From: Nick Andrew <nick@nick-andrew.net>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: Geoffrey McRae <geoff@rabidhost.com>,
Peter Teoh <htmldeveloper@gmail.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: New Security Features, Please Comment
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2008 14:44:02 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20081205034402.GB1626@mail.local.tull.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <95180.1228448127@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
On Thu, Dec 04, 2008 at 10:35:27PM -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> You're also overlooking the fact that the malicious code could do something
> like this:
>
> /* send the parent something that makes it *think* the request finished */
> printf("We're all done now\n");
> while (getpid()) msleep (1);
I think it's pretty basic that setgid/setuid needs to be done _before_
exec'ing untrusted code.
On the other hand, if a trusted process gets its uid changed _and_
expects this to happen then I suppose it can be secure. But if a
process's uid gets changed unexpectedly then nasty things already
pointed out by Alan and others can occur.
Nick.
--
PGP Key ID = 0x418487E7 http://www.nick-andrew.net/
PGP Key fingerprint = B3ED 6894 8E49 1770 C24A 67E3 6266 6EB9 4184 87E7
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-12-05 3:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-12-02 23:28 Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-03 0:24 ` Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-03 0:53 ` Alan Cox
2008-12-03 1:44 ` Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-03 2:11 ` David Newall
2008-12-03 2:55 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2008-12-03 4:02 ` Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-03 4:35 ` Peter Teoh
2008-12-03 5:02 ` Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-03 6:54 ` David Newall
2008-12-03 10:29 ` Alan Cox
2008-12-03 12:42 ` Nick Andrew
2008-12-03 12:46 ` Alan Cox
2008-12-03 22:44 ` Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-03 23:08 ` Alan Cox
2008-12-03 23:27 ` Peter Teoh
2008-12-03 23:40 ` Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-04 21:56 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2008-12-04 22:30 ` Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-05 3:35 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2008-12-05 3:44 ` Nick Andrew [this message]
2008-12-05 3:50 ` Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-05 4:03 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2008-12-03 23:39 ` Miquel van Smoorenburg
2008-12-04 0:00 ` Geoffrey McRae
2008-12-04 0:22 ` Peter Teoh
2008-12-04 0:08 ` Alan Cox
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