From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] efi/random: Increase size of firmware supplied randomness
Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 16:50:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170825155019.6740-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170825155019.6740-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
The crng code requires at least 64 bytes (2 * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE)
to complete the fast boot-time init, so provide that many bytes
when invoking UEFI protocols to seed the entropy pool. Also, add
a notice so we can tell from the boot log when the seeding actually
took place.
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 3 ++-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c | 10 ++++------
include/linux/efi.h | 2 ++
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 6519be44387c..9e822906adcb 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
if (seed != NULL) {
add_device_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
+ pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
} else {
pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
}
@@ -867,7 +868,7 @@ static int update_efi_random_seed(struct notifier_block *nb,
seed = memremap(efi.rng_seed, sizeof(*seed), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (seed != NULL) {
- size = min(seed->size, 32U);
+ size = min(seed->size, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE);
memunmap(seed);
} else {
pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c
index 7e72954d5860..e0e603a89aa9 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c
@@ -145,8 +145,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
return status;
}
-#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 32
-
efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
efi_guid_t rng_proto = EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL_GUID;
@@ -162,25 +160,25 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
return status;
status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
- sizeof(*seed) + RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
+ sizeof(*seed) + EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
(void **)&seed);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
return status;
- status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
+ status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
seed->bits);
if (status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED)
/*
* Use whatever algorithm we have available if the raw algorithm
* is not implemented.
*/
- status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
+ status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
seed->bits);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto err_freepool;
- seed->size = RANDOM_SEED_SIZE;
+ seed->size = EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE;
status = efi_call_early(install_configuration_table, &rng_table_guid,
seed);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 12e05118657c..8dc3d94a3e3c 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1564,6 +1564,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_exit_boot_services(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
void *priv,
efi_exit_boot_map_processing priv_func);
+#define EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 64U
+
struct linux_efi_random_seed {
u32 size;
u8 bits[];
--
2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-25 16:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-08-25 15:50 [GIT PULL 0/5] more EFI changes for v4.14 Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-25 15:50 ` [PATCH 1/5] efi/libstub: Enable reset attack mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-26 7:58 ` [tip:efi/core] " tip-bot for Matthew Garrett
2017-08-25 15:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2017-08-26 7:58 ` [tip:efi/core] efi/random: Increase size of firmware supplied randomness tip-bot for Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-25 15:50 ` [PATCH 3/5] efi/reboot: Make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-26 7:58 ` [tip:efi/core] " tip-bot for Colin Ian King
2017-08-25 15:50 ` [PATCH 4/5] efi: move efi_mem_type() to common code Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-26 7:59 ` [tip:efi/core] efi: Move " tip-bot for Jan Beulich
2017-08-25 15:50 ` [PATCH 5/5] efi: bgrt: use efi_mem_type() Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-26 7:59 ` [tip:efi/core] efi/bgrt: Use efi_mem_type() tip-bot for Jan Beulich
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