Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Dr. Greg Wettstein]

On Mar 28,  8:44am, Stefan Berger wrote:
} Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace sup

Good morning, I hope the week is going well for everyone.

> On 03/28/2018 08:14 AM, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 07:10:12AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >
> > Good morning, I hope the day is starting out well for everyone.
> >
> >> On 03/27/2018 07:01 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >>> Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
> >>>
> >>>> From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
> >>>>
> >>>> Add new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option.  Let clone() create a new IMA
> >>>> namespace upon CLONE_NEWUSER flag. Attach the ima_ns data structure
> >>>> to user_namespace. ima_ns is allocated and freed upon IMA namespace
> >>>> creation and exit, which is tied to USER namespace creation and exit.
> >>>> Currently, the ima_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy
> >>>> interface. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different
> >>>> aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).
> >>> Tying IMA to the user namespace is far better than tying IMA
> >>> to the mount namespace.  It may even be the proper answer.
> >>>
> >>> You had asked what it would take to unstick this so you won't have
> >>> problems next time you post and I did not get as far as answering.
> >>>
> >>> I had a conversation a while back with Mimi and I believe what was
> >>> agreed was that IMA to start doing it's thing early needs a write
> >>> to securityfs/imafs.
> >> Above you say 'proper answer' for user namespace. Now this sounds like
> >> making it independent.
> >>
> >>> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
> >>> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
> >>> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
> >>> before a container is created.
> >> So you are saying to not tie it to user namespace but make it an
> >> independent namespace and to not use a clone flag (0x1000) but use
> >> the filesystem to spawn a new namespace. Should that be an IMA
> >> specific file or a file that can be shared with other subsystems?
>
> > We've been platforming solutions for about 18 months now on top of a
> > namespaced IMA implementation that we developed and carry against the
> > 4.4.x kernel.  Technically its not an IMA namespace, but rather a
> > behavioral namespace, since we implement information exchange event
> > modeling, conceptually though its all the same and its origins were
> > IMA.

> Are you intending to make this publicly available and/or contribute
> it ?

An interesting question and one that will be the subject of a meeting
this afternoon.

The namespace implementation is probably of limited value but the
modeling engine would arguably be utility in open-source form.  We
built the ima/behavior namespace implementation since it is a very
practical requirement for a deterministically modeled os/application
stack.

The current namespace work will satisfy a very broad constituency but
we needed an implementation 18 months ago.  Consensus and expediency
are always conflicting goals.  We are only trying to offer some
insight from practical experience if the community ever wants to
consider a vision larger then file integrity.

> > In some configurations we run unmodified Docker containers inside the
> > behavioral/IMA namespace.  So if experience is a useful metric the
> > 'integrity' namespace needs to be a first class entity and not
> > subordinate or tied to any other resource namespaces.  We would also
> > recommend, again based on our experiences, the use of a clone flag.

> We have been using a clone flag in the first implementation, the
> mount flag afterwards.We treat containers independent of the host,
> meaning that it has its own policy, independent of the host, and
> allows for signed files inside containers to enable
> IMA-appraisal. It does require modifications to user space
> applications like Docker that have to pick up the file signatures.

Our opinion is worth what it is printed on of course, but we would
strongly advocate that a clone flag be used with no dependencies in
whatever becomes the final implementation.  I think it is important to
stress that integrity is but one aspect of platform behavior, which is
ultimately what needs to be modeled from a security perspective.

Our modeling engine is process chain specific, ie. host independent,
as well.  We do export the hardware aggregate measurement so the
namespace specific behavior measurement can be linked to a hardware
trust root if that is desired.

We had originally modified runc to clone the behavior/integrity
namespace but a lot of experience led us to wrap the entire container
invocation into its own integrity envelope.  Adding a clone flag to
the orchestration utility is straight forward, adding support for
running the modeling/integrity engine in a TEE is a bit more of a
lift.  Getting tooling and infrastructure upstream is always a
challenge as everyone knows, particularly as these ecosystems grow.

> > FWIW, at this point we have hoisted a lot of the integrity
> > functionality out of the kernel and up into userspace so it can be run
> > in a trusted execution environment.  There are always the issues with
> > kernel<->userspace communication, particularly of the symmetric
> > variety, but userspace seems to be a much better place for a lot of
> > this functionality.  If the ELF module discussion is any indication it

> Like what functionality? Are you supporting IMA-appraisal? Are you
> doing IMA-measurements? What about IMA-audit? Following our intended
> IMA namespacing, all of this would be done in the kernel following
> an IMA policy parsed by the kernel.

As I commented before, we started with IMA and that effort morphed
into platform behavior modeling, which simplistically, is an integrity
measurement that is the linear extension sum of the information
exchange events mediated by the operating system.  That leads to a
model that is mechanistically simpler implements a superset of the
guarantees one gets with IMA-*.  Most importantly it allows almost a
complete userspace implementation, which is important if one envisions
the notion of a cloud wide integrity orchestration environment.

The Holy Grail in all of this, of course, is the notion of defining a
metric for per process trust.  We link all off this to a per-process
security module (LSM) we wrote that reacts to the output of the
modeling engine.  Alan, Linus and others had previously discussed the
importance of defining what a 'trusted process' is in the context of
how to make a decision on what criteria should be used for turning off
KPTI.

It is a decidedly different way of looking at the problem, which of
course, has its own inherent challenges... :-)

> Stefan

Have a good weekend.

Dr. Greg

}-- End of excerpt from Stefan Berger

As always,
Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D.   Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
4206 N. 19th Ave.           Specializing in information infra-structure
Fargo, ND  58102            development.
PH: 701-281-1686
FAX: 701-281-3949           EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The real question is not whether machines think but whether men do."
                                -- B. F. Skinner
                                   _Contingencies of Reinforcement_

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Stefan Berger]

On 03/29/2018 01:44 PM, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> On Mar 28,  8:44am, Stefan Berger wrote:
> } Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace sup
>
> Good morning, I hope the week is going well for everyone.
>
>> On 03/28/2018 08:14 AM, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
>>> On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 07:10:12AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>
>>> Good morning, I hope the day is starting out well for everyone.
>>>
>>>> On 03/27/2018 07:01 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>> Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Add new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option.  Let clone() create a new IMA
>>>>>> namespace upon CLONE_NEWUSER flag. Attach the ima_ns data structure
>>>>>> to user_namespace. ima_ns is allocated and freed upon IMA namespace
>>>>>> creation and exit, which is tied to USER namespace creation and exit.
>>>>>> Currently, the ima_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy
>>>>>> interface. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different
>>>>>> aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).
>>>>> Tying IMA to the user namespace is far better than tying IMA
>>>>> to the mount namespace.  It may even be the proper answer.
>>>>>
>>>>> You had asked what it would take to unstick this so you won't have
>>>>> problems next time you post and I did not get as far as answering.
>>>>>
>>>>> I had a conversation a while back with Mimi and I believe what was
>>>>> agreed was that IMA to start doing it's thing early needs a write
>>>>> to securityfs/imafs.
>>>> Above you say 'proper answer' for user namespace. Now this sounds like
>>>> making it independent.
>>>>
>>>>> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
>>>>> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
>>>>> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
>>>>> before a container is created.
>>>> So you are saying to not tie it to user namespace but make it an
>>>> independent namespace and to not use a clone flag (0x1000) but use
>>>> the filesystem to spawn a new namespace. Should that be an IMA
>>>> specific file or a file that can be shared with other subsystems?
>>> We've been platforming solutions for about 18 months now on top of a
>>> namespaced IMA implementation that we developed and carry against the
>>> 4.4.x kernel.  Technically its not an IMA namespace, but rather a
>>> behavioral namespace, since we implement information exchange event
>>> modeling, conceptually though its all the same and its origins were
>>> IMA.
>> Are you intending to make this publicly available and/or contribute
>> it ?
> An interesting question and one that will be the subject of a meeting
> this afternoon.

What is the outcome of this meeting ?

>
> The namespace implementation is probably of limited value but the
> modeling engine would arguably be utility in open-source form.  We
> built the ima/behavior namespace implementation since it is a very
> practical requirement for a deterministically modeled os/application
> stack.

It's hard to figure out from what you are saying to determine what you 
doing in user space and what is done in the kernel.

>
> The current namespace work will satisfy a very broad constituency but
> we needed an implementation 18 months ago.  Consensus and expediency
> are always conflicting goals.  We are only trying to offer some
> insight from practical experience if the community ever wants to
> consider a vision larger then file integrity.

I think you may have to become a bit more concrete for others to see 
what you are doing.

>
>>> In some configurations we run unmodified Docker containers inside the
>>> behavioral/IMA namespace.  So if experience is a useful metric the
>>> 'integrity' namespace needs to be a first class entity and not
>>> subordinate or tied to any other resource namespaces.  We would also
>>> recommend, again based on our experiences, the use of a clone flag.
>> We have been using a clone flag in the first implementation, the
>> mount flag afterwards.We treat containers independent of the host,
>> meaning that it has its own policy, independent of the host, and
>> allows for signed files inside containers to enable
>> IMA-appraisal. It does require modifications to user space
>> applications like Docker that have to pick up the file signatures.
> Our opinion is worth what it is printed on of course, but we would
> strongly advocate that a clone flag be used with no dependencies in
> whatever becomes the final implementation.  I think it is important to
> stress that integrity is but one aspect of platform behavior, which is
> ultimately what needs to be modeled from a security perspective.

Either clone flag or some pseudo file that spawns a new namespace upon 
wirte() may be able do it.

> Our modeling engine is process chain specific, ie. host independent,
> as well.  We do export the hardware aggregate measurement so the
> namespace specific behavior measurement can be linked to a hardware
> trust root if that is desired.

Do you tie it to a TPM? Do you log and measure?

>
> We had originally modified runc to clone the behavior/integrity
> namespace but a lot of experience led us to wrap the entire container
> invocation into its own integrity envelope.  Adding a clone flag to
> the orchestration utility is straight forward, adding support for

Yes.

