mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	hannes@stressinduktion.org, davem@davemloft.net,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, edumazet@google.com,
	socketpair@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2015 10:27:34 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151231102734.6414538a@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20151231071253.GG14369@1wt.eu>

On Thu, 31 Dec 2015 08:12:53 +0100
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 31, 2015 at 03:08:53PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > Willy Tarreau wrote:
> > > On Wed, Dec 30, 2015 at 09:58:42AM +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> > > > The MSG_PEEK code should not be harmful and the patch is good as is. I 
> > > > first understood from the published private thread, that it is possible 
> > > > for a program to exceed the rlimit of fds. But the DoS is only by 
> > > > keeping the fds in flight and not attaching them to any program.
> > > 
> > > Exactly. The real issue is when these FDs become very expensive such as
> > > pipes full of data.
> > > 
> > 
> > As you wrote how to abuse this vulnerability which exists in Linux 2.0
> > and later kernel, I quote a short description from private thread.
> > 
> >   "an unprivileged user consumes all file descriptors so that other
> >   unprivileged user cannot work" and "an unprivileged user consumes all
> >   kernel memory so that the OOM killer kills almost all processes before
> >   the culprit process is killed (CVE-2013-4312)".
> > 
> > Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> > Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
> 
> Well I didn't reveal any secret as it was publicly reported first
> in 2010, it's only that Mark sent us the proof of concept exploit
> on the security list recently :-)

There were demonstrations of this bug posted for BSD unixes before Linux
even existed. It and "run the box out of socket buffers" are older than
Linux 8)

Alan

  reply	other threads:[~2015-12-31 10:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-28 14:14 Willy Tarreau
2015-12-29 14:37 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-12-29 14:48 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-12-29 20:35   ` Willy Tarreau
2015-12-30  8:58     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-12-30 11:23       ` Willy Tarreau
2015-12-30 13:14         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-12-31  6:08         ` Tetsuo Handa
2015-12-31  7:12           ` Willy Tarreau
2015-12-31 10:27             ` One Thousand Gnomes [this message]
2016-01-04 21:44 ` David Miller

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20151231102734.6414538a@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --to=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=hannes@stressinduktion.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp \
    --cc=socketpair@gmail.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=w@1wt.eu \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®