* [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check @ 2010-07-08 12:51 Michal Hocko 2010-07-08 13:22 ` Ingo Molnar 2010-07-28 23:57 ` [stable] " Greg KH 0 siblings, 2 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-07-08 12:51 UTC (permalink / raw) To: stable; +Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Darren Hart, LKML Hi stable team, could you consider including the following patch (Linus tree commit: 7a0ea09ad5352efce8fe79ed853150449903b9f5). The original discussion which led to this commit can be found at http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/6/23/52. In short: The original pi locking implementation (since it got to the kernel) contains a credential check (in futex_find_get_task) if we want to create a PI state for already held lock. This test fails if the lock owner has a different (e)uid than the process for which we want to create the state. The lock operation then fails with ESRCH which is the error code which is returned if the process holding a lock doesn't exist. The userspace (glibc) doesn't expect this behavior for shared robust PI futexes and fails with an assert or hang the task in the end-less loop. The test case is attached in the referenced thread. The credential test, which is removed by this patch, doesn't look correct and it limits the functionality without any good reason. There are no security consequences as well because the only thing that should matter in the shared futex-es is accessibility to the shared memory. The patch applies as is on top of Vanilla 2.6.32, but let me know if you want to base it on top of the any of the stable trees. --- >From 7a0ea09ad5352efce8fe79ed853150449903b9f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2010 09:51:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. None of the paths looks it needs the credentials check, though. Different (e)uids shouldn't matter at all because the only thing that is important for shared futex is the accessibility of the shared memory. The credentail check results in glibc assert failure or process hang (if glibc is compiled without assert support) for shared robust pthread mutex with priority inheritance if a process tries to lock already held lock owned by a process with a different euid: pthread_mutex_lock.c:312: __pthread_mutex_lock_full: Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed. The problem is that futex_lock_pi_atomic which is called when we try to lock already held lock checks the current holder (tid is stored in the futex value) to get the PI state. It uses lookup_pi_state which in turn gets task struct from futex_find_get_task. ESRCH is returned either when the task is not found or if credentials check fails. futex_lock_pi_atomic simply returns if it gets ESRCH. glibc code, however, doesn't expect that robust lock returns with ESRCH because it should get either success or owner died. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/futex.c | 17 ++++------------- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index e7a35f1..6a3a5fa 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -429,20 +429,11 @@ static void free_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) { struct task_struct *p; - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; rcu_read_lock(); p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!p) { - p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - } else { - pcred = __task_cred(p); - if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && - cred->euid != pcred->uid) - p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - else - get_task_struct(p); - } + if (p) + get_task_struct(p); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -564,8 +555,8 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, if (!pid) return -ESRCH; p = futex_find_get_task(pid); - if (IS_ERR(p)) - return PTR_ERR(p); + if (!p) + return -ESRCH; /* * We need to look at the task state flags to figure out, -- 1.7.1 -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-07-08 12:51 [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check Michal Hocko @ 2010-07-08 13:22 ` Ingo Molnar 2010-07-12 10:20 ` Thomas Gleixner 2010-07-28 23:57 ` [stable] " Greg KH 1 sibling, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Ingo Molnar @ 2010-07-08 13:22 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michal Hocko; +Cc: stable, Thomas Gleixner, Darren Hart, LKML * Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > Hi stable team, > could you consider including the following patch (Linus tree commit: > 7a0ea09ad5352efce8fe79ed853150449903b9f5). Ack. Ingo ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-07-08 13:22 ` Ingo Molnar @ 2010-07-12 10:20 ` Thomas Gleixner 0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2010-07-12 10:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Ingo Molnar; +Cc: Michal Hocko, stable, Darren Hart, LKML On Thu, 8 Jul 2010, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > * Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > > > Hi stable team, > > could you consider including the following patch (Linus tree commit: > > 7a0ea09ad5352efce8fe79ed853150449903b9f5). > > Ack. Ack tglx ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [stable] [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-07-08 12:51 [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check Michal Hocko 2010-07-08 13:22 ` Ingo Molnar @ 2010-07-28 23:57 ` Greg KH 1 sibling, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Greg KH @ 2010-07-28 23:57 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michal Hocko; +Cc: stable, Thomas Gleixner, Darren Hart, Ingo Molnar, LKML On Thu, Jul 08, 2010 at 02:51:04PM +0200, Michal Hocko wrote: > Hi stable team, > could you consider including the following patch (Linus tree commit: > 7a0ea09ad5352efce8fe79ed853150449903b9f5). Now queued up. thanks, greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: futex: race in lock and unlock&exit for robust futex with PI? @ 2010-06-25 17:53 Darren Hart 2010-06-25 23:35 ` Darren Hart 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Darren Hart @ 2010-06-25 17:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michal Hocko Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Linus Torvalds On 06/25/2010 01:27 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: > On Thu 24-06-10 19:42:50, Darren Hart wrote: >> On 06/23/2010 02:13 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: >>> Hi, > > Hi, > >> >> Hi Michal, >> >> Thanks for reporting the issue and providing a testcase. >> >>> >>> attached you can find a simple test case which fails quite easily on the >>> following glibc assert: >>> "SharedMutexTest: pthread_mutex_lock.c:289: __pthread_mutex_lock: >>> Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed." " >> >> I've run runSimple.sh in a tight loop for a couple hours (about 2k >> iterations so far) and haven't seen anything other than "Here we go" >> printed to the console. > > Maybe a higher load on CPUs would help (busy loop on other CPUs). Must have been a build issue. I can reproduce _something_ now. Within 10 iterations of runSimple.sh the test hangs. ps shows all the simple processes sitting in pause. (gdb) bt #0 0x0000003c0060e030 in __pause_nocancel () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #1 0x0000003c006085fc in __pthread_mutex_lock_full () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #2 0x0000000000400cd6 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffc016e508) at simple.c:101 There is only one call to pause* in pthread_mutex_lock.c: (line ~316): /* ESRCH can happen only for non-robust PI mutexes where the owner of the lock died. */ assert (INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO (e, __err) != ESRCH || !robust); /* Delay the thread indefinitely. */ while (1) pause_not_cancel (); Right now I'm thinking that NDEBUG is set in my build for whatever reason, but I think I'm seeing the same issue you are. I'll review the futex code and prepare a trace patch and see if I can reproduce with that. Note: confirmed, the glibc rpm has -DNDEBUG=1 -- Darren > >> >> I had to add -D_GNU_SOURCE to get it to build on my system (RHEL5.2 >> + 2.6.34). Perhaps this is just a difference in the toolchain. > > I assume that you got PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT undeclared error, don't you? > I have hacked around that by #define __USE_UNIX98 which worked on Debian > and OpenSuse. But you are right _GNU_SOURCE is definitely better > solution. > >> >>> AFAIU, this assertion says that futex syscall cannot fail with ESRCH >>> for robust futex because it should either succeed or fail with >>> EOWNERDEAD. >> >> I'll have to think on that and review the libc source. We do need to >> confirm that the assert is even doing the right thing. > > Sure. I have looked through the glibc lock implementation and it makes > quite a good sense to me. A robust lock should never return with ESRCH. > >> >>> >>> We have seen this problem on SLES11 and SLES11SP1 but I was able to >>> reproduce it with the 2.6.34 kernel as well. >> >> What kind of system are you seeing this on? I've been running on a >> 4-way x86_64 blade. > > * Debian (squeeze/sid) with > - Intel(R) Core(TM)2 CPU T5600 @ 1.83GHz > - kernel: vanilla 2.6.34 > - glibc: 2.11.1-3 > - i386 > > * OpenSuse 11.2 with > - Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU E4500 @ 2.20GHz > - kernel: distribution 2.6.31.12-0.2-desktop > - glibc: 2.10.1-10.5.1 > - i386 > > * SLES11SP1 > - Dual-Core AMD Opteron(tm) Processor 1218 > - kernel: distribution 2.6.32.12-0.3-default > - glibc: 2.11.1-0.17.4 > - x86_64 > > Each box shows a different number of asserts during 10 iterations. > >> >>> The test case is quite easy. >>> >>> Executed with a parameter it creates a test file and initializes shared, >>> robust pthread mutex (optionaly compile time configured with priority >>> inheritance) backed by the mmapped test file. Without a parameter it >>> mmaps the file and just locks, unlocks mutex and checks for EOWNERDEAD >>> (this should never happen during the test as the process never dies with >>> the lock held) in the loop. >> >> Have you found the PI parameter to be required for reproducing the >> error? From the comments below I'm assuming so... just want to be >> sure. > > Yes. If you comment out USE_PI variable in the script the problem is not > shown at all. > >> >>> >>> If I run this application for multiple users in parallel I can see the >>> above assertion. However, if priority inheritance is turned off then >>> there is no problem. I am not able to reproduce also if the test case is >>> run under a single user. >>> >>> I am using the attached runSimple.sh script to run the test case like >>> this: >>> >>> rm test.file simple >>> for i in `seq 10` >>> do >>> sh runSimple.sh >>> done >>> >>> To disable IP just comment out USE_PI variable in the script. >>> You need to change USER1 and USER2 variables to match you system. You >>> will need to run the script as root if you do not set any special >>> setting to run su on behalf of those users. >>> >>> I have tried to look at futex_{un}lock_pi but it is really hard to >>> understand. >> >> *grin* tell me about it... >> >> See Documentation/pi-futex.txt if you haven't already. > > Will do. > >> >>> I assume that lookup_pi_state is the one which sets ESRCH >>> after it is not able to find the pid of the current owner. >>> >>> This would suggest that we are racing with the unlock of the current >>> lock holder but I don't see how is this possible as both lock and unlock >>> paths hold fshared lock for all operations over the lock value. I have >>> noticed that the lock path drops fshared if the current holder is dying >>> but then it retries the whole process again. >>> >>> Any advice would be highly appreciated. >> >> If I can reproduce this I should be able to get some trace points in >> there to get a better idea of the execution path leading up to the >> problem. > > Please make sure that you run the test case with two different users. I > couldn't reproduce the issue with a single user. > > If you have some ideas about patches which I could try then just pass it > to me. > >> >> This would be a great time to have those futex fault injection patches... >> >> >> -- >> Darren Hart >> IBM Linux Technology Center >> Real-Time Linux Team > > Thanks for looking into it. -- Darren Hart IBM Linux Technology Center Real-Time Linux Team ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: futex: race in lock and unlock&exit for robust futex with PI? 2010-06-25 17:53 futex: race in lock and unlock&exit for robust futex with PI? Darren Hart @ 2010-06-25 23:35 ` Darren Hart 2010-06-28 14:42 ` Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Darren Hart @ 2010-06-25 23:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michal