[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 051/101] scsi: sun_esp: fix device reference leaks

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 051/101] scsi: sun_esp: fix device reference leaks

[Sasha Levin]

From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f62f9ffdb5ef683ef8cffb43932fa72cc3713e94 ]

Make sure to drop the reference to the dma device taken by
of_find_device_by_node() on probe errors and on driver unbind.

Fixes: 334ae614772b ("sparc: Kill SBUS DVMA layer.")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/scsi/sun_esp.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sun_esp.c b/drivers/scsi/sun_esp.c
index f2e68459f7ea..6585d75bf732 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/sun_esp.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sun_esp.c
@@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ static int esp_sbus_probe(struct platform_device *op)
 	struct device_node *dp = op->dev.of_node;
 	struct platform_device *dma_of = NULL;
 	int hme = 0;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (dp->parent &&
 	    (!strcmp(dp->parent->name, "espdma") ||
@@ -580,7 +581,11 @@ static int esp_sbus_probe(struct platform_device *op)
 	if (!dma_of)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	return esp_sbus_probe_one(op, dma_of, hme);
+	ret = esp_sbus_probe_one(op, dma_of, hme);
+	if (ret)
+		put_device(&dma_of->dev);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int esp_sbus_remove(struct platform_device *op)
@@ -613,6 +618,8 @@ static int esp_sbus_remove(struct platform_device *op)
 
 	dev_set_drvdata(&op->dev, NULL);
 
+	put_device(&dma_of->dev);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 052/101] powerpc/fadump: avoid duplicates in crash memory ranges

[Sasha Levin]

From: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

[ Upstream commit a77af552ccc9d4d54459a39f9e5f7ad307aeb4f9 ]

fadump sets up crash memory ranges to be used for creating PT_LOAD
program headers in elfcore header. Memory chunk RMA_START through
boot memory area size is added as the first memory range because
firmware, at the time of crash, moves this memory chunk to different
location specified during fadump registration making it necessary to
create a separate program header for it with the correct offset.
This memory chunk is skipped while setting up the remaining memory
ranges. But currently, there is possibility that some of this memory
may have duplicate entries like when it is hot-removed and added
again. Ensure that no two memory ranges represent the same memory.

When 5 lmbs are hot-removed and then hot-plugged before registering
fadump, here is how the program headers in /proc/vmcore exported by
fadump look like

without this change:

  Program Headers:
    Type           Offset             VirtAddr           PhysAddr
                   FileSiz            MemSiz              Flags  Align
    NOTE           0x0000000000010000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000000001894 0x0000000000001894         0
    LOAD           0x0000000000021020 0xc000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000040000000 0x0000000040000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x0000000040031020 0xc000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000010000000 0x0000000010000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x0000000050040000 0xc000000010000000 0x0000000010000000
                   0x0000000050000000 0x0000000050000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x00000000a0040000 0xc000000060000000 0x0000000060000000
                   0x000000019ffe0000 0x000000019ffe0000  RWE    0

and with this change:

  Program Headers:
    Type           Offset             VirtAddr           PhysAddr
                   FileSiz            MemSiz              Flags  Align
    NOTE           0x0000000000010000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000000001894 0x0000000000001894         0
    LOAD           0x0000000000021020 0xc000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000040000000 0x0000000040000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x0000000040030000 0xc000000040000000 0x0000000040000000
                   0x0000000020000000 0x0000000020000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x0000000060030000 0xc000000060000000 0x0000000060000000
                   0x000000019ffe0000 0x000000019ffe0000  RWE    0

Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mahesh J Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c
index 26d091a1a54c..5df362630ffc 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c
@@ -812,8 +812,19 @@ static void fadump_setup_crash_memory_ranges(void)
 	for_each_memblock(memory, reg) {
 		start = (unsigned long long)reg->base;
 		end = start + (unsigned long long)reg->size;
-		if (start == RMA_START && end >= fw_dump.boot_memory_size)
-			start = fw_dump.boot_memory_size;
+
+		/*
+		 * skip the first memory chunk that is already added (RMA_START
+		 * through boot_memory_size). This logic needs a relook if and
+		 * when RMA_START changes to a non-zero value.
+		 */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(RMA_START != 0);
+		if (start < fw_dump.boot_memory_size) {
+			if (end > fw_dump.boot_memory_size)
+				start = fw_dump.boot_memory_size;
+			else
+				continue;
+		}
 
 		/* add this range excluding the reserved dump area. */
 		fadump_exclude_reserved_area(start, end);
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 053/101] libertas: Fix lbs_prb_rsp_limit_set()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 69551f5f370cc20342fab17ca54716b6ec7e332d ]

The kstrtoul() test was reversed so this always returned -ENOTSUPP.

Fixes: 27d7f47756f4 ("net: wireless: replace strict_strtoul() with kstrtoul()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: James Cameron <quozl@laptop.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/libertas/mesh.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/libertas/mesh.c b/drivers/net/wireless/libertas/mesh.c
index d0c881dd5846..a78c4d18fe4b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/libertas/mesh.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/libertas/mesh.c
@@ -239,8 +239,9 @@ static ssize_t lbs_prb_rsp_limit_set(struct device *dev,
 	memset(&mesh_access, 0, sizeof(mesh_access));
 	mesh_access.data[0] = cpu_to_le32(CMD_ACT_SET);
 
-	if (!kstrtoul(buf, 10, &retry_limit))
-		return -ENOTSUPP;
+	ret = kstrtoul(buf, 10, &retry_limit);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 	if (retry_limit > 15)
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 054/101] PCI: Enable ECRC only if device supports it

[Sasha Levin]

From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 675734baa361cf044033bb60594dea33d8d8da36 ]

John reported that an Intel QuickAssist crypto accelerator didn't work in a
Dell PowerEdge R730.  The problem seems to be that we enabled ECRC when the
device doesn't support it:

  85:00.0 Co-processor [0b40]: Intel Corporation DH895XCC Series QAT [8086:0435]
    Capabilities: [100 v1] Advanced Error Reporting
      AERCap: First Error Pointer: 00, GenCap- CGenEn+ ChkCap- ChkEn+

1302fcf0d03e ("PCI: Configure *all* devices, not just hot-added ones")
exposed the problem because it applies settings from the _HPX method to all
devices, not just hot-added ones.  The R730 supplies an _HPX method that
allows the kernel to enable ECRC.

Only enable ECRC if the device advertises support for it.

Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1571798
Fixes: 1302fcf0d03e ("PCI: Configure *all* devices, not just hot-added ones")
Reported-by: John Mazzie <john_mazzie@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/pci/probe.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/probe.c b/drivers/pci/probe.c
index c43300ced57d..b9e843a30692 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/probe.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/probe.c
@@ -1400,6 +1400,11 @@ static void program_hpp_type2(struct pci_dev *dev, struct hpp_type2 *hpp)
 	/* Initialize Advanced Error Capabilities and Control Register */
 	pci_read_config_dword(dev, pos + PCI_ERR_CAP, &reg32);
 	reg32 = (reg32 & hpp->adv_err_cap_and) | hpp->adv_err_cap_or;
+	/* Don't enable ECRC generation or checking if unsupported */
+	if (!(reg32 & PCI_ERR_CAP_ECRC_GENC))
+		reg32 &= ~PCI_ERR_CAP_ECRC_GENE;
+	if (!(reg32 & PCI_ERR_CAP_ECRC_CHKC))
+		reg32 &= ~PCI_ERR_CAP_ECRC_CHKE;
 	pci_write_config_dword(dev, pos + PCI_ERR_CAP, reg32);
 
 	/*
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 055/101] MIPS: CPS: Prevent multi-core with dcache aliasing

[Sasha Levin]

From: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>

[ Upstream commit 5570ba2ee920de4e7760a2802b842771845b2c32 ]

Systems using the MIPS Coherence Manager (CM) cannot support multi-core
SMP with dcache aliasing. This is because CPU caches are VIPT, but
interventions in CM-based systems provide only the physical address to
remote caches. This means that interventions may behave incorrectly in
the presence of an aliasing dcache, since the physical address used
when handling an intervention may lead to operation on an aliased cache
line rather than the correct line.

Prevent us from running into this issue by refusing to boot secondary
cores in systems where dcache aliasing may occur.

Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/16196/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/mips/kernel/smp-cps.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/smp-cps.c b/arch/mips/kernel/smp-cps.c
index 0854f17829f3..0e5ef72c8978 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/smp-cps.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/smp-cps.c
@@ -120,9 +120,11 @@ static void __init cps_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
 
 	/* Warn the user if the CCA prevents multi-core */
 	ncores = mips_cm_numcores();
-	if (cca_unsuitable && ncores > 1) {
-		pr_warn("Using only one core due to unsuitable CCA 0x%x\n",
-			cca);
+	if ((cca_unsuitable || cpu_has_dc_aliases) && ncores > 1) {
+		pr_warn("Using only one core due to %s%s%s\n",
+			cca_unsuitable ? "unsuitable CCA" : "",
+			(cca_unsuitable && cpu_has_dc_aliases) ? " & " : "",
+			cpu_has_dc_aliases ? "dcache aliasing" : "");
 
 		for_each_present_cpu(c) {
 			if (cpu_data[c].core)
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 056/101] MIPS: Handle tlbex-tlbp race condition

[Sasha Levin]

From: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>

[ Upstream commit f39878cc5b09c75d35eaf52131e920b872e3feb4 ]

In systems where there are multiple actors updating the TLB, the
potential exists for a race condition wherein a CPU hits a TLB exception
but by the time it reaches a TLBP instruction the affected TLB entry may
have been replaced. This can happen if, for example, a CPU shares the
TLB between hardware threads (VPs) within a core and one of them
replaces the entry that another has just taken a TLB exception for.

We handle this race in the case of the Hardware Table Walker (HTW) being
the other actor already, but didn't take into account the potential for
multiple threads racing. Include the code for aborting TLB exception
handling in affected multi-threaded systems, those being the I6400 &
I6500 CPUs which share TLB entries between VPs.

In the case of using RiXi without dedicated exceptions we have never
handled this race even for HTW. This patch adds WARN()s to these cases
which ought never to be hit because all CPUs with either HTW or shared
FTLB RAMs also include dedicated RiXi exceptions, but the WARN()s will
ensure this is always the case.

Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/16203/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/mips/mm/tlbex.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/mips/mm/tlbex.c b/arch/mips/mm/tlbex.c
index e3328a96e809..4be16c81be9f 100644
--- a/arch/mips/mm/tlbex.c
+++ b/arch/mips/mm/tlbex.c
@@ -1838,6 +1838,26 @@ static void build_r3000_tlb_modify_handler(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_MIPS_PGD_C0_CONTEXT */
 
+static bool cpu_has_tlbex_tlbp_race(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When a Hardware Table Walker is running it can replace TLB entries
+	 * at any time, leading to a race between it & the CPU.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_htw)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the CPU shares FTLB RAM with its siblings then our entry may be
+	 * replaced at any time by a sibling performing a write to the FTLB.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_shared_ftlb_ram)
+		return true;
+
+	/* In all other cases there ought to be no race condition to handle */
+	return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * R4000 style TLB load/store/modify handlers.
  */
@@ -1874,7 +1894,7 @@ build_r4000_tlbchange_handler_head(u32 **p, struct uasm_label **l,
 	iPTE_LW(p, wr.r1, wr.r2); /* get even pte */
 	if (!m4kc_tlbp_war()) {
 		build_tlb_probe_entry(p);
-		if (cpu_has_htw) {
+		if (cpu_has_tlbex_tlbp_race()) {
 			/* race condition happens, leaving */
 			uasm_i_ehb(p);
 			uasm_i_mfc0(p, wr.r3, C0_INDEX);
@@ -1948,6 +1968,14 @@ static void build_r4000_tlb_load_handler(void)
 		}
 		uasm_i_nop(&p);
 
+		/*
+		 * Warn if something may race with us & replace the TLB entry
+		 * before we read it here. Everything with such races should
+		 * also have dedicated RiXi exception handlers, so this
+		 * shouldn't be hit.
+		 */
+		WARN(cpu_has_tlbex_tlbp_race(), "Unhandled race in RiXi path");
+
 		uasm_i_tlbr(&p);
 
 		switch (current_cpu_type()) {
@@ -2015,6 +2043,14 @@ static void build_r4000_tlb_load_handler(void)
 		}
 		uasm_i_nop(&p);
 
+		/*
+		 * Warn if something may race with us & replace the TLB entry
+		 * before we read it here. Everything with such races should
+		 * also have dedicated RiXi exception handlers, so this
+		 * shouldn't be hit.
+		 */
+		WARN(cpu_has_tlbex_tlbp_race(), "Unhandled race in RiXi path");
+
 		uasm_i_tlbr(&p);
 
 		switch (current_cpu_type()) {
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 057/101] arm64: ptrace: Avoid setting compat FP[SC]R to garbage if get_user fails

[Sasha Levin]

From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit 53b1a742ed251780267a57415bc955bd50f40c3d ]

If get_user() fails when reading the new FPSCR value from userspace
in compat_vfp_get(), then garbage* will be written to the task's
FPSR and FPCR registers.

This patch prevents this by checking the return from get_user()
first.

[*] Actually, zero, due to the behaviour of get_user() on error, but
that's still not what userspace expects.

Fixes: 478fcb2cdb23 ("arm64: Debugging support")
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 2e845f5c8ab2..a12eb17e7985 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -785,8 +785,10 @@ static int compat_vfp_set(struct task_struct *target,
 
 	if (count && !ret) {
 		ret = get_user(fpscr, (compat_ulong_t *)ubuf);
-		uregs->fpsr = fpscr & VFP_FPSCR_STAT_MASK;
-		uregs->fpcr = fpscr & VFP_FPSCR_CTRL_MASK;
+		if (!ret) {
+			uregs->fpsr = fpscr & VFP_FPSCR_STAT_MASK;
+			uregs->fpcr = fpscr & VFP_FPSCR_CTRL_MASK;
+		}
 	}
 
 	fpsimd_flush_task_state(target);
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 058/101] arm64: ptrace: Fix incorrect get_user() use in compat_vfp_set()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit 5fbd5fc49fc39ac8433da62d16682a1d0217ea4f ]

Now that compat_vfp_get() uses the regset API to copy the FPSCR
value out to userspace, compat_vfp_set() looks inconsistent.  In
particular, compat_vfp_set() will fail if called with kbuf != NULL
&& ubuf == NULL (which is valid usage according to the regset API).

This patch fixes compat_vfp_set() to use user_regset_copyin(),
similarly to compat_vfp_get().

This also squashes a sparse warning triggered by the cast that
drops __user when calling get_user().

