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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	Petr Vandrovec <vandrove@vc.cvut.cz>,
	linware@sh.cvut.cz
Subject: [PATCH 36/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the NCPFS filesystem
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2008 14:48:48 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080827134847.19980.68770.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080827134541.19980.61042.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Petr Vandrovec <vandrove@vc.cvut.cz>
Cc: linware@sh.cvut.cz
---

 fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c |   91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 1 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)


diff --git a/fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c b/fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c
index 3a97c95..6d04e05 100644
--- a/fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c
@@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ ncp_get_fs_info(struct ncp_server * server, struct file *file,
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	struct ncp_fs_info info;
 
-	if ((file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) != 0)
-	    && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {
+	if (file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) != 0
+	    && current_uid() != server->m.mounted_uid)
 		return -EACCES;
-	}
+
 	if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ ncp_get_fs_info_v2(struct ncp_server * server, struct file *file,
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	struct ncp_fs_info_v2 info2;
 
-	if ((file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) != 0)
-	    && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {
+	if (file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) != 0
+	    && current_uid() != server->m.mounted_uid)
 		return -EACCES;
-	}
+
 	if (copy_from_user(&info2, arg, sizeof(info2)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -141,10 +141,10 @@ ncp_get_compat_fs_info_v2(struct ncp_server * server, struct file *file,
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	struct compat_ncp_fs_info_v2 info2;
 
-	if ((file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) != 0)
-	    && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {
+	if (file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) != 0
+	    && current_uid() != server->m.mounted_uid)
 		return -EACCES;
-	}
+
 	if (copy_from_user(&info2, arg, sizeof(info2)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -270,16 +270,17 @@ static int __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 	struct ncp_ioctl_request request;
 	char* bouncebuffer;
 	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+	uid_t uid = current_uid();
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	case NCP_IOC_NCPREQUEST_32:
 #endif
 	case NCP_IOC_NCPREQUEST:
-		if ((file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0)
-		    && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {
+		if (file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0
+		    && uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 		if (cmd == NCP_IOC_NCPREQUEST_32) {
 			struct compat_ncp_ioctl_request request32;
@@ -356,10 +357,10 @@ static int __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 	case NCP_IOC_GETMOUNTUID16:
 	case NCP_IOC_GETMOUNTUID32:
 	case NCP_IOC_GETMOUNTUID64:
-		if ((file_permission(filp, MAY_READ) != 0)
-			&& (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {
+		if (file_permission(filp, MAY_READ) != 0
+			&& uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
+
 		if (cmd == NCP_IOC_GETMOUNTUID16) {
 			u16 uid;
 			SET_UID(uid, server->m.mounted_uid);
@@ -380,11 +381,10 @@ static int __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 		{
 			struct ncp_setroot_ioctl sr;
 
-			if ((file_permission(filp, MAY_READ) != 0)
-			    && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid))
-			{
+			if (file_permission(filp, MAY_READ) != 0
+			    && uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 				return -EACCES;
-			}
+
 			if (server->m.mounted_vol[0]) {
 				struct dentry* dentry = inode->i_sb->s_root;
 
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ static int __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				return -EFAULT;
 			return 0;
 		}
+
 	case NCP_IOC_SETROOT:
 		{
 			struct ncp_setroot_ioctl sr;
@@ -455,11 +456,10 @@ static int __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NCPFS_PACKET_SIGNING	
 	case NCP_IOC_SIGN_INIT:
-		if ((file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0)
-		    && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid))
-		{
+		if (file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0
+		    && uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
+
 		if (argp) {
 			if (server->sign_wanted)
 			{
@@ -478,24 +478,22 @@ static int __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 		return 0;		
 		
         case NCP_IOC_SIGN_WANTED:
-		if ((file_permission(filp, MAY_READ) != 0)
-		    && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid))
-		{
+		if (file_permission(filp, MAY_READ) != 0
+		    && uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
 		
                 if (put_user(server->sign_wanted, (int __user *)argp))
 			return -EFAULT;
                 return 0;
+
 	case NCP_IOC_SET_SIGN_WANTED:
 		{
 			int newstate;
 
-			if ((file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0)
-			    && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid))
-			{
+			if (file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0
+			    && uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 				return -EACCES;
-			}
+
 			/* get only low 8 bits... */
 			if (get_user(newstate, (unsigned char __user *)argp))
 				return -EFAULT;
@@ -512,11 +510,10 @@ static int __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NCPFS_IOCTL_LOCKING
 	case NCP_IOC_LOCKUNLOCK:
-		if ((file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0)
-		    && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid))
-		{
+		if (file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0
+		    && uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
+
 		{
 			struct ncp_lock_ioctl	 rqdata;
 
