coda/file.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ int coda_release(struct inode *coda_inode, struct file *coda_file)
BUG_ON(!cfi || cfi->cfi_magic != CODA_MAGIC);
err = venus_close(coda_inode->i_sb, coda_i2f(coda_inode),
- coda_flags, coda_file->f_uid);
+ coda_flags, coda_file->f_cred->fsuid);
host_inode = cfi->cfi_container->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
cii = ITOC(coda_inode);
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 4183190..d2ae1de 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -36,7 +36,9 @@ static struct percpu_counter nr_files __cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
static inline void file_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{
- struct file *f = container_of(head, struct file, f_u.fu_rcuhead);
+ struct file *f = container_of(head, struct file, f_u.fu_rcuhead);
+
+ put_cred(f->f_cred);
kmem_cache_free(filp_cachep, f);
}
@@ -121,8 +123,7 @@ struct file *get_empty_filp(void)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&f->f_u.fu_list);
atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1);
rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock);
- f->f_uid = cred->fsuid;
- f->f_gid = cred->fsgid;
+ f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
eventpoll_init_file(f);
/* f->f_version: 0 */
return f;
diff --git a/fs/hppfs/hppfs.c b/fs/hppfs/hppfs.c
index 795e2c1..b278f7f 100644
--- a/fs/hppfs/hppfs.c
+++ b/fs/hppfs/hppfs.c
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int file_mode(int fmode)
static int hppfs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
struct hppfs_private *data;
struct vfsmount *proc_mnt;
struct dentry *proc_dentry;
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static int hppfs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static int hppfs_dir_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
struct hppfs_private *data;
struct vfsmount *proc_mnt;
struct dentry *proc_dentry;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index d4e0016..057317c 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ struct file {
mode_t f_mode;
loff_t f_pos;
struct fown_struct f_owner;
- unsigned int f_uid, f_gid;
+ const struct cred *f_cred;
struct file_ra_state f_ra;
u64 f_version;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_LOG.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_LOG.c
index 0af1413..dde984a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_LOG.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_LOG.c
@@ -340,8 +340,8 @@ static void dump_packet(const struct nf_loginfo *info,
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
if (skb->sk->sk_socket && skb->sk->sk_socket->file)
printk("UID=%u GID=%u ",
- skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_uid,
- skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_gid);
+ skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsuid,
+ skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsgid);
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_LOG.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_LOG.c
index 3a23169..8d91b23 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_LOG.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_LOG.c
@@ -364,8 +364,8 @@ static void dump_packet(const struct nf_loginfo *info,
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
if (skb->sk->sk_socket && skb->sk->sk_socket->file)
printk("UID=%u GID=%u ",
- skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_uid,
- skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_gid);
+ skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsuid,
+ skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsgid);
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c
index 9a35b57..7659bcf 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c
@@ -474,8 +474,9 @@ __build_packet_message(struct nfulnl_instance *inst,
if (skb->sk) {
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
if (skb->sk->sk_socket && skb->sk->sk_socket->file) {
- __be32 uid = htonl(skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_uid);
- __be32 gid = htonl(skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_gid);
+ struct file *file = skb->sk->sk_socket->file;
+ __be32 uid = htonl(file->f_cred->fsuid);
+ __be32 gid = htonl(file->f_cred->fsgid);
/* need to unlock here since NLA_PUT may goto */
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
NLA_PUT_BE32(inst->skb, NFULA_UID, uid);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_owner.c b/net/netfilter/xt_owner.c
index 9059c16..b8c53e8 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_owner.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_owner.c
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@ owner_mt_v0(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in,
return false;
if (info->match & IPT_OWNER_UID)
- if ((filp->f_uid != info->uid) ^
+ if ((filp->f_cred->fsuid != info->uid) ^
!!(info->invert & IPT_OWNER_UID))
return false;
if (info->match & IPT_OWNER_GID)
- if ((filp->f_gid != info->gid) ^
+ if ((filp->f_cred->fsgid != info->gid) ^
!!(info->invert & IPT_OWNER_GID))
return false;
@@ -66,12 +66,12 @@ owner_mt6_v0(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in,
return false;
if (info->match & IP6T_OWNER_UID)
- if ((filp->f_uid != info->uid) ^
+ if ((filp->f_cred->fsuid != info->uid) ^
!!(info->invert & IP6T_OWNER_UID))
return false;
if (info->match & IP6T_OWNER_GID)
- if ((filp->f_gid != info->gid) ^
+ if ((filp->f_cred->fsgid != info->gid) ^
!!(info->invert & IP6T_OWNER_GID))
return false;
@@ -102,14 +102,14 @@ owner_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in,
(XT_OWNER_UID | XT_OWNER_GID)) == 0;
if (info->match & XT_OWNER_UID)
- if ((filp->f_uid >= info->uid_min &&
- filp->f_uid <= info->uid_max) ^
+ if ((filp->f_cred->fsuid >= info->uid_min &&
+ filp->f_cred->fsuid <= info->uid_max) ^
!(info->invert & XT_OWNER_UID))
return false;
if (info->match & XT_OWNER_GID)
- if ((filp->f_gid >= info->gid_min &&
- filp->f_gid <= info->gid_max) ^
+ if ((filp->f_cred->fsgid >= info->gid_min &&
+ filp->f_cred->fsgid <= info->gid_max) ^
!(info->invert & XT_OWNER_GID))
return false;
diff --git a/net/sched/cls_flow.c b/net/sched/cls_flow.c
index 8f63a1a..95a9b56 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_flow.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_flow.c
@@ -260,14 +260,14 @@ static u32 flow_get_rtclassid(const struct sk_buff *skb)
static u32 flow_get_skuid(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_socket && skb->sk->sk_socket->file)
- return skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_uid;
+ return skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsuid;
return 0;
}
static u32 flow_get_skgid(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_socket && skb->sk->sk_socket->file)
- return skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_gid;
+ return skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsgid;
return 0;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-08-06 15:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-08-06 15:37 [PATCH 00/24] Introduce credentials " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 01/24] Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 02/24] KEYS: Disperse linux/key_ui.h " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 03/24] KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 04/24] CRED: Neuter sys_capset() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 05/24] CRED: Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 06/24] CRED: Change current->fs[ug]id to current_fs[ug]id() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 07/24] CRED: Wrap most current->e?[ug]id and some task->e?[ug]id " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:37 ` [PATCH 08/24] CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 09/24] CRED: Detach the credentials " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 10/24] CRED: Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 11/24] CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 12/24] CRED: Wrap access to SELinux's task SID " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 13/24] CRED: Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 14/24] CRED: Rename is_single_threaded() to is_wq_single_threaded() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 15/24] CRED: Make inode_has_perm() and file_has_perm() take a cred pointer " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 16/24] CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open() " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 17/24] CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 18/24] CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` [PATCH 19/24] CRED: Prettify commoncap.c " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:38 ` David Howells [this message]
2008-08-06 15:39 ` [PATCH 21/24] CRED: Documentation " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:39 ` [PATCH 22/24] CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:39 ` [PATCH 23/24] CRED: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux " David Howells
2008-08-06 15:39 ` [PATCH 24/24] CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions " David Howells
2008-08-07 8:50 ` [PATCH 00/24] Introduce credentials " James Morris
2008-08-07 9:32 ` David Howells
2008-08-07 9:56 ` James Morris
2008-08-07 12:03 ` James Morris
2008-08-08 0:23 ` Stephen Rothwell
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