From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 02:51:06 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170606005108.5646-12-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170606005108.5646-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>
Using get_random_int here is faster, more fitting of the use case, and
just as cryptographically secure. It also has the benefit of providing
better randomness at early boot, which is when many of these structures
are assigned.
Also, semantically, it's not really proper to have been assigning an
atomic_t in this way before, even if in practice it works fine.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/route.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index 655d9eebe43e..11e001a42094 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -2936,8 +2936,7 @@ static __net_init int rt_genid_init(struct net *net)
{
atomic_set(&net->ipv4.rt_genid, 0);
atomic_set(&net->fnhe_genid, 0);
- get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid,
- sizeof(net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid));
+ atomic_set(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid, get_random_int());
return 0;
}
--
2.13.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-06 0:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-06 0:50 [PATCH v3 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:50 ` [PATCH v3 01/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:50 ` [PATCH v3 02/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 5:11 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-06 12:21 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:50 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 17:42 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 18:16 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:50 ` [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 3:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 3:56 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 4:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-06 12:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 15:23 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:26 ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-06 17:30 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:03 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:28 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:57 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-06 18:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 22:19 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2017-06-06 23:14 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07 5:00 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-07 14:42 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2017-06-07 21:27 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07 17:00 ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-07 17:26 ` Mark Rutland
2017-06-08 3:59 ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-07 17:37 ` Mark Rutland
2017-06-08 12:02 ` Kevin Easton
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 06/13] iscsi: " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 10:08 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use David Howells
2017-06-06 12:23 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
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