> running the modeling/integrity engine in a TEE is a bit more of a
> lift.  Getting tooling and infrastructure upstream is always a
> challenge as everyone knows, particularly as these ecosystems grow.

I am not sure what exactly that means.


>
>>> FWIW, at this point we have hoisted a lot of the integrity
>>> functionality out of the kernel and up into userspace so it can be run
>>> in a trusted execution environment.  There are always the issues with
>>> kernel<->userspace communication, particularly of the symmetric
>>> variety, but userspace seems to be a much better place for a lot of
>>> this functionality.  If the ELF module discussion is any indication it
>> Like what functionality? Are you supporting IMA-appraisal? Are you
>> doing IMA-measurements? What about IMA-audit? Following our intended
>> IMA namespacing, all of this would be done in the kernel following
>> an IMA policy parsed by the kernel.
> As I commented before, we started with IMA and that effort morphed
> into platform behavior modeling, which simplistically, is an integrity

I am not sure what integrity has to do with platform behavior. To me 
integrity is more a state of the system. Behavior goes more into the 
area of what software does, like whether it behaves unexpected and 
attempts to steal data, which would be something like malware. Though 
IMA does not address behavior. If you are doing all this in user space, 
I'd be curious to see what and how you are doing this.

> measurement that is the linear extension sum of the information
> exchange events mediated by the operating system.  That leads to a

What are 'information exchange events' in your system?

> model that is mechanistically simpler implements a superset of the
> guarantees one gets with IMA-*.  Most importantly it allows almost a
> complete userspace implementation, which is important if one envisions
> the notion of a cloud wide integrity orchestration environment.

When you model 'platform behavior' for a cloud environment, how do you 
know what software a cloud tenant is attempting to run on the system? Do 
you differentiate between 'good' and 'bad' behavior of software and how 
do you do that?

>
> The Holy Grail in all of this, of course, is the notion of defining a
> metric for per process trust.  We link all off this to a per-process
> security module (LSM) we wrote that reacts to the output of the
> modeling engine.  Alan, Linus and others had previously discussed the

Do you have a more in-depth description of your modeling engine and what 
it does?

> importance of defining what a 'trusted process' is in the context of
> how to make a decision on what criteria should be used for turning off
> KPTI.
>
> It is a decidedly different way of looking at the problem, which of
> course, has its own inherent challenges... :-)

Thanks for your descriptions. I find them a bit too vague to build upon 
at this point ... :-)

>
>> Stefan
> Have a good weekend.

Thanks.

   Stefan

>
> Dr. Greg
>
> }-- End of excerpt from Stefan Berger
>
> As always,
> Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D.   Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
> 4206 N. 19th Ave.           Specializing in information infra-structure
> Fargo, ND  58102            development.
> PH: 701-281-1686
> FAX: 701-281-3949           EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> "The real question is not whether machines think but whether men do."
>                                  -- B. F. Skinner
>                                     _Contingencies of Reinforcement_
>

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Dr. Greg Wettstein]

On Mon, Apr 02, 2018 at 07:20:54AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:

Good morning to everyone.

> On 03/29/2018 01:44 PM, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> >On Mar 28,  8:44am, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >} Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace 
> >sup
> >
> >Good morning, I hope the week is going well for everyone.
> >
> >>On 03/28/2018 08:14 AM, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> >>>On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 07:10:12AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >>>
> >>>Good morning, I hope the day is starting out well for everyone.
> >>>
> >>>>On 03/27/2018 07:01 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >>>>>Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>Add new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option.  Let clone() create a new IMA
> >>>>>>namespace upon CLONE_NEWUSER flag. Attach the ima_ns data structure
> >>>>>>to user_namespace. ima_ns is allocated and freed upon IMA namespace
> >>>>>>creation and exit, which is tied to USER namespace creation and exit.
> >>>>>>Currently, the ima_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy
> >>>>>>interface. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the 
> >>>>>>different
> >>>>>>aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).
> >>>>>Tying IMA to the user namespace is far better than tying IMA
> >>>>>to the mount namespace.  It may even be the proper answer.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>You had asked what it would take to unstick this so you won't have
> >>>>>problems next time you post and I did not get as far as answering.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>I had a conversation a while back with Mimi and I believe what was
> >>>>>agreed was that IMA to start doing it's thing early needs a write
> >>>>>to securityfs/imafs.
> >>>>Above you say 'proper answer' for user namespace. Now this sounds like
> >>>>making it independent.
> >>>>
> >>>>>As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
> >>>>>writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
> >>>>>even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
> >>>>>before a container is created.
> >>>>So you are saying to not tie it to user namespace but make it an
> >>>>independent namespace and to not use a clone flag (0x1000) but use
> >>>>the filesystem to spawn a new namespace. Should that be an IMA
> >>>>specific file or a file that can be shared with other subsystems?
> >>>We've been platforming solutions for about 18 months now on top of a
> >>>namespaced IMA implementation that we developed and carry against the
> >>>4.4.x kernel.  Technically its not an IMA namespace, but rather a
> >>>behavioral namespace, since we implement information exchange event
> >>>modeling, conceptually though its all the same and its origins were
> >>>IMA.
> >>Are you intending to make this publicly available and/or contribute
> >>it ?
> >An interesting question and one that will be the subject of a meeting
> >this afternoon.

> What is the outcome of this meeting ?

After extensive discussion a decision was made that another meeting
was needed.... :-)

> >The namespace implementation is probably of limited value but the
> >modeling engine would arguably be utility in open-source form.  We
> >built the ima/behavior namespace implementation since it is a very
> >practical requirement for a deterministically modeled os/application
> >stack.

> It's hard to figure out from what you are saying to determine what
> you doing in user space and what is done in the kernel.

The kernel exports the characteristics of the information exchange
event, ie. Actor(process)/Subject(inode) identity attributes, the
userspace implementation processes those according to policy
directives and maintains a contour map of the current behavior of the
system.  Most commonly it compares this map to a map that is supplied
with the policy directives to determine if the behavior of the system
is 'on-or-off contour'.

> >The current namespace work will satisfy a very broad constituency
> >but we needed an implementation 18 months ago.  Consensus and
> >expediency are always conflicting goals.  We are only trying to
> >offer some insight from practical experience if the community ever
> >wants to consider a vision larger then file integrity.

> I think you may have to become a bit more concrete for others to see
> what you are doing.

Mimi invited us to present our work at the Linux Security Summit in
Seattle the year before last.

You can get the paper that we wrote to support the presentation at the
following link:

ftp://ftp.idfusion.net/pub/idfusion/iso-identity.pdf

I think it is also still available at kernsec.org.

The paper discussed a specific hardware implementation but has a full
discussion of the theory we use to implement deterministically modeled
application platforms.

Our work has advanced significantly from where things were at when we
wrote that paper.  Most specifically, almost everything has moved to
userspace in order to be hosted in a trusted execution environment.

The paper also does not cover our work on per-process LSM's to
regulate the behavior of processes that have gone 'off-contour',
ie. are bad actors.

> >>>In some configurations we run unmodified Docker containers inside the
> >>>behavioral/IMA namespace.  So if experience is a useful metric the
> >>>'integrity' namespace needs to be a first class entity and not
> >>>subordinate or tied to any other resource namespaces.  We would also
> >>>recommend, again based on our experiences, the use of a clone flag.
> >>We have been using a clone flag in the first implementation, the
> >>mount flag afterwards.We treat containers independent of the host,
> >>meaning that it has its own policy, independent of the host, and
> >>allows for signed files inside containers to enable
> >>IMA-appraisal. It does require modifications to user space
> >>applications like Docker that have to pick up the file signatures.
> >Our opinion is worth what it is printed on of course, but we would
> >strongly advocate that a clone flag be used with no dependencies in
> >whatever becomes the final implementation.  I think it is important to
> >stress that integrity is but one aspect of platform behavior, which is
> >ultimately what needs to be modeled from a security perspective.

> Either clone flag or some pseudo file that spawns a new namespace
> upon wirte() may be able do it.

We tend to be fond of a clone flag, the most important issue is to
have an independent namespace that addresses the integrity/behavior
status of a process and its subordinates.

> >Our modeling engine is process chain specific, ie. host independent,
> >as well.  We do export the hardware aggregate measurement so the
> >namespace specific behavior measurement can be linked to a hardware
> >trust root if that is desired.

> Do you tie it to a TPM? Do you log and measure?

Yes, although most of our work now revolves around using a trusted
execution environment.

One of the problems with TPM's are a limited number of resettable
PCR's.  One solution, obviously, is to run virtual TPM's but that has
security footprint implications.  The use of a TEE also provides a
convenient framework for building a 'cloud' based integrity
orchestration system that is, theoretically, independent of the state
of the platform.

> >We had originally modified runc to clone the behavior/integrity
> >namespace but a lot of experience led us to wrap the entire container
> >invocation into its own integrity envelope.  Adding a clone flag to
> >the orchestration utility is straight forward, adding support for
> 
> Yes.
> 
> >running the modeling/integrity engine in a TEE is a bit more of a
> >lift.  Getting tooling and infrastructure upstream is always a
> >challenge as everyone knows, particularly as these ecosystems grow.

> I am not sure what exactly that means.

If the container runtime is responsible for creating and/or managing
the integrity/behavior namespace, that infrastructure needs to become
mainline and propagate to become useful.  In our case this includes
setting up a TEE on a per container/canister basis.  This is just the
the standard upstream tooling problem.

> >>>FWIW, at this point we have hoisted a lot of the integrity
> >>>functionality out of the kernel and up into userspace so it can be run
> >>>in a trusted execution environment.  There are always the issues with
> >>>kernel<->userspace communication, particularly of the symmetric
> >>>variety, but userspace seems to be a much better place for a lot of
> >>>this functionality.  If the ELF module discussion is any indication it
> >>Like what functionality? Are you supporting IMA-appraisal? Are you
> >>doing IMA-measurements? What about IMA-audit? Following our intended
> >>IMA namespacing, all of this would be done in the kernel following
> >>an IMA policy parsed by the kernel.
> >As I commented before, we started with IMA and that effort morphed
> >into platform behavior modeling, which simplistically, is an integrity

> I am not sure what integrity has to do with platform behavior. To me
> integrity is more a state of the system. Behavior goes more into the
> area of what software does, like whether it behaves unexpected and
> attempts to steal data, which would be something like
> malware. Though IMA does not address behavior. If you are doing all
> this in user space, I'd be curious to see what and how you are doing
> this.