Hocko Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Linus Torvalds On 06/25/2010 10:53 AM, Darren Hart wrote: > On 06/25/2010 01:27 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: >> On Thu 24-06-10 19:42:50, Darren Hart wrote: >>> On 06/23/2010 02:13 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: >>>> attached you can find a simple test case which fails quite easily on >>>> the >>>> following glibc assert: >>>> "SharedMutexTest: pthread_mutex_lock.c:289: __pthread_mutex_lock: >>>> Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed." " >>> >>> I've run runSimple.sh in a tight loop for a couple hours (about 2k >>> iterations so far) and haven't seen anything other than "Here we go" >>> printed to the console. >> >> Maybe a higher load on CPUs would help (busy loop on other CPUs). > > Must have been a build issue. I can reproduce _something_ now. Within 10 > iterations of runSimple.sh the test hangs. ps shows all the simple > processes sitting in pause. > > (gdb) bt > #0 0x0000003c0060e030 in __pause_nocancel () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 > #1 0x0000003c006085fc in __pthread_mutex_lock_full () > from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 > #2 0x0000000000400cd6 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffc016e508) at simple.c:101 > > There is only one call to pause* in pthread_mutex_lock.c: (line ~316): > > /* ESRCH can happen only for non-robust PI mutexes where > the owner of the lock died. */ > assert (INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO (e, __err) != ESRCH || !robust); > > /* Delay the thread indefinitely. */ > while (1) > pause_not_cancel (); > > Right now I'm thinking that NDEBUG is set in my build for whatever > reason, but I think I'm seeing the same issue you are. I'll review the > futex code and prepare a trace patch and see if I can reproduce with that. > > Note: confirmed, the glibc rpm has -DNDEBUG=1 The simple tracing patch (below) confirms that we are indeed returning -ESRCH to userspace from futex_lock_pi(). Notice that the pids of the two "simple" processes lingering after the runSimple.sh script are the ones that return -ESRCH to userspace, and therefor end up in the pause_not_cancel() trap inside glibc. # trace-cmd record -p nop ./runSimple.sh <snip> # ps -eLo pid,comm,wchan | grep "simple " 20636 simple pause 20876 simple pause # trace-cmd report version = 6 CPU 0 is empty cpus=4 field->offset = 24 size=8 <...>-20636 [003] 1778.965860: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH <...>-20636 [003] 1778.965865: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH <...>-20636 [003] 1778.965866: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 >>---> <...>-20636 [003] 1778.965867: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199394: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : cmpxchg failed, retrying <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199400: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199401: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199402: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 >>---> <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199403: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace <...>-21316 [002] 1782.300695: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : cmpxchg failed, retrying <...>-21316 [002] 1782.300698: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : cmpxchg failed, retrying Attaching gdb to 20636, we can see the state of the mutex: (gdb) print (struct __pthread_mutex_s)*mutex $1 = {__lock = 0, __count = 1, __owner = 0, __nusers = 0, __kind = 176, __spins = 0, __list = {__prev = 0x0, __next = 0x0}} This is consistent with hex dump of the first bits of the backing file: # xxd test.file | head -n 3 0000000: 0000 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 0000010: b000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 0000020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ The futex (__lock) value is 0, indicating it is unlocked and has no waiters. The count being 1 however suggests a task has acquired it once, which, if I read the glibc source correctly, means the owner field and __lock fields should not be 0. This supports Michal's thought about lock racing with unlock, seeing it's held, then unable to find the owner (pi_state) as it has since been unlocked. Possibly some horkage with the WAITERS bit leading to glibc performing atomic acquistions/releases and rendering the mutex inconsistent with the kernel's view. This should be protected against, but that is the direction I am going to start looking. -- Darren Hart >From 92014a07df73489460ff788274506255ff0f775d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2010 13:54:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] robust pi futex tracing --- kernel/futex.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index e7a35f1..24ac437 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -683,6 +683,8 @@ retry: */ if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) { /* Keep the OWNER_DIED bit */ + if (ownerdied) + trace_printk("ownerdied, taking over lock\n"); newval = (curval & ~FUTEX_TID_MASK) | task_pid_vnr(task); ownerdied = 0; lock_taken = 1; @@ -692,14 +694,18 @@ retry: if (unlikely(curval == -EFAULT)) return -EFAULT; - if (unlikely(curval != uval)) + if (unlikely(curval != uval)) { + trace_printk("cmpxchg failed, retrying\n"); goto retry; + } /* * We took the lock due to owner died take over. */ - if (unlikely(lock_taken)) + if (unlikely(lock_taken)) { + trace_printk("ownerdied, lock acquired, return 1\n"); return 1; + } /* * We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if @@ -710,13 +716,16 @@ retry: if (unlikely(ret)) { switch (ret) { case -ESRCH: + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH\n"); /* * No owner found for this futex. Check if the * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether * this is a robust futex or not. */ - if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) + if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) { + trace_printk("get_futex_value_locked: -EFAULT\n"); return -EFAULT; + } /* * We simply start over in case of a robust @@ -724,10 +733,13 @@ retry: * and return happy. */ if (curval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) { + trace_printk("ownerdied, goto retry\n"); ownerdied = 1; goto retry; } + trace_printk("ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH\n"); default: + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: %d\n", ret); break; } } @@ -1950,6 +1962,8 @@ retry_private: put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key); cond_resched(); goto retry; + case -ESRCH: + trace_printk("returning -ESRCH to userspace\n"); default: goto out_unlock_put_key; } @@ -2537,8 +2551,10 @@ void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr) /* * Avoid excessively long or circular lists: */ - if (!--limit) + if (!--limit) { + trace_printk("excessively long list, aborting\n"); break; + } cond_resched(); } -- 1.7.0.4 -- Darren Hart IBM Linux Technology Center Real-Time Linux Team ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: futex: race in lock and unlock&exit for robust futex with PI? 2010-06-25 23:35 ` Darren Hart @ 2010-06-28 14:42 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-28 15:32 ` Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-28 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Darren Hart Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Linus Torvalds Hi Darren, On Fri 25-06-10 16:35:14, Darren Hart wrote: [...] > # trace-cmd record -p nop ./runSimple.sh > <snip> > > # ps -eLo pid,comm,wchan | grep "simple " > 20636 simple pause > 20876 simple pause > > # trace-cmd report > version = 6 > CPU 0 is empty > cpus=4 > field->offset = 24 size=8 > <...>-20636 [003] 1778.965860: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH > <...>-20636 [003] 1778.965865: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH > <...>-20636 [003] 1778.965866: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 > >>---> <...>-20636 [003] 1778.965867: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace > <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199394: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : cmpxchg failed, retrying > <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199400: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH > <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199401: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH > <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199402: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 > >>---> <...>-20876 [001] 1780.199403: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace > <...>-21316 [002] 1782.300695: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : cmpxchg failed, retrying > <...>-21316 [002] 1782.300698: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : cmpxchg failed, retrying > [...] I have updated the test case slightly (reduced the number of lock/unlock cycles to 1). Then, I have used the additional patch (see bellow) on top of the one you have posted and here is the log I am getting: version = 6 cpus=2 field->offset = 16 size=4 <...>-13232 [001] 226.693880: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start <...>-13232 [001] 226.693886: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=0 <...>-13235 [001] 226.700204: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start <...>-13235 [001] 226.700210: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=13242 <...>-13235 [001] 226.700211: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH <...>-13235 [001] 226.700211: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 <...>-13235 [001] 226.700212: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace <...>-13235 [001] 226.700212: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=-3 <...>-13240 [000] 226.705574: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start <...>-13240 [000] 226.705580: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=13242 <...>-13240 [000] 226.705581: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH <...>-13240 [000] 226.705582: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 <...>-13240 [000] 226.705582: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace <...>-13240 [000] 226.705583: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=-3 <...>-13231 [000] 226.708095: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start <...>-13231 [000] 226.708101: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=13242 <...>-13231 [000] 226.708102: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH <...>-13231 [000] 226.708102: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 <...>-13231 [000] 226.708103: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace <...>-13231 [000] 226.708103: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=-3 <...>-13242 [001] 226.709246: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi start <...>-13242 [001] 226.709249: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi: TID->0 transition 2147496890 <...>-13242 [001] 226.709250: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi: no waiters, unlock the futex ret=0 uval=-2147470406 <...>-13242 [001] 226.709250: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi done ret=0 As you can see lookup_pi_state fails for the pid (13242) which is at the very bottom and that is unlocking the futex. This smells fishy to me. I can see this pattern consistently for all failures. Maybe I am doing something wrong or the timestamps are not precise enough but from what I can see this looks like a bug in lookup_pi_state which doesn't find an existing PID. -- >From 733816347db91670f27d206382b8c2e57e5ef125 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 13:42:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] futex pi unlock tracing added --- kernel/futex.