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
index a12eb17e7985..01defb4527f4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -773,18 +773,20 @@ static int compat_vfp_set(struct task_struct *target,
 {
 	struct user_fpsimd_state *uregs;
 	compat_ulong_t fpscr;
-	int ret;
+	int ret, vregs_end_pos;
 
 	if (pos + count > VFP_STATE_SIZE)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	uregs = &target->thread.fpsimd_state.user_fpsimd;
 
+	vregs_end_pos = VFP_STATE_SIZE - sizeof(compat_ulong_t);
 	ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, uregs, 0,
-				 VFP_STATE_SIZE - sizeof(compat_ulong_t));
+				 vregs_end_pos);
 
 	if (count && !ret) {
-		ret = get_user(fpscr, (compat_ulong_t *)ubuf);
+		ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &fpscr,
+					 vregs_end_pos, VFP_STATE_SIZE);
 		if (!ret) {
 			uregs->fpsr = fpscr & VFP_FPSCR_STAT_MASK;
 			uregs->fpcr = fpscr & VFP_FPSCR_CTRL_MASK;
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 059/101] x86/um: thin archives build fix

[Sasha Levin]

From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 827880ec260ba048f95fe646b96a205c394fa0f0 ]

The linker does not like vdso-syms.lds in input archive files.
Make it an extra-y instead.

Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile
index 6c803ca49b5d..486f62c3bd04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso-note.o = -pg -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_um_vdso.o = -pg -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
 
 targets += vdso-syms.lds
-obj-$(VDSO64-y)			+= vdso-syms.lds
+extra-$(VDSO64-y)			+= vdso-syms.lds
 
 #
 # Match symbols in the DSO that look like VDSO*; produce a file of constants.
-- 
2.15.1

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 059/101] x86/um: thin archives build fix

[Nicholas Piggin]

On Mon, 9 Apr 2018 00:41:22 +0000
Sasha Levin <Alexander.Levin@microsoft.com> wrote:

> From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
> 
> [ Upstream commit 827880ec260ba048f95fe646b96a205c394fa0f0 ]
> 
> The linker does not like vdso-syms.lds in input archive files.
> Make it an extra-y instead.

I wouldn't say these should be needed on kernels without thin
archives build.

It shouldn't hurt, but no point risking stable breakage.

Thanks,
Nick

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 059/101] x86/um: thin archives build fix

[Sasha Levin]

On Mon, Apr 09, 2018 at 02:29:11PM +1000, Nicholas Piggin wrote:
>On Mon, 9 Apr 2018 00:41:22 +0000
>Sasha Levin <Alexander.Levin@microsoft.com> wrote:
>
>> From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
>>
>> [ Upstream commit 827880ec260ba048f95fe646b96a205c394fa0f0 ]
>>
>> The linker does not like vdso-syms.lds in input archive files.
>> Make it an extra-y instead.
>
>I wouldn't say these should be needed on kernels without thin
>archives build.
>
>It shouldn't hurt, but no point risking stable breakage.
>
>Thanks,
>Nick

Now dropped, thanks Nick!

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 060/101] fs: warn in case userspace lied about modprobe return

[Sasha Levin]

From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 41124db869b7e00e12052555f8987867ac01d70c ]

kmod <= v19 was broken -- it could return 0 to modprobe calls,
incorrectly assuming that a kernel module was built-in, whereas in
reality the module was just forming in the kernel. The reason for this
is an incorrect userspace heuristics. A userspace kmod fix is available
for it [0], however should userspace break again we could go on with
an failed get_fs_type() which is hard to debug as the request_module()
is detected as returning 0. The first suspect would be that there is
something worth with the kernel's module loader and obviously in this
case that is not the issue.

Since these issues are painful to debug complain when we know userspace
has outright lied to us.

[0] http://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/kernel/kmod/kmod.git/commit/libkmod/libkmod-module.c?id=fd44a98ae2eb5eb32161088954ab21e58e19dfc4

Suggested-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/filesystems.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/filesystems.c b/fs/filesystems.c
index 5797d45a78cb..2a7ae03f821e 100644
--- a/fs/filesystems.c
+++ b/fs/filesystems.c
@@ -275,8 +275,10 @@ struct file_system_type *get_fs_type(const char *name)
 	int len = dot ? dot - name : strlen(name);
 
 	fs = __get_fs_type(name, len);
-	if (!fs && (request_module("fs-%.*s", len, name) == 0))
+	if (!fs && (request_module("fs-%.*s", len, name) == 0)) {
 		fs = __get_fs_type(name, len);
+		WARN_ONCE(!fs, "request_module fs-%.*s succeeded, but still no fs?\n", len, name);
+	}
 
 	if (dot && fs && !(fs->fs_flags & FS_HAS_SUBTYPE)) {
 		put_filesystem(fs);
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 061/101] ext4: change fast symlink test to not rely on i_blocks

[Sasha Levin]

From: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 407cd7fb83c0ebabb490190e673d8c71ee7df97e ]

ext4_inode_info->i_data is the storage area for 4 types of data:

  a) Extents data
  b) Inline data
  c) Block map
  d) Fast symlink data (symlink length < 60)

Extents data case is positively identified by EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS flag.
Inline data case is also obvious because of EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA
flag.

Distinguishing c) and d) however requires additional logic. This
currently relies on i_blocks count. After subtracting external xattr
block from i_blocks, if it is greater than 0 then we know that some
data blocks exist, so there must be a block map.

This logic got broken after ea_inode feature was added. That feature
charges the data blocks of external xattr inodes to the referencing
inode and so adds them to the i_blocks. To fix this, we could subtract
ea_inode blocks by iterating through all xattr entries and then check
whether remaining i_blocks count is zero. Besides being complicated,
this won't change the fact that the current way of distinguishing
between c) and d) is fragile.

The alternative solution is to test whether i_size is less than 60 to
determine fast symlink case. ext4_symlink() uses the same test to decide
whether to store the symlink in i_data. There is one caveat to address
before this can work though.

If an inode's i_nlink is zero during eviction, its i_size is set to
zero and its data is truncated. If system crashes before inode is removed
from the orphan list, next boot orphan cleanup may find the inode with
zero i_size. So, a symlink that had its data stored in a block may now
appear to be a fast symlink. The solution used in this patch is to treat
i_size = 0 as a non-fast symlink case. A zero sized symlink is not legal
so the only time this can happen is the mentioned scenario. This is also
logically correct because a i_size = 0 symlink has no data stored in
i_data.

Suggested-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/ext4/inode.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
index c2434d72681e..c70d7d3832c4 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -140,16 +140,12 @@ static int ext4_meta_trans_blocks(struct inode *inode, int lblocks,
 
 /*
  * Test whether an inode is a fast symlink.
+ * A fast symlink has its symlink data stored in ext4_inode_info->i_data.
  */
 static int ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink(struct inode *inode)
 {
-        int ea_blocks = EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl ?
-		EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(inode->i_sb) >> 9 : 0;
-
-	if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
-		return 0;
-
-	return (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_blocks - ea_blocks == 0);
+	return S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_size &&
+	       (inode->i_size < EXT4_N_BLOCKS * 4);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -253,6 +249,16 @@ void ext4_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 
 	if (IS_SYNC(inode))
 		ext4_handle_sync(handle);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set inode->i_size to 0 before calling ext4_truncate(). We need
+	 * special handling of symlinks here because i_size is used to
+	 * determine whether ext4_inode_info->i_data contains symlink data or
+	 * block mappings. Setting i_size to 0 will remove its fast symlink
+	 * status. Erase i_data so that it becomes a valid empty block map.
+	 */
+	if (ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink(inode))
+		memset(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data, 0, sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data));
 	inode->i_size = 0;
 	err = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
 	if (err) {
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 062/101] irqchip/gic-v3: Honor forced affinity setting

[Sasha Levin]

From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit 65a30f8b300107266f316d550f060ccc186201a3 ]

Honor the 'force' flag for set_affinity, by selecting a CPU
from the given mask (which may not be reported "online" by
the cpu_online_mask). Some drivers, like ARM PMU, rely on it.

Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
index 30b93dd1e612..ec8468829aef 100644
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -526,11 +526,16 @@ static void gic_smp_init(void)
 static int gic_set_affinity(struct irq_data *d, const struct cpumask *mask_val,
 			    bool force)
 {
-	unsigned int cpu = cpumask_any_and(mask_val, cpu_online_mask);
+	unsigned int cpu;
 	void __iomem *reg;
 	int enabled;
 	u64 val;
 
+	if (force)
+		cpu = cpumask_first(mask_val);
+	else
+		cpu = cpumask_any_and(mask_val, cpu_online_mask);
+
 	if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 064/101] firewire-ohci: work around oversized DMA reads on JMicron controllers

[Sasha Levin]

From: Hector Martin <marcan@marcan.st>

[ Upstream commit 188775181bc05f29372b305ef96485840e351fde ]

At least some JMicron controllers issue buggy oversized DMA reads when
fetching context descriptors, always fetching 0x20 bytes at once for
descriptors which are only 0x10 bytes long. This is often harmless, but
can cause page faults on modern systems with IOMMUs:

DMAR: [DMA Read] Request device [05:00.0] fault addr fff56000 [fault reason 06] PTE Read access is not set
firewire_ohci 0000:05:00.0: DMA context IT0 has stopped, error code: evt_descriptor_read

This works around the problem by always leaving 0x10 padding bytes at
the end of descriptor buffer pages, which should be harmless to do
unconditionally for controllers in case others have the same behavior.

Signed-off-by: Hector Martin <marcan@marcan.st>
Reviewed-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/firewire/ohci.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firewire/ohci.c b/drivers/firewire/ohci.c
index f047d7c2b643..437f5f0c0d93 100644
--- a/drivers/firewire/ohci.c
+++ b/drivers/firewire/ohci.c
@@ -1137,7 +1137,13 @@ static int context_add_buffer(struct context *ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	offset = (void *)&desc->buffer - (void *)desc;
-	desc->buffer_size = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
+	/*
+	 * Some controllers, like JMicron ones, always issue 0x20-byte DMA reads
+	 * for descriptors, even 0x10-byte ones. This can cause page faults when
+	 * an IOMMU is in use and the oversized read crosses a page boundary.
+	 * Work around this by always leaving at least 0x10 bytes of padding.
+	 */
+	desc->buffer_size = PAGE_SIZE - offset - 0x10;
 	desc->buffer_bus = bus_addr + offset;
 	desc->used = 0;
 
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 063/101] vmlfb: Fix error handling in cr_pll_init()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>

[ Upstream commit 6af574e826740bf17663b48ba3f8fadb81d2113f ]

There is an error path, where iomemory is left mapped.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Alan Hourihane <alanh@fairlite.demon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/video/fbdev/vermilion/cr_pll.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/vermilion/cr_pll.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/vermilion/cr_pll.c
index ebc6e6e0dd0f..ba105c876bed 100644
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/vermilion/cr_pll.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/vermilion/cr_pll.c
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ static int __init cr_pll_init(void)
 	if (err) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR
 		       "Carillo Ranch failed to initialize vml_sys.\n");
+		iounmap(mch_regs_base);
 		pci_dev_put(mch_dev);
 		return err;
 	}
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 065/101] ASoC: au1x: Fix timeout tests in au1xac97c_ac97_read()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 123af9043e93cb6f235207d260d50f832cdb5439 ]

The loop timeout doesn't work because it's a post op and ends with "tmo"
set to -1.  I changed it from a post-op to a pre-op and I changed the
initial the starting value from 5 to 6 so we still iterate 5 times.  I
left the other as it was because it's a large number.

Fixes: b3c70c9ea62a ("ASoC: Alchemy AC97C/I2SC audio support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 sound/soc/au1x/ac97c.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/au1x/ac97c.c b/sound/soc/au1x/ac97c.c
index c8a2de103c5f..7591e48662bf 100644
--- a/sound/soc/au1x/ac97c.c
+++ b/sound/soc/au1x/ac97c.c
@@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ static unsigned short au1xac97c_ac97_read(struct snd_ac97 *ac97,
 	do {
 		mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
 
-		tmo = 5;
-		while ((RD(ctx, AC97_STATUS) & STAT_CP) && tmo--)
+		tmo = 6;
+		while ((RD(ctx, AC97_STATUS) & STAT_CP) && --tmo)
 			udelay(21);	/* wait an ac97 frame time */
 		if (!tmo) {
 			pr_debug("ac97rd timeout #1\n");
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static unsigned short au1xac97c_ac97_read(struct snd_ac97 *ac97,
 		 * poll, Forrest, poll...
 		 */
 		tmo = 0x10000;
-		while ((RD(ctx, AC97_STATUS) & STAT_CP) && tmo--)
+		while ((RD(ctx, AC97_STATUS) & STAT_CP) && --tmo)
 			asm volatile ("nop");
 		data = RD(ctx, AC97_CMDRESP);
 
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 066/101] kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl

[Sasha Levin]

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 51776043afa415435c7e4636204fbe4f7edc4501 ]

This ioctl is obsolete (it was used by Xenner as far as I know) but
still let's not break it gratuitously...  Its handler is copying
directly into struct kvm.  Go through a bounce buffer instead, with
the added benefit that we can actually do something useful with the
flags argument---the previous code was exiting with -EINVAL but still
doing the copy.

This technically is a userspace ABI breakage, but since no one should be
using the ioctl, it's a good occasion to see if someone actually
complains.

Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index f06fd2018651..4de23979d0ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4025,13 +4025,14 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		break;
 	}
 	case KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG: {
+		struct kvm_xen_hvm_config xhc;
 		r = -EFAULT;
-		if (copy_from_user(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, argp,
-				   sizeof(struct kvm_xen_hvm_config)))
+		if (copy_from_user(&xhc, argp, sizeof(xhc)))
 			goto out;
 		r = -EINVAL;
-		if (kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags)
+		if (xhc.flags)
 			goto out;
+		memcpy(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, &xhc, sizeof(xhc));
 		r = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 067/101] tracing/hrtimer: Fix tracing bugs by taking all clock bases and modes into account

[Sasha Levin]

From: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>

[ Upstream commit 91633eed73a3ac37aaece5c8c1f93a18bae616a9 ]

So far only CLOCK_MONOTONIC and CLOCK_REALTIME were taken into account as
well as HRTIMER_MODE_ABS/REL in the hrtimer_init tracepoint. The query for
detecting the ABS or REL timer modes is not valid anymore, it got broken
by the introduction of HRTIMER_MODE_PINNED.

HRTIMER_MODE_PINNED is not evaluated in the hrtimer_init() call, but for the
sake of completeness print all given modes.

Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171221104205.7269-9-anna-maria@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 include/trace/events/timer.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/trace/events/timer.h b/include/trace/events/timer.h
index 68c2c2000f02..9e4af35b3beb 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/timer.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/timer.h
@@ -121,6 +121,20 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(timer_class, timer_cancel,
 	TP_ARGS(timer)
 );
 
+#define decode_clockid(type)						\
+	__print_symbolic(type,						\
+		{ CLOCK_REALTIME,	"CLOCK_REALTIME"	},	\
+		{ CLOCK_MONOTONIC,	"CLOCK_MONOTONIC"	},	\
+		{ CLOCK_BOOTTIME,	"CLOCK_BOOTTIME"	},	\
+		{ CLOCK_TAI,		"CLOCK_TAI"		})
+
+#define decode_hrtimer_mode(mode)					\
+	__print_symbolic(mode,						\
+		{ HRTIMER_MODE_ABS,		"ABS"		},	\
+		{ HRTIMER_MODE_REL,		"REL"		},	\
+		{ HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_PINNED,	"ABS|PINNED"	},	\
+		{ HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED,	"REL|PINNED"	})
+
 /**
  * hrtimer_init - called when the hrtimer is initialized
  * @hrtimer:	pointer to struct hrtimer
@@ -147,10 +161,8 @@ TRACE_EVENT(hrtimer_init,
 	),
 
 	TP_printk("hrtimer=%p clockid=%s mode=%s", __entry->hrtimer,
-		  __entry->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME ?
-			"CLOCK_REALTIME" : "CLOCK_MONOTONIC",
-		  __entry->mode == HRTIMER_MODE_ABS ?
-			"HRTIMER_MODE_ABS" : "HRTIMER_MODE_REL")
+		  decode_clockid(__entry->clockid),
+		  decode_hrtimer_mode(__entry->mode))
 );
 
 /**
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 068/101] PCI: Add function 1 DMA alias quirk for Marvell 9128

[Sasha Levin]

From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit aa008206634363ef800fbd5f0262016c9ff81dea ]

The Marvell 9128 is the original device generating bug 42679, from which
many other Marvell DMA alias quirks have been sourced, but we didn't have
positive confirmation of the fix on 9128 until now.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42679
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg161459.html
Reported-by: Binarus <lists@binarus.de>
Tested-by: Binarus <lists@binarus.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/pci/quirks.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
index 71536c16de9f..fa180f1d318c 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
@@ -3559,6 +3559,8 @@ static void quirk_dma_func1_alias(struct pci_dev *dev)
  */
 DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x9123,
 			 quirk_dma_func1_alias);
+DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x9128,
+			 quirk_dma_func1_alias);
 /* https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42679#c14 */
 DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x9130,
 			 quirk_dma_func1_alias);
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 069/101] tools lib traceevent: Fix get_field_str() for dynamic strings

[Sasha Levin]

From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>

[ Upstream commit d777f8de99b05d399c0e4e51cdce016f26bd971b ]

If a field is a dynamic string, get_field_str() returned just the
offset/size value and not the string. Have it parse the offset/size
correctly to return the actual string. Otherwise filtering fails when
trying to filter fields that are dynamic strings.

Reported-by: Gopanapalli Pradeep <prap_hai@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180112004823.146333275@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 tools/lib/traceevent/parse-filter.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/lib/traceevent/parse-filter.c b/tools/lib/traceevent/parse-filter.c
index 88cccea3ca99..64309d73921b 100644
--- a/tools/lib/traceevent/parse-filter.c
+++ b/tools/lib/traceevent/parse-filter.c
@@ -1867,17 +1867,25 @@ static const char *get_field_str(struct filter_arg *arg, struct pevent_record *r
 	struct pevent *pevent;
 	unsigned long long addr;
 	const char *val = NULL;
+	unsigned int size;
 	char hex[64];
 
 	/* If the field is not a string convert it */
 	if (arg->str.field->flags & FIELD_IS_STRING) {
 		val = record->data + arg->str.field->offset;
+		size = arg->str.field->size;
+
+		if (arg->str.field->flags & FIELD_IS_DYNAMIC) {
+			addr = *(unsigned int *)val;
+			val = record->data + (addr & 0xffff);
+			size = addr >> 16;
+		}
 
 		/*
 		 * We need to copy the data since we can't be sure the field
 		 * is null terminated.
 		 */
-		if (*(val + arg->str.field->size - 1)) {
+		if (*(val + size - 1)) {
 			/* copy it */
 			memcpy(arg->str.buffer, val, arg->str.field->size);
 			/* the buffer is already NULL terminated */
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 070/101] dm thin: fix documentation relative to low water mark threshold

[Sasha Levin]

From: mulhern <amulhern@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 9b28a1102efc75d81298198166ead87d643a29ce ]

Fixes:
1. The use of "exceeds" when the opposite of exceeds, falls below,
was meant.
2. Properly speaking, a table can not exceed a threshold.

It emphasizes the important point, which is that it is the userspace
daemon's responsibility to check for low free space when a device
is resumed, since it won't get a special event indicating low free
space in that situation.

Signed-off-by: mulhern <amulhern@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 Documentation/device-mapper/thin-provisioning.txt | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/device-mapper/thin-provisioning.txt b/Documentation/device-mapper/thin-provisioning.txt
index 2f5173500bd9..2800b014a619 100644
--- a/Documentation/device-mapper/thin-provisioning.txt
+++ b/Documentation/device-mapper/thin-provisioning.txt
@@ -112,9 +112,11 @@ $low_water_mark is expressed in blocks of size $data_block_size.  If
 free space on the data device drops below this level then a dm event
 will be triggered which a userspace daemon should catch allowing it to
 extend the pool device.  Only one such event will be sent.
-Resuming a device with a new table itself triggers an event so the
-userspace daemon can use this to detect a situation where a new table
-already exceeds the threshold.
+
+No special event is triggered if a just resumed device's free space is below
+the low water mark. However, resuming a device always triggers an
+event; a userspace daemon should verify that free space exceeds the low
+water mark when handling this event.
 
 A low water mark for the metadata device is maintained in the kernel and
 will trigger a dm event if free space on the metadata device drops below
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 071/101] nfs: Do not convert nfs_idmap_cache_timeout to jiffies

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jan Chochol <jan@chochol.info>

[ Upstream commit cbebc6ef4fc830f4040d4140bf53484812d5d5d9 ]

Since commit 57e62324e469 ("NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the
keyring") nfs_idmap_cache_timeout changed units from jiffies to seconds.
Unfortunately sysctl interface was not updated accordingly.

As a effect updating /proc/sys/fs/nfs/idmap_cache_timeout with some
value will incorrectly multiply this value by HZ.
Also reading /proc/sys/fs/nfs/idmap_cache_timeout will show real value
divided by HZ.

Fixes: 57e62324e469 ("NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the keyring")
Signed-off-by: Jan Chochol <jan@chochol.info>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/nfs/nfs4sysctl.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4sysctl.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4sysctl.c
index b6ebe7e445f6..b83056329370 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4sysctl.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static struct ctl_table nfs4_cb_sysctls[] = {
 		.data = &nfs_idmap_cache_timeout,
 		.maxlen = sizeof(int),
 		.mode = 0644,
-		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
+		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
 	},
 	{ }
 };
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 072/101] watchdog: sp5100_tco: Fix watchdog disable bit

[Sasha Levin]

From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>

[ Upstream commit f541c09ebfc61697b586b38c9ebaf4b70defb278 ]

According to all published information, the watchdog disable bit for SB800
compatible controllers is bit 1 of PM register 0x48, not bit 2. For the
most part that doesn't matter in practice, since the bit has to be cleared
to enable watchdog address decoding, which is the default setting, but it
still needs to be fixed.

Cc: Zoltán Böszörményi <zboszor@pr.hu>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@iguana.be>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/watchdog/sp5100_tco.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/sp5100_tco.h b/drivers/watchdog/sp5100_tco.h
index 2b28c00da0df..dfe20b81ced5 100644
--- a/drivers/watchdog/sp5100_tco.h
+++ b/drivers/watchdog/sp5100_tco.h
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
 #define SB800_PM_WATCHDOG_CONFIG	0x4C
 
 #define SB800_PCI_WATCHDOG_DECODE_EN	(1 << 0)
-#define SB800_PM_WATCHDOG_DISABLE	(1 << 2)
+#define SB800_PM_WATCHDOG_DISABLE	(1 << 1)
 #define SB800_PM_WATCHDOG_SECOND_RES	(3 << 0)
 #define SB800_ACPI_MMIO_DECODE_EN	(1 << 0)
 #define SB800_ACPI_MMIO_SEL		(1 << 1)
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 073/101] kconfig: Don't leak main menus during parsing

[Sasha Levin]

From: Ulf Magnusson <ulfalizer@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 0724a7c32a54e3e50d28e19e30c59014f61d4e2c ]

If a 'mainmenu' entry appeared in the Kconfig files, two things would
leak:

	- The 'struct property' allocated for the default "Linux Kernel
	  Configuration" prompt.

	- The string for the T_WORD/T_WORD_QUOTE prompt after the
	  T_MAINMENU token, allocated on the heap in zconf.l.

To fix it, introduce a new 'no_mainmenu_stmt' nonterminal that matches
if there's no 'mainmenu' and adds the default prompt. That means the
prompt only gets allocated once regardless of whether there's a
'mainmenu' statement or not, and managing it becomes simple.

Summary from Valgrind on 'menuconfig' (ARCH=x86) before the fix:

	LEAK SUMMARY:
	   definitely lost: 344,568 bytes in 14,352 blocks
	   ...

Summary after the fix:

	LEAK SUMMARY:
	   definitely lost: 344,440 bytes in 14,350 blocks
	   ...

Signed-off-by: Ulf Magnusson <ulfalizer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 scripts/kconfig/zconf.y | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/zconf.y b/scripts/kconfig/zconf.y
index 0f683cfa53e9..52dda772d181 100644
--- a/scripts/kconfig/zconf.y
+++ b/scripts/kconfig/zconf.y
@@ -102,7 +102,27 @@ static struct menu *current_menu, *current_entry;
 %%
 input: nl start | start;
 
-start: mainmenu_stmt stmt_list | stmt_list;
+start: mainmenu_stmt stmt_list | no_mainmenu_stmt stmt_list;
+
+/* mainmenu entry */
+
+mainmenu_stmt: T_MAINMENU prompt nl
+{
+	menu_add_prompt(P_MENU, $2, NULL);
+};
+
+/* Default main menu, if there's no mainmenu entry */
+
+no_mainmenu_stmt: /* empty */
+{
+	/*
+	 * Hack: Keep the main menu title on the heap so we can safely free it
+	 * later regardless of whether it comes from the 'prompt' in
+	 * mainmenu_stmt or here
+	 */
+	menu_add_prompt(P_MENU, strdup("Linux Kernel Configuration"), NULL);
+};
+
 
 stmt_list:
 	  /* empty */
@@ -339,13 +359,6 @@ if_block:
 	| if_block choice_stmt
 ;
 
-/* mainmenu entry */
-
-mainmenu_stmt: T_MAINMENU prompt nl
-{
-	menu_add_prompt(P_MENU, $2, NULL);
-};
-
 /* menu entry */
 
 menu: T_MENU prompt T_EOL
@@ -486,6 +499,7 @@ word_opt: /* empty */			{ $$ = NULL; }
 
 void conf_parse(const char *name)
 {
+	const char *tmp;
 	struct symbol *sym;
 	int i;
 
@@ -493,7 +507,6 @@ void conf_parse(const char *name)
 
 	sym_init();
 	_menu_init();
-	rootmenu.prompt = menu_add_prompt(P_MENU, "Linux Kernel Configuration", NULL);
 
 	if (getenv("ZCONF_DEBUG"))
 		zconfdebug = 1;
@@ -503,8 +516,10 @@ void conf_parse(const char *name)
 	if (!modules_sym)
 		modules_sym = sym_find( "n" );
 
+	tmp = rootmenu.prompt->text;
 	rootmenu.prompt->text = _(rootmenu.prompt->text);
 	rootmenu.prompt->text = sym_expand_string_value(rootmenu.prompt->text);
+	free((char*)tmp);
 
 	menu_finalize(&rootmenu);
 	for_all_symbols(i, sym) {
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 074/101] kconfig: Fix automatic menu creation mem leak

[Sasha Levin]

From: Ulf Magnusson <ulfalizer@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit ae7440ef0c8013d68c00dad6900e7cce5311bb1c ]

expr_trans_compare() always allocates and returns a new expression,
giving the following leak outline:

	...
	*Allocate*
	basedep = expr_trans_compare(basedep, E_UNEQUAL, &symbol_no);
	...
	for (menu = parent->next; menu; menu = menu->next) {
		...
		*Copy*
		dep2 = expr_copy(basedep);
		...
		*Free copy*
		expr_free(dep2);
	}
	*basedep lost!*

Fix by freeing 'basedep' after the loop.

Summary from Valgrind on 'menuconfig' (ARCH=x86) before the fix:

	LEAK SUMMARY:
	   definitely lost: 344,376 bytes in 14,349 blocks
	   ...

Summary after the fix:

	LEAK SUMMARY:
	   definitely lost: 44,448 bytes in 1,852 blocks
	   ...

Signed-off-by: Ulf Magnusson <ulfalizer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 scripts/kconfig/menu.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/menu.c b/scripts/kconfig/menu.c
index 72c9dba84c5d..095a6094d736 100644
--- a/scripts/kconfig/menu.c
+++ b/scripts/kconfig/menu.c
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ void menu_finalize(struct menu *parent)
 			menu->parent = parent;
 			last_menu = menu;
 		}
+		expr_free(basedep);
 		if (last_menu) {
 			parent->list = parent->next;
 			parent->next = last_menu->next;
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 076/101] btrfs: Fix out of bounds access in btrfs_search_slot

[Sasha Levin]

From: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit 9ea2c7c9da13c9073e371c046cbbc45481ecb459 ]

When modifying a tree where the root is at BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL - 1 then
the level variable is going to be 7 (this is the max height of the
tree). On the other hand btrfs_cow_block is always called with
"level + 1" as an index into the nodes and slots arrays. This leads to
an out of bounds access. Admittdely this will be benign since an OOB
access of the nodes array will likely read the 0th element from the
slots array, which in this case is going to be 0 (since we start CoW at
the top of the tree). The OOB access into the slots array in turn will
read the 0th and 1st values of the locks array, which would both be 0
at the time. However, this benign behavior relies on the fact that the
path being passed hasn't been initialised, if it has already been used to
query a btree then it could potentially have populated the nodes/slots arrays.

Fix it by explicitly checking if we are at level 7 (the maximum allowed
index in nodes/slots arrays) and explicitly call the CoW routine with
NULL for parent's node/slot.

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Fixes-coverity-id: 711515
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/btrfs/ctree.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
index 39c68ef10808..c221d37e3ec9 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
@@ -2758,6 +2758,8 @@ again:
 		 * contention with the cow code
 		 */
 		if (cow) {
+			bool last_level = (level == (BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL - 1));
+
 			/*
 			 * if we don't really need to cow this block
 			 * then we don't want to set the path blocking,
@@ -2782,9 +2784,13 @@ again:
 			}
 
 			btrfs_set_path_blocking(p);
-			err = btrfs_cow_block(trans, root, b,
-					      p->nodes[level + 1],
-					      p->slots[level + 1], &b);
+			if (last_level)
+				err = btrfs_cow_block(trans, root, b, NULL, 0,
+						      &b);
+			else
+				err = btrfs_cow_block(trans, root, b,
+						      p->nodes[level + 1],
+						      p->slots[level + 1], &b);
 			if (err) {
 				ret = err;
 				goto done;
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 075/101] kconfig: Fix expr_free() E_NOT leak

[Sasha Levin]

From: Ulf Magnusson <ulfalizer@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 5b1374b3b3c2fc4f63a398adfa446fb8eff791a4 ]

Only the E_NOT operand and not the E_NOT node itself was freed, due to
accidentally returning too early in expr_free(). Outline of leak:

	switch (e->type) {
	...
	case E_NOT:
		expr_free(e->left.expr);
		return;
	...
	}
	*Never reached, 'e' leaked*
	free(e);

Fix by changing the 'return' to a 'break'.