Our paper goes into the theory of why and how we postulate that
behavior is ultimately a manifestation of integrity, or conversely,
integrity monitoring is simply a subset of behavioral modeling.

This includes the notion of extra-dimensional vs intra-dimensional
security events which is another can of worms.  We are letting the
experts in Haskell and formal verification solve the latter problem
while we focus on the former... :-)

> >measurement that is the linear extension sum of the information
> >exchange events mediated by the operating system.  That leads to a

> What are 'information exchange events' in your system?

A very granular expression of an identity constructed and assigned to
a process(actor)/inode(subject) interaction.

More classically, the model can be thought of as assigning unique
identities to the positive accession elements of a type enforcement
matrix.

You commented above that you believe that behavior is a function of
what software does.  Ultimately and most fundamentally, software
translates into actor/subject interactions in the OS, so modeling at
this level captures the behavior of the software.

As an industry, we depend on this model for our most basic security
guarantees, since both discretionary and mandatory access controls
implement platform security by arbitrating these events.

> >model that is mechanistically simpler implements a superset of the
> >guarantees one gets with IMA-*.  Most importantly it allows almost a
> >complete userspace implementation, which is important if one envisions
> >the notion of a cloud wide integrity orchestration environment.

> When you model 'platform behavior' for a cloud environment, how do
> you know what software a cloud tenant is attempting to run on the
> system? Do you differentiate between 'good' and 'bad' behavior of
> software and how do you do that?

This is why an independent behavioral/integrity namespace is so
important to this work.  With respect to a cloud environment, we are
primarily focused on implementing a definition of behavior at the
level of the container, or canister as we refer to it, ie. a
'container with a label'.

In this model, a 'behaviorally trusted cloud' platform or node would
be a very minimal canister/container launch system that would itself
have a precise behavioral definition rooted in something like a
hardware TPM and thus hardware attestable.  This is why we export the
hardware aggregate measurement up into the behavioral modeling engine
for a canister.

This provides a framework where a canister can be pushed up into a
cloud platform which is attesting a known behavior.  The canister can
then attest that it has a known behavior derived from and specific to
its execution platform.  If one thinks about this a bit, there is
possibly an important play with respect to blockchain technology in
this model.

All of this, of course, assumes that we can place a great deal of
trust in the isolation capabilities of namespaces.  That seems to be
largely a given at this point in time, since we are talking about per
namespace IMA... :-)

> >The Holy Grail in all of this, of course, is the notion of defining a
> >metric for per process trust.  We link all off this to a per-process
> >security module (LSM) we wrote that reacts to the output of the
> >modeling engine.  Alan, Linus and others had previously discussed the

> Do you have a more in-depth description of your modeling engine and
> what it does?

The paper has extensive background information and discussion on all
of these issues.  Let me know if you do read it and I will send you a
bronze medal, as you would be the third person who has read it, after
my wife who checked it for typos.... :-)

The per process LSM work is very recent work but actually quite
straight forward and powerful, if one can get one's head wrapped
around the notion that behavior is a manifestation of a processes
identity.  The notion of per process trust is going to be important as
we battle with the performance impact of micro-architectural
vulnerabilities, as the dialogue on per-process KPTI suggests.

> >importance of defining what a 'trusted process' is in the context of
> >how to make a decision on what criteria should be used for turning off
> >KPTI.
> >
> >It is a decidedly different way of looking at the problem, which of
> >course, has its own inherent challenges... :-)

> Thanks for your descriptions. I find them a bit too vague to build
> upon at this point ... :-)

I've always thought the iso-identity model for platform behavior was
very straight forward but I'm learning that may be a bit naive on my
part.

My career evolved out of quantum chemistry where I did very early work
in the field of multi-scale modeling, ie. ab-initio -> newtonian,
model transitioning.  All of this, regardless of it being chemistry or
computers, is very much about 'y = mx + b' if you can stretch your
imagination a bit.

We use self-consistent fields in quantum mechanics since the
complexity of the multi-body problem means that we don't have direct
solutions for anything beyond helium.  Namespaces are important in
deterministic platform modeling since they reduce model complexity and
thus make the problem tractable.

We actually talked about these modeling similarities in the
'cross-pollination tract' of DARPA's high confidence software systems
conference last year:

https://cps-vo.org/node/34578

The site seems to be a bit dysfunctional right now but an
abstract/slides should be there when it is working.

Right now our only concern is advocating for Linux to develop an
independent namespace/clone-bit for encapsulating integrity and/or
behavior.... :-)

> Thanks.
> 
>   Stefan

Thanks for your interest, hopefully others find it thought provoking.

Have a good week.

Dr. Greg

As always,
Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D.   Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
4206 N. 19th Ave.           Specializing in information infra-structure
Fargo, ND  58102            development.
PH: 701-281-1686
FAX: 701-281-3949           EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"When I am working on a problem I never think about beauty.  I only
 think about how to solve the problem.  But when I have finished, if
 the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong."
                                -- Buckminster Fuller

[RFC PATCH v3 0/3] ima: namespacing IMA

[Stefan Berger]

This patch set implements an IMA namespace data structure that gets
created alongside a user namespace with CLONE_NEWUSER, and lays down the
foundation for namespacing the different aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit,
IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).

The original PoC patches [1] created a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag to explicitly
control when a new IMA namespace should be created. The previously posted
version 2 of this series had it hooked on the mount namespace, which was
regarded as inappropriate. Based on comments, we elected to hang the IMA
namepace off of the existing user namespace now. In this patch series we
are adding a pointer to the user_namespace pointing to the ima_namespace.
Both are now tied together and joining the user_namespace with setns() also
joins the ima_namespace that was created along with it.

The first patch creates the ima_namespace data, while the second patch
puts the iint->flags in the namespace. The third patch uses these flags
for namespacing the IMA-audit messages, enabling the same file to be
audited each time it is accessed in a new namespace.


   Stefan

Mehmet Kayaalp (2):
  ima: Add ns_status for storing namespaced iint data
  ima: mamespace audit status flags

Yuqiong Sun (1):
  ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

 include/linux/ima.h                      |  67 +++++++++
 include/linux/user_namespace.h           |   4 +
 init/Kconfig                             |  10 ++
 kernel/user.c                            |   7 +
 kernel/user_namespace.c                  |  18 +++
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  47 ++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c         |   8 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |   4 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  43 ++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c        |  15 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 225 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 12 files changed, 443 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c

-- 
2.14.3

[RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Stefan Berger]

From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>

Add new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option.  Let clone() create a new IMA
namespace upon CLONE_NEWUSER flag. Attach the ima_ns data structure
to user_namespace. ima_ns is allocated and freed upon IMA namespace
creation and exit, which is tied to USER namespace creation and exit.
Currently, the ima_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy
interface. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different
aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).

Changelog:
v3:
* Use CLONE_NEWUSER instead of CLONE_NEWNW flag

v2:
* Moved ima_init_ns and related functions into own file that is
  always compiled; init_ima_ns will always be there
* Fixed putting of imans->parent
* Move IMA namespace creation from nsproxy into mount namespace
  code; get rid of procfs operations for IMA namespace

v1:
* Use CLONE_NEWNS instead of a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag
* Use existing ima.h headers
* Move the ima_namespace.c to security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
* Fix typo INFO->INO
* Each namespace free's itself, removed recursively free'ing
  until init_ima_ns from free_ima_ns()

Signed-off-by: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/ima.h                      | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/user_namespace.h           |  4 ++
 init/Kconfig                             |  8 +++
 kernel/user.c                            |  7 +++
 kernel/user_namespace.c                  | 18 +++++++
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |  3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  4 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |  4 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 37 ++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 0e4647e0eb60..8bca67df0ad3 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 struct linux_binprm;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
@@ -105,4 +106,67 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+
+struct ima_namespace {
+	struct kref kref;
+	struct ima_namespace *parent;
+};
+
+extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
+
+void imans_install(struct ns_common *new);
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *to_ima_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns)->ima_ns;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref);
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!ns);
+	if (ns)
+		kref_get(&ns->kref);
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!ns);
+	if (ns)
+		kref_put(&ns->kref, free_ima_ns);
+}
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct ima_namespace *old_ns);
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	return current_user_ns()->ima_ns;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	return old_ns;
+}
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index d6b74b91096b..8884b22d991c 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
 #define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
 
 struct ucounts;
+struct ima_namespace;
 
 enum ucount_type {
 	UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES,
@@ -76,6 +77,9 @@ struct user_namespace {
 #endif
 	struct ucounts		*ucounts;
 	int ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS];
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+	struct ima_namespace	*ima_ns;
+#endif
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 struct ucounts {
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index a9a2e2c86671..a1ad5384e081 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -931,6 +931,14 @@ config NET_NS
 	help
 	  Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances
 	  of the network stack.
+config IMA_NS
+	bool "IMA namespace"
+	depends on IMA
+	default y
+	help
+	  Allow the creation of IMA namespaces for each mount namespace.
+	  Namespaced IMA data enables having IMA features work separately
+	  for each mount namespace.
 
 endif # NAMESPACES
 
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index 9a20acce460d..31c946f3adce 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
+#endif
+
 /*
  * userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns,
  * and 1 for... ?
@@ -66,6 +70,9 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
 	.persistent_keyring_register_sem =
 	__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+	.ima_ns = &init_ima_ns,
+#endif
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
 
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 246d4d4ce5c7..7d6e7d6e6a34 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
 #include <linux/sort.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
@@ -140,8 +141,20 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
 	if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns))
 		goto fail_keyring;
 
