From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Subject: [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control code
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 02:06:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180110011350.855878109@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180110010652.404145126@linutronix.de>
[-- Attachment #1: x86-speculation--Add-basic-speculation-control-code.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 5218 bytes --]
Add the minimal infrastructure to control the speculation control feature.
- Integrate it into the spectre_v2 coammand line parser and the mitigation
selector function. The conditional selector function is a placeholder
right now, which needs to be expanded with CPU specific decision
functions.
- Provide a static key for the actual code control.
- Provide a init function which is called after jump label patching is
functional.
- Provide an interface for the late micro code loader to allow late
discovery of the IBRS support. Not yet functional.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 9 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 +++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/specctrl.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
@@ -165,5 +167,12 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled;
void spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(specctrl_ibrs);
+
+void specctrl_init_features(void);
+void specctrl_update_features(void);
+bool specctrl_force_enable_ibrs(void);
+bool specctrl_cond_enable_ibrs(bool full_retpoline);
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-y += match.o
obj-y += bugs.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_FREQ) += aperfmperf.o
obj-y += cpuid-deps.o
+obj-y += specctrl.c
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,
};
static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[]
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Mitigation: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation",
};
#undef pr_fmt
@@ -163,6 +165,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_check_boot
void spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
+ bool full_retpoline = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && retp_compiler();
enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
/*
@@ -178,9 +181,22 @@ void spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
return;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
+ /* Command line requested IBRS. Try to enable it */
+ if (specctrl_force_enable_ibrs()) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+ goto set_mode;
+ }
+ /* FALLTRHU */
+
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
/* FALLTRHU */
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+ /* Check whether the CPU prefers to have IBRS */
+ if (specctrl_cond_enable_ibrs(full_retpoline)) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+ goto set_mode;
+ }
goto retpoline_auto;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
@@ -223,6 +239,7 @@ void spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
}
+set_mode:
if (spectre_v2_enabled == mode)
return;
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/specctrl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+
+/* Static key to control enablement of IBRS */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(specctrl_ibrs);
+
+/**
+ * specctrl_init_features - Init speculation control features
+ *
+ * Called after static key patching is functional. The decision which
+ * mitigation to use has been made already in check_bugs() before patching
+ * the alternatives.
+ */
+void __init specctrl_init_features(void)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS)
+ return;
+
+ static_branch_enable(&specctrl_ibrs);
+}
+
+/**
+ * specctrl_update_features - Update the speculation control features
+ *
+ * Called after a late microcode load changed CPU feature bits.
+ *
+ * Note: This is called with CPU hotplug lock and microcode mutex held.
+ */
+void specctrl_update_features(void)
+{
+ if (static_key_enabled(&specctrl_ibrs))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Either the CPU bits need to be reevaluated here or its
+ * done in the late microcode loader. Borislav ?
+ */
+ spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS)
+ return;
+ static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(&specctrl_ibrs);
+}
+
+bool specctrl_force_enable_ibrs(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool specctrl_cond_enable_ibrs(bool full_retpoline)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ return false;
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Add logic here to decide what the best option is for a
+ * particular CPU.
+ */
+ return true;
+}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-10 1:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-10 1:06 [patch RFC 0/5] x86/spectre_v2: Initial integration of IBRS into the spectre_v2 mechanics Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:06 ` [patch RFC 1/5] x86/CPU: Sync CPU feature flags late Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:37 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 1:39 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 1:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 2:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-10 11:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 6:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-10 12:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:06 ` [patch RFC 2/5] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre code a bit Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 6:22 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10 1:06 ` [patch RFC 3/5] x86/spectre: Prepare for IBRS selection Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:51 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 1:06 ` [patch RFC 4/5] x86/cpufeatures: Detect Speculation control feature Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 6:32 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10 11:06 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:06 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-01-10 2:02 ` [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control code Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 4:11 ` Justin Forbes
2018-01-10 9:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-10 9:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 10:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-10 11:22 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 11:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 11:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-10 11:54 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 11:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 12:01 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:07 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:12 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 12:20 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:27 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:42 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 12:09 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 12:17 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:29 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 12:41 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-10 12:51 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 13:02 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:05 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:10 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:12 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:57 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:07 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 13:45 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 13:52 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:53 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 21:35 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-10 22:13 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 13:51 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 13:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 13:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 14:10 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 14:14 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 14:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 15:13 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 15:24 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 15:47 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 15:56 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 13:10 ` Jiri Kosina
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