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 24ac437..d114fee 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -716,7 +716,8 @@ retry: if (unlikely(ret)) { switch (ret) { case -ESRCH: - trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH\n"); + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=%u\n", + uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK); /* * No owner found for this futex. Check if the * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether @@ -2070,8 +2071,10 @@ retry: * again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking * anyone else up: */ - if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) + if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) { uval = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(uaddr, task_pid_vnr(current), 0); + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: TID->0 transition %u\n", uval); + } if (unlikely(uval == -EFAULT)) @@ -2080,8 +2083,10 @@ retry: * Rare case: we managed to release the lock atomically, * no need to wake anyone else up: */ - if (unlikely(uval == task_pid_vnr(current))) + if (unlikely(uval == task_pid_vnr(current))) { + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: release without wakeup\n"); goto out_unlock; + } /* * Ok, other tasks may need to be woken up - check waiters @@ -2093,6 +2098,7 @@ retry: if (!match_futex (&this->key, &key)) continue; ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, this); + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: wake ret=%d uval=%u this=%p\n", ret, uval, this); /* * The atomic access to the futex value * generated a pagefault, so retry the @@ -2107,6 +2113,8 @@ retry: */ if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) { ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval); + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: no waiters, unlock the futex ret=%d uval=%d\n", + ret, uval); if (ret == -EFAULT) goto pi_faulted; } @@ -2600,12 +2608,18 @@ long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout, ret = futex_wake_op(uaddr, fshared, uaddr2, val, val2, val3); break; case FUTEX_LOCK_PI: - if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) + if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) { + trace_printk("futex_lock_pi start\n"); ret = futex_lock_pi(uaddr, fshared, val, timeout, 0); + trace_printk("futex_lock_pi done ret=%d\n", ret); + } break; case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI: - if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) + if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) { + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi start\n"); ret = futex_unlock_pi(uaddr, fshared); + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi done ret=%d\n", ret); + } break; case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI: if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) -- 1.7.1 > > -- > Darren Hart > > From 92014a07df73489460ff788274506255ff0f775d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> > Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2010 13:54:25 -0700 > Subject: [PATCH] robust pi futex tracing > > --- > kernel/futex.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > index e7a35f1..24ac437 100644 > --- a/kernel/futex.c > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > @@ -683,6 +683,8 @@ retry: > */ > if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) { > /* Keep the OWNER_DIED bit */ > + if (ownerdied) > + trace_printk("ownerdied, taking over lock\n"); > newval = (curval & ~FUTEX_TID_MASK) | task_pid_vnr(task); > ownerdied = 0; > lock_taken = 1; > @@ -692,14 +694,18 @@ retry: > > if (unlikely(curval == -EFAULT)) > return -EFAULT; > - if (unlikely(curval != uval)) > + if (unlikely(curval != uval)) { > + trace_printk("cmpxchg failed, retrying\n"); > goto retry; > + } > > /* > * We took the lock due to owner died take over. > */ > - if (unlikely(lock_taken)) > + if (unlikely(lock_taken)) { > + trace_printk("ownerdied, lock acquired, return 1\n"); > return 1; > + } > > /* > * We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if > @@ -710,13 +716,16 @@ retry: > if (unlikely(ret)) { > switch (ret) { > case -ESRCH: > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH\n"); > /* > * No owner found for this futex. Check if the > * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether > * this is a robust futex or not. > */ > - if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) > + if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) { > + trace_printk("get_futex_value_locked: -EFAULT\n"); > return -EFAULT; > + } > > /* > * We simply start over in case of a robust > @@ -724,10 +733,13 @@ retry: > * and return happy. > */ > if (curval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) { > + trace_printk("ownerdied, goto retry\n"); > ownerdied = 1; > goto retry; > } > + trace_printk("ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH\n"); > default: > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: %d\n", ret); > break; > } > } > @@ -1950,6 +1962,8 @@ retry_private: > put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key); > cond_resched(); > goto retry; > + case -ESRCH: > + trace_printk("returning -ESRCH to userspace\n"); > default: > goto out_unlock_put_key; > } > @@ -2537,8 +2551,10 @@ void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr) > /* > * Avoid excessively long or circular lists: > */ > - if (!--limit) > + if (!--limit) { > + trace_printk("excessively long list, aborting\n"); > break; > + } > > cond_resched(); > } > -- > 1.7.0.4 > > -- > Darren Hart > IBM Linux Technology Center > Real-Time Linux Team -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: futex: race in lock and unlock&exit for robust futex with PI? 2010-06-28 14:42 ` Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-28 15:32 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-28 15:58 ` Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-28 15:32 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Darren Hart Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Linus Torvalds On Mon 28-06-10 16:42:46, Michal Hocko wrote: > Hi Darren, Hmm, I think that I've found the reason. I have used one additional tracing patch (bellow) and we are getting ESRCH because cread and pcred don't match: version = 6 CPU 0 is empty cpus=2 field->offset = 16 size=4 <...>-22260 [001] 139.669672: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start <...>-22260 [001] 139.669678: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=0 <...>-22281 [001] 139.693690: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start <...>-22281 [001] 139.693696: bprint: lookup_pi_state : cred(1004,1004) != pcred(1003,1003) <...>-22281 [001] 139.693697: bprint: lookup_pi_state : futex_find_get_task failed with -3 <...>-22281 [001] 139.693697: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=22280 <...>-22281 [001] 139.693698: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH <...>-22281 [001] 139.693698: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 <...>-22281 [001] 139.693699: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace <...>-22281 [001] 139.693700: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=-3 <...>-22280 [001] 139.694033: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi start <...>-22280 [001] 139.694035: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi: TID->0 transition 2147505928 <...>-22280 [001] 139.694036: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi: no waiters, unlock the futex ret=0 uval=-2147461368 <...>-22280 [001] 139.694036: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi done ret=0 <...>-22488 [001] 139.874967: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start <...>-22488 [001] 139.874972: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=0 This would answer why we cannot reproduce with a single user. Btw. I guess that there is a typo in the condition and it should be like this: if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && - cred->euid != pcred->uid) + cred->uid != pcred->uid) -- >From f0743d2b2d2f81c40700c4d6816ad3abfd113c1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 17:08:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] more traces --- kernel/futex.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index d114fee..d1c2489 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -435,11 +435,16 @@ static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!p) { p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + trace_printk("%u pid not found\n", pid); } else { pcred = __task_cred(p); if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && - cred->euid != pcred->uid) + cred->euid != pcred->uid) { p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + trace_printk("cred(%u,%u) != pcred(%u,%u)\n", + cred->euid, cred->uid, + pcred->euid, pcred->uid); + } else get_task_struct(p); } @@ -564,8 +569,11 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, if (!pid) return -ESRCH; p = futex_find_get_task(pid); - if (IS_ERR(p)) + if (IS_ERR(p)) { + trace_printk("futex_find_get_task failed with %d\n", + PTR_ERR(p)); return PTR_ERR(p); + } /* * We need to look at the task state flags to figure out, @@ -581,6 +589,7 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, * cleanup: */ int ret = (p->flags & PF_EXITPIDONE) ? -ESRCH : -EAGAIN; + trace_printk("pid=%u is exiting ret=%d\n", pid, ret); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock); put_task_struct(p); -- 1.7.1 > > -- > From 733816347db91670f27d206382b8c2e57e5ef125 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> > Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 13:42:29 +0200 > Subject: [PATCH] futex pi unlock tracing added > > --- > kernel/futex.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- > 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > index 24ac437..d114fee 100644 > --- a/kernel/futex.c > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > @@ -716,7 +716,8 @@ retry: > if (unlikely(ret)) { > switch (ret) { > case -ESRCH: > - trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH\n"); > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=%u\n", > + uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK); > /* > * No owner found for this futex. Check if the > * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether > @@ -2070,8 +2071,10 @@ retry: > * again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking > * anyone else up: > */ > - if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) > + if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) { > uval = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(uaddr, task_pid_vnr(current), 0); > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: TID->0 transition %u\n", uval); > + } > > > if (unlikely(uval == -EFAULT)) > @@ -2080,8 +2083,10 @@ retry: > * Rare case: we managed to release the lock atomically, > * no need to wake anyone else up: > */ > - if (unlikely(uval == task_pid_vnr(current))) > + if (unlikely(uval == task_pid_vnr(current))) { > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: release without wakeup\n"); > goto out_unlock; > + } > > /* > * Ok, other tasks may need to be woken up - check waiters > @@ -2093,6 +2098,7 @@ retry: > if (!match_futex (&this->key, &key)) > continue; > ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, this); > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: wake ret=%d uval=%u this=%p\n", ret, uval, this); > /* > * The atomic access to the futex value > * generated a pagefault, so retry the > @@ -2107,6 +2113,8 @@ retry: > */ > if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) { > ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval); > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: no waiters, unlock the futex ret=%d uval=%d\n", > + ret, uval); > if (ret == -EFAULT) > goto pi_faulted; > } > @@ -2600,12 +2608,18 @@ long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout, > ret = futex_wake_op(uaddr, fshared, uaddr2, val, val2, val3); > break; > case FUTEX_LOCK_PI: > - if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) > + if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) { > + trace_printk("futex_lock_pi start\n"); > ret = futex_lock_pi(uaddr, fshared, val, timeout, 0); > + trace_printk("futex_lock_pi done ret=%d\n", ret); > + } > break; > case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI: > - if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) > + if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) { > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi start\n"); > ret = futex_unlock_pi(uaddr, fshared); > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi done ret=%d\n", ret); > + } > break; > case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI: > if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) > -- > 1.7.1 > > > > > -- > > Darren Hart > > > > From 92014a07df73489460ff788274506255ff0f775d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > From: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> > > Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2010 13:54:25 -0700 > > Subject: [PATCH] robust pi futex tracing > > > > --- > > kernel/futex.