From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, aryabinin@virtuozzo.com,
dvyukov@google.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, mingo@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] kcov: prefault the kcov_area
Date: Fri, 4 May 2018 14:55:34 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180504135535.53744-3-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180504135535.53744-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
On many architectures the vmalloc area is lazily faulted in upon first
access. This is problematic for KCOV, as __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc
accesses the (vmalloc'd) kcov_area, and fault handling code may be
instrumented. If an access to kcov_area faults, this will result in
mutual recursion through the fault handling code and
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(), eventually leading to stack corruption
and/or overflow.
We can avoid this by faulting in the kcov_area before
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is permitted to access it. Once it has been
faulted in, it will remain present in the process page tables, and will
not fault again.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
---
kernel/kcov.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
index 5be9a60a959f..3b82f8e258da 100644
--- a/kernel/kcov.c
+++ b/kernel/kcov.c
@@ -324,6 +324,17 @@ static int kcov_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep)
return 0;
}
+static void kcov_fault_in_area(struct kcov *kcov)
+{
+ unsigned long stride = PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long);
+ unsigned long *area = kcov->area;
+ unsigned long offset;
+
+ for (offset = 0; offset < kcov->size; offset += stride) {
+ READ_ONCE(area[offset]);
+ }
+}
+
static int kcov_ioctl_locked(struct kcov *kcov, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
@@ -372,6 +383,7 @@ static int kcov_ioctl_locked(struct kcov *kcov, unsigned int cmd,
#endif
else
return -EINVAL;
+ kcov_fault_in_area(kcov);
/* Cache in task struct for performance. */
t->kcov_size = kcov->size;
t->kcov_area = kcov->area;
--
2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-04 13:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-04 13:55 [PATCH 0/3] kcov: fix unexpected faults Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 13:55 ` [PATCH 1/3] kcov: ensure irq code sees a valid area Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 14:56 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 13:55 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2018-05-04 14:36 ` [PATCH 2/3] kcov: prefault the kcov_area Andrey Ryabinin
2018-05-04 14:38 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 14:42 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2018-05-08 22:51 ` Andrew Morton
2018-05-09 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 13:55 ` [PATCH 3/3] sched/core / kcov: avoid kcov_area during task switch Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 14:32 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2018-05-04 14:36 ` Mark Rutland
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