mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
To: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>, Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@fb.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH cgroup/for-4.11] cgroup: drop the matching uid requirement on migration for cgroup v2
Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2017 13:48:14 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170202184814.GB7917@htj.duckdns.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170120162954.GA30978@mtj.duckdns.org>

On Fri, Jan 20, 2017 at 11:29:54AM -0500, Tejun Heo wrote:
> Along with the write access to the cgroup.procs or tasks file, cgroup
> has required the writer's euid, unless root, to match [s]uid of the
> target process or task.  On cgroup v1, this is necessary because
> there's nothing preventing a delegatee from pulling in tasks or
> processes from all over the system.
> 
> If a user has a cgroup subdirectory delegated to it, the user would
> have write access to the cgroup.procs or tasks file.  If there are no
> further checks than file write access check, the user would be able to
> pull processes from all over the system into its subhierarchy which is
> clearly not the intended behavior.  The matching [s]uid requirement
> partially prevents this problem by allowing a delegatee to pull in the
> processes that belongs to it.  This isn't a sufficient protection
> however, because a user would still be able to jump processes across
> two disjoint sub-hierarchies that has been delegated to them.
> 
> cgroup v2 resolves the issue by requiring the writer to have access to
> the common ancestor of the cgroup.procs file of the source and target
> cgroups.  This confines each delegatee to their own sub-hierarchy
> proper and bases all permission decisions on the cgroup filesystem
> rather than having to pull in explicit uid matching.
> 
> cgroup v2 has still been applying the matching [s]uid requirement just
> for historical reasons.  On cgroup2, the requirement doesn't serve any
> purpose while unnecessarily complicating the permission model.  Let's
> drop it.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Applied to cgroup/for-4.11.

Thanks.

-- 
tejun

      reply	other threads:[~2017-02-02 18:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-01-20 16:29 Tejun Heo
2017-02-02 18:48 ` Tejun Heo [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170202184814.GB7917@htj.duckdns.org \
    --to=tj@kernel.org \
    --cc=cgroups@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=hannes@cmpxchg.org \
    --cc=kernel-team@fb.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lizefan@huawei.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®