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- > > 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > > index e7a35f1..24ac437 100644 > > --- a/kernel/futex.c > > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > > @@ -683,6 +683,8 @@ retry: > > */ > > if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) { > > /* Keep the OWNER_DIED bit */ > > + if (ownerdied) > > + trace_printk("ownerdied, taking over lock\n"); > > newval = (curval & ~FUTEX_TID_MASK) | task_pid_vnr(task); > > ownerdied = 0; > > lock_taken = 1; > > @@ -692,14 +694,18 @@ retry: > > > > if (unlikely(curval == -EFAULT)) > > return -EFAULT; > > - if (unlikely(curval != uval)) > > + if (unlikely(curval != uval)) { > > + trace_printk("cmpxchg failed, retrying\n"); > > goto retry; > > + } > > > > /* > > * We took the lock due to owner died take over. > > */ > > - if (unlikely(lock_taken)) > > + if (unlikely(lock_taken)) { > > + trace_printk("ownerdied, lock acquired, return 1\n"); > > return 1; > > + } > > > > /* > > * We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if > > @@ -710,13 +716,16 @@ retry: > > if (unlikely(ret)) { > > switch (ret) { > > case -ESRCH: > > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH\n"); > > /* > > * No owner found for this futex. Check if the > > * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether > > * this is a robust futex or not. > > */ > > - if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) > > + if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) { > > + trace_printk("get_futex_value_locked: -EFAULT\n"); > > return -EFAULT; > > + } > > > > /* > > * We simply start over in case of a robust > > @@ -724,10 +733,13 @@ retry: > > * and return happy. > > */ > > if (curval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) { > > + trace_printk("ownerdied, goto retry\n"); > > ownerdied = 1; > > goto retry; > > } > > + trace_printk("ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH\n"); > > default: > > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: %d\n", ret); > > break; > > } > > } > > @@ -1950,6 +1962,8 @@ retry_private: > > put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key); > > cond_resched(); > > goto retry; > > + case -ESRCH: > > + trace_printk("returning -ESRCH to userspace\n"); > > default: > > goto out_unlock_put_key; > > } > > @@ -2537,8 +2551,10 @@ void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr) > > /* > > * Avoid excessively long or circular lists: > > */ > > - if (!--limit) > > + if (!--limit) { > > + trace_printk("excessively long list, aborting\n"); > > break; > > + } > > > > cond_resched(); > > } > > -- > > 1.7.0.4 > > > > -- > > Darren Hart > > IBM Linux Technology Center > > Real-Time Linux Team > > -- > Michal Hocko > L3 team > SUSE LINUX s.r.o. > Lihovarska 1060/12 > 190 00 Praha 9 > Czech Republic -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: futex: race in lock and unlock&exit for robust futex with PI? 2010-06-28 15:32 ` Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-28 15:58 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-28 16:39 ` Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-28 15:58 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Darren Hart Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Linus Torvalds On Mon 28-06-10 17:32:14, Michal Hocko wrote: > On Mon 28-06-10 16:42:46, Michal Hocko wrote: > > Hi Darren, > > Hmm, I think that I've found the reason. I have used one additional > tracing patch (bellow) and we are getting ESRCH because cread and pcred > don't match: > > > version = 6 > CPU 0 is empty > cpus=2 > field->offset = 16 size=4 > <...>-22260 [001] 139.669672: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start > <...>-22260 [001] 139.669678: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=0 > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693690: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693696: bprint: lookup_pi_state : cred(1004,1004) != pcred(1003,1003) > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693697: bprint: lookup_pi_state : futex_find_get_task failed with -3 > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693697: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=22280 > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693698: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693698: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693699: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693700: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=-3 > <...>-22280 [001] 139.694033: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi start > <...>-22280 [001] 139.694035: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi: TID->0 transition 2147505928 > <...>-22280 [001] 139.694036: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi: no waiters, unlock the futex ret=0 uval=-2147461368 > <...>-22280 [001] 139.694036: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi done ret=0 > <...>-22488 [001] 139.874967: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start > <...>-22488 [001] 139.874972: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=0 > > This would answer why we cannot reproduce with a single user. I am trying to understand why futex_find_get_task has to check the credentials at all. I guess that there might be some concerns from futex_requeue callers but does it make sense from futex_lock_pi_atomic call path? This would mean that the futex is unusable in multi-user process synchronization, right? (Is this documented somewhere?) [...] > > -- > From f0743d2b2d2f81c40700c4d6816ad3abfd113c1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> > Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 17:08:56 +0200 > Subject: [PATCH] more traces > > --- > kernel/futex.c | 13 +++++++++++-- > 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > index d114fee..d1c2489 100644 > --- a/kernel/futex.c > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > @@ -435,11 +435,16 @@ static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) > p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); > if (!p) { > p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > + trace_printk("%u pid not found\n", pid); > } else { > pcred = __task_cred(p); > if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && > - cred->euid != pcred->uid) > + cred->euid != pcred->uid) { > p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > + trace_printk("cred(%u,%u) != pcred(%u,%u)\n", > + cred->euid, cred->uid, > + pcred->euid, pcred->uid); > + } > else > get_task_struct(p); > } > @@ -564,8 +569,11 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, > if (!pid) > return -ESRCH; > p = futex_find_get_task(pid); > - if (IS_ERR(p)) > + if (IS_ERR(p)) { > + trace_printk("futex_find_get_task failed with %d\n", > + PTR_ERR(p)); > return PTR_ERR(p); > + } > > /* > * We need to look at the task state flags to figure out, > @@ -581,6 +589,7 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, > * cleanup: > */ > int ret = (p->flags & PF_EXITPIDONE) ? -ESRCH : -EAGAIN; > + trace_printk("pid=%u is exiting ret=%d\n", pid, ret); > > raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock); > put_task_struct(p); > -- > 1.7.1 > > > > > > -- > > From 733816347db91670f27d206382b8c2e57e5ef125 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> > > Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 13:42:29 +0200 > > Subject: [PATCH] futex pi unlock tracing added > > > > --- > > kernel/futex.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- > > 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > > index 24ac437..d114fee 100644 > > --- a/kernel/futex.c > > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > > @@ -716,7 +716,8 @@ retry: > > if (unlikely(ret)) { > > switch (ret) { > > case -ESRCH: > > - trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH\n"); > > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=%u\n", > > + uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK); > > /* > > * No owner found for this futex. Check if the > > * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether > > @@ -2070,8 +2071,10 @@ retry: > > * again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking > > * anyone else up: > > */ > > - if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) > > + if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) { > > uval = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(uaddr, task_pid_vnr(current), 0); > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: TID->0 transition %u\n", uval); > > + } > > > > > > if (unlikely(uval == -EFAULT)) > > @@ -2080,8 +2083,10 @@ retry: > > * Rare case: we managed to release the lock atomically, > > * no need to wake anyone else up: > > */ > > - if (unlikely(uval == task_pid_vnr(current))) > > + if (unlikely(uval == task_pid_vnr(current))) { > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: release without wakeup\n"); > > goto out_unlock; > > + } > > > > /* > > * Ok, other tasks may need to be woken up - check waiters > > @@ -2093,6 +2098,7 @@ retry: > > if (!match_futex (&this->key, &key)) > > continue; > > ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, this); > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: wake ret=%d uval=%u this=%p\n", ret, uval, this); > > /* > > * The atomic access to the futex value > > * generated a pagefault, so retry the > > @@ -2107,6 +2113,8 @@ retry: > > */ > > if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) { > > ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval); > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: no waiters, unlock the futex ret=%d uval=%d\n", > > + ret, uval); > > if (ret == -EFAULT) > > goto pi_faulted; > > } > > @@ -2600,12 +2608,18 @@ long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout, > > ret = futex_wake_op(uaddr, fshared, uaddr2, val, val2, val3); > > break; > > case FUTEX_LOCK_PI: > > - if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) > > + if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) { > > + trace_printk("futex_lock_pi start\n"); > > ret = futex_lock_pi(uaddr, fshared, val, timeout, 0); > > + trace_printk("futex_lock_pi done ret=%d\n", ret); > > + } > > break; > > case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI: > > - if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) > > + if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) { > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi start\n"); > > ret = futex_unlock_pi(uaddr, fshared); > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi done ret=%d\n", ret); > > + } > > break; > > case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI: > > if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) > > -- > > 1.7.1 > > > > > > > > -- > > > Darren Hart > > > > > > From 92014a07df73489460ff788274506255ff0f775d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > > From: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> > > > Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2010 13:54:25 -0700 > > > Subject: [PATCH] robust pi futex tracing > > > > > > --- > > > kernel/futex.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- > > > 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > > > index e7a35f1..24ac437 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/futex.c > > > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > > > @@ -683,6 +683,8 @@ retry: > > > */ > > > if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) { > > > /* Keep the OWNER_DIED bit */ > > > + if (ownerdied) > > > + trace_printk("ownerdied, taking over lock\n"); > > > newval = (curval & ~FUTEX_TID_MASK) | task_pid_vnr(task); > > > ownerdied = 0; > > > lock_taken = 1; > > > @@ -692,14 +694,18 @@ retry: > > > > > > if (unlikely(curval == -EFAULT)) > > > return -EFAULT; > > > - if (unlikely(curval != uval)) > > > + if (unlikely(curval != uval)) { > > > + trace_printk("cmpxchg failed, retrying\n"); > > > goto retry; > > > + } > > > > > > /* > > > * We took the lock due to owner died take over. > > > */ > > > - if (unlikely(lock_taken)) > > > + if (unlikely(lock_taken)) { > > > + trace_printk("ownerdied, lock acquired, return 1\n"); > > > return 1; > > > + } > > > > > > /* > > > * We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if > > > @@ -710,13 +716,16 @@ retry: > > > if (unlikely(ret)) { > > > switch (ret) { > > > case -ESRCH: > > > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH\n"); > > > /* > > > * No owner found for this futex. Check if the > > > * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether > > > * this is a robust futex or not. > > > */ > > > - if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) > > > + if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) { > > > + trace_printk("get_futex_value_locked: -EFAULT\n"); > > > return -EFAULT; > > > + } > > > > > > /* > > > * We simply start over in case of a robust > > > @@ -724,10 +733,13 @@ retry: > > > * and return happy. > > > */ > > > if (curval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) { > > > + trace_printk("ownerdied, goto retry\n"); > > > ownerdied = 1; > > > goto retry; > > > } > > > + trace_printk("ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH\n"); > > > default: > > > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: %d\n", ret); > > > break; > > > } > > > } > > > @@ -1950,6 +1962,8 @@ retry_private: > > > put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key); > > > cond_resched(); > > > goto retry; > > > + case -ESRCH: > > > + trace_printk("returning -ESRCH to userspace\n"); > > > default: > > > goto out_unlock_put_key; > > > } > > > @@ -2537,8 +2551,10 @@ void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr) > > > /* > > > * Avoid excessively long or circular lists: > > > */ > > > - if (!