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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
Date: Tue,  6 Jun 2017 02:50:59 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170606005108.5646-5-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170606005108.5646-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>

Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is
dangerous.

Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 crypto/rng.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
index f46dac5288b9..e042437e64b4 100644
--- a/crypto/rng.c
+++ b/crypto/rng.c
@@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
 		if (!buf)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		get_random_bytes(buf, slen);
+		err = get_random_bytes_wait(buf, slen);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 		seed = buf;
 	}
 
 	err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
-
+out:
 	kzfree(buf);
 	return err;
 }
-- 
2.13.0

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-06  0:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-06  0:50 [PATCH v3 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:50 ` [PATCH v3 01/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:50 ` [PATCH v3 02/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  5:11   ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-06 12:21     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:50 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 17:42   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 18:16     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2017-06-06  3:00   ` [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06  3:56     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  4:44       ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-06 12:34         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 15:23           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:26             ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-06 17:30               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:03           ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:28             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:57             ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-06 18:01               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 22:19             ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2017-06-06 23:14               ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07  5:00               ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-07 14:42                 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2017-06-07 21:27                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07 17:00               ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-07 17:26                 ` Mark Rutland
2017-06-08  3:59                   ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-07 17:37             ` Mark Rutland
2017-06-08 12:02       ` Kevin Easton
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 06/13] iscsi: " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 10:08 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use David Howells
2017-06-06 12:23   ` Jason A. Donenfeld

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