From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>,
Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>,
Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>,
ecryptfs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: [PATCH 22/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the eCryptFS filesystem
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2008 14:47:35 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080827134735.19980.88570.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080827134541.19980.61042.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.
Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
---
fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
index 1b5c200..92bf606 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
@@ -377,6 +377,7 @@ int ecryptfs_process_response(struct ecryptfs_message *msg, uid_t euid,
size_t msg_size;
struct nsproxy *nsproxy;
struct user_namespace *current_user_ns;
+ uid_t ctx_euid;
int rc;
if (msg->index >= ecryptfs_message_buf_len) {
@@ -401,8 +402,8 @@ int ecryptfs_process_response(struct ecryptfs_message *msg, uid_t euid,
goto wake_up;
}
current_user_ns = nsproxy->user_ns;
- rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, msg_ctx->task->euid,
- current_user_ns);
+ ctx_euid = task_euid(msg_ctx->task);
+ rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, ctx_euid, current_user_ns);
rcu_read_unlock();
mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
if (rc) {
@@ -410,14 +411,14 @@ int ecryptfs_process_response(struct ecryptfs_message *msg, uid_t euid,
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: User [%d] received a "
"message response from process [0x%p] but does "
"not have a registered daemon\n", __func__,
- msg_ctx->task->euid, pid);
+ ctx_euid, pid);
goto wake_up;
}
- if (msg_ctx->task->euid != euid) {
+ if (ctx_euid != euid) {
rc = -EBADMSG;
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Received message from user "
"[%d]; expected message from user [%d]\n", __func__,
- euid, msg_ctx->task->euid);
+ euid, ctx_euid);
goto unlock;
}
if (current_user_ns != user_ns) {
@@ -431,7 +432,7 @@ int ecryptfs_process_response(struct ecryptfs_message *msg, uid_t euid,
rc = -EBADMSG;
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: User [%d] sent a message response "
"from an unrecognized process [0x%p]\n",
- __func__, msg_ctx->task->euid, pid);
+ __func__, ctx_euid, pid);
goto unlock;
}
if (msg_ctx->state != ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_PENDING) {
@@ -482,14 +483,15 @@ ecryptfs_send_message_locked(unsigned int transport, char *data, int data_len,
u8 msg_type, struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx **msg_ctx)
{
struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon;
+ uid_t euid = current_euid();
int rc;
- rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, current->euid,
+ rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, euid,
current->nsproxy->user_ns);
if (rc || !daemon) {
rc = -ENOTCONN;
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: User [%d] does not have a daemon "
- "registered\n", __func__, current->euid);
+ "registered\n", __func__, euid);
goto out;
}
mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c b/fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c
index b484792..047ac60 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c
@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ ecryptfs_miscdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt)
{
struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon;
unsigned int mask = 0;
+ uid_t euid = current_euid();
int rc;
mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
/* TODO: Just use file->private_data? */
- rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, current->euid,
+ rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, euid,
current->nsproxy->user_ns);
BUG_ON(rc || !daemon);
mutex_lock(&daemon->mux);
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ static int
ecryptfs_miscdev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon = NULL;
+ uid_t euid = current_euid();
int rc;
mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
@@ -93,10 +95,10 @@ ecryptfs_miscdev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
"count; rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
goto out_unlock_daemon_list;
}
- rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, current->euid,
+ rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, euid,
current->nsproxy->user_ns);
if (rc || !daemon) {
- rc = ecryptfs_spawn_daemon(&daemon, current->euid,
+ rc = ecryptfs_spawn_daemon(&daemon, euid,
current->nsproxy->user_ns,
task_pid(current));
if (rc) {
@@ -147,10 +149,11 @@ static int
ecryptfs_miscdev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon = NULL;
+ uid_t euid = current_euid();
int rc;
mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
- rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, current->euid,
+ rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, euid,
current->nsproxy->user_ns);
BUG_ON(rc || !daemon);
mutex_lock(&daemon->mux);
@@ -246,11 +249,12 @@ ecryptfs_miscdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
char packet_length[3];
size_t i;
size_t total_length;
+ uid_t euid = current_euid();
int rc;
mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
/* TODO: Just use file->private_data? */
- rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, current->euid,
+ rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon, euid,
current->nsproxy->user_ns);
BUG_ON(rc || !daemon);
mutex_lock(&daemon->mux);
@@ -290,7 +294,7 @@ check_list:
* message from the queue; try again */
goto check_list;
}
- BUG_ON(current->euid != daemon->euid);
+ BUG_ON(euid != daemon->euid);
BUG_ON(current->nsproxy->user_ns != daemon->user_ns);
BUG_ON(task_pid(current) != daemon->pid);
msg_ctx = list_first_entry(&daemon->msg_ctx_out_queue,
@@ -414,6 +418,7 @@ ecryptfs_miscdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t packet_size, packet_size_length, i;
ssize_t sz = 0;
char *data;
+ uid_t euid = current_euid();
int rc;
if (count == 0)
@@ -463,8 +468,7 @@ ecryptfs_miscdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out_free;
}
rc = ecryptfs_miscdev_response(&data[i], packet_size,
- current->euid,
- current->nsproxy->user_ns,
+ euid, current->nsproxy->user_ns,
task_pid(current), seq);
if (rc)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Failed to deliver miscdev "
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-08-27 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-08-27 13:45 [PATCH 00/59] Introduce credentials David Howells
2008-08-27 13:33 ` Alan Cox
2008-08-27 13:45 ` [PATCH 01/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the IA64 arch David Howells
2008-08-27 14:55 ` Artem Bityutskiy
2008-08-27 15:24 ` David Howells
2008-08-27 23:21 ` Stephen Rothwell
2008-08-27 13:45 ` [PATCH 02/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the MIPS arch David Howells
2008-08-27 13:45 ` [PATCH 03/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the PA-RISC arch David Howells
2008-08-27 22:19 ` Kyle McMartin
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 04/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the PowerPC arch David Howells