--limit) > > > + if (!--limit) { > > > + trace_printk("excessively long list, aborting\n"); > > > break; > > > + } > > > > > > cond_resched(); > > > } > > > -- > > > 1.7.0.4 > > > > > > -- > > > Darren Hart > > > IBM Linux Technology Center > > > Real-Time Linux Team > > > > -- > > Michal Hocko > > L3 team > > SUSE LINUX s.r.o. > > Lihovarska 1060/12 > > 190 00 Praha 9 > > Czech Republic > > -- > Michal Hocko > L3 team > SUSE LINUX s.r.o. > Lihovarska 1060/12 > 190 00 Praha 9 > Czech Republic -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: futex: race in lock and unlock&exit for robust futex with PI? 2010-06-28 15:58 ` Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-28 16:39 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-28 16:49 ` Peter Zijlstra 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-28 16:39 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Darren Hart Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Linus Torvalds [I am sorry for bombarding you with emails] On Mon 28-06-10 17:58:45, Michal Hocko wrote: > On Mon 28-06-10 17:32:14, Michal Hocko wrote: > > On Mon 28-06-10 16:42:46, Michal Hocko wrote: > > > Hi Darren, > > > > Hmm, I think that I've found the reason. I have used one additional > > tracing patch (bellow) and we are getting ESRCH because cread and pcred > > don't match: > > > > > > version = 6 > > CPU 0 is empty > > cpus=2 > > field->offset = 16 size=4 > > <...>-22260 [001] 139.669672: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start > > <...>-22260 [001] 139.669678: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=0 > > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693690: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start > > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693696: bprint: lookup_pi_state : cred(1004,1004) != pcred(1003,1003) > > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693697: bprint: lookup_pi_state : futex_find_get_task failed with -3 > > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693697: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=22280 > > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693698: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH > > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693698: bprint: futex_lock_pi_atomic : lookup_pi_state: -3 > > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693699: bprint: futex_lock_pi : returning -ESRCH to userspace > > <...>-22281 [001] 139.693700: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=-3 > > <...>-22280 [001] 139.694033: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi start > > <...>-22280 [001] 139.694035: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi: TID->0 transition 2147505928 > > <...>-22280 [001] 139.694036: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi: no waiters, unlock the futex ret=0 uval=-2147461368 > > <...>-22280 [001] 139.694036: bprint: do_futex : futex_unlock_pi done ret=0 > > <...>-22488 [001] 139.874967: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi start > > <...>-22488 [001] 139.874972: bprint: do_futex : futex_lock_pi done ret=0 > > > > This would answer why we cannot reproduce with a single user. > > I am trying to understand why futex_find_get_task has to check the > credentials at all. I guess that there might be some concerns from > futex_requeue callers but does it make sense from futex_lock_pi_atomic > call path? This would mean that the futex is unusable in multi-user process > synchronization, right? (Is this documented somewhere?) Would something like the following be acceptable (just a compile tested without comments). It simply makes caller of lookup_pi_state to decide whether credentials should be checked. diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index e7a35f1..dfe4b11 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static void free_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) * Look up the task based on what TID userspace gave us. * We dont trust it. */ -static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) +static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid, bool check_cred) { struct task_struct *p; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; @@ -436,10 +436,12 @@ static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) if (!p) { p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); } else { - pcred = __task_cred(p); - if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && - cred->euid != pcred->uid) - p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + if (check_cred) { + pcred = __task_cred(p); + if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && + cred->euid != pcred->uid) + p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + } else get_task_struct(p); } @@ -506,7 +508,7 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) static int lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, - union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps) + union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps, bool check_cred) { struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL; struct futex_q *this, *next; @@ -563,7 +565,7 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, */ if (!pid) return -ESRCH; - p = futex_find_get_task(pid); + p = futex_find_get_task(pid, check_cred); if (IS_ERR(p)) return PTR_ERR(p); @@ -705,7 +707,7 @@ retry: * We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if * we are the first waiter): */ - ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps); + ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps, false); if (unlikely(ret)) { switch (ret) { @@ -1258,7 +1260,7 @@ retry_private: ret = get_futex_value_locked(&curval2, uaddr2); if (!ret) ret = lookup_pi_state(curval2, hb2, &key2, - &pi_state); + &pi_state, true); } switch (ret) { > > [...] > > > > -- > > From f0743d2b2d2f81c40700c4d6816ad3abfd113c1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> > > Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 17:08:56 +0200 > > Subject: [PATCH] more traces > > > > --- > > kernel/futex.c | 13 +++++++++++-- > > 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > > index d114fee..d1c2489 100644 > > --- a/kernel/futex.c > > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > > @@ -435,11 +435,16 @@ static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) > > p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); > > if (!p) { > > p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > > + trace_printk("%u pid not found\n", pid); > > } else { > > pcred = __task_cred(p); > > if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && > > - cred->euid != pcred->uid) > > + cred->euid != pcred->uid) { > > p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > > + trace_printk("cred(%u,%u) != pcred(%u,%u)\n", > > + cred->euid, cred->uid, > > + pcred->euid, pcred->uid); > > + } > > else > > get_task_struct(p); > > } > > @@ -564,8 +569,11 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, > > if (!pid) > > return -ESRCH; > > p = futex_find_get_task(pid); > > - if (IS_ERR(p)) > > + if (IS_ERR(p)) { > > + trace_printk("futex_find_get_task failed with %d\n", > > + PTR_ERR(p)); > > return PTR_ERR(p); > > + } > > > > /* > > * We need to look at the task state flags to figure out, > > @@ -581,6 +589,7 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, > > * cleanup: > > */ > > int ret = (p->flags & PF_EXITPIDONE) ? -ESRCH : -EAGAIN; > > + trace_printk("pid=%u is exiting ret=%d\n", pid, ret); > > > > raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock); > > put_task_struct(p); > > -- > > 1.7.1 > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > From 733816347db91670f27d206382b8c2e57e5ef125 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > > From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> > > > Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 13:42:29 +0200 > > > Subject: [PATCH] futex pi unlock tracing added > > > > > > --- > > > kernel/futex.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- > > > 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > > > index 24ac437..d114fee 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/futex.c > > > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > > > @@ -716,7 +716,8 @@ retry: > > > if (unlikely(ret)) { > > > switch (ret) { > > > case -ESRCH: > > > - trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH\n"); > > > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH for pid=%u\n", > > > + uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK); > > > /* > > > * No owner found for this futex. Check if the > > > * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether > > > @@ -2070,8 +2071,10 @@ retry: > > > * again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking > > > * anyone else up: > > > */ > > > - if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) > > > + if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) { > > > uval = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(uaddr, task_pid_vnr(current), 0); > > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: TID->0 transition %u\n", uval); > > > + } > > > > > > > > > if (unlikely(uval == -EFAULT)) > > > @@ -2080,8 +2083,10 @@ retry: > > > * Rare case: we managed to release the lock atomically, > > > * no need to wake anyone else up: > > > */ > > > - if (unlikely(uval == task_pid_vnr(current))) > > > + if (unlikely(uval == task_pid_vnr(current))) { > > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: release without wakeup\n"); > > > goto out_unlock; > > > + } > > > > > > /* > > > * Ok, other tasks may need to be woken up - check waiters > > > @@ -2093,6 +2098,7 @@ retry: > > > if (!match_futex (&this->key, &key)) > > > continue; > > > ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, this); > > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: wake ret=%d uval=%u this=%p\n", ret, uval, this); > > > /* > > > * The atomic access to the futex value > > > * generated a pagefault, so retry the > > > @@ -2107,6 +2113,8 @@ retry: > > > */ > > > if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) { > > > ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval); > > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi: no waiters, unlock the futex ret=%d uval=%d\n", > > > + ret, uval); > > > if (ret == -EFAULT) > > > goto pi_faulted; > > > } > > > @@ -2600,12 +2608,18 @@ long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout, > > > ret = futex_wake_op(uaddr, fshared, uaddr2, val, val2, val3); > > > break; > > > case FUTEX_LOCK_PI: > > > - if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) > > > + if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) { > > > + trace_printk("futex_lock_pi start\n"); > > > ret = futex_lock_pi(uaddr, fshared, val, timeout, 0); > > > + trace_printk("futex_lock_pi done ret=%d\n", ret); > > > + } > > > break; > > > case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI: > > > - if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) > > > + if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) { > > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi start\n"); > > > ret = futex_unlock_pi(uaddr, fshared); > > > + trace_printk("futex_unlock_pi done ret=%d\n", ret); > > > + } > > > break; > > > case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI: > > > if (futex_cmpxchg_enabled) > > > -- > > > 1.7.1 > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Darren Hart > > > > > > > > From 92014a07df73489460ff788274506255ff0f775d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > > > From: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> > > > > Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2010 13:54:25 -0700 > > > > Subject: [PATCH] robust pi futex tracing > > > > > > > > --- > > > > kernel/futex.