[patch RFC 4/5] x86/cpufeatures: Detect Speculation control feature

[Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>]

[-- Attachment #1: x86-feature--Detect_the_x86_IBRS_feature_to_control_Speculation.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 3504 bytes --]

From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

CPUs can expose a MSR to control speculation. The initial function of this
MSR is to control Indirect Branch Speculation, which is required to
mitigate the Spectre_V2 attack on certain CPU generations.

If CPUID(7).RDX[26] is set then MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL (0x48) is available and
bit 0 of that MSR controls whether Indirect Branch Speculation is
restricted or not. The control bit is named IBRS (Indirect Branch
Restricted Speculation). The IBSR bit can be unconditionally set to 1
without clearing it before.

If IBRS is set, near returns and near indirect jumps/calls will not allow
their predicted target address to be controlled by code that executed in a
less privileged prediction mode before the IBRS mode was last written with
a value of 1 or on another logical processor so long as all Return Stack
Buffer (RSB) entries from the previous less privileged prediction mode are
overwritten.

Thus a near indirect jump/call/return may be affected by code in a less
privileged prediction mode that executed AFTER IBRS mode was last written
with a value of 1.

Code executed by a sibling logical processor cannot control indirect
jump/call/return predicted target when IBRS is set

IBRS is not required in order to isolate branch predictions for SMM or SGX
enclaves.

Enabling IBRS can cause a measurable and depending on the workload
significant CPU performance penalty.

[ tglx: Steam blastered changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |    4 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c    |    1 +
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	( 7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		( 7*32+19) /* Speculation Control */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
 #define MSR_PPIN_CTL			0x0000004e
 #define MSR_PPIN			0x0000004f
 
+#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048
+#define SPEC_CTRL_DISABLE_IBRS		(0UL << 0)
+#define SPEC_CTRL_ENABLE_IBRS		(1UL << 0)
+
 #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0		0x000000c1
 #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1		0x000000c2
 #define MSR_FSB_FREQ			0x000000cd
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits
 	{ X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,		CPUID_EBX, 25, 0x00000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW,    CPUID_EDX,  2, 0x00000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS,    CPUID_EDX,  3, 0x00000007, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL,	CPUID_EDX, 26, 0x00000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3,		CPUID_EBX,  1, 0x00000010, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2,		CPUID_EBX,  2, 0x00000010, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3,		CPUID_ECX,  2, 0x00000010, 1 },