From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
tytso@mit.edu, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 15:35:33 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150312153533.d1c6083e4a9e7825b1a4bc64@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150309204321.AAF412E0@viggo.jf.intel.com>
On Mon, 09 Mar 2015 13:43:21 -0700 Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> wrote:
>
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
>
> Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are
> existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical
> information is available. Here is one example:
>
> http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~vpk/papers/ret2dir.sec14.pdf
>
> If you know the physical address of something you also know at
> which kernel virtual address you can find something (modulo
> highmem). It means that things that keep the kernel from
> accessing user mappings (like SMAP/SMEP) can be worked around
> because the _kernel_ mapping can get used instead.
>
> But, /proc/$pid/pagemap exposes the physical addresses of all
> pages accessible to userspace. This works against all of the
> efforts to keep kernel addresses out of places where unprivileged
> apps can find them.
>
> This patch introduces a "paranoid" option for /proc. It can be
> enabled like this:
>
> mount -o remount,paranoid /proc
>
> Or when /proc is mounted initially. When 'paranoid' mode is
> active, opens to /proc/$pid/pagemap will return -EPERM for users
> without CAP_SYS_RAWIO. It can be disabled like this:
>
> mount -o remount,notparanoid /proc
>
> The option is applied to the pid namespace, so an app that wanted
> a separate policy from the rest of the system could get run in
> its own pid namespace.
>
> I'm not really that stuck on the name. I'm not opposed to making
> it apply only to pagemap or to giving it a pagemap-specific
> name.
Do we really need to disable pagemap entirely? What happens if we just
obscure the addresses (ie: zero them)?
> pagemap is also the kind of feature that could be used to escalate
> privileged from root in to the kernel. It probably needs to be
> protected in the same way that /dev/mem or module loading is in
> cases where the kernel needs to be protected from root, thus the
> choice to use CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Confused. If you have root, you can do mount -o notparanoid.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-03-12 22:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20150309204321.AAF412E0@viggo.jf.intel.com>
2015-03-09 21:31 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <20150309204322.50DA6B5D@viggo.jf.intel.com>
2015-03-09 21:32 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/2] proc: config options for making privileged /proc the default Kees Cook
2015-03-09 22:13 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface Eric W. Biederman
2015-03-09 22:22 ` Kees Cook
2015-03-09 23:08 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-03-09 23:40 ` Kees Cook
2015-03-09 23:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-03-10 0:03 ` Kees Cook
2015-03-10 2:51 ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-10 4:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-03-10 2:28 ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-12 22:35 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2015-03-13 15:56 ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-13 17:16 ` Eric W. Biederman
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