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- > > > > 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > > > > index e7a35f1..24ac437 100644 > > > > --- a/kernel/futex.c > > > > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > > > > @@ -683,6 +683,8 @@ retry: > > > > */ > > > > if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) { > > > > /* Keep the OWNER_DIED bit */ > > > > + if (ownerdied) > > > > + trace_printk("ownerdied, taking over lock\n"); > > > > newval = (curval & ~FUTEX_TID_MASK) | task_pid_vnr(task); > > > > ownerdied = 0; > > > > lock_taken = 1; > > > > @@ -692,14 +694,18 @@ retry: > > > > > > > > if (unlikely(curval == -EFAULT)) > > > > return -EFAULT; > > > > - if (unlikely(curval != uval)) > > > > + if (unlikely(curval != uval)) { > > > > + trace_printk("cmpxchg failed, retrying\n"); > > > > goto retry; > > > > + } > > > > > > > > /* > > > > * We took the lock due to owner died take over. > > > > */ > > > > - if (unlikely(lock_taken)) > > > > + if (unlikely(lock_taken)) { > > > > + trace_printk("ownerdied, lock acquired, return 1\n"); > > > > return 1; > > > > + } > > > > > > > > /* > > > > * We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if > > > > @@ -710,13 +716,16 @@ retry: > > > > if (unlikely(ret)) { > > > > switch (ret) { > > > > case -ESRCH: > > > > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: -ESRCH\n"); > > > > /* > > > > * No owner found for this futex. Check if the > > > > * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether > > > > * this is a robust futex or not. > > > > */ > > > > - if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) > > > > + if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr)) { > > > > + trace_printk("get_futex_value_locked: -EFAULT\n"); > > > > return -EFAULT; > > > > + } > > > > > > > > /* > > > > * We simply start over in case of a robust > > > > @@ -724,10 +733,13 @@ retry: > > > > * and return happy. > > > > */ > > > > if (curval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) { > > > > + trace_printk("ownerdied, goto retry\n"); > > > > ownerdied = 1; > > > > goto retry; > > > > } > > > > + trace_printk("ownerdied not detected, returning -ESRCH\n"); > > > > default: > > > > + trace_printk("lookup_pi_state: %d\n", ret); > > > > break; > > > > } > > > > } > > > > @@ -1950,6 +1962,8 @@ retry_private: > > > > put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key); > > > > cond_resched(); > > > > goto retry; > > > > + case -ESRCH: > > > > + trace_printk("returning -ESRCH to userspace\n"); > > > > default: > > > > goto out_unlock_put_key; > > > > } > > > > @@ -2537,8 +2551,10 @@ void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr) > > > > /* > > > > * Avoid excessively long or circular lists: > > > > */ > > > > - if (!--limit) > > > > + if (!--limit) { > > > > + trace_printk("excessively long list, aborting\n"); > > > > break; > > > > + } > > > > > > > > cond_resched(); > > > > } > > > > -- > > > > 1.7.0.4 > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Darren Hart > > > > IBM Linux Technology Center > > > > Real-Time Linux Team > > > > > > -- > > > Michal Hocko > > > L3 team > > > SUSE LINUX s.r.o. > > > Lihovarska 1060/12 > > > 190 00 Praha 9 > > > Czech Republic > > > > -- > > Michal Hocko > > L3 team > > SUSE LINUX s.r.o. > > Lihovarska 1060/12 > > 190 00 Praha 9 > > Czech Republic > > -- > Michal Hocko > L3 team > SUSE LINUX s.r.o. > Lihovarska 1060/12 > 190 00 Praha 9 > Czech Republic -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: futex: race in lock and unlock&exit for robust futex with PI? 2010-06-28 16:39 ` Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-28 16:49 ` Peter Zijlstra 2010-06-29 8:42 ` [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task make credentials check conditional Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2010-06-28 16:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michal Hocko Cc: Darren Hart, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Linus Torvalds, Ingo Molnar On Mon, 2010-06-28 at 18:39 +0200, Michal Hocko wrote: > Would something like the following be acceptable (just a compile > tested without comments). It simply makes caller of lookup_pi_state to > decide whether credentials should be checked. So it was Ingo, who in c87e2837be8 (pi-futex: futex_lock_pi/futex_unlock_pi support) introduced the euid checks: +futex_find_get_task(): + if ((current->euid != p->euid) && (current->euid != p->uid)) { + p = NULL; + goto out_unlock; + } Ingo, do you remember the rationale behind that? It seems to be causing grief when two different users contend on the same (shared) futex. See the below proposed solution. > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > index e7a35f1..dfe4b11 100644 > --- a/kernel/futex.c > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static void free_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) > * Look up the task based on what TID userspace gave us. > * We dont trust it. > */ > -static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) > +static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid, bool check_cred) > { > struct task_struct *p; > const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; > @@ -436,10 +436,12 @@ static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) > if (!p) { > p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > } else { > - pcred = __task_cred(p); > - if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && > - cred->euid != pcred->uid) > - p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > + if (check_cred) { > + pcred = __task_cred(p); > + if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && > + cred->euid != pcred->uid) > + p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > + } > else > get_task_struct(p); > } > @@ -506,7 +508,7 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) > > static int > lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, > - union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps) > + union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps, bool check_cred) > { > struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL; > struct futex_q *this, *next; > @@ -563,7 +565,7 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, > */ > if (!pid) > return -ESRCH; > - p = futex_find_get_task(pid); > + p = futex_find_get_task(pid, check_cred); > if (IS_ERR(p)) > return PTR_ERR(p); > > @@ -705,7 +707,7 @@ retry: > * We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if > * we are the first waiter): > */ > - ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps); > + ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps, false); > > if (unlikely(ret)) { > switch (ret) { > @@ -1258,7 +1260,7 @@ retry_private: > ret = get_futex_value_locked(&curval2, uaddr2); > if (!ret) > ret = lookup_pi_state(curval2, hb2, &key2, > - &pi_state); > + &pi_state, true); > } > > switch (ret) { ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task make credentials check conditional 2010-06-28 16:49 ` Peter Zijlstra @ 2010-06-29 8:42 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-29 16:41 ` Linus Torvalds 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-29 8:42 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Ingo Molnar Cc: Darren Hart, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra On Mon 28-06-10 18:49:08, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Mon, 2010-06-28 at 18:39 +0200, Michal Hocko wrote: > > Would something like the following be acceptable (just a compile > > tested without comments). It simply makes caller of lookup_pi_state to > > decide whether credentials should be checked. > > So it was Ingo, who in c87e2837be8 (pi-futex: > futex_lock_pi/futex_unlock_pi support) introduced the euid checks: > > +futex_find_get_task(): > + if ((current->euid != p->euid) && (current->euid != p->uid)) { > + p = NULL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } > > Ingo, do you remember the rationale behind that? It seems to be causing > grief when two different users contend on the same (shared) futex. > > See the below proposed solution. Here is the patch with comments and rationale: (reference to the original discussion: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/6/23/52) -- >From f477a6d989dfde11c5bb5f28d5ce21d0682f4e25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2010 10:02:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task make credentials check conditional futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. While credentials check makes sense in the first code path, the second one is more problematic because this check requires that the PI lock holder (pid parameter) has the same uid and euid as the process's euid which is trying to lock the same futex (current). This results in glibc assert failure or process hang (if glibc is compiled without assert support) for shared robust pthread mutex with priority inheritance if a process tries to lock already held lock owned by a process with a different euid: pthread_mutex_lock.c:312: __pthread_mutex_lock_full: Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed. The problem is that futex_lock_pi_atomic which is called when we try to lock already held lock checks the current holder (tid is stored in the futex value) to get the PI state. It uses lookup_pi_state which in turn gets task struct from futex_find_get_task. ESRCH is returned either when the task is not found or if credentials check fails. futex_lock_pi_atomic simply returns if it gets ESRCH. glibc code, however, doesn't expect that robust lock returns with ESRCH because it should get either success or owner died. Let's make credentials check conditional (as a new parameter) in futex_find_get_task. Then we can prevent from check in the pi lock path and still preserve it in the futex_requeue path. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> --- kernel/futex.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index e7a35f1..79b69e5 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -425,8 +425,9 @@ static void free_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) /* * Look up the task based on what TID userspace gave us. * We dont trust it. + * Check the credentials if required by check_cred */ -static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) +static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid, bool check_cred) { struct task_struct *p; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; @@ -436,10 +437,12 @@ static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) if (!p) { p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); } else { - pcred = __task_cred(p); - if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && - cred->euid != pcred->uid) - p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + if (check_cred) { + pcred = __task_cred(p); + if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && + cred->euid != pcred->uid) + p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + } else get_task_struct(p); } @@ -504,9 +507,10 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); } +/* check_cred is just passed through to futex_find_get_task */ static int lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, - union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps) + union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps, bool check_cred) { struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL; struct futex_q *this, *next; @@ -563,7 +567,7 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, */ if (!pid) return -ESRCH; - p = futex_find_get_task(pid); + p = futex_find_get_task(pid, check_cred); if (IS_ERR(p)) return PTR_ERR(p); @@ -704,8 +708,10 @@ retry: /* * We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if * we are the first waiter): + * Do not ask for credentials check because we want to share the + * lock between processes with different (e)uids */ - ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps); + ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps, false); if (unlikely(ret)) { switch (ret) { @@ -1258,7 +1264,7 @@ retry_private: ret = get_futex_value_locked(&curval2, uaddr2); if (!ret) ret = lookup_pi_state(curval2, hb2, &key2, - &pi_state); + &pi_state, true); } switch (ret) { -- 1.7.1 -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task make credentials check conditional 2010-06-29 8:42 ` [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task make credentials check conditional Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-29 16:41 ` Linus Torvalds 2010-06-30 7:01 ` Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Linus Torvalds @ 2010-06-29 16:41 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michal Hocko Cc: Ingo Molnar, Darren Hart, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Peter Zijlstra On Tue, Jun 29, 2010 at 1:42 AM, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > > futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. While credentials check > makes sense in the first code path, the second one is more problematic > because this check requires that the PI lock holder (pid parameter) has > the same uid and euid as the process's euid which is trying to lock the > same futex (current). So exactly why does it make sense to check the credentials in the first code path then? Shouldn't the futex issue in the end