+#if CONFIG_IMA
+	ns->ima_ns = copy_ima(parent_ns->ima_ns);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->ima_ns)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(ns->ima_ns);
+		goto fail_userns_sysctls;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
 	return 0;
+#if CONFIG_IMA
+fail_userns_sysctls:
+	retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
+#endif
 fail_keyring:
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
 	key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
@@ -195,6 +208,9 @@ static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work)
 			kfree(ns->projid_map.forward);
 			kfree(ns->projid_map.reverse);
 		}
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+		put_ima_ns(ns->ima_ns);
+#endif
 		retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
 		key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
@@ -1285,6 +1301,8 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns)
 	put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
 	set_cred_user_ns(cred, get_user_ns(user_ns));
 
+	imans_install(ns);
+
 	return commit_creds(cred);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index d921dc4f9eb0..cc60f726e651 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
+	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d52b487ad259..e98c11c7cf75 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -291,6 +291,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
+int ima_ns_init(void);
+struct ima_namespace;
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 2967d497a665..7f884a71fa1c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -137,5 +137,9 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 
 	ima_init_policy();
 
+	rc = ima_ns_init();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	return ima_fs_init();
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..52cb94b1d392
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *   Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ *   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int __init ima_ns_init(void)
+{
+	return ima_init_namespace(&init_ima_ns);
+}
+
+struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = {
+	.kref = KREF_INIT(1),
+	.parent = NULL,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns);
+
+void imans_install(struct ns_common *new)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns = to_ima_ns(new);
+
+	get_ima_ns(ns);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..62148908015a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *  Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ *  Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(void)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;
+
+	ima_ns = kmalloc(sizeof(*ima_ns), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (ima_ns)
+		kref_init(&ima_ns->kref);
+
+	return ima_ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clone a new ns copying an original ima namespace, setting refcount to 1
+ *
+ * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
+ * Return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise
+ */
+static struct ima_namespace *clone_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns;
+
+	ns = create_ima_ns();
+	if (!ns)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	get_ima_ns(old_ns);
+	ns->parent = old_ns;
+
+	ima_init_namespace(ns);
+
+	return ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Copy task's ima namespace, or clone it if flags specifies CLONE_NEWNS.
+ *
+ * @flags: flags used in the clone syscall
+ * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
+ */
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *new_ns;
+
+	BUG_ON(!old_ns);
+	get_ima_ns(old_ns);
+
+	new_ns = clone_ima_ns(old_ns);
+	put_ima_ns(old_ns);
+
+	return new_ns;
+}
+
+static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	put_ima_ns(ns->parent);
+	kfree(ns);
+}
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns;
+
+	ns = container_of(kref, struct ima_namespace, kref);
+	BUG_ON(ns == &init_ima_ns);
+
+	destroy_ima_ns(ns);
+}
-- 
2.14.3

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Eric W. Biederman]

Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:

> From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
>
> Add new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option.  Let clone() create a new IMA
> namespace upon CLONE_NEWUSER flag. Attach the ima_ns data structure
> to user_namespace. ima_ns is allocated and freed upon IMA namespace
> creation and exit, which is tied to USER namespace creation and exit.
> Currently, the ima_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy
> interface. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different
> aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).

Tying IMA to the user namespace is far better than tying IMA
to the mount namespace.  It may even be the proper answer.


You had asked what it would take to unstick this so you won't have
problems next time you post and I did not get as far as answering.

I had a conversation a while back with Mimi and I believe what was
agreed was that IMA to start doing it's thing early needs a write
to securityfs/imafs.

As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
before a container is created.

Eric

> Changelog:
> v3:
> * Use CLONE_NEWUSER instead of CLONE_NEWNW flag
>
> v2:
> * Moved ima_init_ns and related functions into own file that is
>   always compiled; init_ima_ns will always be there
> * Fixed putting of imans->parent
> * Move IMA namespace creation from nsproxy into mount namespace
>   code; get rid of procfs operations for IMA namespace
>
> v1:
> * Use CLONE_NEWNS instead of a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag
> * Use existing ima.h headers
> * Move the ima_namespace.c to security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
> * Fix typo INFO->INO
> * Each namespace free's itself, removed recursively free'ing
>   until init_ima_ns from free_ima_ns()
>
> Signed-off-by: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/ima.h                      | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/user_namespace.h           |  4 ++
>  init/Kconfig                             |  8 +++
>  kernel/user.c                            |  7 +++
>  kernel/user_namespace.c                  | 18 +++++++
>  security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |  3 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  4 ++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |  4 ++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 37 ++++++++++++++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  10 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>  create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
>  create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 0e4647e0eb60..8bca67df0ad3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>  
>  #include <linux/fs.h>
>  #include <linux/kexec.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>  struct linux_binprm;
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> @@ -105,4 +106,67 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
> +
> +struct ima_namespace {
> +	struct kref kref;
> +	struct ima_namespace *parent;
> +};
> +
> +extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
> +
> +void imans_install(struct ns_common *new);
> +
> +static inline struct ima_namespace *to_ima_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
> +{
> +	return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns)->ima_ns;
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
> +
> +void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref);
> +
> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	BUG_ON(!ns);
> +	if (ns)
> +		kref_get(&ns->kref);
> +	return ns;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	BUG_ON(!ns);
> +	if (ns)
> +		kref_put(&ns->kref, free_ima_ns);
> +}
> +
> +struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct ima_namespace *old_ns);
> +
> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
> +{
> +	return current_user_ns()->ima_ns;
> +}
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	return ns;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	return;
> +}
> +
> +static inline struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
> +{
> +	return old_ns;
> +}
> +
> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
> +{
> +	return NULL;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
>  #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
> diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> index d6b74b91096b..8884b22d991c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
>  #define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
>  
>  struct ucounts;
> +struct ima_namespace;
>  
>  enum ucount_type {
>  	UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES,
> @@ -76,6 +77,9 @@ struct user_namespace {
>  #endif
>  	struct ucounts		*ucounts;
>  	int ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS];
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> +	struct ima_namespace	*ima_ns;
> +#endif
>  } __randomize_layout;
>  
>  struct ucounts {
> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> index a9a2e2c86671..a1ad5384e081 100644
> --- a/init/Kconfig
> +++ b/init/Kconfig
> @@ -931,6 +931,14 @@ config NET_NS
>  	help
>  	  Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances
>  	  of the network stack.
> +config IMA_NS
> +	bool "IMA namespace"
> +	depends on IMA
> +	default y
> +	help
> +	  Allow the creation of IMA namespaces for each mount namespace.
> +	  Namespaced IMA data enables having IMA features work separately
> +	  for each mount namespace.
>  
>  endif # NAMESPACES
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
> index 9a20acce460d..31c946f3adce 100644
> --- a/kernel/user.c
> +++ b/kernel/user.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
>  #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>  #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> +extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns,
>   * and 1 for... ?
> @@ -66,6 +70,9 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
>  	.persistent_keyring_register_sem =
>  	__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> +	.ima_ns = &init_ima_ns,
> +#endif
>  };
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 246d4d4ce5c7..7d6e7d6e6a34 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
>  #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
>  #include <linux/bsearch.h>
>  #include <linux/sort.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
>  
>  static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
>  static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
> @@ -140,8 +141,20 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
>  	if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns))
>  		goto fail_keyring;

Having the functions be #ifdef'd rather than the code would
be preferabble.
>  
> +#if CONFIG_IMA
> +	ns->ima_ns = copy_ima(parent_ns->ima_ns);
> +	if (IS_ERR(ns->ima_ns)) {
> +		ret = PTR_ERR(ns->ima_ns);
> +		goto fail_userns_sysctls;
> +	}
> +#endif
> +
>  	set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
>  	return 0;
> +#if CONFIG_IMA
> +fail_userns_sysctls:
> +	retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
> +#endif
>  fail_keyring:
>  #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
>  	key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
> @@ -195,6 +208,9 @@ static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work)
>  			kfree(ns->projid_map.forward);
>  			kfree(ns->projid_map.reverse);
>  		}
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> +		put_ima_ns(ns->ima_ns);
> +#endif
>  		retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
>  #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
>  		key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
> @@ -1285,6 +1301,8 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns)
>  	put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
>  	set_cred_user_ns(cred, get_user_ns(user_ns));
>  
> +	imans_install(ns);
> +
>  	return commit_creds(cred);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
> index d921dc4f9eb0..cc60f726e651 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
> @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
>  obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
>  
>  ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
> -	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
> +	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
>  ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
> +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
>  ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index d52b487ad259..e98c11c7cf75 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -291,6 +291,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
>  
>  #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
>  
> +int ima_ns_init(void);
> +struct ima_namespace;
> +int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
> +
>  /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> index 2967d497a665..7f884a71fa1c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> @@ -137,5 +137,9 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
>  
>  	ima_init_policy();
>  
> +	rc = ima_ns_init();
> +	if (rc != 0)
> +		return rc;
> +
>  	return ima_fs_init();
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..52cb94b1d392
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
> + * Author:
> + *   Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
> + *   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
> + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/export.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> +
> +int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int __init ima_ns_init(void)
> +{
> +	return ima_init_namespace(&init_ima_ns);
> +}
> +
> +struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = {
> +	.kref = KREF_INIT(1),
> +	.parent = NULL,
> +};
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns);
> +
> +void imans_install(struct ns_common *new)
> +{
> +	struct ima_namespace *ns = to_ima_ns(new);
> +
> +	get_ima_ns(ns);
> +}
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..62148908015a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
> + * Author:
> + *  Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
> + *  Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
> + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/kref.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> +#include <linux/mount.h>
> +
> +#include "ima.h"
> +
> +static struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(void)
> +{
> +	struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;
> +
> +	ima_ns = kmalloc(sizeof(*ima_ns), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (ima_ns)
> +		kref_init(&ima_ns->kref);
> +
> +	return ima_ns;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * Clone a new ns copying an original ima namespace, setting refcount to 1
> + *
> + * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
> + * Return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise
> + */
> +static struct ima_namespace *clone_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
> +{
> +	struct ima_namespace *ns;
> +
> +	ns = create_ima_ns();
> +	if (!ns)
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +
> +	get_ima_ns(old_ns);
> +	ns->parent = old_ns;
> +
> +	ima_init_namespace(ns);
> +
> +	return ns;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * Copy task's ima namespace, or clone it if flags specifies CLONE_NEWNS.
> + *
> + * @flags: flags used in the clone syscall
> + * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
> + */
> +
> +struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
> +{
> +	struct ima_namespace *new_ns;
> +
> +	BUG_ON(!old_ns);
> +	get_ima_ns(old_ns);
> +
> +	new_ns = clone_ima_ns(old_ns);
> +	put_ima_ns(old_ns);
> +
> +	return new_ns;
> +}
> +
> +static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	put_ima_ns(ns->parent);
> +	kfree(ns);
> +}
> +
> +void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
> +{
> +	struct ima_namespace *ns;
> +
> +	ns = container_of(kref, struct ima_namespace, kref);
> +	BUG_ON(ns == &init_ima_ns);
> +
> +	destroy_ima_ns(ns);
> +}