Summary from Valgrind on 'menuconfig' (ARCH=x86) before the fix:

	LEAK SUMMARY:
	   definitely lost: 44,448 bytes in 1,852 blocks
	   ...

Summary after the fix:

	LEAK SUMMARY:
	   definitely lost: 1,608 bytes in 67 blocks
	   ...

Signed-off-by: Ulf Magnusson <ulfalizer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 scripts/kconfig/expr.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/expr.c b/scripts/kconfig/expr.c
index d6626521f9b9..23cd5ce862f7 100644
--- a/scripts/kconfig/expr.c
+++ b/scripts/kconfig/expr.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ void expr_free(struct expr *e)
 		break;
 	case E_NOT:
 		expr_free(e->left.expr);
-		return;
+		break;
 	case E_EQUAL:
 	case E_UNEQUAL:
 		break;
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 077/101] scsi: devinfo: fix format of the device list

[Sasha Levin]

From: Xose Vazquez Perez <xose.vazquez@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 3f884a0a8bdf28cfd1e9987d54d83350096cdd46 ]

Replace "" with NULL for product revision level, and merge TEXEL
duplicate entries.

Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: SCSI ML <linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Xose Vazquez Perez <xose.vazquez@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
index 90abf7f5289d..2f994edce4c4 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ static struct {
 	 * seagate controller, which causes SCSI code to reset bus.
 	 */
 	{"HP", "C1750A", "3226", BLIST_NOLUN},		/* scanjet iic */
-	{"HP", "C1790A", "", BLIST_NOLUN},		/* scanjet iip */
-	{"HP", "C2500A", "", BLIST_NOLUN},		/* scanjet iicx */
+	{"HP", "C1790A", NULL, BLIST_NOLUN},		/* scanjet iip */
+	{"HP", "C2500A", NULL, BLIST_NOLUN},		/* scanjet iicx */
 	{"MEDIAVIS", "CDR-H93MV", "1.31", BLIST_NOLUN},	/* locks up */
 	{"MICROTEK", "ScanMaker II", "5.61", BLIST_NOLUN},	/* responds to all lun */
 	{"MITSUMI", "CD-R CR-2201CS", "6119", BLIST_NOLUN},	/* locks up */
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static struct {
 	{"QUANTUM", "FIREBALL ST4.3S", "0F0C", BLIST_NOLUN},	/* locks up */
 	{"RELISYS", "Scorpio", NULL, BLIST_NOLUN},	/* responds to all lun */
 	{"SANKYO", "CP525", "6.64", BLIST_NOLUN},	/* causes failed REQ SENSE, extra reset */
-	{"TEXEL", "CD-ROM", "1.06", BLIST_NOLUN},
+	{"TEXEL", "CD-ROM", "1.06", BLIST_NOLUN | BLIST_BORKEN},
 	{"transtec", "T5008", "0001", BLIST_NOREPORTLUN },
 	{"YAMAHA", "CDR100", "1.00", BLIST_NOLUN},	/* locks up */
 	{"YAMAHA", "CDR102", "1.00", BLIST_NOLUN},	/* locks up */
@@ -248,7 +248,6 @@ static struct {
 	{"ST650211", "CF", NULL, BLIST_RETRY_HWERROR},
 	{"SUN", "T300", "*", BLIST_SPARSELUN},
 	{"SUN", "T4", "*", BLIST_SPARSELUN},
-	{"TEXEL", "CD-ROM", "1.06", BLIST_BORKEN},
 	{"Tornado-", "F4", "*", BLIST_NOREPORTLUN},
 	{"TOSHIBA", "CDROM", NULL, BLIST_ISROM},
 	{"TOSHIBA", "CD-ROM", NULL, BLIST_ISROM},
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 078/101] scsi: fas216: fix sense buffer initialization

[Sasha Levin]

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

[ Upstream commit 96d5eaa9bb74d299508d811d865c2c41b38b0301 ]

While testing with the ARM specific memset() macro removed, I ran into a
compiler warning that shows an old bug:

drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c: In function 'fas216_rq_sns_done':
drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c:2014:40: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'memset' call is the same expression as the destination; did you mean to provide an explicit length? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]

It turns out that the definition of the scsi_cmd structure changed back
in linux-2.6.25, so now we clear only four bytes (sizeof(pointer))
instead of 96 (SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE). I did not check whether we
actually need to initialize the buffer here, but it's clear that if we
do it, we should use the correct size.

Fixes: de25deb18016 ("[SCSI] use dynamically allocated sense buffer")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c b/drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c
index 71cfb1e504c4..80aa67df41fd 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c
@@ -2010,7 +2010,7 @@ static void fas216_rq_sns_done(FAS216_Info *info, struct scsi_cmnd *SCpnt,
 		 * have valid data in the sense buffer that could
 		 * confuse the higher levels.
 		 */
-		memset(SCpnt->sense_buffer, 0, sizeof(SCpnt->sense_buffer));
+		memset(SCpnt->sense_buffer, 0, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE);
 //printk("scsi%d.%c: sense buffer: ", info->host->host_no, '0' + SCpnt->device->id);
 //{ int i; for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) printk("%02x ", SCpnt->sense_buffer[i]); printk("\n"); }
 	/*
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 080/101] jffs2: Fix use-after-free bug in jffs2_iget()'s error handling path

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jake Daryll Obina <jake.obina@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 5bdd0c6f89fba430e18d636493398389dadc3b17 ]

If jffs2_iget() fails for a newly-allocated inode, jffs2_do_clear_inode()
can get called twice in the error handling path, the first call in
jffs2_iget() itself and the second through iget_failed(). This can result
to a use-after-free error in the second jffs2_do_clear_inode() call, such
as shown by the oops below wherein the second jffs2_do_clear_inode() call
was trying to free node fragments that were already freed in the first
jffs2_do_clear_inode() call.

[   78.178860] jffs2: error: (1904) jffs2_do_read_inode_internal: CRC failed for read_inode of inode 24 at physical location 0x1fc00c
[   78.178914] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b
[   78.185871] pgd = ffffffc03a567000
[   78.188794] [6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
[   78.194968] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
[   78.513147] PC is at rb_first_postorder+0xc/0x28
[   78.516503] LR is at jffs2_kill_fragtree+0x28/0x90 [jffs2]
[   78.520672] pc : [<ffffff8008323d28>] lr : [<ffffff8000eb1cc8>] pstate: 60000105
[   78.526757] sp : ffffff800cea38f0
[   78.528753] x29: ffffff800cea38f0 x28: ffffffc01f3f8e80
[   78.532754] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffff800cea3c70
[   78.536756] x25: 00000000dc67c8ae x24: ffffffc033d6945d
[   78.540759] x23: ffffffc036811740 x22: ffffff800891a5b8
[   78.544760] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000
[   78.548762] x19: ffffffc037d48910 x18: ffffff800891a588
[   78.552764] x17: 0000000000000800 x16: 0000000000000c00
[   78.556766] x15: 0000000000000010 x14: 6f2065646f6e695f
[   78.560767] x13: 6461657220726f66 x12: 2064656c69616620
[   78.564769] x11: 435243203a6c616e x10: 7265746e695f6564
[   78.568771] x9 : 6f6e695f64616572 x8 : ffffffc037974038
[   78.572774] x7 : bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb x6 : 0000000000000008
[   78.576775] x5 : 002f91d85bd44a2f x4 : 0000000000000000
[   78.580777] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 000000403755e000
[   78.584779] x1 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b x0 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
...
[   79.038551] [<ffffff8008323d28>] rb_first_postorder+0xc/0x28
[   79.042962] [<ffffff8000eb5578>] jffs2_do_clear_inode+0x88/0x100 [jffs2]
[   79.048395] [<ffffff8000eb9ddc>] jffs2_evict_inode+0x3c/0x48 [jffs2]
[   79.053443] [<ffffff8008201ca8>] evict+0xb0/0x168
[   79.056835] [<ffffff8008202650>] iput+0x1c0/0x200
[   79.060228] [<ffffff800820408c>] iget_failed+0x30/0x3c
[   79.064097] [<ffffff8000eba0c0>] jffs2_iget+0x2d8/0x360 [jffs2]
[   79.068740] [<ffffff8000eb0a60>] jffs2_lookup+0xe8/0x130 [jffs2]
[   79.073434] [<ffffff80081f1a28>] lookup_slow+0x118/0x190
[   79.077435] [<ffffff80081f4708>] walk_component+0xfc/0x28c
[   79.081610] [<ffffff80081f4dd0>] path_lookupat+0x84/0x108
[   79.085699] [<ffffff80081f5578>] filename_lookup+0x88/0x100
[   79.089960] [<ffffff80081f572c>] user_path_at_empty+0x58/0x6c
[   79.094396] [<ffffff80081ebe14>] vfs_statx+0xa4/0x114
[   79.098138] [<ffffff80081ec44c>] SyS_newfstatat+0x58/0x98
[   79.102227] [<ffffff800808354c>] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[   79.106489] Code: d65f03c0 f9400001 b40000e1 aa0103e0 (f9400821)

The jffs2_do_clear_inode() call in jffs2_iget() is unnecessary since
iget_failed() will eventually call jffs2_do_clear_inode() if needed, so
just remove it.

Fixes: 5451f79f5f81 ("iget: stop JFFS2 from using iget() and read_inode()")
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Jake Daryll Obina <jake.obina@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/jffs2/fs.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/jffs2/fs.c b/fs/jffs2/fs.c
index 601afd1afddf..c0ff490974a6 100644
--- a/fs/jffs2/fs.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/fs.c
@@ -363,7 +363,6 @@ error_io:
 	ret = -EIO;
 error:
 	mutex_unlock(&f->sem);
-	jffs2_do_clear_inode(c, f);
 	iget_failed(inode);
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 079/101] HID: roccat: prevent an out of bounds read in kovaplus_profile_activated()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 7ad81482cad67cbe1ec808490d1ddfc420c42008 ]

We get the "new_profile_index" value from the mouse device when we're
handling raw events.  Smatch taints it as untrusted data and complains
that we need a bounds check.  This seems like a reasonable warning
otherwise there is a small read beyond the end of the array.

Fixes: 0e70f97f257e ("HID: roccat: Add support for Kova[+] mouse")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Silvan Jegen <s.jegen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kovaplus.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kovaplus.c b/drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kovaplus.c
index 966047711fbf..1073c0d1fae5 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kovaplus.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kovaplus.c
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static uint kovaplus_convert_event_cpi(uint value)
 static void kovaplus_profile_activated(struct kovaplus_device *kovaplus,
 		uint new_profile_index)
 {
+	if (new_profile_index >= ARRAY_SIZE(kovaplus->profile_settings))
+		return;
 	kovaplus->actual_profile = new_profile_index;
 	kovaplus->actual_cpi = kovaplus->profile_settings[new_profile_index].cpi_startup_level;
 	kovaplus->actual_x_sensitivity = kovaplus->profile_settings[new_profile_index].sensitivity_x;
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 081/101] RDMA/mlx5: Avoid memory leak in case of XRCD dealloc failure

[Sasha Levin]

From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit b081808a66345ba725b77ecd8d759bee874cd937 ]

Failure in XRCD FW deallocation command leaves memory leaked and
returns error to the user which he can't do anything about it.

This patch changes behavior to always free memory and always return
success to the user.

Fixes: e126ba97dba9 ("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters")
Reviewed-by: Majd Dibbiny <majd@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c
index e261a53f9a02..8a531b5159c3 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c
@@ -3028,12 +3028,9 @@ int mlx5_ib_dealloc_xrcd(struct ib_xrcd *xrcd)
 	int err;
 
 	err = mlx5_core_xrcd_dealloc(dev->mdev, xrcdn);
-	if (err) {
+	if (err)
 		mlx5_ib_warn(dev, "failed to dealloc xrcdn 0x%x\n", xrcdn);
-		return err;
-	}
 
 	kfree(xrcd);
-
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 082/101] ocfs2: return -EROFS to mount.ocfs2 if inode block is invalid

[Sasha Levin]

From: piaojun <piaojun@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 025bcbde3634b2c9b316f227fed13ad6ad6817fb ]

If metadata is corrupted such as 'invalid inode block', we will get
failed by calling 'mount()' and then set filesystem readonly as below:

  ocfs2_mount
    ocfs2_initialize_super
      ocfs2_init_global_system_inodes
        ocfs2_iget
          ocfs2_read_locked_inode
            ocfs2_validate_inode_block
	      ocfs2_error
	        ocfs2_handle_error
	          ocfs2_set_ro_flag(osb, 0);  // set readonly

In this situation we need return -EROFS to 'mount.ocfs2', so that user
can fix it by fsck.  And then mount again.  In addition, 'mount.ocfs2'
should be updated correspondingly as it only return 1 for all errno.
And I will post a patch for 'mount.ocfs2' too.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5A4302FA.2010606@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/ocfs2/super.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/super.c b/fs/ocfs2/super.c
index 93c85bc745e1..c8d4934fc1cc 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/super.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/super.c
@@ -467,9 +467,8 @@ static int ocfs2_init_global_system_inodes(struct ocfs2_super *osb)
 		new = ocfs2_get_system_file_inode(osb, i, osb->slot_num);
 		if (!new) {
 			ocfs2_release_system_inodes(osb);
-			status = -EINVAL;
+			status = ocfs2_is_soft_readonly(osb) ? -EROFS : -EINVAL;
 			mlog_errno(status);
-			/* FIXME: Should ERROR_RO_FS */
 			mlog(ML_ERROR, "Unable to load system inode %d, "
 			     "possibly corrupt fs?", i);
 			goto bail;
@@ -498,7 +497,7 @@ static int ocfs2_init_local_system_inodes(struct ocfs2_super *osb)
 		new = ocfs2_get_system_file_inode(osb, i, osb->slot_num);
 		if (!new) {
 			ocfs2_release_system_inodes(osb);
-			status = -EINVAL;
+			status = ocfs2_is_soft_readonly(osb) ? -EROFS : -EINVAL;
 			mlog(ML_ERROR, "status=%d, sysfile=%d, slot=%d\n",
 			     status, i, osb->slot_num);
 			goto bail;
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 083/101] ocfs2/acl: use 'ip_xattr_sem' to protect getting extended attribute

[Sasha Levin]

From: piaojun <piaojun@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 16c8d569f5704a84164f30ff01b29879f3438065 ]

The race between *set_acl and *get_acl will cause getting incomplete
xattr data as below:

  processA                                    processB

  ocfs2_set_acl
    ocfs2_xattr_set
      __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle

                                              ocfs2_get_acl_nolock
                                                ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock:

processB may get incomplete xattr data if processA hasn't set_acl done.