depend on whether you have a shared page or not - and not on credentials at all? Any two processes that share a futex in the same shared page should be able to use that without any regard for whether they are the same user. That's kind of the point, no? IOW, I personally dislike these kinds of conditional checks, especially since the discussion (at least the part I've seen) hasn't made it clear why it should be conditional - or exist - in the first place. So I'd like the patch to include an explanation of exactly why the two cases are different. The other thing I'd like to see is to move the whole cred checking up a level. There's no reason to check the credentials in futex_find_get_task() that I can see - why not do it in the caller instead? IOW, I think futex_find_get_task() should just look something like this instead: static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) { struct task_struct *p; rcu_read_lock(); p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (p) get_task_struct(p); rcu_read_unlock(); return p; } and then in the caller we'd do something like p = futex_find_get_task(pid); if (!p) return -ESEARCH; if ( .. check p credentials is necessary and fails..) goto put_task_and_exit; because especially with not everybody needing the credentials check, I do not think it should be done at the lowest level (it's clearly not fundamental to the operation, so it shouldn't be part of the core lookup). With some re-factoring, it might even be possible to avoid a dynamic check at all, and just have two different static paths for the two cases. That's a separate issue, though. Linus ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task make credentials check conditional 2010-06-29 16:41 ` Linus Torvalds @ 2010-06-30 7:01 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-30 9:55 ` [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-30 7:01 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Ingo Molnar, Darren Hart, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Peter Zijlstra On Tue 29-06-10 09:41:02, Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Tue, Jun 29, 2010 at 1:42 AM, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > > > > futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > > contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. While credentials check > > makes sense in the first code path, the second one is more problematic > > because this check requires that the PI lock holder (pid parameter) has > > the same uid and euid as the process's euid which is trying to lock the > > same futex (current). > > So exactly why does it make sense to check the credentials in the > first code path then? I though that requeue needs this for security reasons (don't let requeue process for other user), but when I thought about that again you are right and the only what matters should be accessibility of the shared memory. -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-06-30 7:01 ` Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-30 9:55 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-30 16:43 ` Darren Hart 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-30 9:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Ingo Molnar, Darren Hart, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Peter Zijlstra On Wed 30-06-10 09:01:15, Michal Hocko wrote: > On Tue 29-06-10 09:41:02, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > On Tue, Jun 29, 2010 at 1:42 AM, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > > > > > > futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > > > contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. While credentials check > > > makes sense in the first code path, the second one is more problematic > > > because this check requires that the PI lock holder (pid parameter) has > > > the same uid and euid as the process's euid which is trying to lock the > > > same futex (current). > > > > So exactly why does it make sense to check the credentials in the > > first code path then? > > I though that requeue needs this for security reasons (don't let requeue > process for other user), but when I thought about that again you are > right and the only what matters should be accessibility of the shared > memory. And here is the patch which does the thing. -- >From 082c5ad2c482a8e78b61b17e213e750b006176aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2010 09:51:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. None of the paths looks it needs the credentials check, though. Different (e)uids shouldn't matter at all because the only thing that is important for shared futex is the accessibility of the shared memory. The credentail check results in glibc assert failure or process hang (if glibc is compiled without assert support) for shared robust pthread mutex with priority inheritance if a process tries to lock already held lock owned by a process with a different euid: pthread_mutex_lock.c:312: __pthread_mutex_lock_full: Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed. The problem is that futex_lock_pi_atomic which is called when we try to lock already held lock checks the current holder (tid is stored in the futex value) to get the PI state. It uses lookup_pi_state which in turn gets task struct from futex_find_get_task. ESRCH is returned either when the task is not found or if credentials check fails. futex_lock_pi_atomic simply returns if it gets ESRCH. glibc code, however, doesn't expect that robust lock returns with ESRCH because it should get either success or owner died. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> --- kernel/futex.c | 17 ++++------------- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index e7a35f1..6a3a5fa 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -429,20 +429,11 @@ static void free_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) { struct task_struct *p; - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; rcu_read_lock(); p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!p) { - p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - } else { - pcred = __task_cred(p); - if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && - cred->euid != pcred->uid) - p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - else - get_task_struct(p); - } + if (p) + get_task_struct(p); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -564,8 +555,8 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, if (!pid) return -ESRCH; p = futex_find_get_task(pid); - if (IS_ERR(p)) - return PTR_ERR(p); + if (!p) + return -ESRCH; /* * We need to look at the task state flags to figure out, -- 1.7.1 -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-06-30 9:55 ` [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check Michal Hocko @ 2010-06-30 16:43 ` Darren Hart 2010-07-08 9:28 ` Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Darren Hart @ 2010-06-30 16:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michal Hocko Cc: Linus Torvalds, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Peter Zijlstra On 06/30/2010 02:55 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: > On Wed 30-06-10 09:01:15, Michal Hocko wrote: >> On Tue 29-06-10 09:41:02, Linus Torvalds wrote: >>> On Tue, Jun 29, 2010 at 1:42 AM, Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: >>>> >>>> futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two >>>> contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. While credentials check >>>> makes sense in the first code path, the second one is more problematic >>>> because this check requires that the PI lock holder (pid parameter) has >>>> the same uid and euid as the process's euid which is trying to lock the >>>> same futex (current). >>> >>> So exactly why does it make sense to check the credentials in the >>> first code path then? >> >> I though that requeue needs this for security reasons (don't let requeue >> process for other user), but when I thought about that again you are >> right and the only what matters should be accessibility of the shared >> memory. > > And here is the patch which does the thing. > > -- > > From 082c5ad2c482a8e78b61b17e213e750b006176aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> > Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2010 09:51:19 +0200 > Subject: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check > > futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. None of the paths > looks it needs the credentials check, though. Different (e)uids > shouldn't matter at all because the only thing that is important for > shared futex is the accessibility of the shared memory. > > The credentail check results in glibc assert failure or process hang (if > glibc is compiled without assert support) for shared robust pthread > mutex with priority inheritance if a process tries to lock already held > lock owned by a process with a different euid: > > pthread_mutex_lock.c:312: __pthread_mutex_lock_full: Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed. > > The problem is that futex_lock_pi_atomic which is called when we try to > lock already held lock checks the current holder (tid is stored in the > futex value) to get the PI state. It uses lookup_pi_state which in turn > gets task struct from futex_find_get_task. ESRCH is returned either when > the task is not found or if credentials check fails. > futex_lock_pi_atomic simply returns if it gets ESRCH. glibc code, > however, doesn't expect that robust lock returns with ESRCH because it > should get either success or owner died. > > Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> Without hearing back from Ingo on the original intent of the credentials check, this looks right to me. Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> > --- > kernel/futex.c | 17 ++++------------- > 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > index e7a35f1..6a3a5fa 100644 > --- a/kernel/futex.c > +++ b/kernel/futex.c > @@ -429,20 +429,11 @@ static void free_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) > static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) > { > struct task_struct *p; > - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; > > rcu_read_lock(); > p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); > - if (!p) { > - p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > - } else { > - pcred = __task_cred(p); > - if (cred->euid != pcred->euid&& > - cred->euid != pcred->uid) > - p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > - else > - get_task_struct(p); > - } > + if (p) > + get_task_struct(p); > > rcu_read_unlock(); > > @@ -564,8 +555,8 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, > if (!pid) > return -ESRCH; > p = futex_find_get_task(pid); > - if (IS_ERR(p)) > - return PTR_ERR(p); > + if (!p) > + return -ESRCH; > > /* > * We need to look at the task state flags to figure out, -- Darren Hart IBM Linux Technology Center Real-Time Linux Team ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-06-30 16:43 ` Darren Hart @ 2010-07-08 9:28 ` Michal Hocko 2010-07-08 9:32 ` Ingo Molnar 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-07-08 9:28 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Peter Zijlstra, Darren Hart On Wed 30-06-10 09:43:27, Darren Hart wrote: > On 06/30/2010 02:55 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: > >On Wed 30-06-10 09:01:15, Michal Hocko wrote: > >>On Tue 29-06-10 09:41:02, Linus Torvalds wrote: > >>>On Tue, Jun 29, 2010 at 1:42 AM, Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > >>>>contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. While credentials check > >>>>makes sense in the first code path, the second one is more problematic > >>>>because this check requires that the PI lock holder (pid parameter) has > >>>>the same uid and euid as the process's euid which is trying to lock the > >>>>same futex (current). > >>> > >>>So exactly why does it make sense to check the credentials in the > >>>first code path then? > >> > >>I though that requeue needs this for security reasons (don't let requeue > >>process for other user), but when I thought about that again you are > >>right and the only what matters should be accessibility of the shared > >>memory. > > > >And here is the patch which does the thing. > > > >-- > > > > From 082c5ad2c482a8e78b61b17e213e750b006176aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > >From: Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> > >Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2010 09:51:19 +0200 > >Subject: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check > > > >futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > >contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. None of the paths > >looks it needs the credentials check, though. Different (e)uids > >shouldn't matter at all