From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/6] x86/dumpstack: make printk_stack_address() more generally useful
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2016 08:30:16 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160826133016.34yhryrhirwz72pk@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFy8FPRiEr-4p++TGj+keTNsg781q1E1FQZ7z4+nAs0ZaQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 11:12:40PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Aug 25, 2016 10:57 PM, "Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > But I still don't quite understand your statement that dmesg_restrict is
> > only useful for locked down systems.
> >
> > To prevent kernel address disclosure, it seems we already rely on the
> > user setting kptr_restrict today, otherwise I can do cat
> > /proc/self/stack and the game is already lost, right?
>
> The point is: kptr_restrict actually makes sense, and is widely useful. It
> doesn't really end up hurting normal things. It's a pretty targeted thing,
> and generally doesn't actually hurt. You can still do basic health
> monitoring without having to get elevated privileges, for example.
>
> Even system maintainers don't want to be root all the time. In fact, I
> suspect that the better a system maintainer you are, the less you want to
> be root - but you'll still want to see logs etc.
>
> So note the difference between kptr_restrict and dmesg_restrict.
>
> One is useful in a pretty wide environment, the other simply is not.
>
> > So what's the difference between expecting the user to set kptr_restrict
> > vs dmesg_restrict?
>
> Do you see the difference now?
>
> kptr_restrict simply doesn't hurt as much as dmesg_restrict, so you can
> enable it fairly widely by default.
>
> That makes it the *much* better security option. Because security options
> that you can't enable aren't actually useful.
Yeah, at least for human-administered systems, that does make sense.
Grumpy sysadmins don't want to type "sudo dmesg" or "sudo journalctl"
because a) they don't like change; and b) using sudo adds risk.
And a security option which is never used is indeed useless. So *maybe*
that's a good enough argument for expecting the user to only enable
kptr_restrict instead of both.
But with cloud, devops, mobile, embedded, IoT, [insert buzzword], it
seems most systems are actually managed by software nowadays. Then the
above arguments don't seem to apply, and dmesg_restrict could still be
quite widely useful, no?
--
Josh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-08-26 13:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-24 16:50 [PATCH 0/6] x86/dumpstack: more stack dump improvements Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 1/6] perf/x86: check perf_callchain_store() error Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08 9:48 ` [tip:x86/asm] perf/x86: Check " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 2/6] oprofile/x86: add regs->ip to oprofile trace Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-30 11:30 ` Robert Richter
2016-09-08 9:48 ` [tip:x86/asm] oprofile/x86: Add " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 3/6] x86/dumpstack: make printk_stack_address() more generally useful Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 17:28 ` Joe Perches
2016-08-24 18:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 19:07 ` Joe Perches
2016-08-24 19:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 19:57 ` Joe Perches
2016-08-24 18:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-08-24 18:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-24 18:37 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-08-24 19:37 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-25 17:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-25 20:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-25 21:07 ` Josh Poimboeuf
[not found] ` <CA+55aFy3sgA4=ZPhiDWiRMvWj9QPhUd0JBdUr1hm_6G0aSC6uw@mail.gmail.com>
2016-08-26 2:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-26 3:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-26 4:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-08-26 5:56 ` Josh Poimboeuf
[not found] ` <CA+55aFy8FPRiEr-4p++TGj+keTNsg781q1E1FQZ7z4+nAs0ZaQ@mail.gmail.com>
2016-08-26 13:30 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2016-08-31 16:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-31 17:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-09-01 13:09 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-01 16:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-09-08 9:49 ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/dumpstack: Make " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 4/6] x86/dumpstack: add get_stack_pointer() and get_frame_pointer() Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08 9:49 ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/dumpstack: Add " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 5/6] x86/dumpstack: remove unnecessary stack pointer arguments Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08 9:50 ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/dumpstack: Remove " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-08-24 16:50 ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/dumpstack: allow preemption in show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace() Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08 7:04 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-09-08 21:47 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-08 21:49 ` [PATCH v2] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-13 18:29 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-09-13 19:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-14 17:39 ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/dumpstack: Allow " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2016-09-09 6:11 ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/dumpstack: allow " Ingo Molnar
2016-09-01 13:13 ` [PATCH 0/6] x86/dumpstack: more stack dump improvements Josh Poimboeuf
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