@@ -585,9 +582,8 @@ outrel:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	case NCP_IOC_GETOBJECTNAME_32:
-		if (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid) {
+		if (uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
 		{
 			struct compat_ncp_objectname_ioctl user;
 			size_t outl;
@@ -609,10 +605,10 @@ outrel:
 			return 0;
 		}
 #endif
+
 	case NCP_IOC_GETOBJECTNAME:
-		if (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid) {
+		if (uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
 		{
 			struct ncp_objectname_ioctl user;
 			size_t outl;
@@ -633,13 +629,13 @@ outrel:
 				return -EFAULT;
 			return 0;
 		}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	case NCP_IOC_SETOBJECTNAME_32:
 #endif
 	case NCP_IOC_SETOBJECTNAME:
-		if (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid) {
+		if (uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
 		{
 			struct ncp_objectname_ioctl user;
 			void* newname;
@@ -691,13 +687,13 @@ outrel:
 			kfree(oldname);
 			return 0;
 		}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	case NCP_IOC_GETPRIVATEDATA_32:
 #endif
 	case NCP_IOC_GETPRIVATEDATA:
-		if (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid) {
+		if (uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
 		{
 			struct ncp_privatedata_ioctl user;
 			size_t outl;
@@ -736,13 +732,13 @@ outrel:
 
 			return 0;
 		}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	case NCP_IOC_SETPRIVATEDATA_32:
 #endif
 	case NCP_IOC_SETPRIVATEDATA:
-		if (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid) {
+		if (uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
-		}
 		{
 			struct ncp_privatedata_ioctl user;
 			void* new;
@@ -794,9 +790,10 @@ outrel:
 #endif /* CONFIG_NCPFS_NLS */
 
 	case NCP_IOC_SETDENTRYTTL:
-		if ((file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0) &&
-				 (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid))
+		if (file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE) != 0 &&
+		    uid != server->m.mounted_uid)
 			return -EACCES;
+
 		{
 			u_int32_t user;
 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2008-08-27 13:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-08-27 13:45 [PATCH 00/59] Introduce credentials David Howells
2008-08-27 13:33 ` Alan Cox
2008-08-27 13:45 ` [PATCH 01/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the IA64 arch David Howells
2008-08-27 14:55   ` Artem Bityutskiy
2008-08-27 15:24   ` David Howells
2008-08-27 23:21     ` Stephen Rothwell
2008-08-27 13:45 ` [PATCH 02/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the MIPS arch David Howells
2008-08-27 13:45 ` [PATCH 03/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the PA-RISC arch David Howells
2008-08-27 22:19   ` Kyle McMartin
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 04/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the PowerPC arch David Howells
2008-08-27 23:45   ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 05/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the S390 arch David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 06/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the x86 arch David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 07/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the block loopback driver David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 08/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the tty driver David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 09/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the DRM driver David Howells
2008-09-02  1:03   ` Dave Airlie
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 10/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the ISDN drivers David Howells
2008-08-27 17:51   ` Karsten Keil
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 11/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in video input drivers David Howells
2008-08-29 22:32   ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 12/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the network device drivers David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 13/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the USB driver David Howells
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 14/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in 9P2000 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-28 17:59   ` Eric Van Hensbergen
2008-08-27 13:46 ` [PATCH 15/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the AFFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 16/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the autofs filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 17/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the autofs4 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 18/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the BFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 19/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the CIFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 20/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Coda filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 21/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the devpts filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 22/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the eCryptFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 23/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Ext2 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 24/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Ext3 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 25/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Ext4 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:47 ` [PATCH 26/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the FAT filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 14:12   ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 27/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the FUSE filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 28/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the GFS2 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 29/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the HFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 30/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the HFSplus filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 31/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the HPFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 32/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the hugetlbfs filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 33/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the JFFS2 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 34/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the JFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 14:31   ` Dave Kleikamp
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 35/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Minix filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` David Howells [this message]
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 37/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the NFS daemon David Howells
2008-08-27 13:48 ` [PATCH 38/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the OCFS2 filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 23:04   ` Mark Fasheh
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 39/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the OMFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 40/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the RAMFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 41/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the ReiserFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 42/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SMBFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 43/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SYSV filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 44/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UBIFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 45/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UDF filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 14:44   ` Jan Kara
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 46/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 47/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the XFS filesystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 48/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the filesystem subsystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:49 ` [PATCH 49/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SYSV IPC subsystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 50/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the AX25 protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 51/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the IPv6 protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 52/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the netrom protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 53/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the ROSE protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 54/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SunRPC protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 55/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UNIX socket protocol David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 56/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the networking subsystem David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 57/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the key management code David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 58/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the capabilities code David Howells
2008-08-27 13:50 ` [PATCH 59/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernel David Howells
2008-08-27 14:24 ` [PATCH 00/59] Introduce credentials David Howells
2008-08-27 16:39   ` Alan Cox
2008-08-28  9:19   ` David Howells
2008-08-28  9:45     ` Alan Cox
2008-08-28 20:28       ` Paul E. McKenney

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