So we should use 'ip_xattr_sem' to protect getting extended attribute in
ocfs2_get_acl_nolock(), as other processes could be changing it
concurrently.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5A5DDCFF.7030001@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/ocfs2/acl.c   | 6 ++++++
 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/acl.c b/fs/ocfs2/acl.c
index c7641f656494..512be47d9c44 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/acl.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/acl.c
@@ -300,7 +300,9 @@ struct posix_acl *ocfs2_iop_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
 
+	down_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_xattr_sem);
 	acl = ocfs2_get_acl_nolock(inode, type, di_bh);
+	up_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_xattr_sem);
 
 	brelse(di_bh);
 
@@ -319,7 +321,9 @@ int ocfs2_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh)
 	if (!(osb->s_mount_opt & OCFS2_MOUNT_POSIX_ACL))
 		return 0;
 
+	down_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_xattr_sem);
 	acl = ocfs2_get_acl_nolock(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, bh);
+	up_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_xattr_sem);
 	if (IS_ERR(acl) || !acl)
 		return PTR_ERR(acl);
 	ret = __posix_acl_chmod(&acl, GFP_KERNEL, inode->i_mode);
@@ -350,8 +354,10 @@ int ocfs2_init_acl(handle_t *handle,
 
 	if (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
 		if (osb->s_mount_opt & OCFS2_MOUNT_POSIX_ACL) {
+			down_read(&OCFS2_I(dir)->ip_xattr_sem);
 			acl = ocfs2_get_acl_nolock(dir, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT,
 						   dir_bh);
+			up_read(&OCFS2_I(dir)->ip_xattr_sem);
 			if (IS_ERR(acl))
 				return PTR_ERR(acl);
 		}
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
index c237008c010d..068e8af5388f 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -645,9 +645,11 @@ int ocfs2_calc_xattr_init(struct inode *dir,
 						     si->value_len);
 
 	if (osb->s_mount_opt & OCFS2_MOUNT_POSIX_ACL) {
+		down_read(&OCFS2_I(dir)->ip_xattr_sem);
 		acl_len = ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock(dir, dir_bh,
 					OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT,
 					"", NULL, 0);
+		up_read(&OCFS2_I(dir)->ip_xattr_sem);
 		if (acl_len > 0) {
 			a_size = ocfs2_xattr_entry_real_size(0, acl_len);
 			if (S_ISDIR(mode))
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 084/101] mm/mempolicy: fix the check of nodemask from user

[Sasha Levin]

From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 56521e7a02b7b84a5e72691a1fb15570e6055545 ]

As Xiaojun reported the ltp of migrate_pages01 will fail on arm64 system
which has 4 nodes[0...3], all have memory and CONFIG_NODES_SHIFT=2:

  migrate_pages01    0  TINFO  :  test_invalid_nodes
  migrate_pages01   14  TFAIL  :  migrate_pages_common.c:45: unexpected failure - returned value = 0, expected: -1
  migrate_pages01   15  TFAIL  :  migrate_pages_common.c:55: call succeeded unexpectedly

In this case the test_invalid_nodes of migrate_pages01 will call:
SYSC_migrate_pages as:

  migrate_pages(0, , {0x0000000000000001}, 64, , {0x0000000000000010}, 64) = 0

The new nodes specifies one or more node IDs that are greater than the
maximum supported node ID, however, the errno is not set to EINVAL as
expected.

As man pages of set_mempolicy[1], mbind[2], and migrate_pages[3]
mentioned, when nodemask specifies one or more node IDs that are greater
than the maximum supported node ID, the errno should set to EINVAL.
However, get_nodes only check whether the part of bits
[BITS_PER_LONG*BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES), maxnode) is zero or not, and
remain [MAX_NUMNODES, BITS_PER_LONG*BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES)
unchecked.

This patch is to check the bits of [MAX_NUMNODES, maxnode) in get_nodes
to let migrate_pages set the errno to EINVAL when nodemask specifies one
or more node IDs that are greater than the maximum supported node ID,
which follows the manpage's guide.

[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/set_mempolicy.2.html
[2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mbind.2.html
[3] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/migrate_pages.2.html

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510882624-44342-3-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 mm/mempolicy.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c
index d326955b4d05..3cd93e8c9c43 100644
--- a/mm/mempolicy.c
+++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
@@ -1286,6 +1286,7 @@ static int get_nodes(nodemask_t *nodes, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
 		     unsigned long maxnode)
 {
 	unsigned long k;
+	unsigned long t;
 	unsigned long nlongs;
 	unsigned long endmask;
 
@@ -1302,13 +1303,19 @@ static int get_nodes(nodemask_t *nodes, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
 	else
 		endmask = (1UL << (maxnode % BITS_PER_LONG)) - 1;
 
-	/* When the user specified more nodes than supported just check
-	   if the non supported part is all zero. */
+	/*
+	 * When the user specified more nodes than supported just check
+	 * if the non supported part is all zero.
+	 *
+	 * If maxnode have more longs than MAX_NUMNODES, check
+	 * the bits in that area first. And then go through to
+	 * check the rest bits which equal or bigger than MAX_NUMNODES.
+	 * Otherwise, just check bits [MAX_NUMNODES, maxnode).
+	 */
 	if (nlongs > BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES)) {
 		if (nlongs > PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(long))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		for (k = BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES); k < nlongs; k++) {
-			unsigned long t;
 			if (get_user(t, nmask + k))
 				return -EFAULT;
 			if (k == nlongs - 1) {
@@ -1321,6 +1328,16 @@ static int get_nodes(nodemask_t *nodes, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
 		endmask = ~0UL;
 	}
 
+	if (maxnode > MAX_NUMNODES && MAX_NUMNODES % BITS_PER_LONG != 0) {
+		unsigned long valid_mask = endmask;
+
+		valid_mask &= ~((1UL << (MAX_NUMNODES % BITS_PER_LONG)) - 1);
+		if (get_user(t, nmask + nlongs - 1))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		if (t & valid_mask)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (copy_from_user(nodes_addr(*nodes), nmask, nlongs*sizeof(unsigned long)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	nodes_addr(*nodes)[nlongs-1] &= endmask;
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 085/101] mm/mempolicy: add nodes_empty check in SYSC_migrate_pages

[Sasha Levin]

From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 0486a38bcc4749808edbc848f1bcf232042770fc ]

As in manpage of migrate_pages, the errno should be set to EINVAL when
none of the node IDs specified by new_nodes are on-line and allowed by
the process's current cpuset context, or none of the specified nodes
contain memory.  However, when test by following case:

	new_nodes = 0;
	old_nodes = 0xf;
	ret = migrate_pages(pid, old_nodes, new_nodes, MAX);

The ret will be 0 and no errno is set.  As the new_nodes is empty, we
should expect EINVAL as documented.

To fix the case like above, this patch check whether target nodes AND
current task_nodes is empty, and then check whether AND
node_states[N_MEMORY] is empty.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510882624-44342-4-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 mm/mempolicy.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c
index 3cd93e8c9c43..e628b2e71be3 100644
--- a/mm/mempolicy.c
+++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
@@ -1464,10 +1464,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, maxnode,
 		goto out_put;
 	}
 
-	if (!nodes_subset(*new, node_states[N_MEMORY])) {
-		err = -EINVAL;
+	task_nodes = cpuset_mems_allowed(current);
+	nodes_and(*new, *new, task_nodes);
+	if (nodes_empty(*new))
+		goto out_put;
+
+	nodes_and(*new, *new, node_states[N_MEMORY]);
+	if (nodes_empty(*new))
 		goto out_put;
-	}
 
 	err = security_task_movememory(task);
 	if (err)
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 086/101] asm-generic: provide generic_pmdp_establish()

[Sasha Levin]

From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

[ Upstream commit c58f0bb77ed8bf93dfdde762b01cb67eebbdfc29 ]

Patch series "Do not lose dirty bit on THP pages", v4.

Vlastimil noted that pmdp_invalidate() is not atomic and we can lose
dirty and access bits if CPU sets them after pmdp dereference, but
before set_pmd_at().

The bug can lead to data loss, but the race window is tiny and I haven't
seen any reports that suggested that it happens in reality.  So I don't
think it worth sending it to stable.

Unfortunately, there's no way to address the issue in a generic way.  We
need to fix all architectures that support THP one-by-one.

All architectures that have THP supported have to provide atomic
pmdp_invalidate() that returns previous value.

If generic implementation of pmdp_invalidate() is used, architecture
needs to provide atomic pmdp_estabish().

pmdp_estabish() is not used out-side generic implementation of
pmdp_invalidate() so far, but I think this can change in the future.

This patch (of 12):

This is an implementation of pmdp_establish() that is only suitable for
an architecture that doesn't have hardware dirty/accessed bits.  In this
case we can't race with CPU which sets these bits and non-atomic
approach is fine.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171213105756.69879-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <nitin.m.gupta@oracle.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index 752e30d63904..d33fdaee5523 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -181,6 +181,21 @@ extern void pgtable_trans_huge_deposit(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmdp,
 extern pgtable_t pgtable_trans_huge_withdraw(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmdp);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+/*
+ * This is an implementation of pmdp_establish() that is only suitable for an
+ * architecture that doesn't have hardware dirty/accessed bits. In this case we
+ * can't race with CPU which sets these bits and non-atomic aproach is fine.
+ */
+static inline pmd_t generic_pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	pmd_t old_pmd = *pmdp;
+	set_pmd_at(vma->vm_mm, address, pmdp, pmd);
+	return old_pmd;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_INVALIDATE
 extern void pmdp_invalidate(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
 			    pmd_t *pmdp);
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 087/101] mm: pin address_space before dereferencing it while isolating an LRU page

[Sasha Levin]

From: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>

[ Upstream commit 69d763fc6d3aee787a3e8c8c35092b4f4960fa5d ]

Minchan Kim asked the following question -- what locks protects
address_space destroying when race happens between inode trauncation and
__isolate_lru_page? Jan Kara clarified by describing the race as follows

CPU1                                            CPU2

truncate(inode)                                 __isolate_lru_page()
  ...
  truncate_inode_page(mapping, page);
    delete_from_page_cache(page)
      spin_lock_irqsave(&mapping->tree_lock, flags);
        __delete_from_page_cache(page, NULL)
          page_cache_tree_delete(..)
            ...                                   mapping = page_mapping(page);
            page->mapping = NULL;
            ...
      spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mapping->tree_lock, flags);
      page_cache_free_page(mapping, page)
        put_page(page)
          if (put_page_testzero(page)) -> false
- inode now has no pages and can be freed including embedded address_space

                                                  if (mapping && !mapping->a_ops->migratepage)
- we've dereferenced mapping which is potentially already free.

The race is theoretically possible but unlikely.  Before the
delete_from_page_cache, truncate_cleanup_page is called so the page is
likely to be !PageDirty or PageWriteback which gets skipped by the only
caller that checks the mappping in __isolate_lru_page.  Even if the race
occurs, a substantial amount of work has to happen during a tiny window
with no preemption but it could potentially be done using a virtual
machine to artifically slow one CPU or halt it during the critical
window.

This patch should eliminate the race with truncation by try-locking the
page before derefencing mapping and aborting if the lock was not
acquired.  There was a suggestion from Huang Ying to use RCU as a
side-effect to prevent mapping being freed.  However, I do not like the
solution as it's an unconventional means of preserving a mapping and
it's not a context where rcu_read_lock is obviously protecting rcu data.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180104102512.2qos3h5vqzeisrek@techsingularity.net
Fixes: c82449352854 ("mm: compaction: make isolate_lru_page() filter-aware again")
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 mm/vmscan.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c
index 6d652990433a..9d38cf604760 100644
--- a/mm/vmscan.c
+++ b/mm/vmscan.c
@@ -1215,6 +1215,7 @@ int __isolate_lru_page(struct page *page, isolate_mode_t mode)
 
 		if (PageDirty(page)) {
 			struct address_space *mapping;
+			bool migrate_dirty;
 
 			/* ISOLATE_CLEAN means only clean pages */
 			if (mode & ISOLATE_CLEAN)
@@ -1223,10 +1224,19 @@ int __isolate_lru_page(struct page *page, isolate_mode_t mode)
 			/*
 			 * Only pages without mappings or that have a
 			 * ->migratepage callback are possible to migrate
-			 * without blocking
+			 * without blocking. However, we can be racing with
+			 * truncation so it's necessary to lock the page
+			 * to stabilise the mapping as truncation holds
+			 * the page lock until after the page is removed
+			 * from the page cache.
 			 */
+			if (!trylock_page(page))
+				return ret;
+
 			mapping = page_mapping(page);
-			if (mapping && !mapping->a_ops->migratepage)
+			migrate_dirty = mapping && mapping->a_ops->migratepage;
+			unlock_page(page);
+			if (!migrate_dirty)
 				return ret;
 		}
 	}
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 088/101] IB/ipoib: Fix for potential no-carrier state

[Sasha Levin]

From: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 1029361084d18cc270f64dfd39529fafa10cfe01 ]

On reboot SM can program port pkey table before ipoib registered its
event handler, which could result in missing pkey event and leave root
interface with initial pkey value from index 0.

Since OPA port starts with invalid pkey in index 0, root interface will
fail to initialize and stay down with no-carrier flag.

For IB ipoib interface may end up with pkey different from value
opensm put in pkey table idx 0, resulting in connectivity issues
(different mcast groups, for example).

Close the window by calling event handler after registration
to make sure ipoib pkey is in sync with port pkey table.

Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/ipoib/ipoib_main.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/ipoib/ipoib_main.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/ipoib/ipoib_main.c
index dce94ba467b6..0e58a705b37e 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/ipoib/ipoib_main.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/ipoib/ipoib_main.c
@@ -1644,6 +1644,9 @@ static struct net_device *ipoib_add_port(const char *format,
 		goto event_failed;
 	}
 
+	/* call event handler to ensure pkey in sync */
+	queue_work(ipoib_workqueue, &priv->flush_heavy);
+
 	result = register_netdev(priv->dev);
 	if (result) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: couldn't register ipoib port %d; error %d\n",
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 089/101] x86/power: Fix swsusp_arch_resume prototype

[Sasha Levin]

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

[ Upstream commit 328008a72d38b5bde6491e463405c34a81a65d3e ]

The declaration for swsusp_arch_resume marks it as 'asmlinkage', but the
definition in x86-32 does not, and it fails to include the header with the
declaration. This leads to a warning when building with
link-time-optimizations:

kernel/power/power.h:108:23: error: type of 'swsusp_arch_resume' does not match original declaration [-Werror=lto-type-mismatch]
 extern asmlinkage int swsusp_arch_resume(void);
                       ^
arch/x86/power/hibernate_32.c:148:0: note: 'swsusp_arch_resume' was previously declared here
 int swsusp_arch_resume(void)

This moves the declaration into a globally visible header file and fixes up
both x86 definitions to match it.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202145634.200291-2-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_32.c | 2 +-
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c | 2 +-
 include/linux/suspend.h       | 2 ++
 kernel/power/power.h          | 3 ---
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_32.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_32.c
index 291226b952a9..77ac4e4deb16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_32.c
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static inline void resume_init_first_level_page_table(pgd_t *pg_dir)
 #endif
 }
 
-int swsusp_arch_resume(void)
+asmlinkage int swsusp_arch_resume(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
index 009947d419a6..0e0c773edffc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int set_up_temporary_mappings(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int swsusp_arch_resume(void)
+asmlinkage int swsusp_arch_resume(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/suspend.h b/include/linux/suspend.h
index 3388c1b6f7d8..10a48138e063 100644
--- a/include/linux/suspend.h
+++ b/include/linux/suspend.h
@@ -325,6 +325,8 @@ extern int swsusp_page_is_forbidden(struct page *);
 extern void swsusp_set_page_free(struct page *);
 extern void swsusp_unset_page_free(struct page *);
 extern unsigned long get_safe_page(gfp_t gfp_mask);
+extern asmlinkage int swsusp_arch_suspend(void);
+extern asmlinkage int swsusp_arch_resume(void);
 
 extern void hibernation_set_ops(const struct platform_hibernation_ops *ops);
 extern int hibernate(void);
diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
index 2df883a9d3cb..45244cb31c91 100644
--- a/kernel/power/power.h
+++ b/kernel/power/power.h
@@ -85,9 +85,6 @@ extern int in_suspend;
 extern dev_t swsusp_resume_device;
 extern sector_t swsusp_resume_block;
 
-extern asmlinkage int swsusp_arch_suspend(void);
-extern asmlinkage int swsusp_arch_resume(void);
-
 extern int create_basic_memory_bitmaps(void);
 extern void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void);
 extern int hibernate_preallocate_memory(void);
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 090/101] firmware: dmi_scan: Fix handling of empty DMI strings

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>

[ Upstream commit a7770ae194569e96a93c48aceb304edded9cc648 ]

The handling of empty DMI strings looks quite broken to me:
* Strings from 1 to 7 spaces are not considered empty.
* True empty DMI strings (string index set to 0) are not considered
  empty, and result in allocating a 0-char string.
* Strings with invalid index also result in allocating a 0-char
  string.
* Strings starting with 8 spaces are all considered empty, even if
  non-space characters follow (sounds like a weird thing to do, but
  I have actually seen occurrences of this in DMI tables before.)
* Strings which are considered empty are reported as 8 spaces,
  instead of being actually empty.

Some of these issues are the result of an off-by-one error in memcmp,
the rest is incorrect by design.

So let's get it square: missing strings and strings made of only
spaces, regardless of their length, should be treated as empty and
no memory should be allocated for them. All other strings are
non-empty and should be allocated.

Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Fixes: 79da4721117f ("x86: fix DMI out of memory problems")
Cc: Parag Warudkar <parag.warudkar@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c b/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c
index f4dbe6fe9dd9..0694e1b4004c 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
  * of and an antecedent to, SMBIOS, which stands for System
  * Management BIOS.  See further: http://www.dmtf.org/standards
  */
-static const char dmi_empty_string[] = "        ";
+static const char dmi_empty_string[] = "";
 
 static u16 __initdata dmi_ver;
 /*
@@ -36,25 +36,21 @@ static int dmi_memdev_nr;
 static const char * __init dmi_string_nosave(const struct dmi_header *dm, u8 s)
 {
 	const u8 *bp = ((u8 *) dm) + dm->length;
+	const u8 *nsp;
 
 	if (s) {
-		s--;
-		while (s > 0 && *bp) {
+		while (--s > 0 && *bp)
 			bp += strlen(bp) + 1;
-			s--;
-		}
-
-		if (*bp != 0) {
-			size_t len = strlen(bp)+1;
-			size_t cmp_len = len > 8 ? 8 : len;
 
-			if (!memcmp(bp, dmi_empty_string, cmp_len))
-				return dmi_empty_string;
+		/* Strings containing only spaces are considered empty */
+		nsp = bp;
+		while (*nsp == ' ')
+			nsp++;
+		if (*nsp != '\0')
 			return bp;
-		}
 	}
 
-	return "";
+	return dmi_empty_string;
 }
 
 static const char * __init dmi_string(const struct dmi_header *dm, u8 s)
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 091/101] ACPI: processor_perflib: Do not send _PPC change notification if not ready

[Sasha Levin]

From: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit ba1edb9a5125a617d612f98eead14b9b84e75c3a ]

The following warning was triggered after resumed from S3 -
if all the nonboot CPUs were put offline before suspend:

[ 1840.329515] unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x771 at rIP: 0xffffffff86061e3a (native_read_msr+0xa/0x30)
[ 1840.329516] Call Trace:
[ 1840.329521]  __rdmsr_on_cpu+0x33/0x50
[ 1840.329525]  generic_exec_single+0x81/0xb0
[ 1840.329527]  smp_call_function_single+0xd2/0x100
[ 1840.329530]  ? acpi_ds_result_pop+0xdd/0xf2
[ 1840.329532]  ? acpi_ds_create_operand+0x215/0x23c
[ 1840.329534]  rdmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x80
[ 1840.329536]  ? cpumask_next+0x1b/0x20
[ 1840.329538]  ? rdmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x80
[ 1840.329541]  intel_pstate_update_perf_limits+0xf3/0x220
[ 1840.329544]  ? notifier_call_chain+0x4a/0x70
[ 1840.329546]  intel_pstate_set_policy+0x4e/0x150
[ 1840.329548]  cpufreq_set_policy+0xcd/0x2f0
[ 1840.329550]  cpufreq_update_policy+0xb2/0x130
[ 1840.329552]  ? cpufreq_update_policy+0x130/0x130
[ 1840.329556]  acpi_processor_ppc_has_changed+0x65/0x80
[ 1840.329558]  acpi_processor_notify+0x80/0x100
[ 1840.329561]  acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x44/0x5c
[ 1840.329563]  acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x14/0x20
[ 1840.329565]  process_one_work+0x193/0x3c0
[ 1840.329567]  worker_thread+0x35/0x3b0
[ 1840.329569]  kthread+0x125/0x140
[ 1840.329571]  ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
[ 1840.329572]  ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
[ 1840.329575]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x180
[ 1840.329577]  ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[ 1840.329585] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x774 (tried to write 0x0000000000000000) at rIP: 0xffffffff86061f78 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30)
[ 1840.329586] Call Trace:
[ 1840.329587]  __wrmsr_on_cpu+0x37/0x40
[ 1840.329589]  generic_exec_single+0x81/0xb0
[ 1840.329592]  smp_call_function_single+0xd2/0x100
[ 1840.329594]  ? acpi_ds_create_operand+0x215/0x23c
[ 1840.329595]  ? cpumask_next+0x1b/0x20
[ 1840.329597]  wrmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x70
[ 1840.329598]  ? rdmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x80
[ 1840.329599]  ? wrmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x70
[ 1840.329602]  intel_pstate_hwp_set+0xd3/0x150
[ 1840.329604]  intel_pstate_set_policy+0x119/0x150
[ 1840.329606]  cpufreq_set_policy+0xcd/0x2f0
[ 1840.329607]  cpufreq_update_policy+0xb2/0x130
[ 1840.329610]  ? cpufreq_update_policy+0x130/0x130
[ 1840.329613]  acpi_processor_ppc_has_changed+0x65/0x80
[ 1840.329615]  acpi_processor_notify+0x80/0x100
[ 1840.329617]  acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x44/0x5c
[ 1840.329619]  acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x14/0x20
[ 1840.329620]  process_one_work+0x193/0x3c0
[ 1840.329622]  worker_thread+0x35/0x3b0
[ 1840.329624]  kthread+0x125/0x140
[ 1840.329625]  ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
[ 1840.329626]  ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
[ 1840.329628]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x180
[ 1840.329631]  ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30

This is because if there's only one online CPU, the MSR_PM_ENABLE
(package wide)can not be enabled after resumed, due to
intel_pstate_hwp_enable() will only be invoked on AP's online
process after resumed - if there's no AP online, the HWP remains
disabled after resumed (BIOS has disabled it in S3). Then if
there comes a _PPC change notification which touches HWP register
during this stage, the warning is triggered.

Since we don't call acpi_processor_register_performance() when
HWP is enabled, the pr->performance will be NULL. When this is
NULL we don't need to do _PPC change notification.

Reported-by: Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net>
Suggested-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/acpi/processor_perflib.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/processor_perflib.c b/drivers/acpi/processor_perflib.c
index cfc8aba72f86..59130ce3601e 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/processor_perflib.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/processor_perflib.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int acpi_processor_ppc_has_changed(struct acpi_processor *pr, int event_flag)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	if (ignore_ppc) {
+	if (ignore_ppc || !pr->performance) {
 		/*
 		 * Only when it is notification event, the _OST object
 		 * will be evaluated. Otherwise it is skipped.
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 092/101] MIPS: TXx9: use IS_BUILTIN() for CONFIG_LEDS_CLASS

[Sasha Levin]

From: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@mips.com>

[ Upstream commit 0cde5b44a30f1daaef1c34e08191239dc63271c4 ]

When commit b27311e1cace ("MIPS: TXx9: Add RBTX4939 board support")
added board support for the RBTX4939, it added a call to
led_classdev_register even if the LED class is built as a module.
Built-in arch code cannot call module code directly like this. Commit
b33b44073734 ("MIPS: TXX9: use IS_ENABLED() macro") subsequently
changed the inclusion of this code to a single check that
CONFIG_LEDS_CLASS is either builtin or a module, but the same issue
remains.

This leads to MIPS allmodconfig builds failing when CONFIG_MACH_TX49XX=y
is set:

arch/mips/txx9/rbtx4939/setup.o: In function `rbtx4939_led_probe':
setup.c:(.init.text+0xc0): undefined reference to `of_led_classdev_register'
make: *** [Makefile:999: vmlinux] Error 1

Fix this by using the IS_BUILTIN() macro instead.

Fixes: b27311e1cace ("MIPS: TXx9: Add RBTX4939 board support")
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@mips.com>
Reviewed-by: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/18544/
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/mips/txx9/rbtx4939/setup.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/mips/txx9/rbtx4939/setup.c b/arch/mips/txx9/rbtx4939/setup.c
index 2da5f25f98bc..e802259b2a59 100644
--- a/arch/mips/txx9/rbtx4939/setup.c
+++ b/arch/mips/txx9/rbtx4939/setup.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static void __init rbtx4939_update_ioc_pen(void)
 
 #define RBTX4939_MAX_7SEGLEDS	8
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LEDS_CLASS)
+#if IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_LEDS_CLASS)
 static u8 led_val[RBTX4939_MAX_7SEGLEDS];
 struct rbtx4939_led_data {
 	struct led_classdev cdev;
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static inline void rbtx4939_led_setup(void)
 
 static void __rbtx4939_7segled_putc(unsigned int pos, unsigned char val)
 {
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LEDS_CLASS)
+#if IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_LEDS_CLASS)
 	unsigned long flags;
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 	/* bit7: reserved for LED class */
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 093/101] xen/grant-table: Use put_page instead of free_page

[Sasha Levin]

From: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>

[ Upstream commit 3ac7292a25db1c607a50752055a18aba32ac2176 ]

The page given to gnttab_end_foreign_access() to free could be a
compound page so use put_page() instead of free_page() since it can
handle both compound and single pages correctly.

This bug was discovered when migrating a Xen VM with several VIFs and
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled. It hits a BUG usually after fewer than 10
iterations. All netfront devices disconnect from the backend during a
suspend/resume and this will call gnttab_end_foreign_access() if a
netfront queue has an outstanding skb. The mismatch between calling
get_page() and free_page() on a compound page causes a reference
counting error which is detected when DEBUG_VM is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/xen/grant-table.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c
index 7786291ba229..abdb152236c1 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static void gnttab_handle_deferred(unsigned long unused)
 			if (entry->page) {
 				pr_debug("freeing g.e. %#x (pfn %#lx)\n",
 					 entry->ref, page_to_pfn(entry->page));
-				__free_page(entry->page);
+				put_page(entry->page);
 			} else
 				pr_info("freeing g.e. %#x\n", entry->ref);
 			kfree(entry);
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void gnttab_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly,
 	if (gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, readonly)) {
 		put_free_entry(ref);
 		if (page != 0)
-			free_page(page);
+			put_page(virt_to_page(page));
 	} else
 		gnttab_add_deferred(ref, readonly,
 				    page ? virt_to_page(page) : NULL);
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 095/101] cifs: silence compiler warnings showing up with gcc-8.0.0

[Sasha Levin]

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

[ Upstream commit ade7db991b47ab3016a414468164f4966bd08202 ]

This bug was fixed before, but came up again with the latest
compiler in another function:

fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function 'CIFSSMBSetEA':
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:6362:3: error: 'strncpy' offset 8 is out of the bounds [0, 4] [-Werror=array-bounds]
   strncpy(parm_data->list[0].name, ea_name, name_len);

Let's apply the same fix that was used for the other instances.

Fixes: b2a3ad9ca502 ("cifs: silence compiler warnings showing up with gcc-4.7.0")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
index b2218b755dab..fdb72e4dc776 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
@@ -6413,9 +6413,7 @@ SetEARetry:
 	pSMB->InformationLevel =
 		cpu_to_le16(SMB_SET_FILE_EA);
 
-	parm_data =
-		(struct fealist *) (((char *) &pSMB->hdr.Protocol) +
-				       offset);
+	parm_data = (void *)pSMB + offsetof(struct smb_hdr, Protocol) + offset;
 	pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(param_offset);
 	pSMB->DataOffset = cpu_to_le16(offset);
 	pSMB->SetupCount = 1;
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 094/101] proc: fix /proc/*/map_files lookup

[Sasha Levin]

From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit ac7f1061c2c11bb8936b1b6a94cdb48de732f7a4 ]

Current code does:

	if (sscanf(dentry->d_name.name, "%lx-%lx", start, end) != 2)

However sscanf() is broken garbage.

It silently accepts whitespace between format specifiers
(did you know that?).

It silently accepts valid strings which result in integer overflow.

Do not use sscanf() for any even remotely reliable parsing code.