2008-08-27 23:45 ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 05/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the S390 arch David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 06/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the x86 arch David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 07/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the block loopback driver David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 08/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the tty driver David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 09/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the DRM driver David Howells
2008-09-02 1:03 ` Dave Airlie
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 10/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the ISDN drivers David Howells
2008-08-27 17:51 ` Karsten Keil
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 11/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in video input drivers David Howells
2008-08-29 22:32 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 12/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the network device drivers David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 13/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the USB driver David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 14/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in 9P2000 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-28 17:59 ` Eric Van Hensbergen
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 15/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the AFFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 16/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the autofs filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 17/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the autofs4 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 18/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the BFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 19/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the CIFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 20/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Coda filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 21/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the devpts filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` David Howells [this message]
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 23/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Ext2 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 24/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Ext3 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 25/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Ext4 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 26/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the FAT filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 14:12 ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 27/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the FUSE filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 28/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the GFS2 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 29/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the HFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 30/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the HFSplus filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 31/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the HPFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 32/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the hugetlbfs filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 33/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the JFFS2 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 34/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the JFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 14:31 ` Dave Kleikamp
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 35/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Minix filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 36/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the NCPFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 37/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the NFS daemon David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 38/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the OCFS2 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 23:04 ` Mark Fasheh
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 39/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the OMFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 40/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the RAMFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 41/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the ReiserFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 42/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SMBFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 43/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SYSV filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 44/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UBIFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 45/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UDF filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 14:44 ` Jan Kara
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 46/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 47/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the XFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 48/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the filesystem subsystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 49/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SYSV IPC subsystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 50/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the AX25 protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 51/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the IPv6 protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 52/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the netrom protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 53/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the ROSE protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 54/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SunRPC protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 55/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UNIX socket protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 56/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the networking subsystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 57/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the key management code David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 58/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the capabilities code David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 59/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernel David Howells
2008-08-27 14:24 ` [PATCH 00/59] Introduce credentials David Howells
2008-08-27 16:39 ` Alan Cox
2008-08-28 9:19 ` David Howells
2008-08-28 9:45 ` Alan Cox
2008-08-28 20:28 ` Paul E. McKenney
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