because the only thing that is important for > >shared futex is the accessibility of the shared memory. > > > >The credentail check results in glibc assert failure or process hang (if > >glibc is compiled without assert support) for shared robust pthread > >mutex with priority inheritance if a process tries to lock already held > >lock owned by a process with a different euid: > > > >pthread_mutex_lock.c:312: __pthread_mutex_lock_full: Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed. > > > >The problem is that futex_lock_pi_atomic which is called when we try to > >lock already held lock checks the current holder (tid is stored in the > >futex value) to get the PI state. It uses lookup_pi_state which in turn > >gets task struct from futex_find_get_task. ESRCH is returned either when > >the task is not found or if credentials check fails. > >futex_lock_pi_atomic simply returns if it gets ESRCH. glibc code, > >however, doesn't expect that robust lock returns with ESRCH because it > >should get either success or owner died. > > > >Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> > > Without hearing back from Ingo on the original intent of the > credentials check, this looks right to me. Could you comment on that Ingo, please? > > Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> > > > >--- > > kernel/futex.c | 17 ++++------------- > > 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > > >diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c > >index e7a35f1..6a3a5fa 100644 > >--- a/kernel/futex.c > >+++ b/kernel/futex.c > >@@ -429,20 +429,11 @@ static void free_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) > > static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) > > { > > struct task_struct *p; > >- const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; > > > > rcu_read_lock(); > > p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); > >- if (!p) { > >- p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > >- } else { > >- pcred = __task_cred(p); > >- if (cred->euid != pcred->euid&& > >- cred->euid != pcred->uid) > >- p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > >- else > >- get_task_struct(p); > >- } > >+ if (p) > >+ get_task_struct(p); > > > > rcu_read_unlock(); > > > >@@ -564,8 +555,8 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, > > if (!pid) > > return -ESRCH; > > p = futex_find_get_task(pid); > >- if (IS_ERR(p)) > >- return PTR_ERR(p); > >+ if (!p) > >+ return -ESRCH; > > > > /* > > * We need to look at the task state flags to figure out, > > > -- > Darren Hart > IBM Linux Technology Center > Real-Time Linux Team -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-07-08 9:28 ` Michal Hocko @ 2010-07-08 9:32 ` Ingo Molnar 2010-07-08 9:39 ` Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Ingo Molnar @ 2010-07-08 9:32 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michal Hocko Cc: Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Peter Zijlstra, Darren Hart * Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > On Wed 30-06-10 09:43:27, Darren Hart wrote: > > On 06/30/2010 02:55 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: > > >On Wed 30-06-10 09:01:15, Michal Hocko wrote: > > >>On Tue 29-06-10 09:41:02, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > >>>On Tue, Jun 29, 2010 at 1:42 AM, Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > > >>>>contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. While credentials check > > >>>>makes sense in the first code path, the second one is more problematic > > >>>>because this check requires that the PI lock holder (pid parameter) has > > >>>>the same uid and euid as the process's euid which is trying to lock the > > >>>>same futex (current). > > >>> > > >>>So exactly why does it make sense to check the credentials in the > > >>>first code path then? > > >> > > >>I though that requeue needs this for security reasons (don't let requeue > > >>process for other user), but when I thought about that again you are > > >>right and the only what matters should be accessibility of the shared > > >>memory. > > > > > >And here is the patch which does the thing. > > > > > >-- > > > > > > From 082c5ad2c482a8e78b61b17e213e750b006176aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > >From: Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> > > >Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2010 09:51:19 +0200 > > >Subject: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check > > > > > >futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > > >contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. None of the paths > > >looks it needs the credentials check, though. Different (e)uids > > >shouldn't matter at all because the only thing that is important for > > >shared futex is the accessibility of the shared memory. > > > > > >The credentail check results in glibc assert failure or process hang (if > > >glibc is compiled without assert support) for shared robust pthread > > >mutex with priority inheritance if a process tries to lock already held > > >lock owned by a process with a different euid: > > > > > >pthread_mutex_lock.c:312: __pthread_mutex_lock_full: Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed. > > > > > >The problem is that futex_lock_pi_atomic which is called when we try to > > >lock already held lock checks the current holder (tid is stored in the > > >futex value) to get the PI state. It uses lookup_pi_state which in turn > > >gets task struct from futex_find_get_task. ESRCH is returned either when > > >the task is not found or if credentials check fails. > > >futex_lock_pi_atomic simply returns if it gets ESRCH. glibc code, > > >however, doesn't expect that robust lock returns with ESRCH because it > > >should get either success or owner died. > > > > > >Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> > > > > Without hearing back from Ingo on the original intent of the > > credentials check, this looks right to me. > > Could you comment on that Ingo, please? I think that's more of a question to Thomas :-) My memories are hazy and nothing springs out as some credible original intent. So please assume it doesnt exist :-) Ingo ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-07-08 9:32 ` Ingo Molnar @ 2010-07-08 9:39 ` Michal Hocko 2010-07-08 9:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-07-08 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Peter Zijlstra, Darren Hart On Thu 08-07-10 11:32:41, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > * Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > > > On Wed 30-06-10 09:43:27, Darren Hart wrote: > > > On 06/30/2010 02:55 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: > > > >On Wed 30-06-10 09:01:15, Michal Hocko wrote: > > > >>On Tue 29-06-10 09:41:02, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > > >>>On Tue, Jun 29, 2010 at 1:42 AM, Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > > > >>>>contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. While credentials check > > > >>>>makes sense in the first code path, the second one is more problematic > > > >>>>because this check requires that the PI lock holder (pid parameter) has > > > >>>>the same uid and euid as the process's euid which is trying to lock the > > > >>>>same futex (current). > > > >>> > > > >>>So exactly why does it make sense to check the credentials in the > > > >>>first code path then? > > > >> > > > >>I though that requeue needs this for security reasons (don't let requeue > > > >>process for other user), but when I thought about that again you are > > > >>right and the only what matters should be accessibility of the shared > > > >>memory. > > > > > > > >And here is the patch which does the thing. > > > > > > > >-- > > > > > > > > From 082c5ad2c482a8e78b61b17e213e750b006176aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > > >From: Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> > > > >Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2010 09:51:19 +0200 > > > >Subject: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check > > > > > > > >futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two > > > >contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. None of the paths > > > >looks it needs the credentials check, though. Different (e)uids > > > >shouldn't matter at all because the only thing that is important for > > > >shared futex is the accessibility of the shared memory. > > > > > > > >The credentail check results in glibc assert failure or process hang (if > > > >glibc is compiled without assert support) for shared robust pthread > > > >mutex with priority inheritance if a process tries to lock already held > > > >lock owned by a process with a different euid: > > > > > > > >pthread_mutex_lock.c:312: __pthread_mutex_lock_full: Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed. > > > > > > > >The problem is that futex_lock_pi_atomic which is called when we try to > > > >lock already held lock checks the current holder (tid is stored in the > > > >futex value) to get the PI state. It uses lookup_pi_state which in turn > > > >gets task struct from futex_find_get_task. ESRCH is returned either when > > > >the task is not found or if credentials check fails. > > > >futex_lock_pi_atomic simply returns if it gets ESRCH. glibc code, > > > >however, doesn't expect that robust lock returns with ESRCH because it > > > >should get either success or owner died. > > > > > > > >Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko<mhocko@suse.cz> > > > > > > Without hearing back from Ingo on the original intent of the > > > credentials check, this looks right to me. > > > > Could you comment on that Ingo, please? > > I think that's more of a question to Thomas :-) > > My memories are hazy and nothing springs out as some credible original intent. > So please assume it doesnt exist :-) OK, so do you need an ACK from Thomas, or can you grab the patch and push it through one of your trees? > > Ingo -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-07-08 9:39 ` Michal Hocko @ 2010-07-08 9:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2010-07-08 9:50 ` Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2010-07-08 9:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michal Hocko Cc: Ingo Molnar, Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Darren Hart On Thu, 2010-07-08 at 11:39 +0200, Michal Hocko wrote: > OK, so do you need an ACK from Thomas, or can you grab the patch and > push it through one of your trees? > Have a look at Linus' tree. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check 2010-07-08 9:43 ` Peter Zijlstra @ 2010-07-08 9:50 ` Michal Hocko 0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Michal Hocko @ 2010-07-08 9:50 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar, Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, LKML, Nick Piggin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Darren Hart On Thu 08-07-10 11:43:53, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Thu, 2010-07-08 at 11:39 +0200, Michal Hocko wrote: > > OK, so do you need an ACK from Thomas, or can you grab the patch and > > push it through one of your trees? > > > Have a look at Linus' tree. Ahh, you mean 7a0ea09ad5352efce8fe79ed853150449903b9f5. I didn't get any email about the committing. Thanks! -- Michal Hocko L3 team SUSE LINUX s.r.o. Lihovarska 1060/12 190 00 Praha 9 Czech Republic ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2010-07-29 0:16 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 11+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2010-07-08 12:51 [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check Michal Hocko 2010-07-08 13:22 ` Ingo Molnar 2010-07-12 10:20 ` Thomas Gleixner 2010-07-28 23:57 ` [stable] " Greg KH -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2010-06-25 17:53 futex: race in lock and unlock&exit for robust futex with PI? Darren Hart 2010-06-25 23:35 ` Darren Hart 2010-06-28 14:42 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-28 15:32 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-28 15:58 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-28 16:39 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-28 16:49 ` Peter Zijlstra 2010-06-29 8:42 ` [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task make credentials check conditional Michal Hocko 2010-06-29 16:41 ` Linus Torvalds 2010-06-30 7:01 ` Michal Hocko 2010-06-30 9:55 ` [PATCH] futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails check Michal Hocko 2010-06-30 16:43 ` Darren Hart 2010-07-08 9:28 ` Michal Hocko 2010-07-08 9:32 ` Ingo Molnar 2010-07-08 9:39 ` Michal Hocko 2010-07-08 9:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2010-07-08 9:50 ` Michal Hocko
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