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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/6] x86/dumpstack: make printk_stack_address() more generally useful
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2016 08:30:16 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160826133016.34yhryrhirwz72pk@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFy8FPRiEr-4p++TGj+keTNsg781q1E1FQZ7z4+nAs0ZaQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 11:12:40PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Aug 25, 2016 10:57 PM, "Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > But I still don't quite understand your statement that dmesg_restrict is
> > only useful for locked down systems.
> >
> > To prevent kernel address disclosure, it seems we already rely on the
> > user setting kptr_restrict today, otherwise I can do cat
> > /proc/self/stack and the game is already lost, right?
> 
> The point is: kptr_restrict actually makes sense, and is widely useful. It
> doesn't really end up hurting normal things. It's a pretty targeted thing,
> and generally doesn't actually hurt. You can still do basic health
> monitoring without having to get elevated privileges, for example.
> 
> Even system maintainers don't want to be root all the time. In fact, I
> suspect that the better a system maintainer you are, the less you want to
> be root - but you'll still want to see logs etc.
> 
> So note the difference between kptr_restrict and dmesg_restrict.
> 
> One is useful in a pretty wide environment, the other simply is not.
> 
> > So what's the difference between expecting the user to set kptr_restrict
> > vs dmesg_restrict?
> 
> Do you see the difference now?
> 
> kptr_restrict simply doesn't hurt as much as dmesg_restrict, so you can
> enable it fairly widely by default.
> 
> That makes it the *much* better security option. Because security options
> that you can't enable aren't actually useful.

Yeah, at least for human-administered systems, that does make sense.
Grumpy sysadmins don't want to type "sudo dmesg" or "sudo journalctl"
because a) they don't like change; and b) using sudo adds risk.

And a security option which is never used is indeed useless.  So *maybe*
that's a good enough argument for expecting the user to only enable
kptr_restrict instead of both.

But with cloud, devops, mobile, embedded, IoT, [insert buzzword], it
seems most systems are actually managed by software nowadays.  Then the
above arguments don't seem to apply, and dmesg_restrict could still be
quite widely useful, no?

-- 
Josh

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-26 13:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-24 16:50 [PATCH 0/6] x86/dumpstack: more stack dump improvements Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 1/6] perf/x86: check perf_callchain_store() error Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08  9:48   ` [tip:x86/asm] perf/x86: Check " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 2/6] oprofile/x86: add regs->ip to oprofile trace Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-30 11:30   ` Robert Richter
2016-09-08  9:48   ` [tip:x86/asm] oprofile/x86: Add " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 3/6] x86/dumpstack: make printk_stack_address() more generally useful Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 17:28   ` Joe Perches
2016-08-24 18:43     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 19:07       ` Joe Perches
2016-08-24 19:24         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 19:57           ` Joe Perches
2016-08-24 18:03   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-08-24 18:22     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-24 18:37       ` Linus Torvalds
2016-08-24 19:37         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-25 17:49           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-25 20:41             ` Kees Cook
2016-08-25 21:07               ` Josh Poimboeuf
     [not found]                 ` <CA+55aFy3sgA4=ZPhiDWiRMvWj9QPhUd0JBdUr1hm_6G0aSC6uw@mail.gmail.com>
2016-08-26  2:19                   ` Kees Cook
2016-08-26  3:19                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-26  4:40                     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-08-26  5:56                       ` Josh Poimboeuf
     [not found]                         ` <CA+55aFy8FPRiEr-4p++TGj+keTNsg781q1E1FQZ7z4+nAs0ZaQ@mail.gmail.com>
2016-08-26 13:30                           ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2016-08-31 16:53         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-31 17:15           ` Linus Torvalds
2016-09-01 13:09             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-01 16:30               ` Linus Torvalds
2016-09-08  9:49   ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/dumpstack: Make " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 4/6] x86/dumpstack: add get_stack_pointer() and get_frame_pointer() Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08  9:49   ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/dumpstack: Add " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 5/6] x86/dumpstack: remove unnecessary stack pointer arguments Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08  9:50   ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/dumpstack: Remove " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/dumpstack: allow preemption in show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace() Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08  7:04   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-09-08 21:47     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08 21:49       ` [PATCH v2] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-13 18:29         ` Ingo Molnar
2016-09-13 19:38           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-14 17:39         ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/dumpstack: Allow " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-09  6:11       ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/dumpstack: allow " Ingo Molnar
2016-09-01 13:13 ` [PATCH 0/6] x86/dumpstack: more stack dump improvements Josh Poimboeuf

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