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Stefan Berger]

On 03/27/2018 07:01 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>
>> From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
>>
>> Add new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option.  Let clone() create a new IMA
>> namespace upon CLONE_NEWUSER flag. Attach the ima_ns data structure
>> to user_namespace. ima_ns is allocated and freed upon IMA namespace
>> creation and exit, which is tied to USER namespace creation and exit.
>> Currently, the ima_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy
>> interface. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different
>> aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).
> Tying IMA to the user namespace is far better than tying IMA
> to the mount namespace.  It may even be the proper answer.
>
>
> You had asked what it would take to unstick this so you won't have
> problems next time you post and I did not get as far as answering.
>
> I had a conversation a while back with Mimi and I believe what was
> agreed was that IMA to start doing it's thing early needs a write
> to securityfs/imafs.

Above you say 'proper answer' for user namespace. Now this sounds like 
making it independent.

>
> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
> before a container is created.

So you are saying to not tie it to user namespace but make it an 
independent namespace and to not use a clone flag (0x1000) but use the 
filesystem to spawn a new namespace. Should that be an IMA specific file 
or a file that can be shared with other subsystems?

    Stefan

>
> Eric
>
>> Changelog:
>> v3:
>> * Use CLONE_NEWUSER instead of CLONE_NEWNW flag
>>
>> v2:
>> * Moved ima_init_ns and related functions into own file that is
>>    always compiled; init_ima_ns will always be there
>> * Fixed putting of imans->parent
>> * Move IMA namespace creation from nsproxy into mount namespace
>>    code; get rid of procfs operations for IMA namespace
>>
>> v1:
>> * Use CLONE_NEWNS instead of a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag
>> * Use existing ima.h headers
>> * Move the ima_namespace.c to security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
>> * Fix typo INFO->INO
>> * Each namespace free's itself, removed recursively free'ing
>>    until init_ima_ns from free_ima_ns()
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>> ---
>>   include/linux/ima.h                      | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   include/linux/user_namespace.h           |  4 ++
>>   init/Kconfig                             |  8 +++
>>   kernel/user.c                            |  7 +++
>>   kernel/user_namespace.c                  | 18 +++++++
>>   security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |  3 +-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  4 ++
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |  4 ++
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 37 ++++++++++++++
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   10 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>   create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
>>   create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
>> index 0e4647e0eb60..8bca67df0ad3 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
>> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>>   
>>   #include <linux/fs.h>
>>   #include <linux/kexec.h>
>> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>>   struct linux_binprm;
>>   
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
>> @@ -105,4 +106,67 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
>>   #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
>> +
>> +struct ima_namespace {
>> +	struct kref kref;
>> +	struct ima_namespace *parent;
>> +};
>> +
>> +extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
>> +
>> +void imans_install(struct ns_common *new);
>> +
>> +static inline struct ima_namespace *to_ima_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
>> +{
>> +	return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns)->ima_ns;
>> +}
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
>> +
>> +void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref);
>> +
>> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
>> +{
>> +	BUG_ON(!ns);
>> +	if (ns)
>> +		kref_get(&ns->kref);
>> +	return ns;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
>> +{
>> +	BUG_ON(!ns);
>> +	if (ns)
>> +		kref_put(&ns->kref, free_ima_ns);
>> +}
>> +
>> +struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct ima_namespace *old_ns);
>> +
>> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
>> +{
>> +	return current_user_ns()->ima_ns;
>> +}
>> +
>> +#else
>> +
>> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
>> +{
>> +	return ns;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
>> +{
>> +	return;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
>> +{
>> +	return old_ns;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
>> +{
>> +	return NULL;
>> +}
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
>>   #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
>> diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
>> index d6b74b91096b..8884b22d991c 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
>> @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
>>   #define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
>>   
>>   struct ucounts;
>> +struct ima_namespace;
>>   
>>   enum ucount_type {
>>   	UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES,
>> @@ -76,6 +77,9 @@ struct user_namespace {
>>   #endif
>>   	struct ucounts		*ucounts;
>>   	int ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS];
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
>> +	struct ima_namespace	*ima_ns;
>> +#endif
>>   } __randomize_layout;
>>   
>>   struct ucounts {
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index a9a2e2c86671..a1ad5384e081 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -931,6 +931,14 @@ config NET_NS
>>   	help
>>   	  Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances
>>   	  of the network stack.
>> +config IMA_NS
>> +	bool "IMA namespace"
>> +	depends on IMA
>> +	default y
>> +	help
>> +	  Allow the creation of IMA namespaces for each mount namespace.
>> +	  Namespaced IMA data enables having IMA features work separately
>> +	  for each mount namespace.
>>   
>>   endif # NAMESPACES
>>   
>> diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
>> index 9a20acce460d..31c946f3adce 100644
>> --- a/kernel/user.c
>> +++ b/kernel/user.c
>> @@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
>>   #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>>   #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
>>   
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
>> +extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
>> +#endif
>> +
>>   /*
>>    * userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns,
>>    * and 1 for... ?
>> @@ -66,6 +70,9 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
>>   	.persistent_keyring_register_sem =
>>   	__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),
>>   #endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
>> +	.ima_ns = &init_ima_ns,
>> +#endif
>>   };
>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
>>   
>> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> index 246d4d4ce5c7..7d6e7d6e6a34 100644
>> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
>>   #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
>>   #include <linux/bsearch.h>
>>   #include <linux/sort.h>
>> +#include <linux/ima.h>
>>   
>>   static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
>>   static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
>> @@ -140,8 +141,20 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
>>   	if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns))
>>   		goto fail_keyring;
> Having the functions be #ifdef'd rather than the code would
> be preferabble.
>>   
>> +#if CONFIG_IMA
>> +	ns->ima_ns = copy_ima(parent_ns->ima_ns);
>> +	if (IS_ERR(ns->ima_ns)) {
>> +		ret = PTR_ERR(ns->ima_ns);
>> +		goto fail_userns_sysctls;
>> +	}
>> +#endif
>> +
>>   	set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
>>   	return 0;
>> +#if CONFIG_IMA
>> +fail_userns_sysctls:
>> +	retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
>> +#endif
>>   fail_keyring:
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
>>   	key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
>> @@ -195,6 +208,9 @@ static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work)
>>   			kfree(ns->projid_map.forward);
>>   			kfree(ns->projid_map.reverse);
>>   		}
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
>> +		put_ima_ns(ns->ima_ns);
>> +#endif
>>   		retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
>>   		key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
>> @@ -1285,6 +1301,8 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns)
>>   	put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
>>   	set_cred_user_ns(cred, get_user_ns(user_ns));
>>   
>> +	imans_install(ns);
>> +
>>   	return commit_creds(cred);
>>   }
>>   
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
>> index d921dc4f9eb0..cc60f726e651 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
>> @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
>>   obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
>>   
>>   ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
>> -	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
>> +	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
>>   ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
>> +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
>>   ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
>>   obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> index d52b487ad259..e98c11c7cf75 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> @@ -291,6 +291,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
>>   
>>   #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
>>   
>> +int ima_ns_init(void);
>> +struct ima_namespace;
>> +int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
>> +
>>   /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
>>   
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
>> index 2967d497a665..7f884a71fa1c 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
>> @@ -137,5 +137,9 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
>>   
>>   	ima_init_policy();
>>   
>> +	rc = ima_ns_init();
>> +	if (rc != 0)
>> +		return rc;
>> +
>>   	return ima_fs_init();
>>   }
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..52cb94b1d392
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
>> + * Author:
>> + *   Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
>> + *   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>> + *
>> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
>> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
>> + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/export.h>
>> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>> +#include <linux/ima.h>
>> +
>> +int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
>> +{
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +int __init ima_ns_init(void)
>> +{
>> +	return ima_init_namespace(&init_ima_ns);
>> +}
>> +
>> +struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = {
>> +	.kref = KREF_INIT(1),
>> +	.parent = NULL,
>> +};
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns);
>> +
>> +void imans_install(struct ns_common *new)
>> +{
>> +	struct ima_namespace *ns = to_ima_ns(new);
>> +
>> +	get_ima_ns(ns);
>> +}
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..62148908015a
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
>> + * Author:
>> + *  Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
>> + *  Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>> + *
>> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
>> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
>> + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/kref.h>
>> +#include <linux/slab.h>
>> +#include <linux/ima.h>
>> +#include <linux/mount.h>
>> +
>> +#include "ima.h"
>> +
>> +static struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(void)
>> +{
>> +	struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;
>> +
>> +	ima_ns = kmalloc(sizeof(*ima_ns), GFP_KERNEL);
>> +	if (ima_ns)
>> +		kref_init(&ima_ns->kref);
>> +
>> +	return ima_ns;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * Clone a new ns copying an original ima namespace, setting refcount to 1
>> + *
>> + * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
>> + * Return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise
>> + */
>> +static struct ima_namespace *clone_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
>> +{
>> +	struct ima_namespace *ns;
>> +
>> +	ns = create_ima_ns();
>> +	if (!ns)
>> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>> +
>> +	get_ima_ns(old_ns);
>> +	ns->parent = old_ns;
>> +
>> +	ima_init_namespace(ns);
>> +
>> +	return ns;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * Copy task's ima namespace, or clone it if flags specifies CLONE_NEWNS.
>> + *
>> + * @flags: flags used in the clone syscall
>> + * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
>> + */
>> +
>> +struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
>> +{
>> +	struct ima_namespace *new_ns;
>> +
>> +	BUG_ON(!old_ns);
>> +	get_ima_ns(old_ns);
>> +
>> +	new_ns = clone_ima_ns(old_ns);
>> +	put_ima_ns(old_ns);
>> +
>> +	return new_ns;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
>> +{
>> +	put_ima_ns(ns->parent);
>> +	kfree(ns);
>> +}
>> +
>> +void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
>> +{
>> +	struct ima_namespace *ns;
>> +
>> +	ns = container_of(kref, struct ima_namespace, kref);
>> +	BUG_ON(ns == &init_ima_ns);
>> +
>> +	destroy_ima_ns(ns);
>> +}

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Dr. Greg Wettstein]

On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 07:10:12AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:

Good morning, I hope the day is starting out well for everyone.

