From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
socketpair@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2015 13:14:47 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151230131447.453c7d53@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20151230112317.GC14049@1wt.eu>
> > Another idea would be to add the amount of memory used to manage the fds
> > to sock_rmem/wmem but I don't see any advantages or disadvantages.
>
> Compared to the impact of the pending data in pipes themselves in flight,
> this would remain fairly minimal.
The true size of the memory pinned by a file handle cannot be determined
by the socket layer anyway. If the handle is for a device it may be
pinning lots of memory in the device driver. It's up to the rest of the
system to manage and contain those resource allocations correctly which a
fair bit of the code (except graphics) does properly.
The resource counting does create the reverse problem that user A running
a program written by hostile user B may find it takes all their resources,
stuffs them down an AF_UNIX socket and passes the last reference to the
socket via a setuid app somewhere where the user can't get it back.
For an end user case that's pretty irrelevant - you run hostile user B's
app then you already lost. For a service it's an interesting attack vector
but not one I can see any obvious ways to exploit because (with the
possible exception of dbus) services simply don't pass file handles down
sockets to untrusted targets.
Alan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-12-30 13:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-12-28 14:14 Willy Tarreau
2015-12-29 14:37 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-12-29 14:48 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-12-29 20:35 ` Willy Tarreau
2015-12-30 8:58 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-12-30 11:23 ` Willy Tarreau
2015-12-30 13:14 ` One Thousand Gnomes [this message]
2015-12-31 6:08 ` Tetsuo Handa
2015-12-31 7:12 ` Willy Tarreau
2015-12-31 10:27 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-01-04 21:44 ` David Miller
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