From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, aryabinin@virtuozzo.com,
dvyukov@google.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, mingo@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] kcov: fix unexpected faults
Date: Fri, 4 May 2018 14:55:32 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180504135535.53744-1-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
Hi,
These patches fix a few issues where KCOV code could trigger recursive
faults, discovered while debugging a patch enabling KCOV for arch/arm:
* On CONFIG_PREEMPT kernels, there's a small race window where
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() can see a bogus kcov_area.
* Lazy faulting of the vmalloc area can cause mutual recursion between
fault handling code and __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc().
* During the context switch, switching the mm can cause the kcov_area to
be transiently unmapped.
These are prerequisites for enabling KCOV on arm, but the issues
themsevles are generic -- we just happen to avoid them by chance rather
than design on x86-64 and arm64.
I've tested this on arm atop of v4.17-rc3, with KCOV enabled.
Thanks,
Mark.
Mark Rutland (3):
kcov: ensure irq code sees a valid area
kcov: prefault the kcov_area
sched/core / kcov: avoid kcov_area during task switch
include/linux/kcov.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
include/linux/sched.h | 2 +-
kernel/kcov.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
kernel/sched/core.c | 4 ++++
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--
2.11.0
next reply other threads:[~2018-05-04 13:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-04 13:55 Mark Rutland [this message]
2018-05-04 13:55 ` [PATCH 1/3] kcov: ensure irq code sees a valid area Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 14:56 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 13:55 ` [PATCH 2/3] kcov: prefault the kcov_area Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 14:36 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2018-05-04 14:38 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 14:42 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2018-05-08 22:51 ` Andrew Morton
2018-05-09 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 13:55 ` [PATCH 3/3] sched/core / kcov: avoid kcov_area during task switch Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 14:32 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2018-05-04 14:36 ` Mark Rutland
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