> On 03/27/2018 07:01 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
> >
> >>From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
> >>
> >>Add new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option.  Let clone() create a new IMA
> >>namespace upon CLONE_NEWUSER flag. Attach the ima_ns data structure
> >>to user_namespace. ima_ns is allocated and freed upon IMA namespace
> >>creation and exit, which is tied to USER namespace creation and exit.
> >>Currently, the ima_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy
> >>interface. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different
> >>aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).
> >Tying IMA to the user namespace is far better than tying IMA
> >to the mount namespace.  It may even be the proper answer.
> >
> >You had asked what it would take to unstick this so you won't have
> >problems next time you post and I did not get as far as answering.
> >
> >I had a conversation a while back with Mimi and I believe what was
> >agreed was that IMA to start doing it's thing early needs a write
> >to securityfs/imafs.
> 
> Above you say 'proper answer' for user namespace. Now this sounds like 
> making it independent.
>
> >As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
> >writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
> >even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
> >before a container is created.
>
> So you are saying to not tie it to user namespace but make it an
> independent namespace and to not use a clone flag (0x1000) but use
> the filesystem to spawn a new namespace. Should that be an IMA
> specific file or a file that can be shared with other subsystems?

We've been platforming solutions for about 18 months now on top of a
namespaced IMA implementation that we developed and carry against the
4.4.x kernel.  Technically its not an IMA namespace, but rather a
behavioral namespace, since we implement information exchange event
modeling, conceptually though its all the same and its origins were
IMA.

In some configurations we run unmodified Docker containers inside the
behavioral/IMA namespace.  So if experience is a useful metric the
'integrity' namespace needs to be a first class entity and not
subordinate or tied to any other resource namespaces.  We would also
recommend, again based on our experiences, the use of a clone flag.

FWIW, at this point we have hoisted a lot of the integrity
functionality out of the kernel and up into userspace so it can be run
in a trusted execution environment.  There are always the issues with
kernel<->userspace communication, particularly of the symmetric
variety, but userspace seems to be a much better place for a lot of
this functionality.  If the ELF module discussion is any indication it
appears as if userspace and the kernel may be destined to become more
symbiotic in the future.

Just our two cents.

>    Stefan

Have a good remainder of the week.

Dr. Greg

As always,
Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D.   Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
4206 N. 19th Ave.           Specializing in information infra-structure
Fargo, ND  58102            development.
PH: 701-281-1686
FAX: 701-281-3949           EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"So you got your butt kicked by an 'old' guy.

 Before you taunted him did it ever cross your mind that the $1200
 Schmoelke aero-bars he was laying on and the $900 Rocket7 cycling
 shoes he was wearing might mean that the $10,000 custom bike frame he
 was riding might be used for more than transportation to the Dairy
 Queen each night for a Dilly Bar?"
                                -- Dr. G.W. Wettstein
                                   Resurrection

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Stefan Berger]

On 03/28/2018 08:14 AM, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 07:10:12AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
> Good morning, I hope the day is starting out well for everyone.
>
>> On 03/27/2018 07:01 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
>>>>
>>>> Add new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option.  Let clone() create a new IMA
>>>> namespace upon CLONE_NEWUSER flag. Attach the ima_ns data structure
>>>> to user_namespace. ima_ns is allocated and freed upon IMA namespace
>>>> creation and exit, which is tied to USER namespace creation and exit.
>>>> Currently, the ima_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy
>>>> interface. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different
>>>> aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).
>>> Tying IMA to the user namespace is far better than tying IMA
>>> to the mount namespace.  It may even be the proper answer.
>>>
>>> You had asked what it would take to unstick this so you won't have
>>> problems next time you post and I did not get as far as answering.
>>>
>>> I had a conversation a while back with Mimi and I believe what was
>>> agreed was that IMA to start doing it's thing early needs a write
>>> to securityfs/imafs.
>> Above you say 'proper answer' for user namespace. Now this sounds like
>> making it independent.
>>
>>> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
>>> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
>>> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
>>> before a container is created.
>> So you are saying to not tie it to user namespace but make it an
>> independent namespace and to not use a clone flag (0x1000) but use
>> the filesystem to spawn a new namespace. Should that be an IMA
>> specific file or a file that can be shared with other subsystems?
> We've been platforming solutions for about 18 months now on top of a
> namespaced IMA implementation that we developed and carry against the
> 4.4.x kernel.  Technically its not an IMA namespace, but rather a
> behavioral namespace, since we implement information exchange event
> modeling, conceptually though its all the same and its origins were
> IMA.

Are you intending to make this publicly available and/or contribute it ?
>
> In some configurations we run unmodified Docker containers inside the
> behavioral/IMA namespace.  So if experience is a useful metric the
> 'integrity' namespace needs to be a first class entity and not
> subordinate or tied to any other resource namespaces.  We would also
> recommend, again based on our experiences, the use of a clone flag.

We have been using a clone flag in the first implementation, the mount 
flag afterwards.We treat containers independent of the host, meaning 
that it has its own policy, independent of the host, and allows for 
signed files inside containers to enable IMA-appraisal. It does require 
modifications to user space applications like Docker that have to pick 
up the file signatures.


>
> FWIW, at this point we have hoisted a lot of the integrity
> functionality out of the kernel and up into userspace so it can be run
> in a trusted execution environment.  There are always the issues with
> kernel<->userspace communication, particularly of the symmetric
> variety, but userspace seems to be a much better place for a lot of
> this functionality.  If the ELF module discussion is any indication it

Like what functionality? Are you supporting IMA-appraisal? Are you doing 
IMA-measurements? What about IMA-audit? Following our intended IMA 
namespacing, all of this would be done in the kernel following an IMA 
policy parsed by the kernel.


> appears as if userspace and the kernel may be destined to become more
> symbiotic in the future.
>
> Just our two cents.
>
>>     Stefan
> Have a good remainder of the week.
>
> Dr. Greg
>
> As always,
> Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D.   Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
> 4206 N. 19th Ave.           Specializing in information infra-structure
> Fargo, ND  58102            development.
> PH: 701-281-1686
> FAX: 701-281-3949           EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> "So you got your butt kicked by an 'old' guy.
>
>   Before you taunted him did it ever cross your mind that the $1200
>   Schmoelke aero-bars he was laying on and the $900 Rocket7 cycling
>   shoes he was wearing might mean that the $10,000 custom bike frame he
>   was riding might be used for more than transportation to the Dairy
>   Queen each night for a Dilly Bar?"
>                                  -- Dr. G.W. Wettstein
>                                     Resurrection
>

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[John Johansen]

On 03/28/2018 04:10 AM, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 03/27/2018 07:01 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>>
>>> From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
>>>
>>> Add new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option.  Let clone() create a new IMA
>>> namespace upon CLONE_NEWUSER flag. Attach the ima_ns data structure
>>> to user_namespace. ima_ns is allocated and freed upon IMA namespace
>>> creation and exit, which is tied to USER namespace creation and exit.
>>> Currently, the ima_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy
>>> interface. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different
>>> aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).
>> Tying IMA to the user namespace is far better than tying IMA
>> to the mount namespace.  It may even be the proper answer.
>>
>>
>> You had asked what it would take to unstick this so you won't have
>> problems next time you post and I did not get as far as answering.
>>
>> I had a conversation a while back with Mimi and I believe what was
>> agreed was that IMA to start doing it's thing early needs a write
>> to securityfs/imafs.
> 
> Above you say 'proper answer' for user namespace. Now this sounds like making it independent.
> 
Agreed, and if we want to broaden out to LSMs implementing namespacing keeping them independent is the correct solution

>>
>> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
>> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
>> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
>> before a container is created.
> 
> So you are saying to not tie it to user namespace but make it an independent namespace and to not use a clone flag (0x1000) but use the filesystem to spawn a new namespace. Should that be an IMA specific file or a file that can be shared with other subsystems?
> 

A clone flag could work for IMA, but I don't see it working for all the LSMs looking at or doing namespacing, especially if the stacking work ever lands.

As for using an IMA specific file vs shared with the other subsystems, I think subsystem specific makes sense, that or we are going to have to design something that can be shared if LSM stacking ever lands.

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Mimi Zohar]

[Cc'ing John Johansen]

On Tue, 2018-03-27 at 18:01 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
[...]
> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
> before a container is created.

My initial thought was to stage IMA namespacing with just IMA-audit
first, followed by either IMA-measurement or IMA-appraisal.  This
would allow us to get the basic IMA namespacing framework working and
defer dealing with the securityfs related namespacing of the IMA
policy and measurement list issues to later.