	OK
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/               55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000    '
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	very broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/1000000000000000055a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

Andrei said:

: This patch breaks criu.  It was a bug in criu.  And this bug is on a minor
: path, which works when memfd_create() isn't available.  It is a reason why
: I ask to not backport this patch to stable kernels.
:
: In CRIU this bug can be triggered, only if this patch will be backported
: to a kernel which version is lower than v3.16.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171120212706.GA14325@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index dc98620634a3..71e586465168 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 #include "fd.h"
 
+#include "../../lib/kstrtox.h"
+
 /* NOTE:
  *	Implementing inode permission operations in /proc is almost
  *	certainly an error.  Permission checks need to happen during
@@ -1642,8 +1644,33 @@ end_instantiate:
 static int dname_to_vma_addr(struct dentry *dentry,
 			     unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
 {
-	if (sscanf(dentry->d_name.name, "%lx-%lx", start, end) != 2)
+	const char *str = dentry->d_name.name;
+	unsigned long long sval, eval;
+	unsigned int len;
+
+	len = _parse_integer(str, 16, &sval);
+	if (len & KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (sval != (unsigned long)sval)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	str += len;
+
+	if (*str != '-')
+		return -EINVAL;
+	str++;
+
+	len = _parse_integer(str, 16, &eval);
+	if (len & KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (eval != (unsigned long)eval)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	str += len;
+
+	if (*str != '\0')
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*start = sval;
+	*end = eval;
 
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 096/101] bcache: properly set task state in bch_writeback_thread()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>

[ Upstream commit 99361bbf26337186f02561109c17a4c4b1a7536a ]

Kernel thread routine bch_writeback_thread() has the following code block,

447         down_write(&dc->writeback_lock);
448~450     if (check conditions) {
451                 up_write(&dc->writeback_lock);
452                 set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
453
454                 if (kthread_should_stop())
455                         return 0;
456
457                 schedule();
458                 continue;
459         }

If condition check is true, its task state is set to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
and call schedule() to wait for others to wake up it.

There are 2 issues in current code,
1, Task state is set to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE after the condition checks, if
   another process changes the condition and call wake_up_process(dc->
   writeback_thread), then at line 452 task state is set back to
   TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, the writeback kernel thread will lose a chance to be
   waken up.
2, At line 454 if kthread_should_stop() is true, writeback kernel thread
   will return to kernel/kthread.c:kthread() with TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE and
   call do_exit(). It is not good to enter do_exit() with task state
   TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, in following code path might_sleep() is called and a
   warning message is reported by __might_sleep(): "WARNING: do not call
   blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [xxxx]".

For the first issue, task state should be set before condition checks.
Ineed because dc->writeback_lock is required when modifying all the
conditions, calling set_current_state() inside code block where dc->
writeback_lock is hold is safe. But this is quite implicit, so I still move
set_current_state() before all the condition checks.

For the second issue, frankley speaking it does not hurt when kernel thread
exits with TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE state, but this warning message scares users,
makes them feel there might be something risky with bcache and hurt their
data.  Setting task state to TASK_RUNNING before returning fixes this
problem.

In alloc.c:allocator_wait(), there is also a similar issue, and is also
fixed in this patch.

Changelog:
v3: merge two similar fixes into one patch
v2: fix the race issue in v1 patch.
v1: initial buggy fix.

Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org>
Cc: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org>
Cc: Junhui Tang <tang.junhui@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c     | 4 +++-
 drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c | 7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c b/drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c
index ea47980949ef..c1da2321bf26 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c
@@ -285,8 +285,10 @@ do {									\
 			break;						\
 									\
 		mutex_unlock(&(ca)->set->bucket_lock);			\
-		if (kthread_should_stop())				\
+		if (kthread_should_stop()) {				\
+			set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);		\
 			return 0;					\
+		}							\
 									\
 		try_to_freeze();					\
 		schedule();						\
diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c b/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c
index b0667b321a3f..50726f12a7c3 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c
@@ -425,19 +425,22 @@ static int bch_writeback_thread(void *arg)
 
 	while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
 		down_write(&dc->writeback_lock);
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 		if (!atomic_read(&dc->has_dirty) ||
 		    (!test_bit(BCACHE_DEV_DETACHING, &dc->disk.flags) &&
 		     !dc->writeback_running)) {
 			up_write(&dc->writeback_lock);
-			set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 
-			if (kthread_should_stop())
+			if (kthread_should_stop()) {
+				set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
 				return 0;
+			}
 
 			try_to_freeze();
 			schedule();
 			continue;
 		}
+		set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
 
 		searched_full_index = refill_dirty(dc);
 
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 098/101] bcache: fix for data collapse after re-attaching an attached device

[Sasha Levin]

From: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui@zte.com.cn>

[ Upstream commit 73ac105be390c1de42a2f21643c9778a5e002930 ]

back-end device sdm has already attached a cache_set with ID
f67ebe1f-f8bc-4d73-bfe5-9dc88607f119, then try to attach with
another cache set, and it returns with an error:
[root]# cd /sys/block/sdm/bcache
[root]# echo 5ccd0a63-148e-48b8-afa2-aca9cbd6279f > attach
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument

After that, execute a command to modify the label of bcache
device:
[root]# echo data_disk1 > label

Then we reboot the system, when the system power on, the back-end
device can not attach to cache_set, a messages show in the log:
Feb  5 12:05:52 ceph152 kernel: [922385.508498] bcache:
bch_cached_dev_attach() couldn't find uuid for sdm in set

In sysfs_attach(), dc->sb.set_uuid was assigned to the value
which input through sysfs, no matter whether it is success
or not in bch_cached_dev_attach(). For example, If the back-end
device has already attached to an cache set, bch_cached_dev_attach()
would fail, but dc->sb.set_uuid was changed. Then modify the
label of bcache device, it will call bch_write_bdev_super(),
which would write the dc->sb.set_uuid to the super block, so we
record a wrong cache set ID in the super block, after the system
reboot, the cache set couldn't find the uuid of the back-end
device, so the bcache device couldn't exist and use any more.

In this patch, we don't assigned cache set ID to dc->sb.set_uuid
in sysfs_attach() directly, but input it into bch_cached_dev_attach(),
and assigned dc->sb.set_uuid to the cache set ID after the back-end
device attached to the cache set successful.

Signed-off-by: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h |  2 +-
 drivers/md/bcache/super.c  | 10 ++++++----
 drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c  |  6 ++++--
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h b/drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h
index dfdd1908641c..b4812b1b9df4 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ void bcache_write_super(struct cache_set *);
 
 int bch_flash_dev_create(struct cache_set *c, uint64_t size);
 
-int bch_cached_dev_attach(struct cached_dev *, struct cache_set *);
+int bch_cached_dev_attach(struct cached_dev *, struct cache_set *, uint8_t *);
 void bch_cached_dev_detach(struct cached_dev *);
 void bch_cached_dev_run(struct cached_dev *);
 void bcache_device_stop(struct bcache_device *);
diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
index bce1238a7d10..7a2f1317f793 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
@@ -961,7 +961,8 @@ void bch_cached_dev_detach(struct cached_dev *dc)
 	cached_dev_put(dc);
 }
 
-int bch_cached_dev_attach(struct cached_dev *dc, struct cache_set *c)
+int bch_cached_dev_attach(struct cached_dev *dc, struct cache_set *c,
+			  uint8_t *set_uuid)
 {
 	uint32_t rtime = cpu_to_le32(get_seconds());
 	struct uuid_entry *u;
@@ -969,7 +970,8 @@ int bch_cached_dev_attach(struct cached_dev *dc, struct cache_set *c)
 
 	bdevname(dc->bdev, buf);
 
-	if (memcmp(dc->sb.set_uuid, c->sb.set_uuid, 16))
+	if ((set_uuid && memcmp(set_uuid, c->sb.set_uuid, 16)) ||
+	    (!set_uuid && memcmp(dc->sb.set_uuid, c->sb.set_uuid, 16)))
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	if (dc->disk.c) {
@@ -1203,7 +1205,7 @@ static void register_bdev(struct cache_sb *sb, struct page *sb_page,
 
 	list_add(&dc->list, &uncached_devices);
 	list_for_each_entry(c, &bch_cache_sets, list)
-		bch_cached_dev_attach(dc, c);
+		bch_cached_dev_attach(dc, c, NULL);
 
 	if (BDEV_STATE(&dc->sb) == BDEV_STATE_NONE ||
 	    BDEV_STATE(&dc->sb) == BDEV_STATE_STALE)
@@ -1723,7 +1725,7 @@ static void run_cache_set(struct cache_set *c)
 	bcache_write_super(c);
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(dc, t, &uncached_devices, list)
-		bch_cached_dev_attach(dc, c);
+		bch_cached_dev_attach(dc, c, NULL);
 
 	flash_devs_run(c);
 
diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c b/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c
index 4fbb5532f24c..1efe31615281 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c
@@ -263,11 +263,13 @@ STORE(__cached_dev)
 	}
 
 	if (attr == &sysfs_attach) {
-		if (bch_parse_uuid(buf, dc->sb.set_uuid) < 16)
+		uint8_t		set_uuid[16];
+
+		if (bch_parse_uuid(buf, set_uuid) < 16)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		list_for_each_entry(c, &bch_cache_sets, list) {
-			v = bch_cached_dev_attach(dc, c);
+			v = bch_cached_dev_attach(dc, c, set_uuid);
 			if (!v)
 				return size;
 		}
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 097/101] bcache: fix for allocator and register thread race

[Sasha Levin]

From: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui@zte.com.cn>

[ Upstream commit 682811b3ce1a5a4e20d700939a9042f01dbc66c4 ]

After long time running of random small IO writing,
I reboot the machine, and after the machine power on,
I found bcache got stuck, the stack is:
[root@ceph153 ~]# cat /proc/2510/task/*/stack
[<ffffffffa06b2455>] closure_sync+0x25/0x90 [bcache]
[<ffffffffa06b6be8>] bch_journal+0x118/0x2b0 [bcache]
[<ffffffffa06b6dc7>] bch_journal_meta+0x47/0x70 [bcache]
[<ffffffffa06be8f7>] bch_prio_write+0x237/0x340 [bcache]
[<ffffffffa06a8018>] bch_allocator_thread+0x3c8/0x3d0 [bcache]
[<ffffffff810a631f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff8164c318>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
[root@ceph153 ~]# cat /proc/2038/task/*/stack
[<ffffffffa06b1abd>] __bch_btree_map_nodes+0x12d/0x150 [bcache]
[<ffffffffa06b1bd1>] bch_btree_insert+0xf1/0x170 [bcache]
[<ffffffffa06b637f>] bch_journal_replay+0x13f/0x230 [bcache]
[<ffffffffa06c75fe>] run_cache_set+0x79a/0x7c2 [bcache]
[<ffffffffa06c0cf8>] register_bcache+0xd48/0x1310 [bcache]
[<ffffffff812f702f>] kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20
[<ffffffff8125b216>] sysfs_write_file+0xc6/0x140
[<ffffffff811dfbfd>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1e0
[<ffffffff811e069f>] SyS_write+0x7f/0xe0
[<ffffffff8164c3c9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1
The stack shows the register thread and allocator thread
were getting stuck when registering cache device.

I reboot the machine several times, the issue always
exsit in this machine.

I debug the code, and found the call trace as bellow:
register_bcache()
   ==>run_cache_set()
      ==>bch_journal_replay()
         ==>bch_btree_insert()
            ==>__bch_btree_map_nodes()
               ==>btree_insert_fn()
                  ==>btree_split() //node need split
                     ==>btree_check_reserve()
In btree_check_reserve(), It will check if there is enough buckets
of RESERVE_BTREE type, since allocator thread did not work yet, so
no buckets of RESERVE_BTREE type allocated, so the register thread
waits on c->btree_cache_wait, and goes to sleep.

Then the allocator thread initialized, the call trace is bellow:
bch_allocator_thread()
==>bch_prio_write()
   ==>bch_journal_meta()
      ==>bch_journal()
         ==>journal_wait_for_write()
In journal_wait_for_write(), It will check if journal is full by
journal_full(), but the long time random small IO writing
causes the exhaustion of journal buckets(journal.blocks_free=0),
In order to release the journal buckets,
the allocator calls btree_flush_write() to flush keys to
btree nodes, and waits on c->journal.wait until btree nodes writing
over or there has already some journal buckets space, then the
allocator thread goes to sleep. but in btree_flush_write(), since
bch_journal_replay() is not finished, so no btree nodes have journal
(condition "if (btree_current_write(b)->journal)" never satisfied),
so we got no btree node to flush, no journal bucket released,
and allocator sleep all the times.

Through the above analysis, we can see that:
1) Register thread wait for allocator thread to allocate buckets of
   RESERVE_BTREE type;
2) Alloctor thread wait for register thread to replay journal, so it
   can flush btree nodes and get journal bucket.
   then they are all got stuck by waiting for each other.

Hua Rui provided a patch for me, by allocating some buckets of
RESERVE_BTREE type in advance, so the register thread can get bucket
when btree node splitting and no need to waiting for the allocator
thread. I tested it, it has effect, and register thread run a step
forward, but finally are still got stuck, the reason is only 8 bucket
of RESERVE_BTREE type were allocated, and in bch_journal_replay(),
after 2 btree nodes splitting, only 4 bucket of RESERVE_BTREE type left,
then btree_check_reserve() is not satisfied anymore, so it goes to sleep
again, and in the same time, alloctor thread did not flush enough btree
nodes to release a journal bucket, so they all got stuck again.

So we need to allocate more buckets of RESERVE_BTREE type in advance,
but how much is enough?  By experience and test, I think it should be
as much as journal buckets. Then I modify the code as this patch,
and test in the machine, and it works.

This patch modified base on Hua Rui’s patch, and allocate more buckets
of RESERVE_BTREE type in advance to avoid register thread and allocate
thread going to wait for each other.

[patch v2] ca->sb.njournal_buckets would be 0 in the first time after
cache creation, and no journal exists, so just 8 btree buckets is OK.

