From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
peterz@infradead.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linux-foundation.org,
mingo@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, linux@dominikbrodowski.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 21:59:07 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180131035907.sye4x7f3e77wnroh@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d4d8111b-5758-7541-cc30-b11d6b4d6bec@linux.intel.com>
On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 01:23:17PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> On 01/30/2018 09:48 AM, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 10:04:47PM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> >> From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> >>
> >> Flush indirect branches when switching into a process that marked itself
> >> non dumpable. This protects high value processes like gpg better,
> >> without having too high performance overhead.
> >
> > I wonder what the point of this patch is. An audit of my laptop shows
> > only a single user of PR_SET_DUMPABLE: systemd-coredump.
>
> This is an opt in approach. For processes who need extra
> security, it set itself as non-dumpable. Then it can
> ensure that it doesn't see any poisoned BTB.
I don't want other users reading my applications' memory.
I don't want other containers reading my containers' memory.
I don't want *any* user tasks reading root daemons' memory.
Those are not unreasonable expectations.
So now I have to go and modify all my containers and applications to set
PR_SET_DUMPABLE? That seems highly impractical and unlikely.
Plus, I happen to *like* core dumps.
The other option is to rebuild the entire userland with retpolines, but
again, that would make this patch completely pointless.
> > [ And yes, I have gpg-agent running. Also, a grep of the gnupg source
> > doesn't show any evidence of it being used there. So the gpg thing
> > seems to be a myth. ]
>
> I'm less familiar with gpg-agent. Dave was the one who
> put in comments about gpg-agent in this patch so perhaps
> he can comment.
>
> >
> > But also, I much preferred the original version of the patch which only
> > skipped IBPB when 'prev' could ptrace 'next'.
>
> For the A->kernel thread->B scenario, you will need context of A
> to decide if you need IBPB when switching to B. You need to
> worry about whether the context of A has been released ... etc if
> you want to use ptrace.
Is that why the ptrace approach was abandoned? Surely that's a solvable
problem? We have some smart people on lkml. And anyway I didn't see it
discussed anywhere. In the worst case we could just always do IBPB when
switching between kernel and user tasks.
--
Josh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-31 3:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-29 22:04 David Woodhouse
2018-01-30 17:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-30 21:23 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-30 22:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-30 22:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 22:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 3:59 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2018-01-31 23:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-30 20:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-30 21:03 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-30 21:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-30 22:26 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-30 22:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 0:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-31 0:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-30 22:39 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Tim Chen
2018-01-31 7:03 ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-01-31 13:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-01 8:25 ` Christian Brauner
2018-02-01 8:31 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-01 15:40 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-04 19:39 ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-05 14:18 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-05 19:35 ` Tim Chen
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-29 11:33 [PATCH] " David Woodhouse
2018-01-29 12:28 ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-01-29 12:44 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-29 13:56 ` Dominik Brodowski
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