By tying IMA namespacing to a securityfs ima/unshare file, we would
need to address the securityfs issues first.

Mimi

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[John Johansen]

On 04/13/2018 09:25 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> [Cc'ing John Johansen]
> 
> On Tue, 2018-03-27 at 18:01 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> [...]
>> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
>> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
>> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
>> before a container is created.
> 

I do think this is generally the right approach for LSMs when looking
forward to LSM stacking and more LSMs.


> My initial thought was to stage IMA namespacing with just IMA-audit
> first, followed by either IMA-measurement or IMA-appraisal.  This
> would allow us to get the basic IMA namespacing framework working and
> defer dealing with the securityfs related namespacing of the IMA
> policy and measurement list issues to later.
> 
> By tying IMA namespacing to a securityfs ima/unshare file, we would
> need to address the securityfs issues first.
> 

well it depends on what you want to do. It would be possible to have
a simple file (not a jump link) within securityfs that IMA could use
without having to deal with all the securityfs issues first. However it
does require that securityfs (not necessarily imafs) be visible within
the mount namespace of the task doing the setup.

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Mimi Zohar]

On Wed, 2018-04-18 at 09:09 -0700, John Johansen wrote:
> On 04/13/2018 09:25 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > [Cc'ing John Johansen]
> > 
> > On Tue, 2018-03-27 at 18:01 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> > [...]
> >> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
> >> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
> >> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
> >> before a container is created.
> > 
> 
> I do think this is generally the right approach for LSMs when looking
> forward to LSM stacking and more LSMs.
> 
> 
> > My initial thought was to stage IMA namespacing with just IMA-audit
> > first, followed by either IMA-measurement or IMA-appraisal.  This
> > would allow us to get the basic IMA namespacing framework working and
> > defer dealing with the securityfs related namespacing of the IMA
> > policy and measurement list issues to later.
> > 
> > By tying IMA namespacing to a securityfs ima/unshare file, we would
> > need to address the securityfs issues first.
> > 
> 
> well it depends on what you want to do. It would be possible to have
> a simple file (not a jump link) within securityfs that IMA could use
> without having to deal with all the securityfs issues first. However it
> does require that securityfs (not necessarily imafs) be visible within
> the mount namespace of the task doing the setup.

Eric, would you be OK with that?

Mimi

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Eric W. Biederman]

Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:

> On Wed, 2018-04-18 at 09:09 -0700, John Johansen wrote:
>> On 04/13/2018 09:25 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> > [Cc'ing John Johansen]
>> > 
>> > On Tue, 2018-03-27 at 18:01 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> > [...]
>> >> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
>> >> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
>> >> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
>> >> before a container is created.
>> > 
>> 
>> I do think this is generally the right approach for LSMs when looking
>> forward to LSM stacking and more LSMs.
>> 
>> 
>> > My initial thought was to stage IMA namespacing with just IMA-audit
>> > first, followed by either IMA-measurement or IMA-appraisal.  This
>> > would allow us to get the basic IMA namespacing framework working and
>> > defer dealing with the securityfs related namespacing of the IMA
>> > policy and measurement list issues to later.
>> > 
>> > By tying IMA namespacing to a securityfs ima/unshare file, we would
>> > need to address the securityfs issues first.
>> > 
>> 
>> well it depends on what you want to do. It would be possible to have
>> a simple file (not a jump link) within securityfs that IMA could use
>> without having to deal with all the securityfs issues first. However it
>> does require that securityfs (not necessarily imafs) be visible within
>> the mount namespace of the task doing the setup.
>
> Eric, would you be OK with that?

Roughly.  My understanding is that you have to have a write to some
filesystem to set the ima policy.

I was expecting having to write an "create ima namespace" value
to the filesystem would not be any special effort.

Now it sounds like providing the "create an ima namespace" is going to
be a special case, and that does not sound correct.

Eric

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Mimi Zohar]

On Wed, 2018-04-18 at 15:12 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
> 
> > On Wed, 2018-04-18 at 09:09 -0700, John Johansen wrote:
> >> On 04/13/2018 09:25 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >> > [Cc'ing John Johansen]
> >> > 
> >> > On Tue, 2018-03-27 at 18:01 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> > [...]
> >> >> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
> >> >> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
> >> >> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
> >> >> before a container is created.
> >> > 
> >> 
> >> I do think this is generally the right approach for LSMs when looking
> >> forward to LSM stacking and more LSMs.
> >> 
> >> 
> >> > My initial thought was to stage IMA namespacing with just IMA-audit
> >> > first, followed by either IMA-measurement or IMA-appraisal.  This
> >> > would allow us to get the basic IMA namespacing framework working and
> >> > defer dealing with the securityfs related namespacing of the IMA
> >> > policy and measurement list issues to later.
> >> > 
> >> > By tying IMA namespacing to a securityfs ima/unshare file, we would
> >> > need to address the securityfs issues first.
> >> > 
> >> 
> >> well it depends on what you want to do. It would be possible to have
> >> a simple file (not a jump link) within securityfs that IMA could use
> >> without having to deal with all the securityfs issues first. However it
> >> does require that securityfs (not necessarily imafs) be visible within
> >> the mount namespace of the task doing the setup.
> >
> > Eric, would you be OK with that?
> 
> Roughly.  My understanding is that you have to have a write to some
> filesystem to set the ima policy.
> 
> I was expecting having to write an "create ima namespace" value
> to the filesystem would not be any special effort.
> 
> Now it sounds like providing the "create an ima namespace" is going to
> be a special case, and that does not sound correct.

This is not any different than any of the other security/ima/ files
(eg. policy, ascii_runtime_measurements, ...).  The next IMA
namespacing stage would add support for these files.

Mimi

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[John Johansen]

On 04/18/2018 01:12 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
> 
>> On Wed, 2018-04-18 at 09:09 -0700, John Johansen wrote:
>>> On 04/13/2018 09:25 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>> [Cc'ing John Johansen]
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, 2018-03-27 at 18:01 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>> [...]
>>>>> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
>>>>> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
>>>>> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
>>>>> before a container is created.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I do think this is generally the right approach for LSMs when looking
>>> forward to LSM stacking and more LSMs.
>>>
>>>
>>>> My initial thought was to stage IMA namespacing with just IMA-audit
>>>> first, followed by either IMA-measurement or IMA-appraisal.  This
>>>> would allow us to get the basic IMA namespacing framework working and
>>>> defer dealing with the securityfs related namespacing of the IMA
>>>> policy and measurement list issues to later.
>>>>
>>>> By tying IMA namespacing to a securityfs ima/unshare file, we would
>>>> need to address the securityfs issues first.
>>>>
>>>
>>> well it depends on what you want to do. It would be possible to have
>>> a simple file (not a jump link) within securityfs that IMA could use
>>> without having to deal with all the securityfs issues first. However it
>>> does require that securityfs (not necessarily imafs) be visible within
>>> the mount namespace of the task doing the setup.
>>
>> Eric, would you be OK with that?
> 
> Roughly.  My understanding is that you have to have a write to some
> filesystem to set the ima policy.
> 
> I was expecting having to write an "create ima namespace" value
> to the filesystem would not be any special effort.
> 
> Now it sounds like providing the "create an ima namespace" is going to
> be a special case, and that does not sound correct.
> 
not necessarily special case, but they do need to settle on an interface
that will work for them, and will work with the order they want to land
things. I was just trying to point out that there are fs solutions that
can work without having deal with the full securityfs/imafs namespacing
solution landing first.

While create a file directly in securityfs that lives along side the imafs
dir.
ima_create_ns
ima/
does feel like a special case. It could work

what I was thinking of when I proposed a simple is to do it within the ima
dir, say
ima/create_ns

For now its just a single file but once imafs becomes "virtualized" to a
namespace view, each dir that imafs jumplinks to contains a instance of the
file.


Or they could avoid securityfs/imafs entirely and leverage a file in
procfs

/proc/<pid>/attr/{current,exec,...}

currently those are claimed by the LSMs but new file could be added or
perhaps even better we could lift the some code from the LSM stacking work
to provide an ima specific dir

  /proc/<pid>/attr/ima/{current,exec,...}

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Stefan Berger]

On 04/18/2018 05:32 PM, John Johansen wrote:
> On 04/18/2018 01:12 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>>
>>> On Wed, 2018-04-18 at 09:09 -0700, John Johansen wrote:
>>>> On 04/13/2018 09:25 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>> [Cc'ing John Johansen]
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, 2018-03-27 at 18:01 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
>>>>>> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
>>>>>> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
>>>>>> before a container is created.
>>>> I do think this is generally the right approach for LSMs when looking
>>>> forward to LSM stacking and more LSMs.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> My initial thought was to stage IMA namespacing with just IMA-audit
>>>>> first, followed by either IMA-measurement or IMA-appraisal.  This
>>>>> would allow us to get the basic IMA namespacing framework working and
>>>>> defer dealing with the securityfs related namespacing of the IMA
>>>>> policy and measurement list issues to later.
>>>>>
>>>>> By tying IMA namespacing to a securityfs ima/unshare file, we would
>>>>> need to address the securityfs issues first.
>>>>>
>>>> well it depends on what you want to do. It would be possible to have
>>>> a simple file (not a jump link) within securityfs that IMA could use
>>>> without having to deal with all the securityfs issues first. However it
>>>> does require that securityfs (not necessarily imafs) be visible within
>>>> the mount namespace of the task doing the setup.
>>> Eric, would you be OK with that?
>> Roughly.  My understanding is that you have to have a write to some
>> filesystem to set the ima policy.
>>
>> I was expecting having to write an "create ima namespace" value
>> to the filesystem would not be any special effort.
>>
>> Now it sounds like providing the "create an ima namespace" is going to
>> be a special case, and that does not sound correct.
>>
> not necessarily special case, but they do need to settle on an interface
> that will work for them, and will work with the order they want to land
> things. I was just trying to point out that there are fs solutions that
> can work without having deal with the full securityfs/imafs namespacing
> solution landing first.
>
> While create a file directly in securityfs that lives along side the imafs
> dir.
> ima_create_ns
> ima/
> does feel like a special case. It could work
>
> what I was thinking of when I proposed a simple is to do it within the ima
> dir, say
> ima/create_ns

Having looked at SELinux and how Steve does it, I chose 'unshare' as the 
filename and put it into the neighborhood of  existing IMA securityfs 
files: /sys/kernel/security/ima/unshare. Write a '1' to it and you'll 
have an IMA namespace upon the next fork()/clone().