Signed-off-by: Hua Rui <huarui.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/md/bcache/btree.c |  9 ++++++---
 drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c b/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c
index e53ce5e2a28a..5a8c4017be66 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c
@@ -1869,14 +1869,17 @@ void bch_initial_gc_finish(struct cache_set *c)
 	 */
 	for_each_cache(ca, c, i) {
 		for_each_bucket(b, ca) {
-			if (fifo_full(&ca->free[RESERVE_PRIO]))
+			if (fifo_full(&ca->free[RESERVE_PRIO]) &&
+			    fifo_full(&ca->free[RESERVE_BTREE]))
 				break;
 
 			if (bch_can_invalidate_bucket(ca, b) &&
 			    !GC_MARK(b)) {
 				__bch_invalidate_one_bucket(ca, b);
-				fifo_push(&ca->free[RESERVE_PRIO],
-					  b - ca->buckets);
+				if (!fifo_push(&ca->free[RESERVE_PRIO],
+				   b - ca->buckets))
+					fifo_push(&ca->free[RESERVE_BTREE],
+						  b - ca->buckets);
 			}
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
index 9c56cf714b22..bce1238a7d10 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
@@ -1842,6 +1842,7 @@ void bch_cache_release(struct kobject *kobj)
 static int cache_alloc(struct cache_sb *sb, struct cache *ca)
 {
 	size_t free;
+	size_t btree_buckets;
 	struct bucket *b;
 
 	__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
@@ -1851,9 +1852,19 @@ static int cache_alloc(struct cache_sb *sb, struct cache *ca)
 	ca->journal.bio.bi_max_vecs = 8;
 	ca->journal.bio.bi_io_vec = ca->journal.bio.bi_inline_vecs;
 
+	/*
+	 * when ca->sb.njournal_buckets is not zero, journal exists,
+	 * and in bch_journal_replay(), tree node may split,
+	 * so bucket of RESERVE_BTREE type is needed,
+	 * the worst situation is all journal buckets are valid journal,
+	 * and all the keys need to replay,
+	 * so the number of  RESERVE_BTREE type buckets should be as much
+	 * as journal buckets
+	 */
+	btree_buckets = ca->sb.njournal_buckets ?: 8;
 	free = roundup_pow_of_two(ca->sb.nbuckets) >> 10;
 
-	if (!init_fifo(&ca->free[RESERVE_BTREE], 8, GFP_KERNEL) ||
+	if (!init_fifo(&ca->free[RESERVE_BTREE], btree_buckets, GFP_KERNEL) ||
 	    !init_fifo_exact(&ca->free[RESERVE_PRIO], prio_buckets(ca), GFP_KERNEL) ||
 	    !init_fifo(&ca->free[RESERVE_MOVINGGC], free, GFP_KERNEL) ||
 	    !init_fifo(&ca->free[RESERVE_NONE], free, GFP_KERNEL) ||
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 099/101] bcache: return attach error when no cache set exist

[Sasha Levin]

From: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui@zte.com.cn>

[ Upstream commit 7f4fc93d4713394ee8f1cd44c238e046e11b4f15 ]

I attach a back-end device to a cache set, and the cache set is not
registered yet, this back-end device did not attach successfully, and no
error returned:
[root]# echo 87859280-fec6-4bcc-20df7ca8f86b > /sys/block/sde/bcache/attach
[root]#

In sysfs_attach(), the return value "v" is initialized to "size" in
the beginning, and if no cache set exist in bch_cache_sets, the "v" value
would not change any more, and return to sysfs, sysfs regard it as success
since the "size" is a positive number.

This patch fixes this issue by assigning "v" with "-ENOENT" in the
initialization.

Signed-off-by: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c b/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c
index 1efe31615281..5a5c1f1bd8a5 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ STORE(__cached_dev)
 {
 	struct cached_dev *dc = container_of(kobj, struct cached_dev,
 					     disk.kobj);
-	ssize_t v = size;
+	ssize_t v;
 	struct cache_set *c;
 	struct kobj_uevent_env *env;
 
@@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ STORE(__cached_dev)
 		if (bch_parse_uuid(buf, set_uuid) < 16)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
+		v = -ENOENT;
 		list_for_each_entry(c, &bch_cache_sets, list) {
 			v = bch_cached_dev_attach(dc, c, set_uuid);
 			if (!v)
@@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ STORE(__cached_dev)
 		}
 
 		pr_err("Can't attach %s: cache set not found", buf);
-		size = v;
+		return v;
 	}
 
 	if (attr == &sysfs_detach && dc->disk.c)
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 100/101] nfsd: return RESOURCE not GARBAGE_ARGS on too many ops

[Sasha Levin]

From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 0078117c6d9160031b866cfa1853514d4f6865d2 ]

A client that sends more than a hundred ops in a single compound
currently gets an rpc-level GARBAGE_ARGS error.

It would be more helpful to return NFS4ERR_RESOURCE, since that gives
the client a better idea how to recover (for example by splitting up the
compound into smaller compounds).

This is all a bit academic since we've never actually seen a reason for
clients to send such long compounds, but we may as well fix it.

While we're there, just use NFSD4_MAX_OPS_PER_COMPOUND == 16, the
constant we already use in the 4.1 case, instead of hard-coding 100.
Chances anyone actually uses even 16 ops per compound are small enough
that I think there's a neglible risk or any regression.

This fixes pynfs test COMP6.

Reported-by: "Lu, Xinyu" <luxy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 3 +++
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c  | 9 +++++++--
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
index f6429b3d89e2..a976c87eae49 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
@@ -1342,6 +1342,9 @@ nfsd4_proc_compound(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
 	status = nfserr_minor_vers_mismatch;
 	if (nfsd_minorversion(args->minorversion, NFSD_TEST) <= 0)
 		goto out;
+	status = nfserr_resource;
+	if (args->opcnt > NFSD_MAX_OPS_PER_COMPOUND)
+		goto out;
 
 	status = nfs41_check_op_ordering(args);
 	if (status) {
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 660c813467e2..c8ebd89f0f2d 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -1655,8 +1655,13 @@ nfsd4_decode_compound(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp)
 
 	if (argp->taglen > NFSD4_MAX_TAGLEN)
 		goto xdr_error;
-	if (argp->opcnt > 100)
-		goto xdr_error;
+	/*
+	 * NFS4ERR_RESOURCE is a more helpful error than GARBAGE_ARGS
+	 * here, so we return success at the xdr level so that
+	 * nfsd4_proc can handle this is an NFS-level error.
+	 */
+	if (argp->opcnt > NFSD_MAX_OPS_PER_COMPOUND)
+		return 0;
 
 	if (argp->opcnt > ARRAY_SIZE(argp->iops)) {
 		argp->ops = kzalloc(argp->opcnt * sizeof(*argp->ops), GFP_KERNEL);
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 101/101] irqchip/gic-v3: Change pr_debug message to pr_devel

[Sasha Levin]

From: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit b6dd4d83dc2f78cebc9a7e6e7e4bc2be4d29b94d ]

The pr_debug() in gic-v3 gic_send_sgi() can trigger a circular locking
warning:

 GICv3: CPU10: ICC_SGI1R_EL1 5000400
 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 4.15.0+ #1 Tainted: G        W
 ------------------------------------------------------
 dynamic_debug01/1873 is trying to acquire lock:
  ((console_sem).lock){-...}, at: [<0000000099c891ec>] down_trylock+0x20/0x4c

 but task is already holding lock:
  (&rq->lock){-.-.}, at: [<00000000842e1587>] __task_rq_lock+0x54/0xdc

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #2 (&rq->lock){-.-.}:
        __lock_acquire+0x3b4/0x6e0
        lock_acquire+0xf4/0x2a8
        _raw_spin_lock+0x4c/0x60
        task_fork_fair+0x3c/0x148
        sched_fork+0x10c/0x214
        copy_process.isra.32.part.33+0x4e8/0x14f0
        _do_fork+0xe8/0x78c
        kernel_thread+0x48/0x54
        rest_init+0x34/0x2a4
        start_kernel+0x45c/0x488

 -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}:
        __lock_acquire+0x3b4/0x6e0
        lock_acquire+0xf4/0x2a8
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x58/0x70
        try_to_wake_up+0x48/0x600
        wake_up_process+0x28/0x34
        __up.isra.0+0x60/0x6c
        up+0x60/0x68
        __up_console_sem+0x4c/0x7c
        console_unlock+0x328/0x634
        vprintk_emit+0x25c/0x390
        dev_vprintk_emit+0xc4/0x1fc
        dev_printk_emit+0x88/0xa8
        __dev_printk+0x58/0x9c
        _dev_info+0x84/0xa8
        usb_new_device+0x100/0x474
        hub_port_connect+0x280/0x92c
        hub_event+0x740/0xa84
        process_one_work+0x240/0x70c
        worker_thread+0x60/0x400
        kthread+0x110/0x13c
        ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

 -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-...}:
        validate_chain.isra.34+0x6e4/0xa20
        __lock_acquire+0x3b4/0x6e0
        lock_acquire+0xf4/0x2a8
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x58/0x70
        down_trylock+0x20/0x4c
        __down_trylock_console_sem+0x3c/0x9c
        console_trylock+0x20/0xb0
        vprintk_emit+0x254/0x390
        vprintk_default+0x58/0x90
        vprintk_func+0xbc/0x164
        printk+0x80/0xa0
        __dynamic_pr_debug+0x84/0xac
        gic_raise_softirq+0x184/0x18c
        smp_cross_call+0xac/0x218
        smp_send_reschedule+0x3c/0x48
        resched_curr+0x60/0x9c
        check_preempt_curr+0x70/0xdc
        wake_up_new_task+0x310/0x470
        _do_fork+0x188/0x78c
        SyS_clone+0x44/0x50
        __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   (console_sem).lock --> &p->pi_lock --> &rq->lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&rq->lock);
                                lock(&p->pi_lock);
                                lock(&rq->lock);
   lock((console_sem).lock);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 2 locks held by dynamic_debug01/1873:
  #0:  (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}, at: [<000000001366df53>] wake_up_new_task+0x40/0x470
  #1:  (&rq->lock){-.-.}, at: [<00000000842e1587>] __task_rq_lock+0x54/0xdc

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 10 PID: 1873 Comm: dynamic_debug01 Tainted: G        W        4.15.0+ #1
 Hardware name: GIGABYTE R120-T34-00/MT30-GS2-00, BIOS T48 10/02/2017
 Call trace:
  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188
  show_stack+0x24/0x2c
  dump_stack+0xa4/0xe0
  print_circular_bug.isra.31+0x29c/0x2b8
  check_prev_add.constprop.39+0x6c8/0x6dc
  validate_chain.isra.34+0x6e4/0xa20
  __lock_acquire+0x3b4/0x6e0
  lock_acquire+0xf4/0x2a8
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x58/0x70
  down_trylock+0x20/0x4c
  __down_trylock_console_sem+0x3c/0x9c
  console_trylock+0x20/0xb0
  vprintk_emit+0x254/0x390
  vprintk_default+0x58/0x90
  vprintk_func+0xbc/0x164
  printk+0x80/0xa0
  __dynamic_pr_debug+0x84/0xac
  gic_raise_softirq+0x184/0x18c
  smp_cross_call+0xac/0x218
  smp_send_reschedule+0x3c/0x48
  resched_curr+0x60/0x9c
  check_preempt_curr+0x70/0xdc
  wake_up_new_task+0x310/0x470
  _do_fork+0x188/0x78c
  SyS_clone+0x44/0x50
  __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
 GICv3: CPU0: ICC_SGI1R_EL1 12000

This could be fixed with printk_deferred() but that might lessen its
usefulness for debugging. So change it to pr_devel to keep it out of
production kernels. Developers working on gic-v3 can enable it as
needed in their kernels.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
index ec8468829aef..b08de05bf627 100644
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static void gic_send_sgi(u64 cluster_id, u16 tlist, unsigned int irq)
 	       MPIDR_TO_SGI_AFFINITY(cluster_id, 1)	|
 	       tlist << ICC_SGI1R_TARGET_LIST_SHIFT);
 
-	pr_debug("CPU%d: ICC_SGI1R_EL1 %llx\n", smp_processor_id(), val);
+	pr_devel("CPU%d: ICC_SGI1R_EL1 %llx\n", smp_processor_id(), val);
 	gic_write_sgi1r(val);
 }
 
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 001/101] ALSA: timer: Wrap with spinlock for queue access

[Sasha Levin]

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

[ Upstream commit d7f910bfedd863d13ea320030fe98e42d0938ed5 ]

For accessing the snd_timer_user queue indices, we take tu->qlock.
But it's forgotten in a couple of places.

The one in snd_timer_user_params() should be safe without the
spinlock as the timer is already stopped.  But it's better for
consistency.

The one in poll is just a read-out, so it's not inevitably needed, but
it'd be good to make the result consistent, too.

Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 sound/core/timer.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index 6e01a8e3e4ae..c4e4b2925868 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -1758,6 +1758,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_params(struct file *file,
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
 	tu->qhead = tu->qtail = tu->qused = 0;
 	if (tu->timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT) {
 		if (tu->tread) {
@@ -1778,6 +1779,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_params(struct file *file,
 	}
 	tu->filter = params.filter;
 	tu->ticks = params.ticks;
+	spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
 	err = 0;
  _end:
 	if (copy_to_user(_params, &params, sizeof(params)))
@@ -2019,10 +2021,12 @@ static unsigned int snd_timer_user_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
         poll_wait(file, &tu->qchange_sleep, wait);
 
 	mask = 0;
+	spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
 	if (tu->qused)
 		mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
 	if (tu->disconnected)
 		mask |= POLLERR;
+	spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
 
 	return mask;
 }
-- 
2.15.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL for 3.18 052/101] powerpc/fadump: avoid duplicates in crash memory ranges

[Sasha Levin]

From: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

[ Upstream commit a77af552ccc9d4d54459a39f9e5f7ad307aeb4f9 ]

fadump sets up crash memory ranges to be used for creating PT_LOAD
program headers in elfcore header. Memory chunk RMA_START through
boot memory area size is added as the first memory range because
firmware, at the time of crash, moves this memory chunk to different
location specified during fadump registration making it necessary to
create a separate program header for it with the correct offset.
This memory chunk is skipped while setting up the remaining memory
ranges. But currently, there is possibility that some of this memory
may have duplicate entries like when it is hot-removed and added
again. Ensure that no two memory ranges represent the same memory.

When 5 lmbs are hot-removed and then hot-plugged before registering
fadump, here is how the program headers in /proc/vmcore exported by
fadump look like

without this change:

  Program Headers:
    Type           Offset             VirtAddr           PhysAddr
                   FileSiz            MemSiz              Flags  Align
    NOTE           0x0000000000010000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000000001894 0x0000000000001894         0
    LOAD           0x0000000000021020 0xc000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000040000000 0x0000000040000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x0000000040031020 0xc000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000010000000 0x0000000010000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x0000000050040000 0xc000000010000000 0x0000000010000000
                   0x0000000050000000 0x0000000050000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x00000000a0040000 0xc000000060000000 0x0000000060000000
                   0x000000019ffe0000 0x000000019ffe0000  RWE    0

and with this change:

  Program Headers:
    Type           Offset             VirtAddr           PhysAddr
                   FileSiz            MemSiz              Flags  Align
    NOTE           0x0000000000010000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000000001894 0x0000000000001894         0
    LOAD           0x0000000000021020 0xc000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                   0x0000000040000000 0x0000000040000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x0000000040030000 0xc000000040000000 0x0000000040000000
                   0x0000000020000000 0x0000000020000000  RWE    0
    LOAD           0x0000000060030000 0xc000000060000000 0x0000000060000000
                   0x000000019ffe0000 0x000000019ffe0000  RWE    0

Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mahesh J Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c
index 26d091a1a54c..5df362630ffc 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c
@@ -812,8 +812,19 @@ static void fadump_setup_crash_memory_ranges(void)
 	for_each_memblock(memory, reg) {
 		start = (unsigned long long)reg->base;
 		end = start + (unsigned long long)reg->size;
-		if (start == RMA_START && end >= fw_dump.boot_memory_size)
-			start = fw_dump.boot_memory_size;
+
+		/*
+		 * skip the first memory chunk that is already added (RMA_START
+		 * through boot_memory_size). This logic needs a relook if and
+		 * when RMA_START changes to a non-zero value.
+		 */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(RMA_START != 0);
+		if (start < fw_dump.boot_memory_size) {
+			if (end > fw_dump.boot_memory_size)
+				start = fw_dump.boot_memory_size;
+			else
+				continue;
+		}
 
 		/* add this range excluding the reserved dump area. */
 		fadump_exclude_reserved_area(start, end);
-- 
2.15.1