>
> For now its just a single file but once imafs becomes "virtualized" to a
> namespace view, each dir that imafs jumplinks to contains a instance of the
> file.

Right. We need to virtualize our IMA securityfs entries pretty soon 
afterwards so that we can start setting policies in an IMA namespace. At 
the beginning we would not be able to create nested IMA namespaces if a 
user namespace is involved. My current patches that attempt to do this 
basically implement it by getting out of securityfs for namespace 
support and hooking it onto sysfs. On the host we would still use 
securityfs.

>
>
> Or they could avoid securityfs/imafs entirely and leverage a file in
> procfs

If we want to it that way for all other subsystems that do not use a 
clone() flag, we should maybe decide on that now...

>
> /proc/<pid>/attr/{current,exec,...}
>
> currently those are claimed by the LSMs but new file could be added or
> perhaps even better we could lift the some code from the LSM stacking work
> to provide an ima specific dir
>
>    /proc/<pid>/attr/ima/{current,exec,...}
>

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[John Johansen]

On 04/19/2018 04:03 AM, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 04/18/2018 05:32 PM, John Johansen wrote:
>> On 04/18/2018 01:12 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, 2018-04-18 at 09:09 -0700, John Johansen wrote:
>>>>> On 04/13/2018 09:25 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>>> [Cc'ing John Johansen]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, 2018-03-27 at 18:01 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
>>>>>>> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
>>>>>>> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
>>>>>>> before a container is created.
>>>>> I do think this is generally the right approach for LSMs when looking
>>>>> forward to LSM stacking and more LSMs.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> My initial thought was to stage IMA namespacing with just IMA-audit
>>>>>> first, followed by either IMA-measurement or IMA-appraisal.  This
>>>>>> would allow us to get the basic IMA namespacing framework working and
>>>>>> defer dealing with the securityfs related namespacing of the IMA
>>>>>> policy and measurement list issues to later.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> By tying IMA namespacing to a securityfs ima/unshare file, we would
>>>>>> need to address the securityfs issues first.
>>>>>>
>>>>> well it depends on what you want to do. It would be possible to have
>>>>> a simple file (not a jump link) within securityfs that IMA could use
>>>>> without having to deal with all the securityfs issues first. However it
>>>>> does require that securityfs (not necessarily imafs) be visible within
>>>>> the mount namespace of the task doing the setup.
>>>> Eric, would you be OK with that?
>>> Roughly.  My understanding is that you have to have a write to some
>>> filesystem to set the ima policy.
>>>
>>> I was expecting having to write an "create ima namespace" value
>>> to the filesystem would not be any special effort.
>>>
>>> Now it sounds like providing the "create an ima namespace" is going to
>>> be a special case, and that does not sound correct.
>>>
>> not necessarily special case, but they do need to settle on an interface
>> that will work for them, and will work with the order they want to land
>> things. I was just trying to point out that there are fs solutions that
>> can work without having deal with the full securityfs/imafs namespacing
>> solution landing first.
>>
>> While create a file directly in securityfs that lives along side the imafs
>> dir.
>> ima_create_ns
>> ima/
>> does feel like a special case. It could work
>>
>> what I was thinking of when I proposed a simple is to do it within the ima
>> dir, say
>> ima/create_ns
> 
> Having looked at SELinux and how Steve does it, I chose 'unshare' as the filename and put it into the neighborhood of  existing IMA securityfs files: /sys/kernel/security/ima/unshare. Write a '1' to it and you'll have an IMA namespace upon the next fork()/clone().
> 
>>
>> For now its just a single file but once imafs becomes "virtualized" to a
>> namespace view, each dir that imafs jumplinks to contains a instance of the
>> file.
> 
> Right. We need to virtualize our IMA securityfs entries pretty soon afterwards so that we can start setting policies in an IMA namespace. At the beginning we would not be able to create nested IMA namespaces if a user namespace is involved. My current patches that attempt to do this basically implement it by getting out of securityfs for namespace support and hooking it onto sysfs. On the host we would still use securityfs.
> 
>>
>>
>> Or they could avoid securityfs/imafs entirely and leverage a file in
>> procfs
> 
> If we want to it that way for all other subsystems that do not use a clone() flag, we should maybe decide on that now...
> 

It sounds like its already decided, with ima and selinux going with an unshare file within their own fs.

AppArmor went a different route already, splitting namespace creation (mkdir in the apparmorfs policy/namespace dir) and the task entering the namespace with a write apparmor's equiv of setexeccon.

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Stefan Berger]

On 04/19/2018 11:35 AM, John Johansen wrote:
> On 04/19/2018 04:03 AM, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> On 04/18/2018 05:32 PM, John Johansen wrote:
>>> On 04/18/2018 01:12 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, 2018-04-18 at 09:09 -0700, John Johansen wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/13/2018 09:25 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>>>> [Cc'ing John Johansen]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, 2018-03-27 at 18:01 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>> As such I expect the best way to create the ima namespace is by simply
>>>>>>>> writing to securityfs/imafs.  Possibly before the user namespace is
>>>>>>>> even unshared.  That would allow IMA to keep track of things from
>>>>>>>> before a container is created.
>>>>>> I do think this is generally the right approach for LSMs when looking
>>>>>> forward to LSM stacking and more LSMs.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> My initial thought was to stage IMA namespacing with just IMA-audit
>>>>>>> first, followed by either IMA-measurement or IMA-appraisal.  This
>>>>>>> would allow us to get the basic IMA namespacing framework working and
>>>>>>> defer dealing with the securityfs related namespacing of the IMA
>>>>>>> policy and measurement list issues to later.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> By tying IMA namespacing to a securityfs ima/unshare file, we would
>>>>>>> need to address the securityfs issues first.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> well it depends on what you want to do. It would be possible to have
>>>>>> a simple file (not a jump link) within securityfs that IMA could use
>>>>>> without having to deal with all the securityfs issues first. However it
>>>>>> does require that securityfs (not necessarily imafs) be visible within
>>>>>> the mount namespace of the task doing the setup.
>>>>> Eric, would you be OK with that?
>>>> Roughly.  My understanding is that you have to have a write to some
>>>> filesystem to set the ima policy.
>>>>
>>>> I was expecting having to write an "create ima namespace" value
>>>> to the filesystem would not be any special effort.
>>>>
>>>> Now it sounds like providing the "create an ima namespace" is going to
>>>> be a special case, and that does not sound correct.
>>>>
>>> not necessarily special case, but they do need to settle on an interface
>>> that will work for them, and will work with the order they want to land
>>> things. I was just trying to point out that there are fs solutions that
>>> can work without having deal with the full securityfs/imafs namespacing
>>> solution landing first.
>>>
>>> While create a file directly in securityfs that lives along side the imafs
>>> dir.
>>> ima_create_ns
>>> ima/
>>> does feel like a special case. It could work
>>>
>>> what I was thinking of when I proposed a simple is to do it within the ima
>>> dir, say
>>> ima/create_ns
>> Having looked at SELinux and how Steve does it, I chose 'unshare' as the filename and put it into the neighborhood of  existing IMA securityfs files: /sys/kernel/security/ima/unshare. Write a '1' to it and you'll have an IMA namespace upon the next fork()/clone().
>>
>>> For now its just a single file but once imafs becomes "virtualized" to a
>>> namespace view, each dir that imafs jumplinks to contains a instance of the
>>> file.
>> Right. We need to virtualize our IMA securityfs entries pretty soon afterwards so that we can start setting policies in an IMA namespace. At the beginning we would not be able to create nested IMA namespaces if a user namespace is involved. My current patches that attempt to do this basically implement it by getting out of securityfs for namespace support and hooking it onto sysfs. On the host we would still use securityfs.
>>
>>>
>>> Or they could avoid securityfs/imafs entirely and leverage a file in
>>> procfs
>> If we want to it that way for all other subsystems that do not use a clone() flag, we should maybe decide on that now...
>>
> It sounds like its already decided, with ima and selinux going with an unshare file within their own fs.
>
> AppArmor went a different route already, splitting namespace creation (mkdir in the apparmorfs policy/namespace dir) and the task entering the namespace with a write apparmor's equiv of setexeccon.
>
I am supporting procfs entries for the IMA namespace spawned by writing 
a boolean '1' into IMA's securityfs 'unshare' file. It would allow to 
use setns(fd, 0), obviously with the 0 parameter. I think this is an 
important function to support considering entering a set of namespace. I 
am just wondering about the 0 parameter. We don't have a CLONE flag for 
it, so there's not other way to support it then. Does it matter ?

    Stefan

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support

[Eric W. Biederman]

Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:

> On 04/19/2018 11:35 AM, John Johansen wrote:

>> It sounds like its already decided, with ima and selinux going with an unshare file within their own fs.
>>
>> AppArmor went a different route already, splitting namespace creation (mkdir in the apparmorfs policy/namespace dir) and the task entering the namespace with a write apparmor's equiv of setexeccon.
>>
> I am supporting procfs entries for the IMA namespace spawned by writing a
> boolean '1' into IMA's securityfs 'unshare' file. It would allow to use
> setns(fd, 0), obviously with the 0 parameter. I think this is an important
> function to support considering entering a set of namespace. I am just wondering
> about the 0 parameter. We don't have a CLONE flag for it, so there's not other
> way to support it then. Does it matter ?

That should be fine.  We can pick a flag for setns at some point for
IMA.  The setns function uses the flag field as an enumeration so any of
the low 8 bits or a combination with overlapping bit is valid to setns.

Eric